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SUMMARY 
This thesis provides an historical and intellectual summary of the role of the concepts of 
'substance,' and 'participation,' in the making of the doctrine of the Trinity. In the concluding 
chapter, a study is made of the assumptions of deconstruction, which are somewhat hostile to a 
substance paradigm. 
We argue for an appreciation of the importance of both substance and participation for the 
Trinity, and philosophy generally. Chapters are dedicated to individuals who have in some way 
contributed to perceptions of these two terms, as they pertain to the Christian notion of the 
Trinity. Additionally, we seek to define some philosophical problems that accompany a 
Trinitarian metaphysics of 'substance,' and 'participation.' The problems include those of 
deconstruction: issues such as 'Logocentrism,' and 'Presence.' 
Finally, we investigate how Trinitarian ontology can provide answers to many of the questions 
Derrida raises conceming the problematic future of metaphysical thinking. 
.231. 044 NORM 
UN!SA 
BIBUQTc"'"'( ! LIBRARY 
u j 
I Aanwin ........ 
111~111111111111111111111111111 
0001718439 
KEY TERMS 
Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Barth, Heidegger, Levinas, Derrida, 
Trinity, Substance, Participation, Relations, Metaphysics, Transcendence, Presence, 
Closure, Being, Beyond Being, Ontotheology, Deconstruction, Postmodernity. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would firstly like to extend my thanks to my Supervisor, Prof. E(ras)mus Van Niekerk for his 
friendship, encouragement and constructive criticism. I am also indebted to his input in the form 
of many conversations over an extended period of time, prior to this writing. Additionally, I am 
also grateful to Prof. C.W. Du Toit, who has also over the years, contributed towards the 
enrichment of both my thinking and writing. 
The financial assistance of the Church of England in South Africa towards the cost of this work is 
gratefully acknowledged. In this connection, I particularly wish to thank Mr. Noel Wright for his 
encouragement and support. 
NOTE ON ABBREVIATIONS AND WORKS REFERRED TO 
Due to the interdisciplinary nature ofthis thesis, abbreviations have been avoided as much as 
possible. In the case ofthenotes, where necessary, the full name of the author and the work is 
cited. We have also included a list of periodicals referred to in this work. 
Frequently, we have referred to aspects of the history of ideas as being, 'Western' ideas or ideas 
of the 'West.' In making these observations, we do not exclude the fact that beliefs and 
viewpoints of other non-Western traditions, have also made their imprint on what we might term 
the thought of the West. 
In the case of quotations from Augustine's 'De Trinilate' for the most part, the following English 
translation was used: AUGUSTINE.A. (TRANSLATED: OATES.W.J: 1948). 'THE TRINITY.' 
IN: BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. VOL 2. NEW YORK: RANDOM HOUSE. 
However, all English quotations from Book V of'De Trinitate' are from: AUGUSTINE.A. 
(TRANSLATED: HADDAN.A.W.H: 1887). 'ON THE HOLY TRINITY.' 
IN (EDITOR: SCHAFF.P). A SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE 
FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. GRAND RAPIDS: EERDMANS. From time to 
time, we have also referred to the translation appearing in: AUGUSTINE.A. (TRANSLATED: 
BURNABY.J: 1955) 'THE TRINITY' IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS. 
VOL VIII. LONDON: SCM PRESS. When the Latin text of'De Trinitate' is referred to, 
references are to: AUGUSTJNI.A. DE TRINITATE. 'IN (EDITED: MIGNEJ.P: 1844-55). 
PATROLOGIAE CURSUS COMPLETUS. SERIES LATINA. VOL 42. PARIS. 1844-71. 
In the case of Thomas Aquinas, all English references to the 'Summa Theologica' are from the 
following edition: AQUINAS.T. (TRANSLATED: 1948. ENGLISH DOMINICAN 
PROVINCE). 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' 5 VOLS. LONDON: SHEED & WARD. 
(PAPERBACK). When reference is made to the Latin text of the 'Summa,' these are from: 
AQUINATIS. T: 1952. 'SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.' CUM TEXI'U EX RECENSIONE LEONA. 
PRIMA PARS, PARS II, AND TERTIA. PARS. ROMAE: MAR/ETTI. 
All references to the English translation of the 'Church Dogmatics,' are from: BARTH.K. 
(TRANSLATED: BROMILEY.G.W, TORRANCE T.F, ET AL: 1956). 'CHURCH 
DOGMATICS.' EDINBURGH: T&T CLARK. The German edition used is: 
BARTH.K: 1932FF. 'KJRCHLICHEDOGMATIK.' ZURICH: EVANGELISCHE VERLAG. We 
have, on occasion, indicated our reference to the German translation as (GE), and the English 
translation: (EE). 
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SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION: 
ASPECTS OF THE TRINITY 
FROM ARISTOTLE TO DERRIDA 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1-THE THEME: 'SUBSTANCE' AND 'PARTICIPATION' 
Probably the most important question that underlies and surrounds this thesis, and indeed 
fundamental to any theoretical exercise, is the question of whether some ideas in the history of 
thought are more important then others. Do certain concepts, principles, shape others in a way 
more fundamental than their fellow ideas? This is an issue particularly important in today's 
Postmodern environment, specifically because certain proponents of Postmodernity deny that this 
is the case. Instead, such individuals would choose alternatively to interpret the continuum of 
ideas, from a decidedly more 'random' perspective, rejecting the search for the sovereign 
'centre.' This approach, they argue, reflects a certain 'jaded' form of discourse, indicative of 
Enlightenment modernity. Concerning this issue, with such individuals, we do not agree. On the 
contrary, we do feel that under certain circumstances, and in order for us to understand historical 
thought, reductionism, is necessary. 
At the same time there is also the problematic, recent Cartesian tendency in much of what passes 
as academia today. This is the demand to 'start from scratch,' as if nothing passed before, as if no 
prior ideas have shaped our understanding. 
Accordingly, in this thesis, two ideas have been highlighted, as being two possible entries into 
Western thought. These two ideas or concepts are the two principle components of a certain view 
of 'Being,' namely: Being as comprising 'substance,' and 'participation.' We intend to deal with 
these two concepts without falling into these aforementioned problems. 
2 
The theme chosen is thus a specific 'genealogy,' or investigation into the combination of two 
ways of thinking, two intersecting ideas, metaphysical conventions, that have formed important 
foundational components in different discursive modes of thinking in the West for more than two 
thousand years. These two elements or components are 'substance' and 'participation,' 
respectively. Although, in the past, these terms have been rightly associated with certain figures, 
their significance goes beyond any historical epoch. In essence then, they have no specific 
beginning in that they can be traced back to one particular, ideological school, nor does it seem 
that they are about to 'live out' their usefulness and come to an 'end,' regardless of the claims of 
current critics of ontology. 
Once again briefly, the two terms are these: Firstly, 'substance' as the primary metaphysical-
psychological way of conceiving individuality, whether spatio-temporal or otherwise. Therefore 
in a sense, we are setting ourselves the task of evaluating the importance of the individuation of 
continuants, as substances particularly as they apply to divine substance with respect to the 
Trinity. Wiggins states that a theory of individuation must comprise of three things: 'First, an 
elucidation of identity or sameness, second, some however abstract account of what it is for 
something to be a substance that persists through change, and third ... the beginnings of some 
lifelike description, however schematic, of what it is for a thinker at one time and then another to 
single out the same substance as the same substance.' 1 
Secondly, we evaluate the role of 'participation,' which is loosely seen historically as a necessary 
correlate, to the Western theory of individuation. We may loosely define 'participation' as the 
way in which substances relate or participate together. This is the way in which individual entities 
'participate' as continuants in the 'ideal,' or 'real' worlds enabling them to realise their 
individuality in the first place. 
Philosophers have always been inclined to do two things. Firstly, they have tried to isolate 
individual things, seeing them as individual things, or loose components, without differentiation. 
It has been felt that such isolation is needed for the comprehension of such things. Secondly, there 
is the immediate consequence of such isolation, the need to differentiate between entities within a 
Whole. We need to put things back together into the big picture, or the total network. This second 
movement is here loosely termed, the study of 'participation.' It is the desire to see how things 
also have to 'participate' in other things also, if we are going to understand them properly, in 
'togetherness.' For the sake of brevity, we might say that in this thesis we are specifically 
interested in what we might term 'individual substances,' their relationship to themselves and 
their participation in other substances or worlds (Being). 
Now it is recognised that in both philosophy and theology, the ideas of 'substance' and 
'participation' do have formal, specific meanings at certain times. For example, with respect to 
'participation' we can refer formally to Thomas' view of creation, or the Platonic problem of the 
Ideas participating in contingent things. Furthermore, historically speaking, these two terms 
represent opposing metaphysical systems, those of Aristotle and Plato. We include these above, 
formal dimensions within our own usage of the term\s. Nevertheless, our own coverage of the 
two terms is somewhat broader than these specifics which as specifics, tie the terms down to 
certain schools of thought (such as Neoplatonism, or Thomism). When we speak of 'substance' 
and 'participation,' we do so, presupposing a more general summary, pertinent to our own 
argument. Something can only be real, if it can be seen to be something in-itself, whilst at the 
same time, seen to participate in the rest of Being. 
l.2-THE NARROWER FOCUS: ARISTOTLE TO DERRIDA 
In unravelling our argument, we have chosen to employ a roughly chronological method, 
highlighting particular figures. Yet we do not intend to merely summarise what each particular 
chosen individual or epoch had to say about individual substances and the corresponding 
participation of substances. We intend, of course, to partly attempt this task. At the same time, 
however, we wish to place the ontological language of each figure into his general intellectual 
genre and culture, illustrating the various paradoxes and tensions that such a specific 
metaphysical view of the world brings (and brought) about. Rorty states that philosophy has 
claimed to be foundational compared to other discourses: ' ... rest of culture because culture is the 
assemblage of claims of knowledge, and philosophy adjudicates such claims ... Philosophy's 
central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide culture up 
into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those which do 
not represent it at all." 
Conceptualisation is not only founded upon the conceptualised 'object of study, (say, substance 
and participation) but also on the culturally-conditioned question of what true conceptualisation 
is. Additionally, we have to know something of the historical conditions motivating people to 
conceptualise the way they do. Then we need an historical awareness of our own circumstances, 
as students and interpreters of ages past. 
The employment of these two terms (substance\participation) by the West results in more than 
just one tension, in philosophy and theology. The tensions within such employment are diverse, 
with many subsequent paradoxes. These also fall under our scope of interest. 
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Now having said all this, we do admit that we have chosen an almost impossibly wide, 
presupposing theme. Indeed it is impossible to cover such a wide scope, in all its details, in a 
work such as this. It is therefore our purpose to enter into this broader problem through a 
narrower focus. Our study attempts an appreciation and analysis of these issues specifically 
within a theological-philosophical locus: the doctrine of the Trinity and its tentative and uncertain 
future in our changing and Post-modem culture. 
1.3-METAPHYSICAL CONVENTIONS, SCIENCE AND CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE: 
GENERAL REMARKS 
We have chosen to approach the two ideas of 'substantiality' and 'participation' as metaphysical 
conventions and it is this view or interpretative framework that will dictate what follows. What is 
meant by metaphysical conventions? Here the term is defined in a purposefully loose manner as 
the perennial need to understand the ultimate dimensions to reality. The history of ideas can be 
seen as the history of conventions, metaphysical, literary, political etc. These ideas are agreed 
upon by human beings within an intellectual community as indispensable, as tools enabling us to 
"understand the world as it really is"- Generally speaking, for an idea to be a reflection of reality, 
it needs to be 'central,' not peripheral, or 'marginal'. 
Nevertheless, people do not always consciously reflect on the theoretical ideas that 'centralise' 
our universe nor the consequences of attaining to those ideas. In addition, neither do they often 
reflect on how these ideas, rightly or wrongly, monopolise our conceptual habits. These 
'conventions' determine our methodologies and ideologies. They create certain new ideas and 
demonise or marginalise other ones. There are an uncountable number of' conventions' that we 
adhere to, conscious and unconscious. Conventions are agreements that we have with others and 
ourselves as necessary a-priori conditions for the good of truth, harmony, and peace within a 
specific context. They are often also seen as a necessary starting-point for two parties to be 
friends and to agree with each other, or to study together at a certain faculty. They help us to 
decide the question of 'with who we will be friends?' We employ 'conventions' to test whether 
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or not we can 'work together.' They form the means whereby, when necessary, we identify those 
parties, potentially harmful to our cause. These are parties who do not share our ideas. 
The conventions, within which we work, also contribute to our truth-values. Conventions as truth-
values, therefore become labels by which we identify good and bad, through which we can find a 
sense of safety. Also we can use these conventions as power-games (Foucault: regime du savoir) 
to exercise control over things and people. 'Ideas' are seldom beyond the manipulating power of 
politics. Another current issue debated in the philosophy of science is the reluctance we 
sometimes feel in rejecting a current convention in order to accept a new one (or even retaining 
an old one). 
Other fascinating questions, outside of the final scope of this thesis, but implied here, is the belief 
that God has given to us certain unquestionably reliable conventions (revelation), within whose 
parameters we need to operate as theologians. What then is the relationship between revelation 
and metaphysics? How then would a bad metaphysic influence a good faith underneath? 
Not only do we make conventions, or accept conventions with our current culture, our current 
community and even ourselves, but we also accept the invisible but pressing conventions of the 
past, particularly if these conventions are 'determinative' (creeds). We do this, in order that we 
might also support those on whose shoulders we stand (or even if we wish to vehemently deny 
them). 
This leads us to define further what we mean specifically by 'metaphysical conventions.' 
Metaphysical conventions reflect our need to know things specifically: 'really as they are' as 
opposed to 'mere appearances.' The need to 'know the thing in itself' partly arose from the 
Parmenidian belief in the duality of reality and appearance. This dualistic viewpoint brought 
about the beginning of 'first philosophy,' or 'thinking about Being.' The division of appearance 
and reality brought about the justification for the discipline of 'metaphysics,' formalised 
systematically for the first time in the system of Aristotle. 
Additionally in the Western world, the search for reality also led partly to the scientific canon, 
and the pursuit of scientific and 'theoretical' thinking as opposed to rhetoric, the mythos of the 
sophists, all 'aesthetic ontologies.' This is the binary of mythos!Logos. In other words, reality is 
not accessible, via 'looking at the world.' On the contrary, we need to 'look at the world 
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properly,' or be condemned to fatuity. Truth is 'buried,' 'outside of the subject' requiring the 
special hermeneutic skills of the initiated. We have here the beginning of the high canon of 
science, which continues to assert its authority in academic establishments to this day. 
Furthermore, since the time of Parmenides, reality is seen as 'Being,' or 'all that is.' This 
'primary category' cannot really be seen with the eye at all. It can only be apprehended 
transcendentally through the ability to see beyond the world of experience. The birth of 
metaphysics is the birth of a first-order mode of knowing, thus avoiding aporia. Metaphysics is a 
mode of abstraction, a separation from flux. 
Traditionally, metaphysical conventions do not necessarily contradict human life and everyday 
experience but their separation therefrom helps us to understand these experiences more 
completely. The movement is from above to below, with the conventions placing an interpretative 
grid on the 'raw,' 'unprocessed' data of experience, giving it 'understandable' form. 
Roughly, then we can term metaphysical conventions as those conventions that (more than 
others) transcend our daily experiences of life and faith, seek to interpret them, according to 
abstract means, agreed upon by certain parties at certain places and times. Metaphysical 
conventions are present in any academic model of human endeavour or activity, including the 
development of the interpretation of the Bible and the development of Christian doctrine over the 
centuries. 
From the very earliest of times, in fact from a period that cannot be determined as 'starting now,' 
the Church felt the need to reflect rationally upon its creed and its faith, in a 'correct' manner. Of 
course it can also be said that the most 'primitive' reflections on the faith lacked the scientific 
methodologies and structures of the later definitions, but to actually locate the so-called swing 
from the 'primitive' to the 'scientific,' is by no means easy. At the same time, it needs to be said 
that 'science,' or 'theology' cannot be seen to have advanced through the 'soundness of rational 
argumentation' alone. 
What is obvious to the historian of dogma is that, by the age of the apologists at the very latest, it 
was not good enough to simply state that one has 'experienced Christ.' One had to speak of one's 
experience in 'the right way,' the scientific way. Our short chapter on the Arian controversy will 
serve to illustrate this phenomenon. In order to be termed as orthodox, one needed to say more 
than just, 'I believe in the Bible as the word of God'. After all, so did the heretic. Metaphysics 
started to play a crucial role in the solving of certain doctrinal problems, paralogisms, and as a 
means to ·getting at truth.' What made the problem more acute was the inevitability that it was 
not always certain to all involved parties, what the right metaphysical interpretation of a certain 
issue actually was. There was not always a naive continuity in terms of exactly what the Bible 
said, what the Church said and the scientific expression thereof. It is at this important point, that 
Christianity, became part of a general history ofWestem culture and metaphysics, and thus 
somewhat subject to some of the many limitations and contemporary critiques of that history. 
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Speaking about theology, or thinking about God in a 'scientific manner,' was also a means of 
'thinking about Being and culture,' like it or not. The story cannot be otherwise. Christianity 
cannot have an evangelistic claim on history and on people, unless it is part of that history and 
people. However this is not to say that faith and revelation are devoid of transcendent reality, that 
they are nothing more than 'cultural expressions.' Neither do we intend to deny the fundamental 
role of the Trinity in Christian doctrine. The point however is that Christianity, like the many 
other historic modes of discourse, chose to employ or to adhere to, certain acceptable, 
standardised ways of reasoning that were 'secular,' as well as 'Biblical.' 
At this point we have the introduction of one of the most poignant problems in the application of 
theology to culture: If Christianity or theology is part of culture, is it to be identified with culture 
·completely, or should it only partly overlap? Is God part of Being, the ground of Being, beyond 
Being, without Being or Before Being? Many naively choose ambivalence as the way to deal with 
this problem; others try to conceive of a theology that has no connection to culture, science or 
philosophy at all. Also many have debated the question of what Christianity would be like ifit did 
not become subject to the Hellenistic spirit. What kind of Christianity would we have today, if it 
were not subject to this influence? Would it be a religion of merely tropes? Or would we have a 
'purer faith' today, lacking the problems of'ontology' and 'substantialism?' These questions are 
irrelevant, no matter on what side one stands in the debate. This is because we simply do not 
know what Christianity would be like without these metaphysical 'isms'. 
Often, these debates are subject to the assumption that there will always in any type of discourse, 
be a clear demarcation line between 'Christian' and 'non-Christian' assumptions. Of course some 
times this kind of distinction can be made. The statement: 'there is no God,' can in its elementary 
intention be interpreted as a non-Christian assumption. In the same way to say: 'I believe in Jesus 
Christ,' can also be deemed the opposite of atheism. But often the story is not so simple as this. 
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For example, if we take the argument into the realm of cognition itself, can we say that certain, 
basic assumptions of logic always operate differently in the Christian consciousness, compared to 
that of the non-Christian? In the same way it is also difficult to argue convincingly that a fully 
rounded understanding of the world is entirely based on 'a-priori' assumptions, rather than those 
of experience. Human experience, including that of 'metaphysical conventions,' is a continuum 
of multifaceted inputs, each complementing each other, and providing the total apprehension of 
'what there is.' 
Inevitably then, as the first Christian thinkers sought to evangelise the world, debate with the 
world, understand the world, and even deny the world, they had to in some sense think the 
world's thoughts after her, whilst thinking God's thoughts after him. 
As implied in the above, it is a fundamental conviction of this thesis that ideas do have 
consequences (contra Stanley Fish and other exponents of epistemological anarchy and the idea 
that theology is merely another type of 'narrative fiction'). Philosophy is not just 'another kind of 
writing.' Neither have we seen the end of ideas nor the end of ideology, nor are we likely to see 
these things in the future. It is our conviction that there is something out there and the current 
fashion of exporting literary-critical ideas into other disciplines in order to deconstruct them of 
their truth-values, is just not playing ball. There is more to the Trinity than it being a collection of 
dated, substantialist, 'sublimated metaphors.' 
1.4-WHY THE TRINITY? 
Why is it specifically Trinitarian discourse that we wish to follow? Firstly, the doctrine of the 
Trinity is central to Christian theology, not only in terms of its past, but also (as a surprising 
number of recent studies show) critical to its future. Secondly, the debates on what the Trinity is 
or is not, over the years, often provide an illuminating insight into what is going on in the 
philosophical-cultural arena as a whole. To discuss Trinitarian metaphysics, is to discuss culture, 
albeit from a specific angle. Also the Trinity is an ideal locus-point for a general interpretation 
and understanding of metaphysical ontology as a whole. One's doctrine of the Trinity, or the lack 
thereof, has a fascinating way of shaping and interpreting the rest of one's doctrinal 
superstructure. 
Furthermore, the doctrine of the Trinity is particularly paradoxical in that although the Church 
has always confessed this doctrine as being subject to profound mystery, it is precisely this 
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doctrine that has been subject to more reasoned scrutiny, than just about any other. We, for 
centuries have seen thinkers trying to get to grips with the Trinity, through applications of certain 
schools of logic, specifically within the area of the relationship between 'part and whole.' In the 
last three hundred years we have seen methodologies often associated with that type of reasoning 
attributed to the school of modernity and the analytic school of philosophy also applied to the 
problem of the logic of the Trinity. In these circles, there has always been a preoccupation with 
these 'logical' issues as they apply to theology and philosophy. In our thesis we will use the 
Trinity as a backdrop to reflect upon certain problems manifest in much of Western thought, 
highlighted recently by the thinking of Derrida and others. 
One of these problems is the strange combination of the affirmation and the denial of closure in 
the same discourse\s. Within the theological arena; this is specifically noticeable in the language 
of the doctrine of the Trinity. Therefore, in our overall discussion of the metaphysical 
interpretation of the Trinity over the years, we are merely making use of the Trinity as a mirror. 
The Trinity becomes a type of backdrop, a means to a deeper end, that of philosophical and 
cultural commentary. 
The thesis therefore does not read as a 'History of the Doctrine of the Trinity.' If approached in 
such a manner, it will most certainly disappoint. Instead it presupposes the disciplines of 
Systematic Theology, The History of Dogma and Philosophy. The Trinity, is merely the window 
into a specific problem, of a much broader scope, relevant to all the above disciplines. 
1.5-POINTS ON A LINE OF DISSEMINATION 
We have included in our title the phrase: 'pointers on a line of disintegration'. Concerning this we 
must make some further remarks. Mapping only a few main figures or epochs (such as Aristotle, 
Plato, Augustine, Arius, Barth etc), hardly constitutes an exhaustive survey, nor does it suggest 
that other figures are not seminal to the debate. The four philosophers (Aristotle, Plato, Plotinus 
and Derrida) and the four theologians (Arius, Augustine, Aquinas and Barth), chosen are merely 
selected highlights in certain interpretations of the history of ideas. Although the chosen focus in 
the thesis (substance and participation) is an extremely 'narrow' discussion in a specific area of 
philosophical theology, in covering the opinions of these individuals, we have attempted to place 
the discussion of our subjects firmly into the respective cultural and intellectual genres of their 
times. 
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Secondly, we can also to some extent, term our investigation as: 'pointers on a line of 
development.' It depends on the approach adopted. As with any idea or intellectual movement, 
contributors borrow from their predecessors, and develop their ideas. This implies some type of 
teleology, in fact unavoidably so. Yet, it is not always a blessing to stand on the shoulders of our 
predecessors, sometimes it is problematic. With the case of the church reflecting on the Trinity, 
some development can obviously be seen to have taken place. Even at this time where 
hermeneutic fragmentation is very much 'de rigeuer,' teleology cannot be rejected out of hand. 
While each of our selected thinkers undeniably wrote at different times, there is in each one, a 
sense of'development' and reliance on predecessors. 
Nevertheless, as a general rule, together with the idea of 'development,' it can be recognised that 
there is also a 'disintegration' of metaphysical ideas in the movement of our discussion from 
Aristotle, through to the era of Postmodemity. It is thus with an acknowledgement of this two-
sided tension that we use the word, 'disintegration' in our title. 
1.6-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND METAPHYSICS 
In the argument of the thesis, certain assumptions are implied. Firstly, it is assumed that it is only 
for making pointers, or for 'discussion purposes,' that we make a strong distinction between 
terms such as 'theology,' 'ideas,' 'metaphysics' or 'philosophy.' Within certain contexts these 
distinctions are important, even indispensable. Nevertheless in the real world of ideas as concepts 
that flow and interconnect with each other and the history of which they are part, there is no easy 
distinction between these terms. Theology, metaphysics and so on are all components of the same 
'stuff' of which ideas are made. They are contiguous modes. Statements like: "this is a 
metaphysical problem, not a theological one," or , "I study anthropology, not philosophy," can 
therefore be unhelpful. In this thesis, we seek to interact with 'theological' ideas 'as they relate to 
general 'theories of metaphysics,' yet these isolations are not to be seen as concepts that exist 
apart from the substratum of cultures and human life. Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' reminds us that 
there comes a time when our saying is exhausted. It is then that we have to say through showing. 
Perhaps, (and undoubtedly, not in the precise sense that the early Wittgenstein meant) we need 
always to see ideas as part of the fabric of a life world that feeds them, moves them and the 
people that think them. 
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1.7-THE DEBATE CONCERNING THE UNIVERSALS 
Ifwe are seeking to discuss the relationship between 'substantiality' and 'participation,' are we 
not merely renewing the age-old issue of the universals? This debate continues to rage today, and 
like many other issues in academic faculties world-wide, will probably never be 'solved.' Briefly, 
we feel the reason or the need to affirm the existence of universals or to deny such existence as an 
either-or situation, probably misses the point (the answers lie doubtless somewhere in between). 
Furthermore, the problem of the universals can incline the Western philosopher towards an 
acceptance of an alternative philosophy of 'deferral,' as we shall attempt to argue below. 
Our line of argumentation, although having bearing on the universals debate, is nevertheless not 
an attempt at a restatement or a solution to the problem of 'part and whole.' It is more a 
theological-cultural commentary on the relationship between individual substances, through the 
idea of participation. This relationship is viewed through theological-Trinitarian eyes. How have 
people, when speaking about God, used these two important concepts as aids to intelligibility? 
1.8-THE FOCUS ITSELF 
Having covered these important introductory assumptions, we now move on in our introduction 
to finally comment specifically in the actual overview of the thesis itself, and its main line of 
argument. Our general style of writing (and reading) is perhaps dissimilar to possible other angles 
of approach. Although we do seek to confine ourselves to a few central themes, such confmement 
takes place in a conversational tone in which various views and thinkers are brought into bear 
upon the issues at stake. As these readings take place, the main lines and conclusions are 
simultaneously developed and argued. 
Our focus begins at an important period in history where these two components of thinking 
('substance and participation'), became consolidated as major players in systematic philosophy: 
The age of Plato and then particularly Aristotle, through to Plotinus. These three figures are 
important not because they invented these ideas, but because together they interpreted them, 
(albeit it very differently) in such a way, that a certain synthesis, a certain tradition arose, from 
which Christianity was to draw, later on. 
1.9-DERRIDA'S PLACE IN THE IBESIS 
Perhaps here is the place to speak further of Derrida's place in this work. It might be seen that the 
succeeding chapters covering the work of certain individuals are indeed relevant to the Trinity, 
but what about Derrida? How can his work be applied to a study of the Trinity? We believe that 
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Derrida can be thus applied in two ways. Firstly, we can approach our study by applying 
Derrida's specifically theological statements to the Trinity. Certainly, the theological importance 
of Derrida's religious statements has been largely overlooked. Lately, Derrida has been making 
more and more remarks about the question of God, not only in specific works, (such as 'The Gift 
of Death,' 'Memoirs of the Blind,' 'Circumfession,' and 'Foi .' ) but also scattered over his other 
texts. In recent times, John D. Caputo ('The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida') and others 
have provided careful studies of current developments in Derrida's religious thought. This area of 
Derrida's pilgrimage certainly provides a possible basis of such a study of the Trinity and the 
question of God. Additionally there is also the option to take the textual insights of Derrida's 
thought and apply them hermeneutically to those pertinent passages in the Bible that point to the 
pluralism of the Godhead. Various scholars, such as Dominic Crossan, Mark. C Taylor, P.J Hartin 
have applied deconstruction as a discipline to the hermeneutical task of biblical interpretation 
(although, to our knowledge, not to the so-called Trinitarian passages per se). 
We, however, have chosen the second of the two options. Instead of concentrating on Derrida's 
theological statements or applying deconstruction to biblical interpretation, the second possibility 
is to focus on the general program ofdeconstruction as a whole, particularly its ·anti-
metaphysical' statements, as a philosophical lens into the Trinity. Our thesis title of'Substance 
and Participation' indicates our option for the second possibility. 
Our concern is therefore not for Derrida as a 'nascent theologian,' or as an interpreter of the 
Bible, but for Derrida as a more philosophical commentator on Trinitarian metaphysics. We shall 
be particularly interested (when the time comes) to study his unique metaphysical views 
regarding the notions of iterability and presence, rather than his view on the question of God as a 
religious principle or problem. 
However, we shall not only focus Derrida's critical insights onto the Trinity, but we shall also 
focus certain elements of Trinitarian thinking onto Derrida's school of deconstruction. To some 
extent, we believe that the Trinity is uniquely able to provide something of a foil and a response 
to much of what Derrida has been saying. We believe that this two-way discussion shall be 
beneficial not only to the future of the church's conception of the Trinity, but also to the school of 
deconstruction. 
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Let us make some more general remarks concerning Derrida's place in the thesis. Derrida has not 
really at the time of writing, made any study of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. His influence 
on this thesis is still of some importance. Firstly there is the matter of the way the thesis reads. 
The reader will notice that the way in which this thesis provides a reading of its subject matter, is 
somewhat influenced by the Derridean 'method,' especially the employment of perceptions of 
'Presence,' 'Differance,' 'Dissemination' and 'Supplement,' to name just three examples. Not 
that the thesis is slavishly following what we might call deconstruction. It provides its own 
independent reading, but in so doing, is sensitive to much that the writer has learned from 
Derrida. 
Secondly, the thesis seeks to suggest (especially in the last chapter) that, at the very least, Derrida 
is relevant as a landmark student of thought. This is true whether we like him or not. What we are 
therefore intending to do, after providing our own unravelling of our subject, is relate our 
conclusions and findings to what Derrida has to say about how Western people think. This means 
that the place of Derrida in this thesis is more primary compared to the other thinkers discussed. 
He is not portrayed as one of the individuals on the pathway. On the contrary, it is at his door that 
we finally stop, in order to round off our presentation, and provide conclusions. 
We do not intend to apply Derrida's insights in a blanket, naive manner to what we have said. 
Much 'fashion theology' today, does just that. It portrays Derrida as an unsubtle, 'butcher-type' 
relativist, hacking everything to pieces. Derrida is misinterpreted, in order to bolster preconceived 
notions about the end of metaphysics, the damning of representation and truth. Derrida is used to 
answer the ultimate question as to whether we can continue with theology or not. 
We feel that Derrida is neither a 'relativist,' or a 'butcher' in this manner. Indeed ifhe was just 
the 'clownish' metaphysical anarchist in the way he is portrayed by those who only bother 
themselves with reading the secondary sources on him, Derrida today would be no more than an 
obscure, provincial teacher in some jaded French institution. On the contrary, while the current 
writer does not like to term himself with those who literally 'worship' everything that comes out 
of Derrida's mouth, we are of the opinion that he is a writer, who at times, is capable of 
displaying insights of enormous insight and subtlety. 
In this work, we will be employing the insights of Derrida in a far more subtle sense than many 
other theological renderings. We will not be borrowing him to decide the question of whether to 
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abandon the doctrine of the Trinity utterly, or whether God does or does not exist. Our reading 
will be positive in that we will seek to allow Derrida's insights to guide us into a deeper 
understanding of the theological and philosophical problems that lie both in the past and ahead of 
theology's ongoing quest to relate its content to a contemporary culture. 
PART ONE 
'GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED' 
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PART ONE: ARISTOTLE TO ARIUS. 'GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED.' 
CHAPTER TWO: ARISTOTLE1 
2.1-INTRODUCTION 
The thesis proceeds from the premise that the fundamental intellectual unity, the critical 
substructure of the Western Canon, to date has been the twin pillars of 'substantiality' and 
'participation' ('substance' and 'participation' loosely interpreted according to the Platonic 
tradition or otherwise). These two terms embrace what we might term the language of Being. 
Recapping, substantiality is the belief in separate entity or individual substances, whether real or 
abstract, or even principles of logic or of the mind. 
Quine provides an interesting definition here, showing how Aristotelian essentialism is linked to 
the idea of necessary existence: ' ... Aristotelian essentialism. This is the doctrine that some of the 
attributes of a thing (quite independently of the language in which the thing is referred to, if not at 
all) may be essential to the thing and others accidental. E.g., a man or talking animal, or 
featherless biped (for they are the same things), is essentially rational and accidentally two-legged 
and talkative, not merely qua man but qua itself." 
Participation is the correlate beliefthat it is possible to work with the existence of individual, 
necessarily existing things, realities or substances, through their fundamental ability to be 
ontologically related to each other, bringing about a possible unity of the universe, empirically, 
logically, but most importantly, metaphysically. We also need to stress the early ontological 
nature of participation as a relational term. In the later Enlightenment and post-Enlightenment 
periods in philosophy, other, non-ontological views arose. The Greek view of 'participation' 
(particularly Neoplatonism) views relations in an ontological manner. However, having said this, 
there is a connection between what we mean by 'participation,' and what is generally termed 
'relations.' Substantiality implies that in some sense, relations are also 'necessary.'3 This belief in 
'ontology,' derives from the desire of the West, starting with the earliest Greek philosophers, to 
discover 'what is really real.' Although the answers given to this question have understandably, 
been vastly different over the years, Rorty has shown throughout his text 'Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature,' that such a search has inevitably involved the methodology of 'getting at 
essences.' 
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What Rorty is implying here, and we are not entirely in agreement with him in every instance, is 
that, generally speaking and in practice, 'substantiality,' has always had a place of pre-eminence 
over 'participation' (although as we shall see, things do not always work as simple as this). The 
belief in the primacy of 'substance' over 'participation' has been the cause of many tensions and 
paradoxes for both Trinitarian theology, and other areas of philosophy and culture. It is our 
conviction that even in today's changing (even postmodern) philosophical climate, the method of 
academia, basically has remained the same: This is the inclination to know 'what really is,' the 
need to know Being, as comprising primary substances. 
Anscombe' asserted that the central components to Aristotle's system are his doctrines of 
substance, existence and predication. Of the three terms, we will concentrate on substance 
because it seems to bethe most fundamental of the three. We find Aristotle's understanding of 
substance particularly in his treatises, the 'Categories' and the 'Metaphysics. ' 5 As Aristotle 
grounds existence in necessity, the 'Metaphysics' begins with the question: 'What is substance?' 
which is generally very close to the question: 'what is Being?'6 The way in which we proceed 
with our question of Being (to use a Heideggerian phrase) is through the employment of the 
highest form of wisdom. 7 As is commonly known, Heidegger also concerned himself with this 
question in 'Zur Seimjrage' (1955). He spoke of the line that separates the Being of beings (Sein 
des Seienden) from beings. The Being of beings-the is-ness of that which is, establishes a line of 
difference (Ereignis) between what 'is' and its Being. 
2.2-THE SCOPE OF IBE ARISTOTELIAN METAPHYSICS 
Aristotle is important for our study, because of his theory of substance as found especially in the 
'Metaphysics.' In this thesis, we firstly comment on how Aristotle saw the need to systematically 
isolate things out of the world of 'what is' (Being), and why he specifically called this world 
amongst other things, a world of 'substances.' In this way he placed a foundational 'underneath' 
(substratum) to science, a metaphysical foundation before the 'physical,' the 'sensible' world. For 
him, this is a necessary foundation required prior to the possibility of a science. 
The stuff the world is made of is divided into basic intellectual components, (which happen to 
model the way the world is made anyway) facilitating comprehension of such a world. It is 
important to see that in Aristotle, the principle of 'isolation' is paramount. This is the practice of 
the abstracting ofreality, in order to make it intelligible. Part of the principle of isolation, 
involves the acceptance of opposites. For example, we can point to Aristotle's way of 
categorising and describing the universe of entities via their opposites: actuality-potentiality, 
primary-secondary, and so on. 
2.2.1-BEING OUA BEING 
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But what precisely for Aristotle, is 'Being' or the study of 'Being qua Being?' Firstly, the word 
'qua' means something like: 'insofar as they are.'' There are two main approaches to the 
interpretation of this phrase as it appears in the 'Metaphysics.' The first school of interpretation 
maintains that when Aristotle claims that metaphysics is a study of 'Being,' he means 'Being' as 
an individual category, the nature of existence. That is to say, 'Being' itself as somewhat removed 
from individual existents.9 This would then indicate that, in Aristotle, 'Being' would be in a 
category of its own. The other school of thought instead interprets 'Being,' as the nature of 
concrete existence. In choosing between these two interpretative modes, it is best to place this 
issue into the context of Aristotle's method in general, although it may be said that both views at 
times, seem to be in Aristotle's mind. Nevertheless, generally Aristotle refutes the Platonic idea 
that a quality or an entity can exist only as a Form (in the world of Being), other than 'where it 
is,' in the 'concrete world' ofbecoming10 
Plato moved firstly from the idea of a metaphysical idea of unity, towards the world of diversity, 
whereas Aristotle chose to start with conceptual multiplicity in order to understand an underlying 
unity. 
Owens" puts it this way: 'The primary instance of Entity, of Being qua Being, of Form, of the 
causes, of truth in this objective sense, is equally separate Entity. The nature of separate Entity is 
the theme studied under all these designations. The "ontological'' conception of the sciences, 
accordingly, is nowhere to be found in the Metaphysics. A science treating universality of Beings 
which is not identified with the substance of a definite type of Being, the primary type, is foreign 
to the Stagrite's procedure.' Aristotle is concerned to study different types of existents (including 
potential existents), as they are seen to exist. As we perceive it, he includes two dimensions to his 
understanding of the study of 'Being qua Being.' 
Firstly, Aristotle wishes to appreciate the multiplicity of 'what is. __ ' The multiplicity factor is 
plain. We study 'Being' as it manifests itself in the different existents (individual things). Yet, in 
addition to this, there must be underlying unity. For knowledge to 'be,' there must also be that 
which is unity. This second, unity-factor in his thought, is that which characterises existence 
itself. All things have a unity, in the sense that all things exist in a certain intelligible way. 
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Says Aristotle: 'There is a science which studies Being qua Being, and the properties inherent in 
it in virtue of its own nature. This science is not the same as any of the so-called particular 
sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally qua Being; they divide off some 
portion of it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for example the mathematical 
sciences.' 12 
We can see this science, argues Aristotle, in different ways. Firstly because individual substances 
are the highest form of Being, 13 it is primarily this type of existent that forms the subject of 
metaphysics. At the same time, substance means also the study of 'first causes,' which are 
primary, the realities upon which other things depend. Then, (specifically important for our 
purposes) later on in Aristotle, comes his introduction to 'theology' which also is a study of 
Being. 14 Now, to speak of first principles in the Aristotelian vocabulary, does not only imply a 
discussion of substance. It also means to speak of change and motion. Change and motion, is the 
actualisation of potency. This is the urge in the world of all existents, to move towards the 
actualisation of form. This inward urge would remain dormant unless there were actually existent 
some external perfection to awaken it, by instilling the desire of imitation, in so far as that was 
possible for each thing in its own particular mode of Being. 1' This principle is the unmoved 
mover. Later on, below, we shall see that this principle of combining actualisation as well as 
intelligible form to existence, is a particularly important one, comprising an important component 
within the theistic metaphysics of Thomas Aquinas. 
For Aristotle then, 'Being,' or what most certainly 'is,' must have an axiomatic nature. It must be 
capable of assertion, denial and analysis. This is the 'logic of Being,' the rationality (form) of 
Being. We cannot try to comprehend existents, unless we examine how a thing can exist, or not 
exist: 'Clearly, then, it pertains to one science to study Being qua Being ... and the same science 
investigates, besides the concepts mentioned above, Priority and Posteriority, Genus and Species, 
Whole and Part, and all other such concepts.' 16 
In other words, the study of 'Being' implies the need to understand its form, in the rational sense. 
In order for 'Being' to be comprehensible, it must orient itself properly, it must be intelligible 
(Hegel, as another example, saw the need to place the idea of Being at the very forefront of his 
logic). Aristotle again: ' ... Hence since these axioms apply to all things qua Being (for this is 
what is common to them), it is the function of him who studies Being qua Being to investigate 
them as well.' 17 
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Here, probably showing the influence of the Platonic 'Laws,' Aristotle calls the study of' Being' 
also a study of 'truth.' Later we shall find an even stronger connection between 'Being,' 
(ontology) and morality (ethics), in the work of Plato. This was a particularly important 
connection, revived again in the metaphysics of the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. It is a 
necessary observation, even at this early point in our presentation. Recently, both Macintyre and 
Levinas have appreciated that ethics and metaphysics always belong together. In fact up to the 
present time, Western ontologies ('is' statements) have always been immersed with ethics and 
ideologies ('ought' statements). The genesis of this combination, (later forgotten, due to the 
university faculty categorisation of metaphysics, as a thing separate to ethics) is to be found with 
the Greeks, particularly Plato and Aristotle. Nevertheless, even at this early Hellenistic stage, 
ontology was always treated as being prior to ethics. However, the later theological metaphysics 
of Aquinas and Levinas, provide interesting exceptions. Aquinas, for example, restores the 
concept of the 'good,' to the concept of 'Being.' This is undoubtedly due to the ethical nature of 
the Bible's presentation of the person of God, the creator of 'Being.' Together with his 
thoroughly Biblical theology, Thomas has synthesised the ontologies of Plato, (who specifically 
emphasised the moral in ontology) and Aristotle in a new way. With Thomas, the 'Goodness, of 
Being,' and the 'Is-ness,' of 'Being,' just about overlap. 18 
Even Kant, with his deconstructive critique of 'any future metaphysics,' continues to think in this 
mode. In grappling with the need to affirm the existence of God, he eradicates any possibility of 
knowing the noumenal 'is-ness' of God, yet refuses to eliminate the 'oughtness' of theological 
statements, the 'summum bonum.' In the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, we have an even 
more integrative combination of both ontology and ethics. 
Returning to Aristotle, we see that the science of 'Being qua Being' is a very broad one indeed. If 
the study of Being is the study of all that is, (even if we do take 'all that is,' in the concrete, 
existential sense) then surely this study, in view of its very nature, is impossible? How can one 
study the existence of all that is, if we do not know all there is (which must surely be the case)? 
Even if such knowledge were possible, how can we be certain that we really know properly what 
we think we do know? Aristotle recognised that the term 'Being' is equivocal: there are many 
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different senses in which things are said to be. Yet he insisted on the homonymy of Being, for if 
its nature is truly homonymous, this does not necessitate its absolute ambiguity. 19 Derrida, of 
course, rejects this view ofhomonymy. 
2.2.2-SUBSTANCE 
Aristotle will be remembered for his definition and use of the word 'substance,' as that which 
denotes, more than anything else, what 'really is.' As we shall see later, his answer to the 
question, of reality took a different turn to that of the Parmenides-Plato tradition, although 
Aristotle was not entirely free from their influence and their problems. We can begin by stating 
that what Aristotle means by substance is not what the common word might mean today. Our 
understanding of the word, (although directly derived from the Aristotelian tradition) would 
instead approximate itself more towards the Aristotelian concept of 'matter,' not 'substance.' 
Anscombe'0 rightly points out that Aristotle's substance roughly aligns itself to what post-
Lockean philosophy would term, 'individual things.' In Aristotle's system, however, substance is 
that entity which is most concrete, most real. A substance is an entirely self-subsisting thing, not 
depending on any participation within another entity, in order to subsist. 21 'A substance is an 
ontologically prior item. That is to say, "F''s are substances insofar as the account for F's to exist 
does not include any reference to what it is for anything else to exist.'" A substance is one in 
number (although one substance might have many attributes). The 'oneness' therefore, of 
Aristotle's substance, is not the same as the 'Oneness' of Plotinus-which is a metaphysical 
Oneness, a Oneness beyond Being. 
For Aristotle, metaphysical unity does not lie in self-identity, or inunutability. Thus the emphasis 
on the self or the subject, characteristic of modernity is probably indebted to N eop latonism in 
particular. Aristotle's unity of substance is that of unity of number. To be a substance, is to be one 
thing. We can see why this was to become a problem later on with Trinitarian theology. Ifwe 
identify God with that which is most perfectly, self-subsisting substance, how do we account for 
the 'threeness' in God? Says Aristotle: 'A substance-that which is called a substance most 
strictly, primarily and most of all-is that which is neither said of a subject not in a subject, e.g. the 
individual man or the individual horse ... ' 23 Until the Eighteenth Century, the Aristotelian 
definition would hold sway, as the definition of substantiality as that which persists through 
change. 'Every substance seems to signify a certain "this."'24 
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At this point, the immediate question we might as Twentieth Century individuals, aim at Aristotle 
is: 'Aristotle, in your language of substance are you granting a certain priority to the linguistic 
nature of reality, or the ontological or even the mental?' Aristotle's answer would be something 
like, 'I do not see the necessity to make this distinction. ' 2 ' In this kind of answer, Aristotle in his 
metaphysical realism, reflects a basic similarity, with, say the 'Tractatus' of the early 
Wittgenstein. There is a real continuity, flowing from our language about the world and the world 
itself. Tuns, broadly speaking: 'The limits of my language are the limits of my world.' Of course 
postmodernity would label this as being optimistic. 
Nevertheless Aristotle's belief in the basic continuity between the intelligible, the linguistic and 
the metaphysical has had momentous long-term effects.26 We see this specifically with respect to 
his conception of substance which is presented in his writings, in an almost entirely linguistic-
logico fashion. The correct use of language or grammar is the window to 'Being.' If I can learn to 
reason correctly, I shall know correctly. We illustrate this from the 'Categories': 'All the other 
things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. This is clear 
from an examination of individual cases. For example, animal is predicated of man and therefore 
also of the individual man; for was it predicated of none of the individual men it would not be 
predicated of a man at all. Again, colour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for 
was it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. Thus all the other things are said 
either of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects. So if the primary substances 
did not exist, it would be impossible for any other things to exist. ' 27 This in our opinion, is one of 
the reasons why Derrida in criticising the Aristotelian tradition later on, will choose to operate 
purposefully in the linguistic sphere. He will do this as primarily a philosopher (not as some 
believe, as a literary theorist), in his deconstructive program. It is in the linguistic sphere, that 
'Logos' identifies itself, as the very shaping element within all language. 
2.2.3-THE 'CATEGORIES' 
Continuing our investigation of 'substance,' we need to now pay some attention to Aristotle's 
'Categories."' Aristotle shares with Plato a hierarchical view of ontology, and this is seen 
specifically in his doctrine of the categories 29 In Aristotle and the entire Western tradition after 
him, the understanding of all things, and their relationships to other entities, necessitates different 
levels of entity. 'Each actual being is, so to speak, made up of several metaphysical layers, all of 
which necessarily enter its constitution, but not on the same level nor with equal rights. ' 30 Even 
much later on when Russell developed his theory of Types, as his proposed answer to the famous 
logical paradox ofFrege, hierarchical thinking is employed.31 Categorical theory and Russell's 
theory of Types are not far removed from each other.32 
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What did Aristotle think his list of categories to be? To him the word 'category,' would mean 
something similar to what we might call a 'predicate."' His intention was not to provide an 
exhaustive list of predicates, but the most important, the most 'ultimate' predicates that there are. 
We can ask many questions about an entity (say, a primary substance) and get all kinds of 
answers. Those answers, if they are to say anything about that entity, will be predicates. Any two 
predicates which satisfy the same interrogative are of the same category, and any two which do 
not satisfy the same interrogative, are of different categories.34 Furthermore, we must remember 
that Aristotle's understanding of substance is intrinsic to his view of the categories, of which it is 
the primary part. His doctrine appears in almost all of his works, and in terms of the total number 
of categories, his interpreters have identified ten (some prefer eight), categories in total. Ross' list 
for example, includes 10 types." In his theory; Aristotle is to be seen as identifying two main 
ways in which we predicate a thing or quality ofa subject. If, using Aristotle's language, we say 
'predicable of a subject,' we are referring to the relation of a universal to a particular, which is an 
instance of it. Yet the phrase: 'present in a subject,' refers to the relation of an attribute to its 
possessor. 36 
From here, we can proceed to outline four types of entity to which Aristotle wishes to refer. 
Firstly there is the particular, non-attributive entity, or the primary substance. Secondly, there are 
the particular attributes, or the attributes of primary substances. These are followed thirdly by 
universals of which particular non-attributive things are examples. These, in other words, are 
secondary substances. Fourthly, there are the universals of which particular attributes are 
instances.37 Now we can relate this discussion of the categories to Aristotle's exposition of 
'Being' as follows: 'Being' (as we have seen) is divided into roughly three senses. Firstly, it is an 
analysis of the essential and the accidental, secondly the division of true and false, and thirdly, it 
is understood as the tension between potential and actual. The categories fall into the first 
division, namely, that of the essential and accidental.38 It is thus evident that the 'categories' are 
about existent things, but Being itself is not a category. 
We can now proceed to list the categories themselves. Firstly, there is Substance (Ousia). Also, 
there is the associated notion of Essence, said to signify 'Ousia' in 'Topics' 103b31.39 Secondly, 
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there is Quantity, ('poson ) dealing for example with questions such as: 'how much?' Thirdly, we 
have Quality, ('poion') handling questions such as: 'what type?' Fourthly, there is Relation, 
('pros ti') which handles issues such as: 'with relation to what?' Fifthly, we have Place, ('pou ') 
'where?' Sixthly, there is Time, ('pote') 'when?' Seventhly, we have Situation, ('keisthai'), also 
referred to as 'position', 'posture', 'to be laid', or 'to lie.' Eighthly, there is State or Condition, 
(' echein'). This, literally means 'to have' or 'hold,' and intransitively, 'to hold oneself or 'be,' 
'keep in a certain state.' Ninth, there is Action, ('poien') 'to do' or 'make.' Tenth, there is 
Passion, ('paschein ') 'to suffer,' 'to be affected. ' 40 Aristotle did not place too much emphasis on 
the exact number of the categories, and in certain places they seem to overlap in his exposition.41 
Yet we can assume that in some sense, Aristotle wanted his categories to be comprehensive. This 
might be, but how so? 'A distinction can be drawn between the uses to which Aristotle puts the 
categories as a set, and the specific uses of individual categories. Among the first we find: (I) 
logical use or appeal to the categories to help clarify terms, furnish definitions, and detect 
fallacies of ambiguity. For example, "white" cannot be the genus of "snow" and "swan" because 
they are substances while it is a Quality (Topics 120b37FF). (2) Use in physics, or appeal to the 
categories directly to classify types of movement or change: corning to be and passing away as 
change in substance, alteration in Quality, growth and continuation in Quantity, and locomotion 
in Place (e.g., Physics III 200b33FF.) ... (3) Use in metaphysics-Aristotle appeals to the categories 
as ultimate genera of Being in a frequent attempt to head off any treatment of Being itself or of 
the One as ultimate substance. ' 42 
It is clear that the theory of the categories developed in Aristotle's mind as he progressed in his 
philosophy. This explains the scattered nature of the subject's treatment in the Aristotelian 
corpus. Ackrill suggests that the list was arrived at by Aristotle's combination of two different 
paths, the one by observing what types of answers are appropriate to different questions, and the 
other by pressing the question: 'What is it?' to any thing whatsoever until we come to some very 
high genera.43 In providing these answers to the questions, Aristotle provided the building blocks 
and the setting of his entire future direction in philosophy. To use Popper's term, categorical 
theory (like everything else) is 'theory-laden.' This has led Twentieth-Century theorists, such as 
Kuhn, Haberrnas, Feyerabend and Peter Bergerto acknowledge the need to consider also 'social' 
categories as also contributing to the philosophy of science and theory as a whole. Yet for the first 
thousand years and more of the pre-Enlightenment age, the social structure to knowledge was 
overlooked. 
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Getting back to Aristotle, it seems that the role and dominance of the categories in the breakdown 
of Being, later seemed to fade somewhat-as he moved away from the struggle of the question of 
the ontological nature of the essential and the accidental.44 Later on he would begin to 
characterise the nature of 'Being' differently. Instead of proceeding from the perspective of 
substance-accident, Aristotle progressed to 'potentiality' and 'actuality.' Nevertheless for the 
Early Church, the younger Aristotle had already cast the die for much of the metaphysical 
Trinitarianism that was to come. By the age of Thomas and Barth however, the potentiality-
actuality nature of Being, was once again taken into account. Derrida on the other hand, seeks to 
deconstruct 'actuality,' and in our view, concentrates alternatively on the perpetual potentiality of 
the relationship between humans and the world. 
2.2.4-SUBSTANCE, CATEGORY, MATTER AND ESSENTIALISM 
Our digression into Aristotle's categories has been important for our exposition of his theory of 
substance. This is because in Aristotle, 'substance' is the highest or the first category. Heidegger 
later pointed out, that the Aristotelian doctrine of categories, was a theory of one type of Being, 
portraying Being as 'objective presence' ('Vorhandensein'). To Heidegger, this view did not take 
into account the other, radical interpretation of Being, that of 'existence,' which can only be 
understood through the application of the existential analytic. 
It has been seen that with Aristotle, the categories are intended in one sense, as an exposition of 
substance, the categories being those things, which are or can be predicated of a substance. The 
first substance is (as we have recorded) an individual object that we can call by a name; i.e., 
'Socrates.' It is that which is neither asserted of a subject, nor does it exist in a subject. A proper 
name is never qua proper name, a predicate.45 Of course, something can be in a subject, but not 
asserted of it. The surface of the ring is 'in the subject,' but is not asserted of it. 'Second 
substances ... are the kinds to which belong first substances such as man, horse, cabbage. "16 In 
other words the second substance is indicated in the predicate or one of the categories other than 
substance. 'Animal' is part of the definition of man. 'Aristotle says that the definition of a 
secondary substance (i.e. of the kind X such that being the same individual means being the same 
X), will be predicable of the individual, and so too will parts of the definition. E.g. animal is part 
of the definition man. ' 47 Later Locke will say, to the contrary, that we only recognise a thing by 
its properties. Such views, essentially nominalist, are based on the assumption that one can 
identify a certain entity, without needing to know the thing-in-itself, or by identifying it as a such-
an-such. This is because we are incapable of conceiving substance except as entities comprised of 
certain qualities. In a certain sense, we can also term Derrida 'nominalist' in that he also wishes 
to understand the world through its 'effects,' not its 'essence.' 
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At this point, it might be surmised that Aristotle's primary ontological building-block is that of 
first substance." In one sense this is the case, as with substances, Aristotle is wanting to ask the 
same question as his predecessors, (and most of his successors) 'what is really real?' lfwe want 
to know what, in Aristotle's opinion, is really real, his answer is 'the first substance.' Socrates is a 
first substance. Now what enables a substance to be a true primary substance, is its ability to 
receive contraries, without passing away. It seems most distinctive of substance that what is 
numerically one and the same is able to receive contraries. In no other case could one bring 
forward anything, numerically one, which is able to receive contraries. For example, a colour 
which is (as a colour) numerically one and the same will not be, black and white, nor will 
numerically one be two and the same action, be bad and good; and similarly with everything else 
that is not substance. A substance, being numerically one and the same, is also able to receive 
contraries. For example, individual men, one and the same man becomes pale at one time and 
dark at another, hot and cold, bad and good. Nothing like this is to be seen in any other accidental 
case.
49 In other words, a substance requires nothing else for its own continued existence. 
Undoubtedly, this lends itself towards an essentialist position, metaphysically. There has 
however, been some controversy as to what kind of essentialism Aristotle subscribes to, if at all. ' 0 
This question is important for our study, as much of that which calls itself postmodernity claims 
that Aristotle is the primary progenitor of essentialism as we have come to know it today. 
Kneale" identifies three main views of substance as propagated at various times in the history of 
the analytical tradition. He commences with Aristotle's view, which he summarises as: firstly, 
things which require nothing else for their existence. Then secondly, there is the later 
development of Aristotle's idea, of substance now becoming interpreted as 'things that have no 
constituents', and then thirdly: 'Things which can be the subjects of atomic propositions.' 
If Aristotle was correct in attributing substance as that which can receive contraries without 
change, this necessarily implies that the 'stuff' of which substances are made, does not constitute 
that substance's individuality. In other words, Socrates might be closely connected somehow to 
his own flesh and bone, but his individuality does not stem from his 'matter,' or his flesh." True, 
but matter does make up Socrates. Now, Aristotle accepts that substance is predicated ofmatter.53 
This, admits Aristotle, might lead one to consider that matter is therefore that which is most truly 
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substance ('ousia'). The reason why one might be tempted to believe this, is because the idea of 
being a subject of predication-can be thought to be the criterion of being a substance5 " 
Now the concept of matter is not found in the 'Categories,' but in the 'Metaphysics,' it plays an 
important role. The question however is whether Aristotle is providing the concept of matter in 
the 'Metaphysics,' the same interpretation he gave earlier to first substance in the 'Categories'? " 
Actually, this is not the case, as at times in the 'Metaphysics,' matter is that which comes prior to 
substance. Substances come to be and pass away and these occurrences are changes. Yet 
Aristotle's view of change requires a subject, and this subject seems to be the matter of which the 
individual is composed. Socrates might die, and in so dying, he stops being a man. Yet, the matter 
of which he is composed lives on for some time after his demise. This would lead us to conclude 
that the relation between substance and matter, is the same as that between substance and quality 
(or accident). Clearly, pride of place seems to be given to matter not substance. 
Aristotle, however is not prepared to allow the term 'matter' to be given the meaning 'Ousia,' as 
this would contradict his entire metaphysical schema, which is about 'what is,' about 'that which 
is individual.' Substance has to be a separate entity, a 'thing.' Individuality concerns itself with 
ontological independence. Matter by itself, is thus not an individual thing and therefore cannot be 
a substance." The individuality of a thing (substance), is not based on the 'matter,' of which it is 
composed. Matter does not give us individuals whose substance predicates hold good of them 
only accidentally. ' 7 'The matter term by itself does not specify any individual and hence does not 
specify an individual whose substance-predicates hold good of it only accidentally.'" 
Matter then, is not the individual of which Socrates is predicated. There is not in Aristotle, any 
subject which is both identical to Socrates and yet might have failed to be a man ... There is a 
material something underlying Socrates, it is true, and this material something might even survive 
the death of Socrates. Yet this material something is not that which makes Socrates an individual. 
It was never a man, it only makes up a man. Socrates (unlike his matter) does not make up a man; 
he is one. ' 59 This means that even though substance can be predicated of matter, the place of 
substances as rock-bottom individuals is not threatened. For there is no individual of which man 
is predicated accidentally.60 We can now conclude that Aristotle does uphold the priority of 
substantiality, with his view of substance and its intelligible form. At the same time, Aristotle's 
form of essentialism seems to be in conflict with Quine's definition which states: ' ... necessity 
resides in the way in which we say things, and not in the things we talk about.'61 Aristotle's 
essentialism is not merely linguistic, but reflecting his belief in 'things as they really are,' or 
metaphysical realism. 
Nevertheless, as we shall argue in our conclusion to this thesis, we suspect that the seminal role 
of 'matter' in Aristotle is underestimated by his interpreters. Furthermore, we believe that the 
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case for the priority of matter, over and above substance in Aristotle's system, has not been 
successfully refuted even by Aristotle himself. A deconstructive reading of the Aristotelian 
corpus can provide a new understanding of 'matter,' which Aristotle purposefully marginalises, in 
order to keep his system together, based on the primary role of substance. If a case for the priority 
of matter can be made in Aristotle's metaphysics, (as we believe it can) then Derrida's and 
Heidegger's perception of the primacy of'presences' (substances) in the Hellenistic tradition, can 
be partly challenged. If the priority of matter can be established, this will bring about a new 
appreciation of the possible role of'differentiation,' in Aristotle. Matter, is then perceived to be 
an endless whole that can be perpetually differentiated into a myriad of substances. 
2.2.5-SUBSTANCE. EXISTENCE. ACTUALISM AND POTENTIALITY2 
Having provided a summary of Aristotle's view of true 'Being' defined as that which is 
substance, we might conclude that his more 'concrete philosophy,' dealing with existents, (in 
other words, rejecting the Forms of Plato) is very much set upon the question of concrete 
existence. After all, 'Being' is that 'which is' To speak of Being is to speak about that 'which 
exists.' Aristotle sees 'Being' and 'existence' as almost synonymous. Gilson, argues that this is 
not the case, and the fact that it is not, is important forthe understanding of Western 
metaphysics.63 
It seems that in spite of the great contrast in Aristotle's thinking compared to Plato, there is one 
common element with both, and this is the equating of 'Being' with 'theoria,' or intelligible 
'form.' In other words, the true nature of' Being' cannot be located primarily through sense 
impressions. In equating 'real Being' with substance, (which supports or 'underlies' the world of 
accidents, perceivable by the eyes) Aristotle does the same thing as his illustrious predecessor, 
Plato. In a sense, Aristotle also places Being 'beyond reach.' To be fair, more than Plato, with 
Aristotle at least we have an idea of where to look for 'Being'. At least it is closely connected to 
the individual thing, but when it comes to actually putting our hands on it, it cannot be found.64 In 
their innermost reality, substances are unknown." In our chapter on Augustine, it shall be seen 
that he (Augustine) has also inherited this problem, when he uses Aristotelian metaphysics as a 
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means of speaking about the Trinity. This is because of Aristotle's theory of form, which, unlike 
his view of matter, is the intelligible portion of the individual entity. It is primarily form, which 
makes a substance intelligible. Without form, we are left with matter as brute 'stuff,' having no 
individuality_.. In other words, the question we might like to ask Aristotle, despite all of his 
concentration on individual entities, is: 'What constitutes the reality of that entity, that man or 
that cabbage?' Aristotle has, of course, already answered us: 'The substance of that entity.' 
Nevertheless, Aristotle has also insisted that the substance of an entity is not comprised of its 
matter. It is the logocentric form of that substance which gives it, its individuality.67 Lesher 
discusses the dilemma, saying: ' In book Zeta of the "Metaphysics" and elsewhere, Aristotle 
commits himself to the following propositions: (A) No universal can be substance.6' (B) The form 
is a universal. (C) The form is that which is most truly substance.' Almost all commentators agree 
that it is very difficult to solve this problem, particularly as it appears in the 'Metaphysics.' At 
times, Aristotle seems to have claimed that the form is 'a this. ' 69 This seems to preclude it from 
being a universal. However, if it comprises the intelligible 'shape' of a thing, it has to be 
universal, as knowledge is knowledge of the universal. 70 
Although we shall not seek to examine the various attempts that have been made to solve this 
contradiction in Aristotle, we have succeeded in our purpose, which is to point out that Aristotle's 
conception of the 'really real,' is similar to that of Plato, Parmenides and Plotinus. That which is 
real, is the intelligible form, the 'Logos-element,' presiding above the existent itself. Existence is 
not included in Aristotle's definition of 'Being,' although he obviously would not deny that real 
things existn Notwithstanding, it is the 'whatness of a thing,' that makes it part of 'Being,' not 
the 'Is-Ness' ofa thing ('ls-ness,' here interpreted in the light of existence). 72 
There are close connections between Aristotle's view of form and his teachings concerning 
'actuality-potentiality' (or 'dunamis' and 'energeia'). These binary terms are designed to indicate 
the distinction between firstly 'what something is capable of doing,' and then secondly, 'being 
something and actually doing it. ' 73 We have shown that in Aristotle, man is part matter and part 
form, the matter being potentially man, and the form actually man. 74 Aristotle's view of actuality 
is slightly different to later philosophical understanding. Later definitions will try to understand 
the nature of an entity by enquiring into the function of that entity according to its dynamic 
movement or its purpose in a network. This approximates the view of Aquinas, and to an extent, 
Barth, as we shall see. In the case of Aristotle, actuality is more of an understanding of the 'What-
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ness,' or the 'essence' of a thing, not its dynamic function. The entire universe reflects a desire, a 
movement, from 'brute matter,' towards 'intelligible form,' which results in the actualisation of 
individual things, substances_ We can trace Barth's view of the actualisation of man through his 
encounter with the Word, back to this basic Aristotelian way of conception. This is one of the 
fundamental arguments that Derrida has with the West. He sees this movement towards an 
eschatological 'end' or closure as being problematic. It is here with Aristotle that we find the 
origins of what he terms the eschatological tone in recent philosophy. 
Nonetheless, Gilson reflected on the difficulty Aristotle had in actually defining what 'act' is." In 
our opinion, the difficulty Aristotle experienced, was due to his very early view of relations and 
his strong 'essentialist' ontology. He was preoccupied with the 'Is-ness,' or the 'What-ness' of a 
thing, not the 'How-ness.' Gilson again: 'There is something which is not above being, as was the 
Good of Plato, but which is in being or, rather, which is the very reality of Being, yet escapes 
definition.' 76 
2.3-CONCLUSION: GOD AND BEING ARE INTRODUCED 
Having come to the end of our short survey, certain summarising points can be made. 
Aristotle reflects the typically Greek obsession with intellectual unity. This is true, even though 
his thinking reflects a swing away from the Platonic ideas towards the real concrete world. In 
Aristotle, Plato's Forms have not completely died out, (nor have they today) they have just 
merged themselves with the intelligible, determining component of concrete things, as part of 
their existential nature that cannot quite be seen or grasped. 'The limits of my mind are the limits 
of my world.' There is this ongoing dichotomy between 'form' and 'matter,' which according to 
Derrida, marks the birth ofmetaphysics.77 'Whether it is a question of Husserl's determining 
"eidos" in opposition to Platonism, or form (Form) ... or "morphe"- __ in opposition to Aristotle, the 
force, vigilance, and efficacy of (Husserl's) critique remain intrametaphysical _._Only a form is 
self-evident, only a form has or is an essence, only a form presents itself as such. __ Form is 
presence itself Formality is whatever aspect of the thing in general presents itself, lets itself be 
seen, gives itself to be thoughL. {M)etaphysical thought.. .is a thought of Being and form."" 
How does my mind then, comprehend the world, the 'form' of the world? Aristotle answers, it is 
through the perception of the building-blocks of individual entities, arranged according to a 
hierarchical unity through certain types of relations or 'participation.' When we term Aristotle's 
view of individuals as being 'hierarchical,' we do not do so in the same sense as with Plato's use 
of the term. The hierarchicalism in Aristotle stems from his belief in the primacy of primary 
substance, over the other types of categories. 
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One can briefly illustrate the fundamental and pervasive Greek influence behind this belief in the 
close affinity between 'Being,' and the 'receptive mind,' throughout the later West, by drawing 
attention, to Thomas Aquinas. Writing in 1974, on the subject: 'What is most and least relevant in 
the Metaphysics of St Thomas Today?"9 Clarke summarises the entire Thomistic metaphysical 
programme, compressing it into eight principle theses. The first thesis (and that which represents 
the foundation of Thomism) is 'The intrinsic correlativity, or connaturality, that exists between 
the human spirit, in its two main facets of intellect and will, on the one hand, and the realm of 
being on the other.' This is pure Aristotle, and is foundational to most Western philosophy and 
much theology up to the end of the Nineteenth Century. Surely here we see the beginnings of the 
later tensions that would become the contemporary, theological 'correlation' problem, the issue of 
whether God is somehow synonymous with Being, culture or the mind, or not at all. 
When we speak of'substance' and 'participation', can we say that both terms really apply to 
Aristotle? It might be argued that the theory of participation features specifically in Plato and 
later Neoplatonism, but it not a theory in Aristotle. In the narrow, technical sense of the term this 
is undoubtedly correct. Aristotle is not a 'participationist,' the way Plato is. In the broader sense 
nevertheless, Aristotle does accept a theory of participation as do all those who practice 
essentialist metaphysics (participation in the sense of having to try to harmonise together, 
individual things, in order to discover metaphysical unity). 
Later, this problem was to become particularly evident to thinkers such as Leibniz, who grappled 
with the problem of trying to locate the 'relation,' between two things. Where is this relation, this 
'participation,' to be found? Is participation a component of substances themselves, or are they 
elusive entities, making up an invisible glue in-between? Plato seeks to provide a metaphysical 
unity, through the participation of individual things in the world of the Forms. Aristotle, on the 
other hand argues that what provides unity, is the intelligible form of the individual. Then there is 
the ability of the mind to 'catalogue,' to discern individual things, according to this fonn, 
identifying their secondary characteristics (predicates), which might or might not have common 
elements with the predicates of other substances. While these characteristics are genuinely part of 
substances, in another sense they are not, as the substance. itself is somehow 'prior,' to its 
secondary qualities. In Aristotle, the 'participation-component' of Being, lies in the inherence of 
the accidents, in the substance. This 'participation' seems to be an ontological one, but in actual 
fact, its true nature is hard to pin down or define. With both Plato and Aristotle the supposed 
'relationality' ofa thing, is not a 'relation' per se, but a property of that thing. Ifwe say, 
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'Simmias is large,' it is because Simmias is really large, irrespective of the context in which he 
finds himself (Simmias is the example that Plato uses to present this argument in 'Phaedo' I 02b-
c). When we see something is 'larger' or 'smaller,' or 'harder,' these terms whilst having a 
definite bearing on the understanding of how that thing might relate to other things, the 
'hardness,' the 'largeness,' of that entity tells us something about what that entity really is, not 
only how it relates to other entities. Augustine later on in his Trinity, would try to modify this 
view of relations, teaching that the three persons are relations themselves. As such, they do 
possess ontological independence, each person is a person. Thy are not dependent upon each 
other for personhood. His critics however, were not convinced. Augustine's philosophical 
background, being Aristotelian, (when it came to his view ofrelations) made it difficult for him to 
place this new view of relations into his overall scheme of predication, without an inclination 
towards logical (if not theological) modalism. 
The order of priority for Plato, Aristotle and the West, is always seemingly substance above or 
prior to 'participation' In other words, substance (or the form) is before the participation, the 
relatedness of that substance, to other substances. Or, to put it again in another way: The 'Is-
ness,' of an entity, is prior to the 'relatedness' or the context of that entity. This methodology 
would dictate the future course of all the Western sciences, which would become the search for 
the understanding of the essence of things. We can even mention the 'Periodic Table' as an 
example of chemistry's 'baptism,' of Aristotelian, categorical thinking. 
Later, with Plotinus and certain dimensions of the Christian tradition, we shall see that there is a 
subtle, unofficial shift in method, with 'participation' moving into greater prominence, through 
the belief that an entity only possesses its true individuality, through its 'participation' in the 
'One,' or 'God,' and not within its own intelligible form. Nevertheless, generally speaking this 
problem of the primacy of substance before relation, is also a problem that crops up again and 
again in later Trinitarian thinking, for example once more, in Augustine's theory of the Holy 
Spirit as constituting the love between Father and Son. Although Augustine insists on the co-
equality of the three persons, when he relegates the Holy Spirit to the role of 'relation,' he has 
been criticised, for reducing the 'ontological' status of the Spirit. 
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We are not implying, however, that the 'relatedness' component of Being, is not real. In the 
thinking of both Aristotle and Plato, the individual form or substance, together with its means of 
integration with other forms or substances, is equally part of the same metaphysical unity. The 
paradox comes when we discover that the 'substance,' with Aristotle, or the 'Form,' for Plato, is 
somehow 'more real,' than the means employed (participation-relatedness-accident) to link them 
together. 
2.3.1-ARISTOTLE'S GOD 
Ourtreatment of this area of Aristotle's theology is brief as, for our purposes, we are wishing to 
establish only one important principle. This we find in the 'Metaphysics.' Aristotle argues, that 
although in some measure, 'god' is greater than other beings, he is nevertheless, part of Being. He 
is the cause of Being, but we can still understand him, by employing the same conceptual 
language that we might employ to speak about any dimension in metaphysics. Aristotle is paving 
the way for later, Christian theological metaphysics. God becomes part of Being or Being itself. 
In the Christian metaphysical enterprise, metaphysical terminology can now be used to speak 
about God. This represents a movement away from the Hebraic worldview of the Old Testament, 
where it would have been anathema to have portrayed God in these terms. 
Aristotle's theory of god arose from his view of actuality and potentiality. ' 0 'The study of 
immovable substances is theology. Immovable substances are primary, and so theology is 
primary. Because it is primary, it is universal and considers everything. Hence it considers Being 
qua Being.'" Theology is not just a traditional study of the Greek pantheon of gods, as this in 
Aristotle's opinion, is 'myth.' Instead, theology finds itself being a rational study of the ultimate, 
immaterial principle of causality. 
Guthrie" suggests that there was probably a development in Aristotle's theology, commencing 
with the views of Plato, particularly in the 'Laws.' Plato also argued for some kind of ultimate 
mind that had a direct influence on the movement in the cosmos. According to the 'Laws,' all the 
planets have self-moving souls, but there is one other soul in supreme control." This is the soul of 
the 'outermost' sphere. Here, we have the standard view of antiquity, namely that the seat of the 
divine was the outermost heaven. It seems that originally, Aristotle identified the divine principle 
with the fifth substance-type, 'aether' (as opposed to the traditional Greek division of four 
substance-types that comprise earthly things). 'The four terrestrial elements have their own 
natural motions, earth and water, downwards, air and fire, upwards (i.e. to or from the centre of 
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the kosmos), that is to say, two of them are heavy and two are light. ' 84 'Aether,' on the other hand, 
is that substance which is purer than our air, which occupies the outer reaches of space where the 
heavenly bodies are. In the early stages of the development of his theory, Aristotle seems to have 
accepted that god was somehow to be identified with this 'aether.'" Later on in the 
'Metaphysics,' he abandoned his earlier materialism and contended that the unmoved mover is an 
incorporeal, rational principle. 86 God for Aristotle is the purest principle of actualism, and he here 
anticipates the view of both Barth and Aquinas who also sought to embody the being of God 
within the principle ofactualism. 
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CHAPTER THREE: PLATO 
3.1-INTRODUCTION: 'BEING AND THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE' 87 
3.1.1-ETIENNE GILSON ON PLATO, PLOTINUS AND THE PROBLEM OF BEING 
Before we provide an exposition of Plato's doctrine of substance and participation, we intend to 
firstly provide a summary ofGilson's astute presentation of the problems that attach themselves 
to the Platonic view of Being. Gilson orientates himself into the discussion, by beginning with the 
Parmenidian view that the fundamental reality of Being is that it exists. What makes something 
really 'something,' is the fact that 'it is.' The entity is self-identical. We have seen this with 
Aristotle. This perception of the 'Is-ness' ofa thing became foundational for much of the future 
Western canon, whether logic, mathematics, 'truth,' and so on. This 'Is-ness,' dimension is taken 
for granted. When Aristotle starts to talk about that 'Being,' 'that which Is,' even when he uses 
the language of 'how' or 'why' something is the way it is, this 'Is-ness' (or the existence of the 
entity) is automatically taken for granted. 
Matthen, for example looks at the 'truth' aspect to Being, in his article 'Greek Ontology and the 
"Is" of Truth.'" Gilson 's point is that Parmenides bequeathed to the West the Idea that Being is 
'something.' This idea persisted for more than two thousand years until Heidegger's celebrated 
inaugural lecture to the Freiburg university faculties, delivered on July 24"', 1929, entitled: 'What 
is Metaphysics?'" 
In the Parmenidian view, there can be no intermediate view of existence.90 This thesis, at first 
sight, seems to be reasonable. To be part of Being means 'to exist.' Yet if this is true: 'if to be a 
being and to exist are one and the same thing, it becomes imperative for us to exclude from actual 
existence whatever does not exhibit the genuine characters of being ... ' 91 Now according to the 
Platonic tradition, to talk about what 'is' is to speak of that which is 'one.' The reason for this, is 
because all the things that truly are, are part of that one 'Being.' Consequently 'Being' is in this 
sense, 'one.' 
Nevertheless our senses and experience of our enviromnent is that of the experience of 'many,' 
not 'one'. lfwethen wish to ascribe 'Being' to the world of sense, we are in trouble, because then 
'Being' becomes 'many. ' 92 The presumable conclusion to this dilemma is that 'Being,' or the 
'truly real' must therefore not be the sensible, only that which we can apprehend with the mind. 
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This is because only the mind can perceive the homogenous, or the changeless, pure unity. 
Appearance, must therefore be illusory. We are now in the dualistic universe of Plato. What has 
happened now is that 'there is nothing in being as such to account for the fact of existence. ' 93 For 
Plato, the 'really real,' is the world of 'Being,' not entities in the empirical world. Additionally, 
'To be is to be its own self according to itself: "auto kath auto."' The ultimate mark of true 
'Being' lies accordingly in 'selthood. ' 94 This idea of truth as self-identity is, in the eyes of 
Derrida, the cause of 'phonocentrism': the priority of speech before writing (gramme). Plato sees 
truth as pure, sovereign, self-immediacy, identical with itself, separating itself from 'others' that 
threaten its existence. Unity in metaphysics depends upon this premise. Because the 'really real,' 
is defined as self-identity, 'Being' is immutable and not in any way, subject to change. After all, 
to be something else is to be another 'being'. With Plato then, self-identity is the real attribute of 
'Being,' not existence. When we come (below) to examine his view of the Forms and their 
participation in particulars, we shall see that this notion of the Forms displaying self identity, or 
self-predication (Bravery is brave) is what his critics believe is Plato's greatest problem. 
The common property of all that truly 'is' constitutes what Plato himself calls 'Ousia.' In other 
words, 'Ousia' points to the property which belongs to the really real as such and makes it to be a 
being.9' These are the Ideas or the Forms. As self-identical concepts, outside of the material 
world of perception, they are supremely intelligible. We can see now where Aristotle discovered 
the foundations of what was to become his view of substance. Of course, normal life is not really 
possible ifthat which is truly real is not that with which we interact, with our senses everyday. 
This is why Plato had to in some sense, 'redeem' the world of becoming by arguing that in some 
sense, it too participates to some measure, in 'Being.' The problem then is fairly obvious: ifthe 
world of becoming does participate in reality, how does this differ from the 'real' reality that is 
the Forms? How can a Form be 'self-identical' and yet participate in many things? 
We can go even further, in outlining this problem, says Gilson_.. A Form is two things, according 
to Plato. It is firstly, a unity, but it is also 'itself,' or 'self-identical,' namely, part of 'Being.' 
Consequently, it can no longer be self-identical. Plato tried various means to solve this apparent 
self-contradiction, the most significant attempt comprising the positing of the Supreme Being of 
the 'Republic.' This, the 'Good,' is the principle that is 'beyond Being,' giving rise to 'Being' 
itself.97 The problem however, is now compounded, as 'Being,' or that which is defined as 'self-
identical,' is constituted and dependent on a principle which is 'beyond Being.' This is the 
'Good.' Now in the 'Republic,' the 'Good' is even more 'real,' than 'Being' itself, yet it is 
38 
beyond Being.9' As a principle that is supposed to be synonymous with self-identify, true 'Being' 
actually turns out to be 'beyond Being.' As such, it is unable to account for itself. 99 Plato, in 
bringing forth the concept of 'beyond Being,' is opening the road to mysticism. which became a 
pathway trod firstly by Plotinus, and then Christianity. Now with his new principle of the 'One,' 
Plato, has inadvertently shifted the entire focus of metaphysics. 'Being' is now no longer the 
primary concept in_metaphysics. That place now belongs to the 'Good,' or the 'One' (Plotinus). 
Only because the 'One' is 'beyond Being,' or 'not Being, 'can it be the source of 'Being.' 
Gilson, 100 illustrates the important difference between the God of Plotinus and the later Christian 
tradition, especially that of Aquinas: Plotinian metaphysics states that all entities receive their 
Being because the One 'is not Being,' while Christianity says that alt things receive their being 
because God 'is.' In Neoplatonism, 'Ousia,' comes second to the cause, which transcends it. 
Gilson's verdict is that:' ... once removed from being, existence can never be pushed back into it, 
and, once deprived of its existence, being is unable to give an intelligible account of itself.' The 
consequences? The hierarchical preference of the one over the many, 'sameness' over difference, 
form over matter, eternity over time, immediacy before deferment. 101 This problem, astutely 
recognised by Gilson, has plagued the Western mind. Derrida would term it as the scvereignty of 
the transcendent 'centre,' the ultimate 'signified' in traditional texts or discourse. With just about 
every thinker, from Socrates to Sartre, 'essence,' or some other kind of 'presence,' is always seen 
as preceding existence. Even Barth, in his enigmatic announcement of the Freedom of the Word, 
does so only at the eicpense of man's freedom. This is because the Word of God is the 
determining form for man. 
Existentialism would state the problem as: always form before function, or as Sartre was to say 
form before freedom. Instead of our humanity being determined by who we are and what we do, 
from moment to moment, the human is determined by various predetermining 'logoi' of various 
types, detracting from authentic existence. As a result Heidegger, and to some extent, Sartre, 
responded by reducing the idea of' essence,' or 'form,' to existence. 
3.2-PLATO AND PARTICIPATION'02 
3.2.1-TERMINOLOGY 
Sweeney' 0' agrees that the concept of participation 'has recurred in every period of the history of 
Western thought.' 104 Before his exposition of the dialogues of Plato, he begins with some word 
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studies. The English, 'participation,' is more a derivation from the Latin noun 'participario,' in 
turn, derived from 'parricipare,' meaning to 'take a part,' 'partem cape re.' The Greek derivation, 
which is applicable to Plato, differs in emphasis. 10' The Greek 'metechein,' (and its derivatives) 
inStead deals with the notion of 'in the midst of,' or it can also have the meaning of: 'having in 
common with, along with, in the midst of' 106 
Gilson has already implied that Plato possibly developed his theory of participation, subsequent 
to his theory of 'Being,' or the Forms. What is primary is the Form, the notion of participation is 
an effort to try to link the world to that Form. To link 'Being 'to 'becoming.' With Plato, the 
'signifier-aspect' of the notion of participation, or in other words the contingent thing involved, to 
which the Form points, (such as 'the 'beautiful girl') is always ontologically secondary to the 
'signified-aspect' of the process, the Form itself (Beauty). The other difficult issue is the fact that 
in the Platonic tradition, causality is also an essential part of the meaning of participation. This 
also implies a type of 'ontological' priority of the 'cause' over the 'caused.' In other words, to try 
to adapt the Platonic view of participation, in order to speak of three equal persons participating 
in a common godhead, was going to prove to be a difficult task. 
3.2.2-THE 'PARMENIDES' AND PARTICIPATION'07 
We commence our discussion of Plato's doctrine with some comments on what must be one of 
the most important Platonic dialogues, dealing with this subject, the 'Parmenides.' Curd isolates 
the main issues and problems in lines 13 lc-132b-'°8 Socrates is busy listening to a treatise read 
out by Zeno, and in response to the problems outlined, proposes the theory of the Forms as a 
solution. Parmenides, also hearing of the opposing theory of Socrates, rejects it as a solution. In 
addition, Zeno's argument supports Parmenides' claim that everything is 'unity,' or 'one,' 
because if there is plurality, then these plurals will exhibit pairs of opposite characteristics, and it 
is impossible that something can be both 'F,' and 'not~F, ' 109 at the same time. There are two kinds 
of pluralities that Zeno is attacking: first! y the normal idea of the plurality of entities or (a 
numerical many), and secondly the idea of a predicational many, or the plurality of predicates in a 
single entity-"0 
We can see that Socrates is going to present the theory of the Forms as a means to solve Zeno's 
problems, whilst at the same time, being able to assert the possibility of plurality that Zeno is 
denying. Says Socrates: 'But tell me, do you not believe there is an idea of likeness in the 
abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, the opposite of the first, and that you and I and all things 
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which we call many partake of these two? And that those which partake of likeness become like, 
and those, which partake of unlikeness become unlike, and those which partake of both become 
both like and unlike, all in the manner and degree of their participation?' 111 A particular thing can 
receive contraries in that it participates in more than one Form of those contraries. A certain 
entity has the quality of 'F-ness', by virtue of its participation in the form, 'F.' It might also have 
a certain quality that is the opposite to that of 'F,' because it participates in another Form. 
Now Socrates (reflecting the Platonic position) insists that the Forms are one, they cannot be 
divided. 112 How then can the Forms be divided amongst their participants without losing their 
unity? Parmenides shows that if a certain entity participates in the Form 'F,' then that particular 
receives a certain amount of the Form 'F .' However, the upshot of the argument is that the 'F-
ness,' that the particular possesses as a portion of the Form 'F,' can, in certain cases, tum out to 
be the opposite of 'F.' Let us take largeness, as an example. If a certain particular, participates in 
the Form, 'largeness,' part of that Form dwells within the particular, not all of it, else nothing else 
then could be seen as being large. Nevertheless, 'if a particular receives merely a part and not the 
whole of largeness, it will receive a part of largeness that is smaller than the original whole, 
Largeness itself' 113 'A participant is to be made "F" by having as its share of the F-itself a 
portion that is not F, and indeed is the opposite ofF.' 114 'In the middle dialogues, the participation 
of particulars in Forms was an article of faith; Plato does not offer an extended or complete 
analysis of participation.' 115 
Morris, nevertheless, suggests that there is a solution to Plato's participation dilemma. 'I wish to 
defend this solution to the dilemma by arguing that the share of a Form that is in an object can be 
identified with the immanent Forms of "Phaedo" l 03d, and that the immanent Forms can be 
identified with the qualities which come into and go out of the receptacle (Timaeus 49b-50a). 
These qualities are said to be copies (mimemeta) of Forms (Timaeus 50c). ' 116 We find the same 
problem posed in both the 'Republic' and the 'Sophist.' In the 'Republic,' Plato deals with the 
issue of participation, using the concept of a craftsman, making a bed. In his mind, the craftsman 
has the Form of the bed, as he reproduces it. 117 
The painter is another similar type of craftsman. In one sense, when he paints a bed, it is not the 
real bed, but in another sense it is a bed. A Form can be in many locations at once, because it is 
the image of the Form ('Eikon') that is present, not the Form-in-itself'" It is Morris' contention 
that those critics of Plato's doctrine of participation, base their criticism upon crude, materialism, 
when they insist on seeing that participation, necessarily implies division. no Henry Teloh feels 
that this problem concerns the confusion between the Form actually being part of the act of 
participation itself, and merely being in the thing which participates."" 
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Sweeney suggests that the 'intelligent,' creative agent of the 'Parmenides,' and other dialogues, is 
an important part to this solution. The intelligent agent brings creation about by his activity as an 
efficient cause. The Form is not directly involved in the creation process, it directs the process, 
and is an exemplary cause. 121 'Being ("Ousia'') therefore is the power to act or to be acted upon 
and, by inference, to cause or to be caused and to be participated in or to participate in. Being is, 
then, that by which the Forms can participate among themselves and that by which things can 
participate in Forms. ' 122 
Sweeney's 123 summary of Plato's doctrine as spread out over the relevant dialogues is as follows: 
'Phaedo' introduces the theory of participation and attempts to explain how particulars exist, 
through their participation in the Forms present in them. The 'Parmenides,' goes into further 
detail, specifically with respect to how single Forms can be present in multiple particulars. Those 
scholars who maintain that Plato ultimately managed to successfully refute the arguments against 
participation (in terms of the participation of many particulars in one Form), interpret Plato 
speaking of participation in the sense of the original and the 'image,' as with a mirror Sweeney, 
in his own defence of Plato, makes much of the difference between the Form as an exemplary and 
the artisan as the efficient cause. The 'Timaeus' outlines a view of the Forms as not only models 
of reality, but also goals. 
3.2.3-THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT 
Gilson's criticism of the Platonic view of Being as self-identity, is further illustrated in the 
notorious Sailcloth or Third Man Argument. This is the other main refutation of the Platonic 
defence of participation, that which Aristotle called the 'Third Man Argument.' This issue is 
raised in the 'Parminedes' 132a-b, 124 as an ontological regress argument, again related to 
participation. The premises that we use to imply that the existence of a Form, can also be applied 
to the existence of other Forms, and so on in an infinite regress. 125 The whole argument hinges on 
whether we can include ontologically, the Forms with other types of entity, as being subject to the 
same conditional premises, for their existence. 
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When one considers a whole group of particulars that all have the same quality, say, beauty, one 
then is moved to accept the existence of a single Form, beauty, in which all these particulars 
participate. Yet if you then consider this absolute beauty, the Form Beauty, surely there must then 
be an ever higher 'Form,' than this one and so on? 
Many interpreters of Plato, regard him as having succeeded in overcoming the argument. Sweeny 
maintains that if one accepts rather the analogous causality and link between the Form and the 
particular, this infinite regress argument is avoided. 126 The Form in a participational situation 
does not have but is the perfection involved in that situation, analogously, not uni vocally. 'The 
Form of (say) Largeness or of Beauty is posited not as another large or beautiful thing but as the 
very cause of existents being large or beautiful.' 127 On the other hand, Vlastos 128 argues that the 
main criticism of the Third Man Argument, relies upon an incorrect use of premises, in the use of 
the reductio argument. ' ... The device it exploits, the infinite regress, was the prize product of 
Greek logical virtuosity, and Plato must have found a bitter delight in turning it against his own 
theory. ' 129 Vlastos breaks down, once again, the logic of the argument as follows 130 : 
(Al) Ifa number of things, a, b, c, are all F, there must be a single Form, F-ness, in virtue of 
which we apprehend a, b, c, as all F. 
(A2) Ifa, b, c, and F-ness are all F, there must be another Form, Fl-ness, in virtue of which we 
apprehend a, b, c, and F-ness as all F. 
He then comments as follows, l.ll 'Now merely to compare (A2) with (Al) above is to see a 
discrepancy in the reasoning which ... has never been noticed before ... In (Al) we are told that if 
several things are all F, they are all seen in such virtue ofF-ness. But (A2) tells us that if several 
things are all F, they are all seen as such not because of F-ness, but because of a Form other than 
F-ness, namely, Fl-ness.' 
Gilson has already pointed out that for Plato, the truly real, (Being) is self-identical, or self-
predicative, in the manner of 'F (Beauty) is F-ness.' Now in some cases, or with certain forms, 
this is acceptable. We can follow an argument that says 'Beauty is beautiful.' Nevertheless, as we 
have seen with certain other Forms, especially those that speak of quantities, this argument breaks 
down. Or, for example, take the notion of the Form, 'Bravery.' To speak of 'Bravery,' as being 
brave is absurd. 132 Meinwald's solution to the issue, lies in her suggestion that Plato might not 
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have meant necessarily the standard view of predication, when he suggests: F-ness is F. We can 
mean different things, when we speak about 'The Just,' or 'The Beautiful.' On the one hand we 
might be referring to something that happens to be just. The Beautiful, might be a reference to the 
vases of Helen. Abstract usage of these terms might be used in a different way, however. 133 We 
can also be using the term, say, 'Just,' to refer to 'what exactly it is about something that makes it 
just.' 'What is relevant of present purposes comes from thinking about the fact that in describing 
the second kind of use we employed phrases like: "what is just about these things," "what it is 
about Helen that is beautiful." In these phrases "just" and "beautiful" are already being 
predicated. This suffices to guarantee that: 
The Just is just (or Justice is just) 
and 
The Beautiful is beautiful (or Beauty is beautiful) 
must hold. They do no more that repeat the predications we accepted within the relative clauses 
glossing our subject terms' 134 
Meinwald's solution to the Third Man Argument is to suggest that when Plato, on the one hand, 
speaks of the Form being identical to (predicated of) itself, and then on the other hand, the 
particular thing as predicated of the Form, he is not using the same kind of predication."' There is 
that kind of predication that speaks of the idea of 'in relation to itself' ('pros heauto'), and 'in 
relation to others' ("pros ta al/a'). 
'Thus the difference between what holds in a subject in relation to itself and what holds of the 
same subject in relation to the other is not simply due to the distinction between the others and the 
subject. It derives more fundamentally from the fact that a different relation is involved in each 
kind of case. A predication of a subject in relation to itself holds in virtue of a relation internal to 
the subject's own nature, and can be so employed to reveal the structure of that nature. A 
predication in relation to the others by contrast concerns its subjects' display of some feature, 
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which Plato takes to be conformable in general to something other-namely the nature associated 
with that feature.' 136 
We are now able to draw this section on participation to a conclusion by summarising the nature 
of the problem in the light of our own theme. We do not intend so much to solve the Third Man 
Argument, so much as to illustrate the problems that it suggests. Later on we shall suggest that 
Derrida with his immanent view of differentiation, might also be subject to a slightly similar kind 
of criticism. 
Boethius showed that whenever you use the idea of participation, you are continuing to operate 
within the 'essence,' 'accident' paradigm, the 'necessary,' 'contingent' paradigm. That which is 
participated in, is the primary Being, but the participant is the secondary being. 137 All of the 
attempts of Plato's interpreters, in trying to solve the problem, reveal this basic, hierarchical order 
of things. Because, in the Platonic system, to be ultimately real, is to be 'self-identical,' it 
becomes extremely difficult to relate this self-identity to other identities. 
3.3-PLA TO AND SUBSTANCE138 
3.3.1-SUBSTANCE AS TRUIB 
Having reviewed the Platonic view of participation, we now tum to his understanding of 
substance. Firstly, we need to provide some introductory comments. Plato does not separate the 
issues of epistemology from those of metaphysics. Plato's opinion, unlike the modem 
philosopher, is that there can be no difference between the science of' Being,' and the type of 
knowledge that brings it about. Almost all Western models of truth presuppose a certain 
continuity between intellect and Being itself. We can go even further than this and suggest that in 
Plato, knowledge is assimilated to discourse (Derrida). The root metaphor behind the word 
'Logos,' is that of 'bringing things together.' Speech brings the world together and makes it 
intelligible. 139 His earlier works are specifically concerned with the search for definitions, 
especially ofthe Forms. 
It is not a matter of whether something is 'F,' ornot, but 'what is F-ness?' 14-0 In Plato's later 
works, this search for definitions changes somewhat, now it becomes: the need to know in a more 
applicatory sense, 'what F-ness is.' The earlier dialogues also concern themselves with the 
resultant problems our search for definitions bring about: 'problems about the entities they deal 
with and our judgements concerning them.' 141 This again demonstrates the close proximity 
between metaphysics and epistemology. To understand something really, the philosopher or 
master of dialect needs to: 'demand an account of the essence of each thing' ('ton logon 
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hekastou ... tes ousiai'). 142 What however, is the essence (Ousia) of each thing? It is the intelligible 
nature, as it is seen to participate in the Form/s. 143 See, for example, 'Sophist' 219b. 144 In this 
passage, we have the first occurrence of the singular, neuter participle of the verb 'to be,' 
('Ousia') clearly employed in the sense ofsubstantiality or subsistence. 
Now although in both Aristotle"' and Plato, (particularly Aristotle) 'Being' is used in more than 
one sense, it is employed to reflect 'that which is most truly, substance.' Gilson has pointed out 
that neither in Plato, nor Aristotle, does 'substance' ('Being') mean existence. 146 In fact (with 
perhaps the partial exception of Augustine) up to the Medieval Western period, the modern word 
'existence,' does not really involve itself within the herrneneutical constitution of 'Being,' or 
substance. Aquinas however, following medieval, Arabic scholars, understands the verb 'esse,' as 
'existence,' in our modern sense. 
Kahn suggests that it was the specific Christian doctrine of creation that imposed this new 
dimension on the traditional interpretation of 'Being.' He states that even Augustine and 
specifically the Greek Fathers, continued in the traditional line, influenced by Greek ontology. 147 
The question of 'Ousia,' then, for Plato and the Greeks, is: 'How must the universe be structured 
so that we might understand it properly?' What must the ontological nature of things be, before 
we can say 'this is the case,' (esti) or 'This is true?' Wittgenstein presents a case with his 
'picture-theory of meaning.' He makes the following comment concerning the nature of the 
world: 'The Welt is alles. was der Fall ist. Die Welt isl die Gesamthett der Tatsachen. nicht der 
Dinge.' 148 As this is the earlier Wittgenstein, we can attribute his rendering of the copula 'is,' as 
the intelligible 'is.' What is true, is what is intelligible, the logical spaces in the world.''° 
During the classical period in Greek philosophy, down to Aristotle, the 'veridical,' meaning of 
substantiality, remains at the fore, not the existential. The commencement point with the Greeks, 
is the poem of Parrnenides. Parmenides says; what is 'Being,' is true and what is true is Real. 
Plato is closer to Parrnenides than is Aristotle. 'Plato is interested in establishing that Forms (as 
contrasted with sensibles) are things that are, (not things that are and are not). Aristotle in 
showing that there is not just one kind of Being.' 1'0 In the case of Plato, the discussion of 
'Ousia,' surrounds the copula: 'Xis Y.' This means that there will always be both predicative and 
existential dimensions to the discussion, but the existential is not discussed, it is taken for granted. 
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Ifwe say: 'Socrates is a man,' it is obvious that in some sense Socrates exists. However, the 
'existential' dimension is never studied for its own sake, it is always the logical predication that is 
placed first. The copula type of proposition, ifit deals with a perceptible particular, will only be 
substantially real through participation in the Form. Its 'reality' does not stem from the fact that it 
exists within itself. The true 'substance' has an intelligible, noetic nature, as it participates in the 
Form of that nature. Substance insofar as it is intelligible, is Truth. We have something similar in 
Barth: All of the world becomes supremely, 'spiritually-real,' as it participates in the Word that in 
some sense 'precedes it.' 'Intelligible,' here according to Barth's definition in the 'Church 
Dogmatics,' takes a new tum as the intelligible can only be that which is 'theologically' 
determined. The Logocentric now becomes the Theologocentric. The historicity of the world and 
of human beings is not the critical dimension, it is the participation of these in the divine Word 
that enables true 'substantiality' to come about."' 
3.3.2-PLATO ON SUBSTANCE 
By the time of the 'Republic,' the use of 'Ousia' has become common in the Platonic corpus and 
is not qualified. 152 However, in the Platonic corpus generally, the usage of the word, undergoes a 
certain amount of development. Plato does not use it in nearly as systematic a manner as 
Aristotle. He initially uses the term, to show a predicative identity between two things. 'This, 
then, which gives to the objects of knowledge their truth and to him who knows them his power 
of knowing, is the Form or essential nature of Goodness.'"' Here we perceive the difference 
between Levinas' notion of goodness and Plato's. In Plato's case, something is Good, if it is 
purely itself as a perfect Form. With Levinas, (as we shall see) the ethical 'goodness' of the world 
lies in the basic orientation or obligation of the subject to that of the Other. 
Substantiality is very much part of Plato's search for identity and definitions. " 4 Stead also points 
out that in his search for terms and definitions, Plato also rooted those terms and definitions in 
immutability. That is to say, we cannot really 'know' something that does not last_m Therefore, 
'Ousia,' is to be associated with 'Being,' not 'Becoming. ' 156 At times, Plato referred to the Forms 
collectively as 'Ousia.' Here, we can draw a certain similarity between the Being/Becoming 
binary of Plato and the Substance/ Accident of Aristotle. m 
3.3.3-STEAD'S SUMMARY OF PLATO'S DEVELOPMENT 
Stead begins his summary of Plato's view of substance, by describing his use of it in the early 
dialogues, as a means to make definitions: 'Beauty is.' Another method would be to ask: 'What is 
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X?' 'What is justice?' Here, in the early dialogues, we are not specifically speaking of the Form, 
X. We are merely wanting to know a certain characteristic of an entity_ By the period of the 
'Hippias Major,' a development has taken place_ 'Ousia,' has now become the description of the 
reality of' Justice in itself,' not merely the description of a 'just,' man, or the justness in a man.'" 
We now have a concept of Justice that is no longer directly connected to that quality in sensible 
particulars (such as men) anymore_ Now, 'Ousia,' does not describe a class of things, but a 
transcendent (noumenal) principle of perfection_ This indicates the different direction that Plato's 
substance takes, with respect to that of Aristotle. Plato's philosophy concerns itself with the 
noumenal, not the phenomenon. With Aristotle, but unlike Plotinus, Plato still starts with the 
intelligible world, and moves towards the determining principle. ' ... if anything else is beautiful 
besides beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason than that it partakes of that beauty .. _ '"9 
The next step, in Plato's development as seen in the 'Phaedo,' is the conception of 'Ousia,' that is 
therefore beyond change or imperfections_ In the 'Republic,' 'Ousia,' is no longer used or 
phrased with a dependent genitive, as if it denotes an attribute of something_ It is now used as a 
collective singular. 160 This type of 'Ousia,' or 'to on,' is 'aletheia_' Nevertheless, we must 
rememberthat the Good of the 'Republic,' is not to be attributed to 'Being' (Ousia). Says Plato: 
'. __ And so with our objects of knowledge: these derive from the Good not only their power of 
being known, but their very being and reality; and Goodness is not the same thing as being, but 
even beyond Being, surpassing it in dignity and power. ' 161 
The Good then is the prototype of all the Ideas, of all 'Being_' Stead makes the important 
observation that seldom does Plato come even near to speaking of the Good, in precisely the same 
sense as one might speak of the Christian God. The Good of the 'Republic' is devoid of a sense of 
intelligence or consciousness_ Admittedly, the situation in the 'Timaeus' later on, starts to 
change. 162 Neoplatonising Christians later on would identify the 'demiurge ·of the 'Timaeus' with 
the Good of the 'Republic_' 163 
3.3.4-SUBSTANCE AND RECEPTACLE 
Although the material of the Aristotelian corpus, is strongly anti-Platonic, Driscoll164 maintains 
that although this is the case, this never prevented Aristotle from drawing upon Plato's thought. 
Consequently, the 'receptacle' of Plato, provided the background for Aristotle's doctrine of 
substance as found in the fifth chapter of the 'Categories_' Plato's 'receptacle' is among his most 
difficult concepts. If the Platonic Forms are those things that are most truly substance, how do 
they come to rest in the intelligible things of the world? Plato states his case as follows: 'We must 
start our new description of the universe by making a fuller subdivision than we did before, we 
then distinguished two forms ofreality-we must now add a third. Two were enough at an earlier 
stage, when we postulated on the one hand an intelligible and unchanging model and on the other 
a visible and changing copy of it. We did not distinguish a third form, considering two would be 
enough; but now the argument compels us to try to describe in words a form that is difficult and 
obscure ... In general terms, it is the receptacle and, as it were, the nurse of all becoming and 
change.' 165 
The Demiurge devises the rational shape of the universe, by reflecting on the Forms as models. 
Now in order to account for the way we perceive the universe, the 'receptacle' is then introduced. 
It does not consist of the traditional elements of fire, water, and earth. These elements indicate 
differences of quality, not of substance. 166 The 'receptacle,' unlike the four elements, is part, or a 
type of true 'Being.' At the same time, it is ultimately undefinable, because it does not have any 
real character of its own, save that of the impression that is made in it by the entities that subsist 
in it. 167 It therefore seems that we must not interpret Plato's 'receptacle' as 'substance' in the 
traditional sense of that term. Yet, on the other hand, there is a close approximation between the 
'receptacle,' in Plato and the basic 'matter,' that underlies the form-matter synthesis in 
Aristotle. 168 
Aristotle clearly seems to indicate that his 'matter,' is that out of which things are made. Plato, 
however, does not use the word 'Ousia,' to describe the 'receptacle,' whereas Aristotle does use 
the concept when speaking about matter. Plato's resistance to the title in this application arises 
from his beliefthat only the world of the Forms constitutes true 'reality' or 'substance.' Now we 
believe that the role of Plato's receptacle is subject to the same paradoxical problems as the 
substrate in Aristotle, and is also subject to the same deconstructive reading. The real 'anchor' in 
Plato's system does not really seem to be the 'substance,' (Forms) only. If they are mere 
exemplary causes, they seem to occupy at the very least a role of equal importance to that of the 
receptacle which is the actual 'stuff' or anchor in which individual things subsist. Yet, as is the 
case with Aristotle's substrate, the receptacle is marginalised in Plato's system. 
Driscoll compares the principles that apply to the 'categories' of Aristotle and the 'receptacle' of 
Plato, and suggests a close similarity. 169 In comparing the two concepts, he notes the following: 
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I-Within both the cases of 'primary substance' and the 'receptacle,' entities of a different 
ontological nature can come into being. In other words the entity that comes into being, can only 
do so in the light of the underlying 'receptacle' or 'substratum.' 2-As with the 'receptacle,' 
primary substance does not have a contrary of its own, yet (3) both can receive contraries, (4) 
whilst preserving their essential identity. Despite this intriguing comparison, the differences 
between the basic orientation of Aristotle and Plato remains: Aristotle accords any sensible 
substance or entity, the title of 'Being,' whereas Plato reserves that title, in its purest form, only to 
the abstract world of 'Being.' Later on, with our Trinitarian discussions, we shall see that 
Augustine, instead of using the 'receptacle' as his metaphysical basis for the three persons, chose 
instead to apply the Aristotelian theory of the 'unity of substratum. ' 170 In doing this, his Trinity 
also falls subject to similar paradoxes that we find in Aristotle. 
3.3.5-PLA TO ON SUBSTANCE: CONCLUDING REVIEW 
There are significant differences between the term 'substance,' as perceived by Aristotle and 
Plato. Nevertheless there is an important overlap. Aristotle, Plato and even Parmenides wish to 
firstly explain and understand individual 'things.' The interpreters of Plato particularly, seldom 
acknowledge this. Often it is argued that Plato is trying to rather understand the 'Ideal' world of 
the Forms, not the individual entity. On the contrary, they argue, it is Aristotle, who starts with 
the individual. We do not take this line of interpretation. Both Aristotle, and Plato want to 
understand the individual thing. The difference lies in the way they see the individual thing. 
Aristotle locates the logical 'reality,' of the spatio-temporal substance within that substance 
(form) Plato locates it elsewhere, in the ideal world of the Forms. This means that it is then 
specifically in Plato, that we find the traditional doctrine of participation. Ontologically, Plato and 
Neoplatonism, are far more dependent upon the idea of participation as the sharing of essences, 
than is Aristotle. This Platonic tradition reflects the need to reconcile or join together, individuals 
and their Forms in the Ideal world. 
Aristotle is far more systematic in his treatment and we can interpret him as taking certain lines in 
Plato's thought and incorporating them into his own scheme, which is also trying to understand 
the intelligible world more comprehensively. Plato's 'substance,' is not as 'systematic', nor as 
carefully worked out as Aristotle's is. Aristotle's development was a movement away from the 
system of Plato. Plato was concerned with integrating the different levels of reality (Being) into 
his cosmos. He tried to explain the life of 'becoming,' in the light of a prior realm; 'Being.' This 
means that he had a modified view of 'participation,' compared to Aristotle. With Plato, 
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'participation,' was the answer to the problem of trying to link the two worlds together. As we 
have pointed out, Aristotle does not use the term 'participation' the way Plato does. Plato's 
interpretation of participation, has to fill a large gap between the world of the Forms and the 
world of becoming. This is a large gap, but without participation, there would be no world at all. 
Aristotle's doctrine of 'participation,' can be loosely applied to his view of 'substances,' 
'participating' in 'matter,' 'substrate,' even in intelligible form. In addition, in the Aristotelian 
corpus, we may term the relationship between 'accident' and 'first substance,' also as a type of 
'participation.' 
The link between Aristotle and Plato, however, is clear: substance is prior to participation. 
Participation is only the link or the glue, binding the brute matter of the world, to its determining 
form, its intelligibility. This is also true with Aristotle, even if we acknowledge that he accepted a 
far closer link between the 'matter,' making up a primary substance and its intelligible form. 
Aristotle, it is true, even went as far to suggest that the form is part of the substance. 
Notwithstanding, the basic principle is the same: 'participation' is marginalised, substance is 
central. Looking at this situation with 'deconstructive' eyes as we hope to show, the problem is 
clear. 'Participation,' is not nearly as marginal as Plato and particularly Plotinus, thought. In fact, 
it forms the very focussing point for 'Being,' it is the very context upon which 'Being' must 
depend for its survival. 
Both Aristotle and Plato did not fully work out a contextual ontology of relationships. With Plato, 
'participation,' is not quite the same thing as a relation, indeed his view of relations was 
problematic. The true identity of an entity does not stem from its relationship with other entities, 
but with the Forms. This is not to suggest that Plato was unaware of the relational dimension in 
comparing entities. When speaking relationally, (as we have seen) with a sentence such as 
'Simmias overtops Socrates,' Plato would prefer to interpret this sentence in non-relational terms. 
Instead, he would prefer to locate the concept of 'tallness,' or 'shortness,' as properties of the 
entity concerned. In other words, he would choose to say instead; 'Simmias has tallness, in 
comparison to the shortness of Socrates (See 'Phaedo' 102b-c).' Consequently, and to some 
extent similar to Aristotle, Plato chose to view what modern philosophers would call 'relations,' 
as 'properties' of the entities described. 
In the case of both Plato and Aristotle, it is the coherent, inner Form of an entity that provides it 
with its identity, not its relationship with other entities. True ontological identification of an 
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entity, follows therefore two steps: An inward, followed by an outward movement. Firstly we 
have an inward movement (reflexive unity). Thus a horse is constituted a horse, not because it is 
different ro a cow, in make up and appearance, but because it has the 'inner form' of a horse. 
Secondly, and only now in the ontological order of things, can we then compare the horse to other 
things, such as cows etc. 
We can put it this way: I-The horse for itself(inner Form). 
2-The horse for others (accidental relationships). 
Later on, with the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, exemplified in the work of Augustine, but 
particularly Aquinas, there is the revolutionary movement to combine both steps into one. 
However, in doing this, the problem lay in the 'logical' arena. It was soon discovered that 
expressing this dual movement logically would prove to be an impossibility. 
The primacy of difference that we detect in Saussure and Derrida is not immediately apparent in 
Aristotle and Plato. We can see that this Greek emphasis on the subjectivity is precisely how the 
Western church was to treat the non-Trinitarian doctrine of God, later on. 
God's person is firstly to be interpreted as God-in-Himself, and only then: God-for-others. 
However, by the time of Aquinas, with the full elevation of divine relationality to the status of 
substance, this position starts to fall away. 
There is another fascinating issue that is evident in the Platonic corpus. This is the emerging 
paradox of 'Being' and the problem of closure. In the case of both Plato and Aristotle, 'Ousia,' is 
the epitome of closure, dimensionality. It is a term that denotes ultimate presence, genuine 
'location.' A 'substance' is its own thing, separated from other substances. It is set with certain 
boundaries. Without this conception of closure, both Aristotle and Plato (and the West subsequent 
to them) believed that true metaphysical unity would be impossible. This is why substance is 
always prior to participation. However, for all his substantialism, there is a certain, paradoxical 
resistance to closure in Plato, and then particularly later on, in Plotinus and Neoplatonism. It was 
the Gnostic tradition, not Plato, that condemned the descent into the material as evil. On the 
contrary, Plato's thought, although accepting the Forms as being superior ontologically, 
nonetheless viewed the lesser, intelligibles as also important, indeed logically necessary. The 
higher can only be seen as such in the light of the lower. Subsequently, participation takes on a 
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new, subtle role; that of the consolidation of substance. Participation has a way of consolidating 
different levels of ontological beings or 'hypostates,' in such a way that the 'substantiality,' of 
each is not compromised. Yet, participation can only do this, through self-effacement, without 
demanding 'first place,' or access to the title of 'substance.' 
This conception of participation was to be useful to the Church later on, as demonstrated here for 
example by Athanasius who says: 'And since to be participated no one of us will ever call 
affection or division of God's substance, for it has been shown and acknowledged that God is 
participated and to be participated is the same thing as to beget, therefore that which is begotten is 
neither affection nor division of that blessed substance.' 171 We shall continue to discover more of 
this type of paradox below as we investigate the sources of what later became the Christian triad. 
3.4-CONCLUSION: THE PLATONIC TRIAD 
As we now begin to maneuver ourselves towards Christian Trinitarian thinking, we tum to the 
following question: To what extent can we read triadic thinking into Plato? The Platonic 
dialogues seem to be able to sustain a dyadic principle, 172 but there does not seem to be specific 
evidence ofa defmite triadic metaphysic beyond the dyad. This, in our opinion, is significant in 
the light of the Derridean critique of the West, which stems from the premise that all 
logocentrism is dualistic, not triadic. Later, triadic Neoplatonism was probably a modification of 
the dualism in Plato, as triads in Plato are not particularly clear. 173 In Western thinking, almost all 
triadic concepts, including those of Barth, can ultimately be explained in tenns of binary, 
oppositional problems. However, as we shall argue, a developed doctrine of the Trinity provides 
an answer to the Derridean critique of binary metaphysics. 
3.4.1-THE COSMOLOGICAL TRIAD 
Most scholars who search for triads in Plato, see such doctrines not in the Platonic oeuvre itself, 
but in what other critics (especially Aristotle) have alleged, concerning what Plato taught. This 
brings about the question of Plato's unwritten opinions. To what extent have we true access to 
them, and are these opinions really different from, or developments of Plato's position expressed 
in the dialogues?174 It is our view that whatever Plato did teach outside of his extant dialogues, it 
probably would not have violently contradicted what the dialogues do in fact, teach. 
Both Findlay, and Montserrat-Torrents,"' base their opinions of the Platonic triad, partly on the 
dialogues and partly on Aristotle's interpretation of the unwritten portions of Plato's thought. The 
absolute starting point when searching for a triad, is the two extreme ontological-metaphysical 
components in Plato's cosmos, the transcendent Unity, (Being) and the contingent, uncertain 
world of'Becoming.' Plato's method is procession from the knowledge of the sensory world to 
the One. His triad is not theological. It is not the result of a search seeking to discover the 
metaphysical structure of a deity. 176 If we can read a triad into Plato, it would be arise out of his 
solution to the epistemological question: how do we make intelligible sense of the sensible? 
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As we have seen in the 'Timaeus,' all sensible things subsist in the receptacle, and partly consist 
of this 'substratum,' which gives them space. The other component of the sensible individual is 
the intelligible form. What kind of entity is this intelligible form? Post-Platonic tradition, and 
some of the dialogues, assert that this is a mathematical entity. m These mathematical forms are 
not universal, although they are eternal 'in time.' 178 The eternity of the mathematical forms stems 
from the fact that their truth does not change in time, yet because their form is part of the 
intelligible world of particulars, they are part of the spatial continuum. Thus the mathematical 
intelligible consists of a determining component (which we shall see, is the noetical intelligible) 
and a detennined one. We have already implied that the determined one is the substratum-the 
spatial continuum. The determining component of the mathematical intelligible, is the noetical 
intelligible (We have also pointed out that this hierarchy is subject to a deconstructive reading). 
With a view to the subsequent application to Trinitarian theology, the intermediate179 function of 
the mathematical intelligible, will lead to a further division into 'upper,' and 'lower Soul,' in the 
Platonic tradition chronologically after Plato himself. The ontological status of both the 
mathematical and the noetic intelligible is substantiality. 180 
'Substantiality' here is meant as composite substance: as with the mathematical intelligible, the 
noetical intelligible is capable of being broken down for further analysis. As with the 
mathematical, the noetic intelligible consists also of a determining and a determined 
component."' The determined principle is the intelligible substratum, the simple indefinite, or the 
'Indefinite Dyad.' 1' 2 The Indefinite Dyad is part of Plato's attempt to account forthe diversity of 
the world (numerically) as it lies under the supreme principle of unity. Ultimate unity needs to be 
associated with a second principle, the limited and unlimited, ('Philebus' 16 c-e, 23c-d) or the 
'great and small.'"' Findlay points out that even in the 'Eide,' themselves as 'Being,' there are 
implied contraries. In this paradoxical sense, they always include whatever they 'exclude,' and 
what falls short of the Forms as true 'Being.' It is this duality that makes itself possible through 
the Indefinite Dyad, for the real world. " 4 The determined principle of the mathematical 
intelligible then is the 'Indefinite Dyad.' The determining principle is the 'One. ' 185 
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Now unlike the mathematical intelligible forms, the determining concepts (the noetical 
intelligibles) are ungenerated, universals, independent ofspace. 186 The noetical intelligibles, do 
have substantial existence, but only in the area of metaphysics, they do not have any contact with 
the sensible world."' The mathematical intelligibles are the objects of the discursive faculty (the 
arts), whilst the higher noetic intelligibles are the objects of the intuitive faculty, science being 
their field ofknowledge. 188 
The determining principle of the noetic intelligible, is the 'One.' Montserrat-Torrents, raises some 
interesting issues concerning the One, that will have direct impact on Trinitarian thinking later on. 
The point is, that the ontological status of the One is not substantiality, diverse or multiple. It is 
not part of 'Being,' but beyond 'Being.' 189 'Being,' is the principle of determination, but the One 
is beyond determination, and is beyond the grasp of the mind in the normal sense, other than 
analogy. 
We are now able to determine how, during the Christian era; these Platonic principles were 
modified, and drawn upon, via Plato and then Plotinian Neoplatonism. Below is a general 
summary, including certain strands of non-orthodox, as well as orthodox interpretations. Firstly, 
and possibly most importantly, in Christian trinitarianism, we have the transfer from object to 
subject. The objective, mathematical and epistemological principles of Plato, now become 
intelligent, thinking beings. 190 This issue of the Subjectivity/Objectivity of God was to plague 
Barth throughout his career. With the doctrine of the Trinity, theological ontology has replaced 
epistemology. The other Trinitarian modification that took place, using Aristotelian metaphysics, 
instead of Plato's, was the incorporation of each principle into a single unity, which paradoxically 
was an essential dimension to each hypostasis as well! 191 This was to be the foundation of the 
main problem in Trinitarian theology as neither the metaphysics of Plato, nor Aristotle, provided 
any method of achieving this incorporation without many logical problems. This became 
particularly apparent by the time of Aquinas. Augustine, on the other hand, felt that the logical 
problem, was to some extent, solvable. 
Augustine and the West after him set about taking the principle of substratum, which is at the 
bottom of the Platonic scheme, and placing it at the 'ontological' top, as the underlying 
metaphysical 'foundation,' from which the three persons 'arise.' Historically, sometimes this 
'foundation' is also seen as the Father, the fount of deity. 
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Furthermore with Christian theology, the Platonic direction is about to become reversed. Plato 
begins his method from the bottom or the world of Becoming. Plotinus and Christianity, operate 
from the Monad down. The divine creator has to be understood in terms of his creation. Of 
course, concerning the Trinitarian thinking in the East, we need to admit the exception: The 
Fathers of the Eastern Church as a general rule, based their Trinitarian speculations, primarily 
within the locus of the history of redemption, not within the metaphysical-ontological scheme of 
Augustine. 
One other significant modification, was orthodox Trinitarianism's radical reviewing of the 'One,' 
of the 'Republic,' and its radical outworking in Plotinus. Plato's system pointed towards or 
suggested the denial of closure in two ways. Firstly, in Plato, we have the logical necessity of the 
'layers of Being,' each relying on the other for subsistence. Each hypostasis, retains its 'unity,' in 
the light of the others, and their mutual participation. To posit one hypostasis is not enough. The 
identity of one is only constituted in the light of the others. The other, more radical resistance to 
closure in Plato, is the definition of the One in the Republic as beyond 'Being.' Gilson has 
already illustrated (above) why Plato had to define the Good in this way. This contradictory 
definition of the Good beingthat which constitutes 'Being,' but remains 'Beyond Being,' was to 
open up different directions in theology, and many problems. The first direction was the 
mysticism of Plotinus and the Gnostics. The orthodox Trinitarians, however, acknowledged the 
transcendence of God, as did Plotinus with his principle of the 'One,' but with certain 
modifications. Many of the Christian Trinitarians, were somewhat hesitant to apply Plotinus' 
radical term of 'beyond Being,' to the first hypostasis in the Trinity. 
Yet as our study shall show, throughout ecclesiastical history, this principle was never completely 
absent from the first person of the Trinity, even the Trinity itself. However, generally, much 
orthodox Trinitarianism, ignored the radical transcendent conceptual language of the Platonic and 
Plotinian first principle, and instead.chose to concentrate on the Second principle (Nous) as being 
the most transcendent. The Second, (Nous) became that which represents the Father. The absolute 
indetermination of the One is replaced by 'pre-eternal self-consciousness.' The reason for this 
was the Church's reading of the Bible, which, as far as she was concerned, did not speak of God 
as 'Beyond-Being,' and self-consciousness. 
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'Owing to the withdrawal of the First, the Second assumes some of the transcendental attributes 
of the former. This process we could designate as the raising of the Second. The fifth operation is 
the splitting of the Third. The third principle is burdened with too many functions in its 
transformation into a conscious subject and by the raising of the Second. So its entity tends to 
duplicate into an Upper principle belonging to the realm of intellect, and a Lower, nature 
informing one.' 192 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PLOTINUS 
4.1-THE TRIAD OF PLOTINUS: 'BEING AND THE ONTOLOGY OF DEFERRAL' 
4.1.l-PLOTINUS AND THE 'PARMENIDES' 
The central tenet of Plotinian Neoplatonism is the concept of unity, construed as the grounds and 
pior necessity, for an understanding of diversity. This thought has determined the West, old and 
new: from Plato, through Dionysius and Thomas, Spinoza and Leibniz, the Idealism of Fichte, 
Hegel and Schelling, up to Derrida. 
Plotinus is important for the West, as he stands at the head of the tradition of subsequent 
Neoplatonism, which never succeeded in really going beyond Plotinus. In fact the later scholastic 
character ofNeoplatonism involves a concern with the explicit systematising of Plotinus, rather 
than the quest for originality. We begin our exposition of Plotinus' triadic ontology with a brief 
examination of the roots of his thought. These are undoubtedly far more Platonic than 
Aristotelian, especially in his view of both substance and participation. Yet Plotinus, although 
seeing his own involvement with Platonism as merely that of a true expositor of Plato, went 
beyond Plato's position.193 Plotinus was far more of a systematician, employing more focus in 
terms of his overall goals, than Plato. These goals were decidedly other-worldly as Plotinus 
entirely ignored the more social-political aspects to the Platonic corpus. m Here lie at least some 
of the roots of the problem manifest in the Christian Trinity, just about unattended to, until 
Moltrnann. This is the lack of a concrete, social dimension to the Trinity. Our focus is specifically 
concerned with the way Plotinus synthesises the Platonic doctrines of Being, substance and 
participation into a reduced, triadic overview of cosmology and ontology. 
Jackson suggests that the origins of the Plotinian triad are to be found in the Platonic 
'Parmenides. ' 191 Plotinus himself concurs with this interpretation of his work, 196 with respect to 
its origin in the 'Parmenides.' 197 It can certainly be clearly seen that the first conception of the 
'One,' historically, is definitely present in Plato's dialogue, predating Plotinus. 
4.1.2-PLOTINUS: IBE QUEST FOR A FIRST PRINCIPLE 
We have already suggested that the ontological movement in Plotinus is opposite to that in Plato. 
Both Plato and Plotinus tried to work out a comprehensive scheme of explaining the diversity of 
59 
things, through a theory of the one and the many_ Plato moved towards the suggestion that unity-
in-itself must come first, but only as the best means to understand diversity_ This unity, most of 
the time seemed to bethe unity of the Forms. Only seldom (such as in 'Republic' 509b) did Plato 
intimate that there was an ontological reality beyond the Forms_ Plotinus, on the other hand 
begins his metaphysical system with the 'One,' not the many. This is why Gerson commences his 
summary in his monograph on Plotinus with the first chapter entitled: 'An argument for the 
existence of the first principle of all. ' 198 From today's somewhat sceptical and immanent 
perspective, it is difficult for us, in the aftermath of Russell, Hume and Derrida, to appreciate 
Plotinus' desire for a first principle philosophically. 199 
Gerson points out that in seeking the existence of a first principle, Plotinus was furthering a long 
tradition in Greek philosophy."'" However, what made Plotinus begin with this principle? One 
answer is to remind ourselves that Plotinus took over from Plato the search for what is really real 
(Being)_ In fact, all three hypostases need to be understood on this basis-'°1 Now, other than Plato 
as his teacher, Plotinus' authority is reason_ That which is real, must in some sense, be 
intelligible. In Plato, the true determining paradigms of 'Being,' are the Fonns_ With Plotinus 
however, although Intellect is the locus of the Forms, the One and Soul also perform 
paradigmatic functions as well."'2 Following on with Greek tradition, Plotinus also seeks to 
understand things causally. 203 
He says this: 'If there is anything after the First, it must necessarily come from the First; it must 
either come from it directly or have its ascent back to it through the beings between, and there 
must be an order of seconds and thirds, the second going back to the first and the third to the 
second_ For there must be something simple before all things, and this must be other than ail the 
things which come after it, existing by itself, not mixed with the things which derive from it, and 
all the same able to be present in a different way to these other things, being really one, and not a 
different being and then one; it is false even to say of it that it is one, and there is "no concept or 
knowledge" of it, it is indeed also said to be "beyond Being." For if it is not to be simple, outside 
all coincidence and composition, it could not be a first principle; and it is the most self-sufficient, 
because it is simple and the first of all __ . A reality of this kind must be one alone: for ifthere was 
another of this kind, both would be one_ For we are certainly not talking about two bodies, or 
meaning that the One is the first body. For nothing simple is a body, and body is what comes into 
being, but not the first principle; and "the first principle has not come into being," ifthen it was a 
principle, which was not bodily, but was truly one, that (other of this kind) would be the First_ " 04 
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Plotinus in this passage argues that the existence of simples requires the existence of a prior 
simple. As we have seen, Gilson also suggests another reason why Plotinus, working from Plato's 
fotmdation, has to have a single, unified principle, beyond 'Being.' This is because that which is 
simple cannot be 'Being,' and therefore must be beyond it. In continuing his summary of 
Plotinus' reason for the existence of the One, Gerson introduces the medieval distinction of 
' , d ' . ,10~ essence, an existence. 
In Plotinus' view, we cannot attribute 'existence,' to the One in the same way that we attribute it 
to other entities. Although the One is beyond Being, Plotinus does not suggest that it therefore 
does not have its own 'essence,' or 'nature.' Its essence is just inconceivable in the normal way of 
conceiving things. Instead, its essence is identical with its existence, unlike contingent, composite 
beings, where these two concepts can be separated. ' 06 We would assume that the affirmation that 
both the qualities of substance (essence) and existence are indivisibly within the make-up of the 
One, enables Plotinus to avoid a possible ontological-regress argument. 
The 'whatness' of the One, is identical to the 'ls-ness' of the 'One.' This means that, in the 
Aristotelian sense (albeit with some modification) we can therefore say that the One is 'that 
which is most truly substance,' as it is entirely self-dependent. 'From the premise that there can 
be at most one unqualifiedly simple thing in which essence (substance) and existence are 
indistinct, Plotinus can infer immediately that in a given plurality at least one thing must be such 
that essence and existence are really distinct in it .. Thus, any plurality as such provides the 
requisite datum for an argument to the One.'207 
4.1.3-SUBSTANCE, PARTICIPATION AND THE THREE HYPOSTASES: 
THE 'ONE' IN RELATION TO 'NOUS' AND 'SOUL. 
We have already introduced the concept of the One, the hypostasis that is prior both ontologically 
and logically to the others, namely Nous and Soul. In his postulation of the One, Plotinus moves 
beyond Middle-Platonism, especially in his conception of the One as beyond Being. ' 0 ' Normally 
speaking, Plotinus' predecessors would have postulated the highest principle of the triad, as being 
that which was roughly synonymous with his rendering of Nous (Intellect). 
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Nevertheless, in Plotinus the One is beyond Being because it is pure unity and cannot have a trace 
of duality. Anything that is part of Being must have both form or essence (Ousia) together with 
Being. Here Plotinus, for example, would differ from his predecessor, Numenius who believed 
that the first principle has both supreme intellect and supreme Being. ' 09 The universe of Plotinus, 
up to the hypostasis of Intellect, is fairly standard Neoplatonism. Beyond that point, we have the 
total indetermination of the One, which is the vitality underlining the formed and created world of 
Intellect itself. 210 Because the First principle is beyond the duality of subject and object, it cannot 
engage in thinking or cognition in the normal manner. This introduces the unique, mystical aspect 
in Plotinus. In the pursuit of true knowledge, one must move towards the One. To do this requires 
that type of thinking which is beyond the philosophical, the 'reasonable.' The mind has to be 
purged of its philosophy to find the Good. The supreme achievement of the intellect is to leave 
intellect behind. 211 
We are reminded here of Wittgenstein when he says: 'My propositions are elucidatory in this 
way: he who understands me finally recognises them as senseless, when he has climbed out 
through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has 
climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly ... ' 212 
As we have intimated, with Middle-Platonism, Mind is the highest reality, and the intrinsic 
goodness in all things stems from their logical conformity to the divine Mind. With Plotinus, this 
is not so. All reality is only real or 'good,' in that it follows after the pattern of the 'One.' In their 
derivation from the One, all entities have and find their reality. w This means that Plotinus is not 
merely concerned with the imposition of form upon all things, in order to grant them 'reality.' He 
is more concerned with understanding 'how things can exist,' with respect to the One. This does 
not mean that Plotinus is viewing the idea of' existence,' in the way we might interpret such a 
word. He is not here thinking about 'existence,' in the physical, material meaning of the term. 
After all, the three hypostases are not primarily things that consist of 'matter.' His concern for 
existence is a metaphysical concern, underlying the ontological make-up of things. Still, with his 
theory of the One, Plotinus is moving closer to the Christian view of God, than his predecessors. 
We might say that he is mid-way between Aristotle and Aquinas. Not being concerned with 
creation in time, he is more interested in creation outside of time. 214 Now, in the movement of all 
'Being,' towards that which is beyond Being, does not Plotinus advocate monistic mysticism?"' 
This is not so. Plotinus in describing the return to the One, does not suggest that a person or other 
entity can become ontologically in union with the 'One.' This union does not detract from the 
absolute transcendence of the One. That is why the gap between the One and the other two 
hypostases, owing to the unique nature of the One, will always be greater than the gap between 
Nous and Soul. 
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However, because of the One's unique position, in comparison to the other two hypostases, 216 can 
we really call it 'a hypostasis,' or 'a substance,' at all? Ifwe term a substance or a hypostasis a 
metaphysical entity that is self-existent, self-sufficient, (as the Aristotelian tradition would 
suggest) difficulties can develop. Anton looks into this problem,217 and after examining the 
opinions of Deck and others who deny that the One can be a substance in the traditional sense, 
replies that the One can indeed, be seen to be a hypostasis. One way of looking at the matter is to 
argue that more than the other hypostases; the One is hypostasis as it is self-subsisting in the more 
superlative sense of the word. If however, we call the One, 'hypostasis,' then what label do we 
give to 'Nous' and 'Soul,' who are obviously less self-sufficient? Plotinus says the following: 218 
'Ennead' VI.6.3.11: The One as having hypostasis. 
'Ennead · VI.8.13 .43-44: The hypostasis of the Good. 
'Ennead' Vl.8.7.4.7: It is a quasi-hypostasis. 
In conclusion to this matter we can argue that the One is indeed 'a hypostasis,' or 'a substance', if 
we do so within the boundaries of Plotinian tenninology and metaphysics.219 Plotinus is not 
consistent in sticking to a certain term such as 'substance,' or 'hypostasis,' when speaking about 
the One or the other two natures, Nous and Soul. He might however use a term such as 
'hypostasis,' to define what it is that he wishes to name, as being most true to the nature of the 
One. Thus, we might term the One as a hypostasis, or a substance, as long as we make use of 
these words in a way that applies uniquely to the One, not as they apply to the other two 
hypostases. The One cannot be 'hypostasis' or 'substance,' in precisely the same way as we 
might attribute these terms to Nous and Soul. Here we can see the genesis of the tensions that 
would manifest themselves later. Christian theology would later attempt to uphold both the 
transcendence of God, as well as idea of God as a substance (This is the paradox of God as 
Being\Beyond Being). 
It must also be said that when using the term 'substance,' in the philosophy of Plotinus, caution is 
advised. Plotinus, operating within the Platonic tradition, is extremely critical of the Aristotelian 
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view ofsubstance.220 The major difference between the Aristotelian and Plotinian viewpoints lies 
in the fact that Plotinus will not view 'Ousia,' (especially material entity) as the primary 
ontological component. True Being is not substance. Neither can sensible substance in Plotinus' 
opinion, be entirely self-sufficient. All sensible entities find their 'Being,' in the three hypostases 
that originate in the One. The sensible world is only an image of the more real, intelligible 
universe.221 Participation in Plotinus, as we shall see, nullifies the Aristotelian doctrine of 
sensible, primary substances. Any part of the sensible world possesses Being only in the light of 
its participation in something prior to it, ultimately the One. 
With the Plotinian doctrine of the One, we see reflected the powerful Platonic/Neopythagorean 
principle of the idea of unity as the principle from which all multiplicity flows, or the Dyad from 
the Unity. We have seen this, for example, in Plato's doctrine of the 'Indefinite Dyad' as a 
reflection of diversity coming from Unity. In our opinion, this leads to the correlate view of 
'substance,' prior to, and before 'participation.' Substantiality as interpreted as being 'one,' or 
'self-subsistent,' in the Plotinian tradition, applies in the superlative sense, to the One of Plotinus. 
The One is supremely single, a unity. While the hypostases 'Nous,' and 'Soul,' might also be 
hypostases in their own right, they contain the element of 'multiplicity,' which the One does not. 
'Substance' then, can mean absolute unity, 'oneness,' but participation cannot. Participation 
always implies the interrelationship between two metaphysical modes of being. It is here that we 
see the origins of the hierarchically determined Western viewpoint of 'substance,' or 'presence' 
before 'participation' (relatedness). 
4.1.4-NOUS 
The second hypostasis 'proceeds,' from the One. Exactly how this procession takes place, is 
subject to some debate. At times Plotinus uses the word 'emanation,' popular with Middle-
Platonism, but it is clear that in some ways he wants to go beyond the traditional meaning of this 
term.'22 At times he will speak of light that emanates from the sun, as well as using other 
metaphors. The important thing here is that the production does not in any way effect the 
source. 
223 As consciousness does not occupy a high level as a human activity, the emanation does 
not come about through any conscious effort on the part of the One. Yet the Soul, Intellect and 
the One are always separate substances. Iamblichus, another important figure in Neoplatonism, 
chose a different route to that of Plotinus by distinguishing between a primary and a secondary 
'One,' prior to the Dyad. This 'second One,' is capable of entering into relations with 
indeterminate otherness, and generates the Dyad (multiplicity). lamblichus' model of Being was 
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that it takes form in three modes: The First as being immutable, unrelated to all other entities. The 
Second mode is potentiality, related to all other things beyond itself, and the Third as actuality in 
relation. This is the triad of unparticipated, participated and participating, 224 a viewpoint 
intriguingly similar to the three participant modes of Barth: Revealer, Revealdness and 
Revelation. 
The task of Intellect is to bring about the differentiation of the unity of the One, without losing 
that unity. Its thinking, when compared to that of Soul, is far more intuitive and immediate. This 
is because although the principle (Arche) of Intellect does include the idea of duality in thought 
this is an extremely self-reflexive intellection, unlike that of the Soul. Its focus is on the eternal 
Forms. As a hypostasis it cannot be identified with the noetic activities as in other beings. It is, 
instead, the starting-point in explaining all intellects. 'The Nous or mind is not something crassly 
other than or begotten from Unity, but is simply unity itself separated from itself by difference, 
and returning to itself from difference."" The unity of the thought in Intellect is not like the 
instantive intelligences in the souls of men which operates in time. This higher, causative Mind, is 
the unique 'eidos' of knowledge, as seen in the figure of the demiurge of the 'Timaeus. ' 226 
Intellect in Plotinus is also roughly synonymous to the Forms in Plato, the highest level of Being. 
4.1.5-SOUL OR UNQUIET BEING 
As the final and third of Plotinus' hypostases, Soul is the most wide-ranging and various in its 
activities.227 Furthermore, it is far closer to the second hypostasis, 'Intellect,' than Intellect is to 
the One. As with Intellect, its primary purpose is also cognitive, but on a far lower, discursive 
level (i.e., reasoning from premises to conclusions). Soul stands analogously to Intellect as 
Intellect stands to the One. 228 Instead of focussing its noetic intentions on eternity; Soul looks 
more to the world of sensible things. It is the mediator between the Forms and the sensible 
world.229 Thus, Soul in the 'Ennead's' can be identified with the Word-Soul of the 'Timaeus.' Of 
course the great difficulty here, (which Plotinus, spends quite some time discussing, as we shall 
see, below) is how the universal Soul participates in the individual, created souls in space. 230 Soul 
is part of incorporeal Being which cannot be divided. How then can it participate without losing 
this undividedness, in contingent souls?231 
4.2-PARTICIPATION IN PLOTINUS 
It is with the Plotinian view of participation that further important developments, finding their 
roots in the Platonic tradition, but moving beyond it, emerge. It has already been argued that in 
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the Western world, as a general rule, the doctrine of individual substances has seen pre-eminence 
over that of participation. Superficially, this is so in Plotinus: he fashions his metaphysical 
scheme around three specific, identifiable, metaphysical and ontological essences. The story, 
however, is not as simple as that, as these essences participate to a significant extent within each 
other, to the point of diminishing the role of the importance of their separate subsistences. This 
brings about deferral. Western thought, rooted in the Greek mind, is exemplified by the search for 
closure. This has been seen as attainable through the perception of the intelligible forms of 
individual substances. Knowledge of this forrn/s depends on the ability to identify the 
individuality of the entity as distinct from other entities. For, if we cannot know what object it is 
that we are seeking to understand, overall comprehension is impossible. In other words, to know 
something 'properly' implies a knowledge of its boundaries (isolation), its 'separateness,' its 
'substance,' as distinguished from other substances. In our opinion, both Plotinus and Aristotle 
represent this way of thinking, but with certain important differences. 
Because Aristotle is more of a nominalist, he is happy to isolate the form of individual 
substances, within the entities themselves, whereas Plotinus and Plato will try to find the 'form,' 
of the sensible individual within the world of Being. This world of Platonic Being, when reduced 
to its essential aspect, is actually beyond Being. The crisis however, is that within these traditions, 
there is also the unacknowledged and paradoxical tendency of essentialism (whether realism or 
nominalism) to also resist closure. Of course, this resistance is not always obvious, especially 
when we are dealing with philosophies that seek with every breath to resist this problem. Some of 
today's revisionist thinkers, however, have nevertheless brought this problem to the fore.232 Yet, 
even going back to the thinking of seminal figures such as, Aristotle, Plato and Plotinus, the 
problems are visible. With norninalism, closure is a problem because although nominalism claims 
that it has succeeded in isolating the individual entities, it finds difficulty in integrating them into 
the system of the whole. 
Unlike Plato and Plotinus, Aristotle's substances are pretty much isolated from each other. In fact 
as certain empiricists were later to point out, we cannot even know Aristotle's substances, without 
knowing their accidents. This means that substances only 'participate' in other substances, or the 
whole of the universe, accidentally. We can know the similarity between two substances because 
they share in certain accidental properties. 'Participation,' is an accidental thing. With this being 
the case, the question is whether we really can then know the individual thing (substance). 
Be that as it may, the concern in this thesis is for the alternative problems that are raised with 
realism, not 
so much with nominalism. The reason for this is because, via Plotinus, and N eoplatonism, 
Christian Trinitarian theology inclined towards a theology of realism, not nominalism. 
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How then does Neoplatonism, (realism) entrenched in Christian theology, resist closure? The 
answer is in the continual, mutual interdependence, the deferral of being between different 
ontological zones, levels or hypostases leading up to the One. Despite the emphasis on the 
individual hypostases as individuants, they are so ontologically intertwined that it becomes 
increasingly difficult to understand one of the hypostases, without bringing in the others, and their 
mutual participation. This is why in Plotinian ontology, we have the problem of ontological 
regression, or continual deferral. We will try to illustrate this with the interrelationship between 
Plotinus' three hypostases. In addition to this, Plotinian Neoplatonism also paradoxically 
undermines its own essentialism through its doctrine of the One which is 'beyond Being,' or 
beyond essentialism. In other words, in a culture that thrives on the 'location of Being,' Plotinus' 
great foundation, on which all things depend, cannot be thus located. 
Each of the three hypostases cannot be located as independent entities, (substances) exclusively 
from each other. This is despite the fact that Plotinus uses the language and the methodology that 
seems to point to such location. The hypostases are only what they are because of their 
participation in each other, and especially the One. 
4.2.1-THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT REVISITED 
There are many dimensions to any discussion of Plotinus and participation. The first and perltaps, 
more obvious starting point is his own answer to the Platonic 'Sailcloth dilemma,' or 'Third Man 
Argument. "'3 In 'Ennead' VI.4-5, Plotinus specifically concerns himself with the solving of the 
problem of the 'Parmenides,' and the 'Timaeus.' How can immaterial Forms participate in 
multiple sensibles? Plotinus' specific reformulation of the problem is the question of how the 
lowest hypostasis, Soul, can participate in multiple sensibles. 134 However, he uses the term 
'participation' fairly broadly whenever an item has a property that it has gained through 
something else. In other words a property that is not part of its own essence. 235 
Plotinus' reply to the Third Man argument, is to move away from the Platonic idea of speaking of 
that which is participated in (the Form) as being discontinuous with its participant, by calling the 
participant an image (Eikon) of the Form. The reason for this is that in the case of Plotinus, this 
suggests that the Form and the sensible participant are totally apart. For him, in some sense, 
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participants must participate in Ideas by possessing their powers, and they can only have such 
powers, if the Ideas are really present in them, and this brings us back to the same Third Man 
dilemma. 236 However, Plotinus insists that in order to 'be itself truly,' any Idea must be separate 
and cannot participate in the sensible. His solution to the problem is as follows. Instead of 
suggesting that the Ideas proceed towards the participants, (the sensible world) the participants 
move towards the Ideas and participate in them in this alternative manner, preserving the Ideas' 
individual status. So every Idea (Form) is present to the sensible world without entering into it. 
That is, without becoming a constituent of it. 'Precisely these sensible things that have the 
appropriate capacity to participate in a given Idea do so by somehow coming to be directly 
present to that Idea. The agent or productive factor in this process is soul and its Logos ... ' 237 
Nature then 'creates,' through the contemplation of Soul. 'And if anyone were to ask nature why 
it makes, if it cared to hear and answer the questioner it would say: "You ought not to ask, but to 
understand in silence ... Understand what then? That what comes into being is what I see in my 
silence, and object of contemplation which comes to be naturally, and that I, originating from this 
sort of contemplation have a contemplative nature. And my act of contemplation makes what it 
contemplates .. _ '"238 
4.2.2-PARTICIPATION BETWEEN THEHYPOSTASES 
Most articles dealing with Plotinus' doctrine of participation, discuss Plotinus' answer to the 
problem Plato raises in the 'Timaeus,' and the 'Parmenides.' Plotinus' answer to the question is 
unique and intriguing (although we suspect, not without its problems). However, we must also 
bear in mind much comment that has occurred on the subject of Plotinus' interrelation of the three 
hypostases themselves.239 It is precisely here, that the most important issues lie, with respect to 
our overall purpose in this thesis. 
The bringing about of Intellect from the One is a spontaneous happening, not involving any 
noetic activity on the part of the One.240 Yet in Plotinus' scheme of things, this spontaneous 
giving is necessary to create Being as we know it. His account of the bringing about of Intellect 
involves two continuous, deferring movements. Firstly, 'unformed potentiality,' or an 
'indeterminate vitality,' proceeds from the One. Then we have a second movement where this 
vitality returns back to the One in contemplation. As it performs this action, it is filled with 
content and becomes 'Intellect' and Being. 241 Armstrong points out that in returning to the One in 
contemplation, Intellect does not resume the ontological shape of the One. The One is beyond 
ontological form. Instead, Intellect has to surpass its own Being in order to contemplate the 
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One.242 'Rather, the intellect must return, so to speak, backwards, and give itself up, in a way, to 
what lies behind it (for it faces in both directions); and there, ifit wishes to see that First 
Principle, it must not be altogether intellect. ' 143 
There is also another important dimension to this procedure. Although this self-assertion of 
Intellect is necessary for Being to come abcut, it is, in another sense, illegitimate self-assertion 
(To/ma).'.., 'To/ma,' is the Neopythagorean term for the Platonic 'Indefinite Dyad,' separating 
itself from the Good, and bringing multiplicity about. The 'To/ma,' principle in Plotinus' 
metaphysics is the 'unquiet' principle, resident in the three hypostases. It is this principle that 
causes the hypostases to be 'unhappy' with their Being, or 'substantiality.' 'For when it 
contemplates the One, it does not contemplate it as one: otherwise it would not become Intellect. 
But beginning as one, it did not stay as it began, but, without noticing it, became many, as if 
heavy (with drunken sleep), and unrolled itself because it wanted to possess everything-how 
much better it would have been for it not to want this, for it became the second!' 245 
The illegitimate desire oflntellect is the cause of the production of multiplicity and number, as 
opposed to the perfect unity of the One. This is the desire 'to be,' to have Being.246 However, as a 
desire to 'exist,' it must also tum back to the One in order to have that 'Being.' This, then, is what 
we call the oscillating ontology of continual deferral, back and forth from the One to the many, 
the legitimate to the illegitimate and back again. Therefore, in our opinion, participation takes 
precedence over 'substance.' Without this participation, this continual deferral, back and forth, 
the two hypostases of Intellect and Soul are nothing. That which has 'Being,' refers continually to 
that which is beyond 'Being,' that which has no Being at all I 
4.2.3-PARTICIPATION AS THE INTERRELATION OF SUBJECT-OBJECT 
It has already been observed that one of the Neoplatonic modifications of Platonism, was to 
provide the different hypostases with 'consciousness,' to suggest that they are 'contemplating 
subjects.' This inaugurated the usage of psychological paradigms in the language of the Trinity, 
reaching its zenith in Augustine, Hegel and Barth. Both Plotinus and Barth attempt to view 'God,' 
as somehow being beyond the traditional distinction between subject-object. Barth speaks of God 
as the Object that is indissolubly Subject. In another sense, Plotinus speaks of the One who as the 
supreme subject, (although Plotinus denies traditional consciousness to the One) somehow gives 
rise to object. This is almost Husserlian. This object, in its tum then becomes the subject of an 
activity that results in the rise of another object. This process continues until we arrive at an 
object which does not become a subject for any further object. w 
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In other words, the One does not spontaneously generate the other two hypostases. It is only 
Intellect that comes from the One. 'There are apparently two species of contemplation, one which 
precedes, not temporally but logically, the act ofhypostatic creation, and another which takes as 
its object the product of this created activity.'""' It is the second movement of contemplation, 
moving towards that hypostasis which preceded, that produces the next hypostasis. It is in this 
secondary movement, (say, Intellect returning to the One) that enables the secondary hypostasis 
to 'conceive' of the first one, as an 'object.' Both Barth and Plotinus struggle with the idea of the 
transcendence of God (or the One). If something is utterly transcendent, how can we behold it as 
an 'object?',.. Barth withdraws to 'revelation,' as the determining factor here. God is His 
revelation. Only God can make himself somehow 'Object,' in his hiddeness. Man cannot 
conceive of God as Object, without God's initial movement from above. Plotinus is fascinatingly 
different here. He denies that the 'One,' engages in any downward movement towards the other 
hypostases. They participate in the One, through their own spontaneous movement. Of course, 
Barth would suggest that this viewpoint is suspiciously reminiscent to that of Schleiermacher. 
Yet unavoidably, contemplation must mean some type of awareness. " 0 Hunt suggests that there 
are two types of awareness in Plotinus,251 explicit awareness and implicit awareness. Explicit 
awareness is normal consciousness when one focuses on some object in a reflective and attentive 
way. It can focus on an object, and be aware of that which is contemplated. Implicit awareness 
(which can accompany explicit awareness) is subconscious and indefinite. It is thus possible to 
contemplate explicitly a certain object or sensible particular, whilst being implicitly aware of 
another reality, such as the divine origin (the One) from which we come."' The point that Hunt 
makes in his reading of the' 'Enneads,' is that one is generally aware of an object on the same 
hypostatic level, in an explicit manner. However, one is made aware of the higher level of reality 
through implicit awareness. This implicit awareness of higher realities resides in the memory of 
the knower. 'How does it happen that, while we possess in us such great things, we are not aware 
of them, but some of us often, and some always, do not activate those capacities? These realities 
themselves, Intelligence and the self-sufficient existence superior to Intelligence, are always 
active. The soul, too, is always in motion. But the operations that go on within her are not always 
perceived. They reach us only when they become objects of perception. When everything that is 
active within us does not transmit its action to the part that perceives, this action is not 
communicated to the entire soul.'"' 
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There is a sense then, in which the higher hypostasis, already exists in the implicit consciousness 
of the lower one, meaning that when the lower hypostasis seeks to contemplate the higher, it is 
not moving outside of itself, but merely triggering off implicit knowledge. Participation is thus 
seen as cognition. Pure 'Being,' is pure thinking (Logos). Hypostatic life is the life254 of thought, 
or 'noesis.' Plotinus uses these terms often interchangeably with 'theoria,' or contemplation. This 
ability to implicitly meditate on that which is higher, does not come automatically. For in the case 
oflutellect, and particularly Soul, the tendency is rather to 'look down, not up.' Self-
development, in the case of Soul, is initially required. This is the ability (in the case of Soul) to 
stop looking outward, but inward. 
The image, then, of Intellect that Soul can perceive through implicit awareness, is not Intellect 
itself, but the representation of Intellect. Soul only realises its full potential when it sees that 
potential in Intellect, and then the One. This, once again, is similar to Barth's argument that man 
is only truly constituted as truly man, as he perceives himself in Christ (anthropology= theology). 
In perceiving this, however, Barth does not invoke the same process of inward movement that we 
find with Plotinus and Augustine. In the case of Plotinus, Soul can only apprehend the hypostasis 
above it (Jutellect) when it becomes like (homoios) that which it apprehends. We interpret this 
'likeness,' in a quasi-ontological and epistemological sense. 
This exposition of Plotinus' triadic ontology as the contemplation ofsubject-<)bject upholds our 
view of the intrinsic deferral in his system, a deferral, when based on the One, resists closure. If 
the One constitutes all that there is, and the One is beyond Being, how can we really be sure that 
the other hypostases are not beyond Being? None of the three hypostases are what it seems, there 
is always continual deferring to higher levels which constitute the lower ones. It becomes difficult 
to decide what the 'hypo.stasis,' 'really is in itself,' because of the extensive nature of 
participation involved between them. We cannot understand what Intellect is, without bringing in 
the One and so on. We might even ask the question: Why must there only be three hypostases? 
Why not an endless number?"' Although Plotinus did suggest a solution to the problem of the 
Platonic 'Third Man Argument,' he has not to our knowledge, effectively refuted the same 
argument of the 'ontological regress,' when applied to the three hypostases themselves. 
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Furthermore, Plotinus' doctrine nms into trouble when it is applied to the relationship of 
everything else to the One, as does Barth's relationship between man and God. This is because of 
the effort to try and understand all 'Being,' working from a foundation that goes beyond 'Being.' 
As Van Niekerk''° has pointed out, this problem can be summarised in two, stepped arguments: 
Firstly, God (the One) is argued as being beyond Being and cannot be understood according to 
the language of what He is in Himself (Beyond Being). He can only be described according to the 
language of human beings (that of Being). The second argument then goes on to promptly 
describe what God is like, in Himself, using the language of Being. 
4.3-CONCLUSION: PLOTINUS AND THE ATTEMPTED 'DECONSTRUCTION' OF 
ARISTOTELIAN ESSENTIALISM 
Although Plotinus falls plainly into the Neoplatonic tradition, he is in one sense, almost as 
indebted to Aristotle as he is to Plato. His usage of the term 'substance,' is frequent. As with 
Aristotle, he locates metaphysical reality within self-subsisting continuants or hypostases. He 
differs from Aristotle in the area of category"' theory, yet retains the idea of 'substance,' as the 
term which describes self-sustaining particulars. The 'Arche,' of 'Nous' is the ultimate 
explanation or cause of thinking, life, and 'Ousia.'m Some examples: 'All things which exist, as 
long as they remain in being, necessarily produce from their own substances (Ousiai), in 
dependence on their present power, a surrounding reality (hypostasin) directed to what is outside 
them ... ,,,. Again, 'In each and every thing there is an activity of the substance (Ousia) and there 
is an activity from the substance, and that which is of the substance derives from the first one, and 
must in everything be a consequence of it, different from the thing itself. .. ""' 
Aristotle's chief 'energy,' or 'power,' in the universe is the noetic activity of the unmoved mover. 
When Plotinus rejected the ultimate nature of the Aristotelian Nous, he simultaneously rejected 
the Aristotelian primacy of 'Being,' or 'substance,' as the subject of first philosophy or first 
principles. As we have intimated, this is because 'Ousia,' represents limitedness or distinctness in 
nature. In Plotinus' case, the first principle (Arche) goes beyond 'Ousia,' and beyond limit. 161 We 
have suggested that in choosing to place that which is primary in his metaphysical system as 
being 'Beyond Being,' Plotinus undermines the rest of his system, which employs the language 
and the structure of 'Being' as inherited from Plato and Aristotle. What however, does Plotinus 
mean when he speaks of 'Beyond Being?' 
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'Nor should we be afraid to assume that the first activity (energeia) is without substance (Ousia), 
but posit this very fact as his, so to speak, existence (hypostasin). But if one posited an existence 
without activity, the principle would be defective and the most perfect of all imperfects. And if 
one adds activity one does not keep the One. if then the activity is more perfect than the 
substance, and the first is most perfect, the first will be activity. " 62 We have seen that when 
Plotinus speaks about the One, he normally avoids using the word 'substance,' without further 
qualification. Yet his writings concerning the 'One,' do not suggest that it is beyond existence or 
'Being,' altogether. Says Gerson: 'Suggestions to the contrary are just misunderstandings of 
Plotinus' so-called negative theology. What Plotinus rejects in reference to the One is language 
that implies limitedness or complexity. " 63 
'But if it (The One) is needed for the existence of each and every substance-for there is nothing 
which is not one-it would also exist before substance and as generating substance. For this reason 
also it is one-being (en on), but not first being and then one, for in that which was being and also 
one ... there would be many ... ' 264 It seems that when Plotinus describes the One as 'Beyond 
Being,' he is not wishing to deny it any kind of subsistence at all. Instead he simply wants to deny 
of it the 'Aristotelian' form of the term, as Aristotle applied it mainly to sensible particulars. This, 
to our understanding, represents the paradox in the Plotinian system. At the same time this 
element in Plotinus' thought (and we must not carry the point too far) represents possibly the first 
'Greek' attempt to go beyond both the language and the conceptualism ofessentialism.26' The 
primary way in which Plotinus attempts to do this, is the undermining of substance, in favour of 
participation (although we believe this 'undermining' was never completely consistent and 
thoroughly followed through). Other areas include his unique doctrine of the One, and even his 
unique usage of metaphorical constructs in his language. 
A further new element in Plotinus is the separation of 'existence' (for which he seems to attribute 
the word 'hypostasis') and 'essence. This is due to his theory of the 'One.' Both Plotinus and 
Aristotle take for granted that to have 'substance,' is to have some type of existence. However, 
Aristotle never seemed to speak of 'existence,' as something that is separate from the form of a 
particular. Plotinus on the other hand, does separate the two. The reason for this is because he will 
attribute 'existence,' to the One, (as the cause of all existence, it must exist in a supreme manner) 
but not 'Ousia.' As the One is beyond Being (Ousia) it does not bring about 'Ousia.' The One 
brings about the existence of all things directly, but not the 'Ousia,' of entities. This is rather the 
purpose of Intellect, which 'proceeds' from the One. 266 
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In the thinking of Plotinus and his three hypostases, we have the beginnings of a triadic ontology, 
or the 'Trinification of the world.' This is something which continues in the thought of both 
Augustine and Barth, but in different ways. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE THOUGHT OF ARIUS' 
5.1-SOME HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Although all of the individuals' ideas investigated here are undoubtedly 'historical,' the historical 
dimensions to the thought of Arius are particularly important, as they surround a time of much 
historical agitation. There is also much debate amongst historians concerning Arius as a person 
and, as well as the influences upon Arius's thought. Plotinus' system was consciously almost 
entirely devoid of historical elements, indeed such was its underlying assumption. With Arius, 
this is not the case. 
Augustine composed his 'De Trinitate,' over many years and there are no real signs of it being 
powerfully influenced by stressful, 'historical,' crises. Arius, remains an entirely different case, 
and his thinking was part of one of the great struggles in the Early Church, where extremely 
'theoretical' terminology, became painfully determinative for everyday life and politics. 
Therefore, because of Arius' complex historical background, we need to show careful attention to 
the polemical and textual issues, before embarking on a summary of his theoretical opinions. 
Ideas, no matter how 'irrelevant,' or 'obscure,' have consequences. They cannot be forever 
contained in safe, ivory-tower boxes. With Arius we are introduced to one of the early 
metaphysical debates in the church, reflecting certain 'factions,' and 'conventions.' It is not our 
purpose here to study the politics and factions on every side, but to show how Arius' thought, (as 
much as we can really know his thought) reflected a desire to balance together opposing 
'theoretical conventions' that were seen make up Christian orthodoxy. Orthodoxy was partly seen 
in the sense of the Vincentian canon as being 'that which is believed by all everywhere,' together 
with sound Biblical exegesis and rational, dialectical thinking. As we look back over history, we 
can see that effectively combining these three elements is by no means, always an easy task. 
Because of the specific historical-textual problems associated with any presentation of Arius' 
thought, we need to firstly look into some of these issues. 
The general conclusions of most scholars following Epiphanius is that Arius was born in Libya.2 
Both Hanson and Williams use Epiphanius as evidence, as well as a couple of Arius' letters.3 
After his birth we next encounter him at Alexandria and the later Arian controversy can be seen 
to start4 with the Melitian schism, in 318. Before this time, Lietzmann' demonstrates that Arius 
had already gained a theological reputation for himself, not only as an eloquent teacher, but also 
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as an original thinker.6 One thing that we can say is that, although being at Alexandria, Arius 
brought into that theological situation, the elements of other theological traditions. This ultimately 
brought about much attention to himself. Says Seeberg: 'With great activity, political sagacity, 
and tact, Arius made provision for the propagation of his theory. He not only gained a following 
in Egypt, among bishops and virgins, but he succeeded in winning the schismatic Melitians, and 
also found comrades among the bishops in Palestine and Syria. The mighty co-Lucianist, 
Eusebius ofNicomedia, became the patron of his doctrine.'' As with most of the theological 
controversies that rocked the early church, the Melitian and the later Arian controversy, contained 
intermixed theological and political elements. Seldom are academic disagreements devoid of 
personal power-struggles. 
Like the Donatist schism, the Melitian schism dated back to the Great Persecution and the 
consequent heated debate that arose within the church concerning the lapsed Christians.' Peter, 
bishop of Alexandria, during the persecution, together with others, refused to deny the faith and 
were incarcerated in Alexandria (in about 304). Peter's fellow prisoner was Melitius, bishop of 
Lycopolis, in upper Egypt.9 Melitius advocated harsh reprisals for those who had abjured the 
faith, but Peter suggested less stringent measures. '0 During the persecution of Diocletian, Peter 
had taken refuge in flight, but Melitius took on the administration of Peter's see in his absence, 
despite his protests. 11 
Later, upon release from prison, the parties of Peter and Melitius each went their separate ways, 
but the controversy deepened. Melitius' cause gained the support of Arius. However, by 311 
(despite the fact that Peter had been martyred) the moderate side of Peter, gained the upper hand 
in the controversy, and Arius was alleged to have changed sides, from that ofMelitius to Peter. 12 
Yet, prior to him switching sides, Melitius, upon the martyrdom of Peter, seems to have moved 
some influence into Alexandria, and had had Arius ordained, probably as priest. 13 Once changing 
his allegiance to Peter, Arius continued in good standing, but was then deposed for opposing 
Peter's hard line concerning the re-admittance ofMelitians into the church. However, he was 
again later admitted into the church and re-ordained by Achillas, (who, for a short time, 
succeeded the martyred Peter, as bishop). 
Arius continued in good standing, under Achillas' successor, Alexander, for a time. 14 The 
Melitians, nevertheless, had not forgotten his about-face and were certainly waiting for an 
opportunity to get their revenge_ In 318, Alexander conducted what seemed to be a theological 
'discussion' with the local clergy on the subject of; 'The unity of the Trinity. ' 1' It was Arius' 
opposition to Alexander's position, that the Melitians capitalised upon, in order to secure his 
condemnation for heresy. Melitius denounced Arius to Alexander. 16 
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Yet, the issue went deeper than just politics: Melitius, (according to Sozomen 's Ecclesiastical 
History 1.15) advocated virtually no subordination between the Father and Son, and Arius's 
subordinationist views were denounced. 17 Alexander decided to take the issue further, and after 
two hearings where both men presented their positions, Arius was condemned. Arius, in his tum, 
accused Alexander of Sabellianism, and began to seek support from other ecclesiastics. With the 
subsequent Arian cause growing to the point that it was, Alexander then convened a synod of 
nearly one hundred bishops, in order to deal with Arius and his clerical partisans_ At this synod, 
Arius and his teaching was, once again, condemned. 
Yet the conflict in Alexandria grew to such an extent that Alexander finally ejected the now 
excommunicated Arius from the city. Arius, then travelled to Palestine and began soliciting more 
support, notably that of Eusebius of Caesarea_ Seeing the continued increase of adherents to the 
side of Arius, Alexander now began a letter-writing campaign of his own, and he contacted 
bishops in a broad area, soliciting their support for his cause. Arius then scored a coup, in his 
persuasion ofEusebius ofNicomedia to join his side. Eusebius was to prove a valuable and 
outspoken member of the pro-Arian cause_ 
Arius, then took up residence for a time at Nicomedia and it was there that he wrote his 'Thalia' 
('Banquet'). This was distributed far and wide and prompted Alexander in response, to issue a 
solemn encyclical to all Catholic bishops 'everywhere_' However, Eusebius ofNicomedia's 
response to the encyclical of Alexander was to convene his own church council, which 
predictably upheld the Arian position_ The Arian party, feeling that by now, with all the 
considerable support that it had gained, the time had come to return to Egypt. When this finally 
took place, Egypt was thrown into an uproar. 
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Constantine, hearing of the problem, sent a briefletterto both Alexander and Arius, commanding 
them, in the name of universal peace, to desist from these inconsequential quarrels. When there 
was no real improvement, Constantine then sent his own Western ecclesiastical advisor, Ossius of 
Cordova, to investigate. Ossius summoned a council and threw his weight behind the anti-Arian 
party. Those who refused to agree with Ossius were excommunicated, with the proviso that they 
might be reinstated at the next ecumenical council of Ancyra (the venue of which was then 
changed by Constantine to Nicaea). The road was now set finally for Nicaea. 
Long after the historical Arius was forgotten, his reputation continued to fill the minds and 
imaginations of the orthodox, even into the Middle Ages. Arius was seen, next to Judas, as the 
archetypal heresiarch, the antichrist, his malice skilfully veiled behind an austere facade. 18 His 
very name, conjured up feelings of intense emotion on the part of the orthodox. Yet as an 
individual thinker and writer, Arius just does not feature at all in the annuls of church history. In 
his incisive study of Arianism or more specifically, Nee-Arianism, Hanson19 is worth quoting in 
full: 'In the first place Arius was not a particularly significant writer, and the people of his day, 
whether they agreed with him or not, did not regard him as a particularly significant writer. He 
may have written a lot of works apart from his Thalia and the one or two letters, which are all that 
survive. But if he did write other works neither his supporters nor his opponents thought them 
worth preserving. Those who follow his theological tradition seldom or never quote him, and 
sometimes directly disavow connection with him ... He was not a great heresiarch in the same 
sense as Marcion or Mani or Pelagius might deserve that term. He virtually disappears from the 
controversy at an early stage in its course .. He was the spark that started the explosion, but in 
himself he was of no great significance.' 
5.1.1-ARIUS' OWN WORDS 
Before we examine the thought of Arius, we need to firstly turn our attention to the question of 
whether we can know what it was that Arius really wrote. As far as his own works go, we have 
three letters, some fragments of another letter, and some fairly long quotations from his 'Thalia,' 
or 'Banquet,' a document that seems to have been composed according to the Sotadean metre. 20 
In terms of the letters, the chronological order is as follows. 21 Firstly, there is the confession of 
faith presented to Alexander, signed by Arius and 11 supporters. Then there is a letter of Arius to 
Eusebius ofNicomedia. Then, thirdly, there is the confession of Arius and Euzois, presented to 
Constantine sometime between the years 327-335.22 
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Of course, of importance are the remains of his dogmatic composition, the 'Thalia,' as preserved 
for us by Athanasius in two of his (Athanasius') writings. The first seven lines of the 'Thalia,' are 
reproduced in his 'Orationes contra Arianos 1.5, "' whilst other passages are to be found in 
further of Athanasius' works,'4 specifically the De Synodis. 15. "'With respect to approaching 
these sources, Stead'6 remarks that as the first interpretative principle, it would seem natural to 
place most weight on the three letters of Arius, as these are supposed to reflect his own thinking. 
Secondly, we should then pay some attention to those records of his works preserved by others 
(especially the 'Thalia'). 
Thirdly, we can then tum to the more indirect reports of others, on both sides of the fence. 
However, Stead also suggests that there can be difficulties in this approach. 27 In the first case, the 
letters of Arius were written at specific times, dealing with certain very pointed issues. As such, 
they do not really reflect a true overview of what he really believed, with respect to a general, 
objective summary. 
In the case of the letter to Alexander, there is some evidence that Arius was trying to bring about 
a reconciliation between himself and his estranged bishop. The purpose is apologetic: Arius is 
appealing to his status as a teacher in the church, and his belief in the doctrines of orthodoxy. 
Indeed, in one section, he reminds Alexander that he gained much of his beliefs from Alexander 
himself!" In the case of the much later confession offuith, submitted to Constantine, Arius' 
motives are more political than theological: he is wishing to gain the emperor's support in his 
(Arius') reinstatement from exile. He is therefore careful to avoid any contentious Ianguage.29 
Although all sources need to be examined carefully, it is the 'Thalia,' as preserved by Athanasius, 
that is the most comprehensive, and after taking into account the problems of Athanasius' 
obvious bias, most rewarding to our efforts to find the real Arius. 30 Yet, the two pieces of the 
'Thalia,' as preserved by Athanasius, do present us with problems of interpretation. The first 
section (as preserved in 'Orationes contra Arianos) shows very much Athanasius' 
interpretations, often prefuced by statements such as: 'and he says that ... ' 
Often here Athanasius is not trying to quote Arius exactly, but is paraphrasing. Those paraphrases 
(as well as the selection of material that he is trying to paraphrase) will obviously reflect 
Athanasius' agenda, as well as his biases.31 Also, the first seven lines in Athanasius' 'Orationes,' 
were written twenty years after32 Arius penned the original, and the other section that Athanasius 
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included in his 'De Synodis,' was written about twenty years later again. Stead published an 
important article in 1976: 'Rhetorical Method in Athanasius, dJ where he presented a picture of 
Athanasius involved in a very acrimonious and bitter struggle, and was not above using polemical 
devices and representations, allowed by the conventions of his time. One positive point is that at 
least the 42 lines in the 'De S'.vnodis,' seem to represent a direct quotation of what Arius actually 
said, and this represents probably our best source. 
5.2-THEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND AND THE ANTECEDENTS OF ARIUS 
The first classic assessment of Arius in English, was that of J.H. Newman. Then came Hamack's 
'History of Dogma,' and then Gwatkin 's study. 34 The tone of these first expositions was 
extremely negative in nature. Gwatkin said that 'Arianism was utterly illogical and unspiritual. '" 
Since that time an enormous amount of work has been done on Arius, in Germany, Europe, North 
America and Australia, by numerous scholars. 
In sketching in the background to Arius' theology we shall commence with some reflection upon 
the seminal article ofWiles: 'In Defence of Arius,' published in 1962.36 Wiles argued forthe 
need of a new direction in Arian research and scholarship. His challenge of traditional viewpoints 
took two forms: Firstly he suggested that a new attitude be taken towards Arius as a person, and 
secondly, he advocated greater circumspection, when it came to placing Arius's thinking and its 
background into context. Roughly up to that point, most Arian scholarship tended to place his 
background, both philosophical and theological into neat little boxes, with every item clearly in 
place. Also, much of the interpretations offered, were very much biased because of a view of 
Arius himself, that tended to place him into the camp of the anti-Christ. It seems that Athanasius' 
propaganda had paid off, even up to the Twentieth Century. 
5.2.1-THE SEARCH FOR A SCHOOL 
Thinkers such as Newman, Harnack, Gwatkin and more lately, Pollard, have followed the method 
of placing Arius firstly into a certain school, in order to understand him better, whether that 
'school,' be Antioch, Alexander and so on. Williams has effectively argued that this methodology 
is not always sound. 37 Having said all that, we can now proceed nevertheless, to suggest that there 
are certain clear influences on Arius' ideas. The first and obvious source for Arius is the teaching 
of the church and the Scriptures. 
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The Arian controversy was not about the view of 'one cosmology over another,' it was about the 
interpretation ofScripture.38 In this sense, we can term Arius a theological conservative.39 At all 
times, he sought to defend his orthodoxy, during a period when orthodoxy was not always 
carefully defined, or even fully worked out in the theoretical sense. He does not introduce any 
new idea or concept that cannot be found in his predecessors. Arius' innovation lay in the strong 
conclusions to which he pressed the tensions in the thinking of others, and indeed, the church. 
We can however, trace a certain 'logic,' in his thinking, a logic that dictates the course that he 
follows. This is the logic of upholding a central philosophical and exegetical tenet, a tenet central 
to his entire thought. This is the absolute transcendence, immutability and unknowability of the 
Monad.40 At times where his contemporaries wish to hold back, Arius wants to press on and 
'solve the problem logically.' This has led some scholars to rebuke his 'arrogance in the face of 
mystery,' but again such criticism is not quite fair as all the Fathers, to some extent or another, 
showed a certain indebtedness to Hellenistic thought. We are not saying that Arius, reflected no 
philosophical influence, rather we are saying that he did not consciously seek to argue 
'philosophy,' as opposed to the Bible. 
5.2.2-ALEXANDRIA 
Williams places Arius as an Alexandrian, and as such it would be impossible to deny strong 
Alexandrian influence in his thought. Williams cites three Alexandrians worthy of mention: 
Philo, Clement and Origen, to which we will now provide some attention. 
All three thinkers, each in their own way, are dealing with Middle Platonist, Logos cosmologies, 
which they are trying to relate to the Judeo-Christian tradition. All three are thus attempting to 
solve the problem of relating the immutable, transcendent God, to His creation. Their concerns 
are thus those of cosmology. There are, in the Alexandrian tradition, primarily two ways of 
looking at the concept of the Logos. The first way is to see the Logos as being identical with God, 
or as one of God's 'attributes.' Secondly, the Logos can he portrayed as that 'element,' in God 
that is specifically able to make Him intelligible to His creation. In line with the Jewish tradition, 
the Alexandrian God is personal, 'Pure Being' (to ontos on).41 
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Roughly speaking, the God of Philo is synonymous with 'Intellect,' in Plotinus. God is absolutely 
free and self-sufficient, absolutely transcendent, even beyond the Idea of Good and Beauty,42 or 
the material. He is above thought and can only be apprehended through immediate intuition. 
When Philo speaks like this, however, he seems to intimate that God is on the same level with the 
One of Plotinus. Like the other Middle Platonists (Albinus) and the Neopythagoreans, 
(Numenius) positing such a transcendent Monad requires certain intermediary beings, bridging 
the gap between God and the material realm. For Philo, the highest of these intermediary beings 
is the Logos, the 'first-born of God.' 
In Philo's thought, at times the Logos seems to be an aspect of the person of God Himself, but at 
other times, he seems to be asserting that the Logos, is a separate being, certainly separate from 
God. This paradox in Philo, seems to be intentional. When we consider the Logos from the side of 
the multiplicity of created things, the Logos cannot be separated from God's essence. Yet when 
we look at the story from the side of God's transcendence, there is a definite difference between 
the absolute, simple Monad, and the Logos. 
The Platonic ideas are transposed into the Philonic Logos. It is in the Logos that the ideal world is 
located.43 Frequently, Philo uses Old Testament and Judaic terminology to describe his Logos. 
The Logos is an angel, or the dynamic 'Word of God,' although there could never be in the 
system of Philo, anyplace forthe incarnation of such a Word. One of the developments within 
the Christian version of Middle-Platonism, is the belief in the 'creative will,' of the First 
Principle.44 Here we perceive a departure from the more secular religion of Plotinus who claimed 
that the 'One,' has no such 'will,' or even 'purpose.' To claim such characteristics for the One, 
would detract from his utter simplicity. 
The tension here is obvious with the Christian 'baptism' of the One of Plotinus: it is impossible to 
uphold Plotinian transcendence, as well as attributing to the One the personal attributes of the 
God of the Bible. This is why, in our opinion, Philo and the Alexandrians after him tried to juggle 
together and apply both the qualities of the Plotinian One and Nous, to the Christian God. In 
another sense, the thought of the Christian Neoplatonists reflects a certain theological unity that 
their secular counterparts did not: The creative will of God serves to unite the many cosmological 
beings, linking the Monad to the universe. This 'will' concept was that which was to become the 
unifying force in the more sophisticated Trinities of the Church later on. The other point to notice 
with Christian Neoplatonism, is the change in orientation from, 'ascent,' towards 'revelation.' 
Instead of man having to employ mystical means to 'ascend,' towards God, God assists man 
through His revelation. We do not suggest with Christianity, we have an either-or case. With 
Augustine, for example, we have both the elements of 'ascent, (illumination) and 'revelation' 
from God. 
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In another sense, Williams4' shows that the Logos separates God's nature, from His activities: We 
cannot know God in Himself, but we know his creative activities through the Logos. This strong 
divide between the 'is-ness' of God and the activities ('how-ness,) has plagued Christianity ever 
since. Aquinas and Barth (God-for-us, God-for-Himself) represent the most sophisticated effort to 
solve the paradox from the perspective of the Christian tradition. 
Williams, refutes the claim ofWolfson-16 that the common ground between the Arian position and 
that of Philo is that both supported the idea of an individually subsistent Logos, separate in 
substance from the Father. To be sure, at times, Philo seems to be suggesting this, but generally 
his thought is much less certain. Arius' position, on the other hand is far clearer in his doctrine of 
the 'separation,' of the Logos from the Father's substance. 
We are now able once again, to see the same tensions that clearly run through Christianity when it 
is allied with Platonism and Aristotelianism, tensions that we wish to trace throughout this thesis. 
Firstly, there is the issue of the transcendent Monad, who sometimes seems to be beyond Being, 
other times Being itself. The second problem is the inclination to relate this principle to the world, 
which is diametrically opposite in nature to the principle of the 'One.' Again, 'participation,' is 
the concept chosen to solve the problem. Another problem is the strongly 'materialistic' 
terminology of Aristotle, particularly that of 'substance,' which continues to be employed 
together with Middle-Platonist terminology (the 'One,' 'Beyond Being,' and so on) which is anti-
materialist. It is also necessary at this point, to insist that it is not only with 'Thomism,' that we 
find a combination of the terms and concepts of Plato and Aristotle. We find this combination 
right through Christian and secular Western thought from the time of Plotinus. 
5.2.3-CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA 
Unlike Tatian and Tertullian;" but in the tradition of Justin, Clement represents a clear 'Eastern' 
view of truth, in terms of the relationship between 'Jerusalem and Athens.' Jerusalem can plunder 
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Athens for truth, to the glory of God. As with all Christian Neoplatonists, the God of Clement is 
immutable, simple and transcendent. Concerning the doctrine of the impassability of God, says 
Pelikan: 'To Clement of Alexandria it meant that "God is one, and beyond the one and above the 
monad itself," to Origen, that "all things, whatever they are, participate in him who truly is," to 
Hilary it was "an indication concerning God so exact that it expressed in the terms best adapted to 
human understanding an unattainable insight into the mystery of the divine nature," ... to 
Augustine it proved that "essence" could be used of God with strict propriety, whilst "substance," 
could not. '4 ' Says Harnack: 'In Clement, then, ecclesiastical Christianity reached the stage that 
Judaism had attained in Philo, and no doubt the latter exercised great influence over him. '49 
This means, as much as Philo, Clement wants to assert that God is very remote from us,'0 and 
attempts to unitethat remoteness with the world, through the Logos. S.R.C. Lilla" has, with 
others, identified three stages in the development of the Logos in Clement. 'The Logos is, first of 
all, the mind of God which contains his thoughts; at this stage, he is still identical with God. In 
the second stage, he becomes a separate hypostasis, distinct from the first principle; in this stage 
he represents the immanent law of the universe, or in other words the, world-soul. ' 52 Only the 
Logos, as the Gospel of John states, can reveal God to man. This awareness that we have through 
the Logos, is not of God's Ousia, only of his works.53 We have the same tension here in Clement, 
as we found in Philo. The Logos is the supreme principle of Wisdom, the administrator of the 
universe, activated by the will of the Father. He is the primary image of God.54 We cannot know 
God in Himself, we only know God through the Logos. We find in Clement, strong statements 
that link the Logos to the person of God himself, and then others that indicate a separation of the 
Father from the Logos. As with Philo, Clement is not seeking to 'work the problem out logically 
and clear up the matter,' there is a mystery, an unexplained, inconsistent dimension to this 
complex relationship between the Logos and the Father. Nevertheless, in the Logos the inner and 
outer 'oikonomia,' of the Father is revealed." 
There is one important area however, where Clement moves away from the thought of his 
Middle-Platonist progenitors. This is in his belief in the Logos becoming flesh. 'The fact that in 
contrast to the Logos concept of Middle Platonism, which is defined predominantly in personal 
and cosmological terms, Clement identifies the personal pre-existent Logos with the historical 
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person of Jesus Christ_ Here, he shows his essential distinction from all non-Christian Logos and 
pneuma doctrines, however much they may have influenced him.'" 
5.2.4-0RIGEN 
Origen is undoubtedly the Alexandrian'7 giant, with respect to influence. Jn terms of his doctrine 
of the Logos, Grillmeier recognises in Origen a two-fold role: ' ... it is the source of creaturely 
"ratio," but also of supernatural "sapienna." The pneuma inserts itself between these two 
functions_ It provides a new substratum, which makes it possible to receive the wisdom of 
Christ.'" The Holy Spirit is neither unbegotten like the Father, nor begotten as is the Son, nor is it 
created like other creatures. It comes from the Father and becomes a subsisting hypostasis by 
means of the Father_ 
Looking now at the relationship between the Father and the Logos, once again, in the tradition of 
Clement, Origen asserts that God is transcendent, Being and 'beyond Being. " 9 Yet this Father is 
not devoid of personality as the Creator of the world_ Furthermore, it is the Logos, proceeding 
from the Father that makes this utter immutable, simple pan of his nature known to men_ 
Therefore, in contrast to the Father, the nature of the Son must be multiple_ Also, concerning the 
nature of the Father and the Son, Origen is much clearer than Clement and Philo: there are 
definitely two 'hypostases,' when we speak about the Logos and the Father.60 The Son is the 
Logos, the image of the Father and his wisdom_ The Son proceeds from the Father, not by any 
division, but in a spiritual way. 
Says Crouzel: 'Twice in the "Treatise on First Principles," and once in the "Commentary on the 
Epistle to the Romans," we find that famous sentence that was to be used against the Arians: "ouk 
en hoti auk en"-There was not when He (the Son) was not_ Eternal generation but also continual 
generation: the Father is begetting the Son at each instant, just as light is always emitting its 
radiance. '61 
A times it seems that Origen is completely consistent in stressing the true divinity of the Son, 
equal to that of the Father. 'Furthermore, this Son of God is not only co-eternal with the Father, 
but it can be said of him that he is divine "according to essence," and not "through 
participation_ t),62 
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The tension in Origen (as with his predecessors) shows in his distinction between an utterly 
transcendent Father, and a Son whose transcendence is somewhat limited in nature, and his 
language in this department is often confused and contradictory. Origen did not have a carefully 
worked-out vocabulary. 'The intermediary between God and created beings must Himself be 
eternally generated, while, on the other hand, God, being Simple and One, the Logos cannot be 
"o' tritos Theos," but is only a "deuteros Theos," He cannot be "o Theos," (God with the article) 
but is only "Theos' (God without the article). '63 Origen also mentions in the ('De Oratione.' 15.1) 
that he has 'elsewhere proven,' that the Father and the Son are different in 'hypostasis,' and 
'hypokeimenon. ' 64 
Williams concludes, rightly in our opinion, that Origen would not therefore have said (as 
Gonzalez seems to intimate) that the Son is 'homoousios' with the Father. ' 6' Crouzel says: 
'Numerous texts, using all kinds of images, in forms that are dynamic rather than ontological, 
compel recognition that Origen is expressing the equivalent of the Nicene "homoousios."'66 
Whether Origen was an advocate of the 'homoousion' or not is a contentious question with 
scholars. Many of them for apologetic purposes report that he was indeed, a 'homoousion.' 
Williams draws attention to a certain 'celebrated fragment,' where Origen does seem to be using 
the very use of 'homoousios,' as preserved in Rufinus' Latin version of Pamphilius' 'Defence of 
Origen.' Williams feels that the text might well be suspect, as in the current form, it is very close 
to the specific interests of the Post-Nicene period, to come directly from Pamphilius, let alone 
0 . 67 ngen. 
Williams argues convincingly that in the light of certain of the other texts of Origen, that it would 
be unlikely that Origen did at anytime, claim that the Son is 'homoousios,' with the Father,6' as 
these texts repudiate the idea. The reason for this is that, in the opinion of Williams, (seemingly 
confirmed in the criticism ofHeracleon in XIIl.25) Origen saw or understood 'homoousios' as the 
designation of two co-ordinate members ofa single class, with the same properties.69 'Since his 
Gnostic opponents taught that holy souls were of one substance with God, they imp! ied, Origen 
claimed, that God was as capable of change and corruption as any created spirit. Obviously this 
unacceptable corollary would not apply if the Son were spoken of as "homoousios." However it 
would be impossible for Origen to regard the Son as another member of a class including the 
Father, and so it is difficult to imagine him using theterm of the Son.'70 The Son is rather God 
'through participation,' ('metousia') not substancen 
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Both Crouzel and Williams show that, in moving away from using Aristotelian terms such as 
'homoousios,' Origen is repudiating the materialism of the Gnostics. The Word comes forth from 
the Father as the will comes from the mind. A part of God's substance cannot be divided up-in 
order to make a Son, as it is necessary to guard against positing two first principles. 
5.2.5-0THER TRADITIONS 
As can be intimated from some of our discussion above, the question of the precise origins of 
Arius' thought, is still very much debated. 72 Although we commenced this section on the 
antecedents of Arius, with an examination of the Alexandrian tradition, we again need to be 
reminded of the difficulty in attributing a specific school to Arius. 
Yet, for some time, many have suggested that the main Arian influence theologically, comes from 
the School of Antioch. Indeed, the first adherent of this view was Alexander of Alexandria 
himself 73 This view was later endorsed by BJ. Kidd,74 and J.H.Newman." Yet, Loofs describes 
Arius as having inherited a left-wing view ofOrigenism.76 
Pollard, takes the view that the Antiochene background is important. n He cites" the following 
reasons: There is firstly the rather 'literal exegetical style,' of Arius, typical of the Antiochene 
tradition. Then there is the 'philosophical, monotheism' of the heresiarch, typical of Antioch. 
Thirdly, we have the strong distinction between 'Logos,' and 'Son.' Wallace-Hadrill in his text: 
'Christian Antioch,' confirms that these traits mentioned by Pollard, are Antiochene traits. 79 
However, Stead, 80 Williams 81and Wiles" have all criticised this suggestion of Pollard. In our 
own assessment, we also incline to the position of the major influence being that of Alexandria. 
All the same, we need to accept that Arius probably borrowed somewhat from outside 
Alexandria, to some extent. 83 Having said all this, it remains important to see whether or not, one 
can trace certain Antiochene elements, or influences. 
5.2.6-PAUL OF SAMOSTA 
Paul of Samosta, named after his native town, was also governor to Queen Zenobia of Palmyra. 
From AD 260, he was also bishop of Antioch. However, a synod held at Antioch condemned him 
for his Trinitarian (dynamist Monarchian) and Christological (predecessor of Nestorius) errors."" 
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Paul has always had a bad press morally more so than theologically." Eusebius describes him as 
being vain, pompous and loud-mouthed, a description that undoubtedly had an added impulse to 
bad feelings about his theology. 86 Political rivalry also seemed to form part of the conflict which 
brought about Paul's condemnation at the council.87 In spite of the difficulties with respect to 
evidence," Paul's religion was probably based on an Antiochene literal interpretation of the New 
Testament, and the humanity of Christ. The doctrinal point that Paul brought into conflict with his 
two main accusers: Eusebius of Alexandria and his representative Malchion, concerned the nature 
of the divinity of Christ. 89 ln facing Malchion and Eusebius, Paul faced the Alexandrian, 
Origenist tradition, very different to his own. The Alexandrian tradition, started with 
'multiplicity' in the Godhead, as a means to explain the unity. Paul and his fellow Antiochenes 
operated the other way around.90 To the Alexandrians, Paul was a unitarian, to Paul, the Eusebius 
party were tritheists. 
For Paul, it seems that the Word dwells in the humanity of Christ, not 'substantially,' but through 
'participation.' This preserves the humanity of Jesus,91 as well as the integrity of the divinity of 
the Godhead. Studer, calls this approach of Paul, 'unitarian, so-called, Asiatic theology. ' 92 'As it 
intended to ascribe to God alone the whole work of salvation, it did not regard Christ as the 
Logos, i.e., the mediator between God and the world, but rather as the firstborn among many 
brethren, as the one who has opened the way to God for men ... According to him (Paul) Jesus was 
inspired by the Logos, linked with him in a union ("synapheia") of grace. The Word itself, like 
the Holy Spirit, he understood as a mere energy of the One God. ' 93 
Like Arius, Paul wishes to strongly assert Christian monotheism, but at the cost of the unity of the 
three persons.94 Only the Father is God. The Son is not the true God, neither is he the Word or 
Wisdom of God, and he only comes into existence after the incarnation, at the moment of 
conception in Mary's womb. This Son is not true God in substance, as that which is human 
cannot beget God. The Word seems to be little more than the 'creative energy,' of God, with no 
subsistent reality. 
'The question at issue was that of unity and multiplicity; if two units interpenetrate, what kind of 
unity is possible which maintains the individual identity of the components? Does not a human 
being show a real union of apparently incompatible elements, that of spirit and body? May there 
not then be a real union of divine spirit and human flesh in Christ without any lowering of the 
former?'" Paul denied such a unity between the Godhead and the humanity in Christ as this 
would threaten the unity and the divinity in God. 
5.2.7-LUCIAN OF ANTIOCH 
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The supposed connection between Arius and Lucian, is the letter of Arius to Eusebius of 
Nicomedia, where he terms Eusebius: 'a fellow Lucianist.' It can be established that Arius and 
others (such as Eusebius ofNicomedia), knew Lucian as a respected teacher,96 but it is doubtful 
that any other certain connection can be made. Of those many that were confirmed 'Lucianists,' 
onlythree97 refused to sign the Nicene Creed, (Theognis, Maris and Eusebius ofNicomedia) and 
it seems that those who did not, later recanted of this. Also in Antioch in 341, the Lucianists 
dissociated themselves from the Arian creed, with a creed of their own. 
It is even more difficult to discover what Lucian believed, than it is to learn of Arius' ideas. His 
name, however, is associated with one of the creeds that emerged from the Council of Antioch in 
341-" This is the second creed to come from the synod, and Sozomen claims that Lucian's 
disciples subscribed to a copy of this creed, written in Lucian's own hand. 99 
Wallace-Hadrill describes this creed as follows: ' ... belief in a Trinity of individual persons 
standing in a relationship of superiority and inferiority to each other... The creed adopts the 
Origenist position on the matter, and quite consistently rejects the Arian exaggeration of 
Origenism at the same time as it rejects the Marcellen extreme in the opposite direction. The 
godhead is three in subsistence and one in agreement. The son is here a true image or likeness of 
the Father, but the dangerous "homoousios," "of the same substance," is avoided. ' 100 As a 
document, the creed runs to over four hundred words of Greek, with quotations from the First and 
Fourth gospels. Yet, it is certainly not an Arian creed as it repudiates the Arian teaching and 
speaks of the Son as begotten before all ages, from the Father. 101 At its conclusion it rejects the 
idea that the Son at some time, 'did not exist,' and that he is a creature, part of the creation of the 
Father. 
In conclusion, we might say that although perhaps very minor elements of Arius' thought can be 
traced back to these two Antiochene thinkers, it is very unlikely that the influence was specially 
severe, or obvious. We must rather conclude that Arius drew widely from various sources, but 
specifically that of Alexandria (bearing in mind that even with Alexandria, much eclecticism is 
present). 
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5.3-THE THEOLOGY OF ARIUS 
After this somewhat lengthy introduction, we now proceed to a summary of Arius' actual 
thinking. To some extent it can be suggested that Arius is not one hundred percent necessary to 
our argument in tracing the concepts of substance and participation, and their role in Christian 
philosophy and theology of this time. Athanasius, for the most part, also operated within the same 
theological-philosophical and cultural milieu; he could have been an equally satisfying example. 
Yet, Athanasius lacks the mystique of the heretic and Arius's struggle is unique in opening up 
many of the problems discussed in this thesis. 
In his provocative article, 'Why is Contemporary Scholarship so Enamoured of Ancient 
Heretics?' P. Henry102 deals with this very question. He suggests that the swing to the 
unambiguous support of heretics in recent patristic scholarship, is also part of a general swing in 
theological scholarship as a whole. He speaks of three transitional steps 'by which we have come 
to where we are.'"' He first identifies the stage of 19th Century historical criticism, as 
exemplified in the reaction against Hegelianism. Historical criticism accepted the real, changing 
issues in history and the flexibility of the historical situation. 'Historical criticism became aware 
of the inability of people to be conscious of all the forces moulding their actions and beliefs, and 
a claim, whether by an individual of a group, to be captain of one's own fate and master of one's 
own soul was henceforth treated with severe scepticism.' 104 
The second stage of the process, Henry describes as 'an ideal of historical even-handedness.' 10' 
This is the pursuit of 'objectivity,' on the part of the researcher or historian. Personal prejudices 
of the researcher must not be evident. There is to be no 'moralising,' as characterised by much of 
the work of the Nineteenth Century. 106 This type of approach could be seen for example, in the 
works of Gwatkin and Newman, taking a very anti-Arian, moralising viewpoint. Arius is rebuked 
for his 'lack of spirituality,' and moral honesty. The historical approach as illustrated by the more 
recent, second stage, takes a dim view of this, wishing instead to describe what Arius said and did 
in the most objective terms, without 'getting involved' personally. After all, orthodoxy is only 
one of many options. The third stage in this historical interpretative process, Henry describes 
thus: 'In much current writing about Christian origins, the Fathers are no longer put on a par with 
the heretics, they are put on the defensive, and it is assumed that the heretics are true religious 
geniuses, and even more, the bearers of the authentically radical spiritual breakthrough 
inaugurated by Jesus. In short, the secret of the history of the origin of Catholic Christianity is 
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that true Christianity was obliterated, and it is only now, after nearly two millennia, that the true 
story comes to light.' '07 
Although Henry might put his case somewhat harshly, his point is taken. The spirit of ecumenism 
can erode the need for definition. If Christianity is something and not everything, it must be 
definable, and if this is the case, wrong defmitions must be possible. However, recent work108 in 
the area of the appreciation of the relationship between 'power-truth' issues, together with the 
institutionalisation of truth-values, has helped us to see the often 'biased modes' in which heresy 
is perceived. We have briefly indicated this with Athanasius' interpretation of Arius. 
In approaching Arius' opinion of his own thought, we do not find a man who is trying to be 
innovative. On the contrary, Arius is trying to present himself as one who wishes to further the 
course of orthodoxy, in a venerable line of teaching tradition. If this is true, can we then say that 
he is saying anything different from his contemporaries? Despite the limited evidence, the 
answer is generally yes, and it now becomes our task to ask how it can be that Arius' said 
something different, but yet claimed to be orthodox. 
5.3.1-DID ARIUS HA VE A METHODOLOGY? 
Can we firstly ascribe to Arius some type of theological methodology? Once again, due to scanty 
and biased sources, this is difficult, but the question is well worth trying to answer, as it is always 
the methodology that pinpoints the major concerns of a thinker. Biblical theology, is always 
cultural theology and the way we draw out from the Bible its main theses, is to some extent 
influenced by our presuppositional cultural and personal motives. The theologians of the 
Christian Church were slowly driven to a realisation that the deepest questions which face 
Christianity cannot be answered only from the Bible, because the questions are about the meaning 
of the Biblical language itself In the course of this, the Church was impelled to reluctantly form 
dogma. 
We are not asserting here, that the Early Church rejected the hermeneutic method of: 'Let 
Scripture be its own interpreter.' In fact, both Arius and Athanasius held fast to this dictum. We 
are merely saying that the issue is not quite as simple as that. When our debates concerning what 
authentic Christianity must really teach, sometimes enter into a technical cultural arena, alien to 
the issues with which the text directly deals, we are forced to employ these alien vocabularies as 
interpretative and applicatory tools, when applying the Bible to these areas. In a sense, we have to 
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find out 'what the Bible is saying,' within a specific context, by converting Biblical language into 
'technical language.' 
This requires firstly employing the necessary means to understand the Biblical text and message 
in its own right, and then 'converting the clear meaning of the Bible,' into contextual language 
that can provide an answer to the problems at hand, without losing that original meaning. !n other 
words, the upholders of the canons of the council ofNicaea would acknowledge that the Bible 
does not claim that specifically the Son is 'of the same substance as the Father,' but they would 
claim in another way, within its own language-scale, it does. Translation work therefore does not 
only take place when we are translating a text from one language to another, but also when we 
translate a text into a 'theology.' 
5,3.2-EXEGETICAL ISSUES 
Although our priorities in this thesis are more metaphysical than exegetical, a short account of 
Arius' exegetical priorities with respect to his overall method is helpful. Both Arius and 
Athanasius had seemingly the same respect for the text of Scripture, yet both are not 'theologians 
of consensus,' to the point of losing originality of exegetical and theological insight. In addition 
to this, It cannot be suggested that Arius took his starting-point with unbelieving philosophy and 
that Athanasius began 'with the Bible.' Most of the Arian controversy surrounded in the first 
instance, exegetical discussions, not metaphysical. In this sense, as Simonetti remarked, the 
history of patristic theology is the history of patristic exegesis. '09 
We might have many examples of the exegesis of Arius' critics but little of his own work. This is 
despite the fact that Athanasius, for example, might mention the ideas of Arius on certain 
subjects. Alexander mentions certain points concerning disputed texts, probably Psalm 45:7-8, 
Proverbs 8:22, and Isaiah 1:2-"0 With most of the exegetical controversy, each side of the debate 
was able to find an abundance of texts that were superficially able to support their position. Arius 
would highlight those texts that would seem to speak of the subordination of the Son, whilst 
Athanasius, would spend time looking at those references which pointed towards a co-unity and 
co-eternity of both Son and Father. After all, the Scriptures: Old and New Testaments, did not 
provide an organic presentation of doctrine, but scattered claims. These were often difficult to 
harmonise. 111 In the Arian debate, obviously the starting point of both Arius and his opposition, 
was not a 'neutral understanding of the Bible.' Instead, it was the theological crisis, onto which 
the Bible was supposed to throw some helpful light. This meant that the style of reading the Bible 
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employed, reflected very much the issues at hand. The decisive issue on both sides was not 
ultimately the interpretation of individual passages but the dynamics between the hermeneutic 
understanding of individual texts, and the general theological framework. This framework in the 
case of Arius and Athanasius, was partly determined by the unwritten diverging ecclesiastical 
traditions, which by the end of the Fourth Century, were hardly without loose ends. 
Simonetti makes the following observation. He suggests that the priorities of both Arius and his 
enemies were not primarily the interpretation of the Scriptures in their original context.112 Indeed, 
it seems likely that at that time, the very idea of 'original context,' was virtually unknown as an 
important methodological factor. 
Certain schools of thought (such as that of J.H. Newman) tried to tie up Arius' divergent 
theology, by reducing it to a certain style of exegesis. For example, Arian exegesis as 
'literalistic,' in the school of Antioch, whilst individuals snch as Origen, Alexander or 
Athenasius, were more 'allegorical' in their hermeneutic method. This explains the divergences. 
Arius 'literalism,' is the reason for his 'bad' exegetical grounds of attributing an inferior status to 
the Son, with respect to the Father. To be sure, Arius does seem to interpret certain passages 
'literalistically.' !n Proverbs 8:22, the 'Lord created me,' is seen as teaching creationism. Again 
he is 'literalistic,' in his view of Col 1 :5: 'The firstborn of all creation ... ' However, it can further 
be seen that Origen interprets these self-same texts precisely in the same way that Arius does, 
namely 'literalistically,' but comes to totally different conclusions to those of Arius. 113 Looking at 
Prov 8:22, Origen also accepts that the Son is 'created by God.' Yet then in looking at the next 
verse (Vs 25) he goes on to argue that the Logos is 'begotten.' The interpretative styles of both 
Origen and Arius (in this particular sense) are exactly the same, the different outcomes are 
explained by their diverging theological presuppositions. Yes, there might be a limited amount of 
truth in the claim that Arius is 'literalistic' in his hermeneutic style and Origen less so. However, 
careful studies of patristic exegesis show that, both thinkers (as well as most others of the period) 
follow both 'allegorical,' and 'literalistic' approaches, depending on their overall motive. 
5.4-ARIUS' THEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION 
Sozomen reported Arius as being 'dialektichotatos,' an acute reasoner, a highly dialectical 
man.
114 Wiles amongst others, has argued that modem interpreters of Arius, must not read too 
much into this reference. We must not perceive Arius as an earlier Peter Abelard, perceived by 
his 'enemy' Bernard of Clairvaux as: addicted to 'logic,' and 'dialectics,' to the detriment of 
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sound spiritual theology. 115 There is no evidence that this is the case. However, Williams suggests 
that Arius' theological method did employ a certain rational element, different to that of 
Athanasius. 116 Athanasius is more inductive in his style-forestalling final opinion, and to a lesser 
extent, dependent on carefully worked out premises. Arius, on the other hand proceeds more 
deductively, relying on a stronger presuppositionery framework, than does Athanasius. Thus, 
Arius' style is 'scholastic,' in that it pursues a desire for overall rationality in a system which 
incorporates as its heart, the transcendence of the Father. All other components of the system 
need to operate from this base. Athanasius, is no less 'rational,' but in his methodology, is 
reluctant to afford any one, single theological principle the primary place to the detriment of 
others. 117 
5.4.l-THE PRIMACY OF THE FATHER 
Arius (and Athanasius, for that matter) have inherited the problem of describing the concept of 
Biblical monotheism, in a Middle-Platonist, philosophical manner. This was for the most part, the 
definition of God as 'Beyond Being,' together with all the problems this brings. This is the 
tension of upholding the unique dignity of the Father, especially in comparison to the divine 
Logos. 118 It has been observed that in the tradition of Origen and that of Alexandria, the Godhead 
was interpreted in a pluralist manner. It insisted that the persons of the Trinity were real and 
subsistent beings, and not mere origins or energies of the Father. Origen taught that the Logos has 
its own 'substance,' but is not created, being eternally generated from the Father. Alexander and 
Athanasius (anticipating the Western tradition) went beyond Origen and although agreeing with 
him when it came to the eternal generation of the Father, insisted that the Son has equal dignity 
and power to the Father. 
The one common theme that runs through both portions of the 'Thalia,' preserved by Athanasius 
is the clear argument: God alone is 'agennetos and anarchos ,' whose freedom is strong! y 
stressed. 119 Arius here stands in the transcendent tradition of Origen and others. It is the Plotinian 
tradition of the transcendence of the Father and the impossibility of believing in two self-
sustaining 'agen(n)eta,' first principles. 120 This means that the Son has his own 'substance,' or 
'subsistence,' that is not that of the Father. Here Arius is with Origen, in repudiating the idea of 
the 'homoousion,' because of the problem with materialism. Perhaps this is why the creed of 
Lucian also avoids this term (if indeed it does come from his hand). Arius is passionately 
concerned to avoid the materialism of the Valentinians and the Sabellians, in seeing the Son a 
'probole. '121 The first fragment of the 'Thalia,' (and the less reliable portion as recorded by 
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Athanasius) spends most of its time describing the Father in negative terms. This is so in order 
that the distinction between the hypostases can be made. The second fragment 'S,' uses far more 
positive terms, but the overall intention is the same: the Father is beyond Being, absolutely 
unknowable. It is not that Arius wants to make Trinitarian distinctions, separating the being of the 
Father and Son and so on. Arius wishes to employ the apophatic method to separate 'all Being,' 
including that of the Son, from the Father. It is important for him to affirm that all things are 
unlike God in substance. 122 Following the ideas of Plotinus and other Middle-Platonists, Arius 
affirms that the Father is simple and utterly indivisible. 'But if "from Him" and "from the womb" 
and "I proceeded and came forth from the Father" (I Cor 8:6, Ps 109:3, John 8:42) is understood 
as a part or as an emanation of the same substance as him, then according to this view the Father 
is composite and divisible and changeable and corporeal, and accordingly the incorporeal God is 
both corporeal and capable of suffering. ' 123 Neither, in upholding the extreme unity of the monad, 
is the doctrine of the stages of the Logos acceptable to him.' 99 Therefore as with Barth, revelation 
for Arius, is that of a supremely free and active God. To understand this liberty, is to understand 
His absolute 'otherness.' 
5.4.2-THE LOGOS 
The question now becomes, how then do we explain the existence of the Logos, without 
threatening this philosophical monotheism? Plotinus had the same problem and he tried to 
circumvent it with his conception of the illegitimate 'desire' of Intellect, after its coming into 
being, by 'looking back' on the One. Arius as a Christian theologian, instead supports the belief 
in the creative act of the Father, in eternity. Therefore, there was a time when God was 'not 
Father. .m 'The Son did not always exist. Everything is created out of nothing (ex ouk onion), all 
existing creatures, all things that are made; so the Word of God Himself came into existence out 
of nothing ... ' The Son exists by the 'will of God.' This is how Arius tries to link the Father and 
the Son, through 'will,' not Being itself. TI1ere are 'two Wisdoms.' One that 'is with God,' and 
the other that 'comes into being' as the Son. The Son can only be called 'Wisdom,' through 
'participation in the Father's Wisdom.'"' The Son is who He is, because of'grace and favour.' 126 
God knowing in advance, before his creation that He would be good, 'gave him this glory in 
anticipation.' 127 Yet as a substance, the Son has 'no participation in the Father.' He is the 
beginning of all creatures ('Archen ... ton geneton ). 120 The Son 'takes his subsistence from 
God. ' 129 This strong dualism in Arius' system, it must be remarked, was shared also by his 
opponents, reflecting, at least at this point, a common background of thought. Arius' divergence 
from his contemporaries is explained by the fact that the latter are prepared to compromise on this 
96 
dualism, in order to do proper honour to the Son, whereas Arius, despite his best efforts to do the 
same, wishes to do so without losing that strong duality_ This, however, was not possible_ 
Stead warns that Arius' theology was probably more subtle than the objectionable and simplistic 
form that Athanasius presents it in_ One example is the way in which Arius' critics call the Son 'a 
creature. ' 13° Considering his inclination to deny any change in God, it is quite possible that he 
taught that God was always Father, since he always had the power to beget a Son whenever he 
willed. 131 Athanasius' language suggests that Arius quite simply placed the Son on the same level 
as that of creation, but this is not the case. 132 Arius places the Son as the first of all originate 
being_ Wiles also points out that Arius can be misinterpreted here in his view of the Son's 
relationship to the Father. 133 It is true that Arius' basic presuppositions forced him to claim a 
difference of 'ousia,' between the Father and the Son. However this is the most 'basic distinction' 
that he makes, and it does not explain the entire story. Once having made this basic distinction, 
Arius went on to 'emphasise in the highest possible degree the qualifications which require to be 
made in the understanding of those basic distinctions. ' 134 Having set out this basic distinction, he 
was anxious as anybody to continue to stress the similarity of character and will between the 
Father and the Son_ rn This indicates that we cannot ascribe to Arius a crude form of 
'adoptionism' ('he philarchos')_ In his letter to Alexander, Arius is careful to disclaim any idea 
that the Son is a creature like the creatures. He is 'begotten,' but unlike anything else that is 
'begotten.' 136 
Then there are also those references in the 'S' fragment that suggest that the Son does not even 
know his own substance. 137 Williams places this in the context of the Son not having the same 
creative perspective of the Father who created him. 138 A created being cannot know itself in the 
same way that God can know it. 
Now, bearing in mind that we have little of Arius' own mind to go by, and that what we do have 
has been presented to us in a polemic and coloured manner, we can still detect a certain tension in 
his thought. The Son is as closest to God as He can possibly be, in fact in one sense He is 'God,' 
but in another not as the Father is God. He does not have the Father's glory and stability by 
nature; they are given to Him. This necessarily forces Arius in the direction of adoptionism, 
which he is trying to avoid. 
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5.5-PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES 
A fair amount of investigation has been made into the philosophical background of Arius' ideas, 
together with the philosophical background at Alexandria. This investigation has taken place 
because of the tendency of Arius' critics to accuse him of being more ofa philosopher, than a 
theologian. For example, Wolfson, and Hendrikus Berkoff, rooted Arius' theology in 
Aristotelianism. 139 The key to understanding heresy, the orthodox often said, is the appreciation 
of the heretics' undue dependence on the teachings of philosophy.,..., This was to be an on-going 
debate, and it still continues today. However the truth is that little is known of the precise 
philosophical environment at Alexandria after the time of Plotinus (middle of the third Century), 
until the time ofTheon who taught at Alexandria during the reign of the emperor Theodosius 
(379-95). 141 Before Theon's time, after Plotinus, there is no knowledge of any specific 
philosophical school in existence. H.I. Marrou has suggested that there were municipal chairs of 
philosophy, similar to other chairs in the cities of the Empire. 141 All we can therefore say about 
philosophy and Alexandria, from the second half of the Third Century, up to the Sixth Century, is 
that individual teachers of philosophy taught there. Anatolius, later to be Bishop of Laodicea, 
taught the Aristotelian tradition there in the late Third Century, long after Arius.'" This, of 
course, is not to deny that Arius came into contact with individuals who represented certain 
traditions. However, because we can know very little about the antecedents of Arius, (theological 
and philosophical) evidence of philosophical influences upon him, will have to be discovered 
from the internal evidence furnished in his extant works. 
Stead in an important article: 'The Platonism of Arius,' 144 argues against any kind of either\or 
situation, concerning the question: was Arius influenced either by Aristotle or Plato?'" At that 
time in Alexandria, the influence of intellectual opposition against Aristotle and general favour 
towards Plato, was declining, Plotinus being the last great representative of the Platonic tradition. 
'Nevertheless there were still anti-Aristotelian Platonists, especially amongst Christians, who 
found Aristotle's logic too dialectical and his theology too attenuated. Nevertheless, the anti-
Platonist Aristotelians no longer existed. ' 146 There is scant sign, during the early moments of the 
Arian controversy, of any specific philosophical school at work. The philosophical influences on 
Arius, Athanasius and others, were divergent with mainly Platonic and watered down Stoic 
elements, together with a small amount of Aristotelianism. 147 Neither did these traditions, appear 
to the Christian Church as openly 'philosophical.' Instead, they became assimilated, and 
embedded into the multi-traditional cultural background from which all drew. 
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Wiles takes note of some main philosophical, priorities which in this above manner, made 
themselves apparent in much of the rich background from which the thinking of Arius and his 
contemporaries drew. Firstly, there is the strong Platonic distinction between the Ideas and the 
creation, the immutable and the mutable. Secondly, in the 'Timaeus' 28c, the Father is seen as the 
Creator of all. Is this Father the creator of the cosmos itself, (as the philosopher Atticus saw it) or 
does (as Numenius saw it) this Father create firstly a second 'God,' who then becomes the creator 
of the cosmos? In addition to this, what kind of relationship does this ultimate Father have to his 
creation? 148 
5.5.1-ARIUS ON SUBSTANCE: THE BACKGROUND 
The Nicene controversy was not primarily about the philosophical meaning of the term 
'Homoousion' (of the same substance). Neither was it a controversy about philosophy. It was first 
and foremost, a theological controversy, concerning the place of the Son, in relation to the Father. 
Yet, because by the early fourth Century, the church had for some time committed herself to 
solving theological problems with philosophical terms, the issue inevitably took on a strong 
philosophical element. To some extent the reason for the protracted nature of the controversy, 
(going on after Nicaea) was precisely because the main players were unaware of the fact that it 
was largely philosophical in the use of terms. Had the principal players such as Athanasius and 
Arius reflected more upon their own philosophical assumptions, as much as their theological 
ones, perhaps much pain would have been averted. This kind of remark will always be the chief 
reflection of historical hindsight. 
It needs to be said that by the 4"' Century, the concept of 'substance,' had submerged itself 
thoroughly into theological language, going back long before Arius. This poses difficulties for the 
student of the term, as used at this time. Having been undoubtedly assimilated into both 
theological and 'popular-level,' vocabularies of the time, discovering precise meanings of the 
term at certain times or as used by certain figures, is not always possible. 149 By the time a term or 
word has become thoroughly assimilated into a new culture, (with its own technical agenda) it 
often becomes sufficiently divorced from its original sources, and develops a new meaning. This 
new meaning, although partly influenced by its (many) original settings, takes its own character. 
This means that the modem scholar needs to firstly discover what the term generally means in the 
old setting as well as the new, in order to discover what one specific individual meant in the use 
of the term. Did he follow the current usage or not? Of course, these are issues too vast for us to 
consider here, and we shall merely provide a summary of certain aspects as they apply to the 
Arian viewpoint. 
5.5.2-A THANASIUS AND ARIUS 
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In terms of Christian scholarship with respect to the 'homoousion' controversy various main 
figures can be recognised. Stead has shown'" in a study of Athanasius' use oftheterm 
'substance,' that he was not consistent, lacking the same philosophical consistency that we might 
expect in a modem thinker. Stead suggests that there cannot be much certainty as to what 
'homoousios,' actually meant to each contemporary Nicene thinker. Harnack suggested that at 
Constantinople in 381, 'Homoousios,' meant generic similarity and equality with the Father, not 
'Substantial equivalence.' Bethune-Baker upheld the traditional view that the meaning of 
'Homoousios,' is the same at both Nicaea and Constantinople: The Son is literally of the same 
substance as the Father. In his line of argument, he says that Latin theology had had sufficient 
influence on Nicaea, for the distinction between 'Substantia' and 'natura,' to be fully 
understood."' Prestige, interpreted the understanding of the Catholic doctrine at the time of 
Nicaea, as viewing the Father, Son and Holy Spirit as one, single identical, object. In other words, 
he in claiming this, is suggesting that God was interpreted in the sense of an Aristotelian primary 
substance. The Godhead is 'one complete object,' but seen in its external sense as 'appearing in 
three presentations.' At Nicaea, says Prestige; the issue was not the unity of God but the divinity 
of Christ. The official interpretation, thus, at Nicaea, left the unity question unsolved. Yet, he 
suggests that in Athanasius, 'homoousios,' means not only equality, but also identity of 
substance. 152 However, Stead points out'" that there are other portions of the Athanasius writings 
that refer to 'homoousios' in the generic sense of the term. Prestige is well aware of this, but 
suggests that whenever Athanasius uses the term with respect to the Godhead, he only grants it 
one sense. Stead also makes another observation with respect to the position of Prestige. Prestige 
takes the meaning of 'Ousia,' as that of Aristotle's 'prate Ousia,' or one concrete, distinct reality. 
The difficulty is that Athanasius (if he indeed were using the term 'Ousia' in the Aristotelian 
manner), would have run into trouble if in stating that the Son is 'of the substance of the Father,' 
he is meaning'"' the 'same identical object.' Surely then, the substance of the Son cannot mean 
the same object as the Father. Stead says, 'In this phrase, we therefore insist, "Ousia," does not 
mean primary "Ousia" in the classical sense of the term as defined by Aristotle in the categories, 
namely the "tode ti" of individual entity. But clearly the phrase "e Ousia tou patros," does not 
donate something other than "o patros." The relationship may perhaps be expressed by borrowing 
a term from recent logic, and saying that both terms denote the same entity, but the connotation is 
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different.' Stead effectively convinces his audience that Prestige takes a somewhat too neat and 
simplistic line, in his interpretation of the Athanasian view of 'Homoousios.' 
There is no doubt that to a limited extent, the Aristotelian meaning of substance as a self-
subsisting material object was known in Athanasius' time. Athanasius did hold to the idea that the 
substance of God is communicable. This 'materialism' of Athanasius is an important contrast to 
Arius, and partly explains the difference between their positions. 
5.5.3-TRANSCENDENCE IN GOD LEADS TO DEFERRAL IN LANGUAGE 
Jn his assessment of Athanasius' and the then current usage of the term 'Ousia,' Stead's 
investigation brings him to the following conclusions: There was no precise, 'logical' use or 
'methodology' in applying the term 'Ousia,' or 'homoousios.' The notions of: 'exactly the same,' 
'very different,' 'similar' etc, only take on a precise form when we actually are able to clearly 
divide up into clear classes, the things we are talking about. Jn the case of the Father and the Son, 
this kind of sure knowledge was not possible. 1" The clear, confident understanding of' Ousia,' 
modified theologically into an entirely 'non-material' idea, only came about by the time of Basil, 
who together with his contemporaries, seemed to have had a clearer understanding of Aristotle's 
logic. 1' 6 Athanasius, as well as Arius for that matter, did not have any real, formal knowledge of 
Aristotle first hand. Neither one of these two quote him. The matrix from which both operated, 
was the Bible. This meant that neither thinker (more so with Athanasius, it seems) subjected their 
analyses to a rigorous logical analysis. Nevertheless, in a general way, by Athanasius' time, there 
seemed to be knowledge of the logical distinction between 'essence' and 'accident.' Athanasius 
used it himself to establish that the continuity between the divinity of Father and Son is not 
'accidental,' but 'essential,' i.e., permanent and necessary. Stead says that the imprecise nature of 
the use of these terms, at this time in the church's unfolding doctrine, was a boon, not a 
disadvantage, as the vagueness allowed for the element of 'divine mystery' to play an important 
part in the proceedings. To put this in a different way, or to use our own adopted terms, a certain 
lack of precision enabled the concept of deferral or the resistance to closure to continue to play an 
important part in the church's theology from this time to today. This is true, notwithstanding an 
inclination to use rational constructs. A further interesting observation is what was to become an 
extension of this idea, originating in Plotinus. Jn theology, the transcendence of the One, was to 
not only apply to the 'immutable Father,' but (as we shall see) it was also going to take up its 
residence in theological language as well. 
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In our opinion, the logical tension that Arius was to detect in Athanasius and Alexander, was the 
affirmation of the unity and indivisibility of the Father on the one hand and the sharing of the 
Father's substance on the other, by the Son. Certainly, the precise nature of that sharing might not 
have been set in the pristine logical terms of the 'Categories,' and neither was Athanasius nearly 
as pluralistic as Origen, but it was still sufficient for Arius to find fault with. It is Arius' 
identification of the 'crude materialism' of Athanasius and others, that prevented him (and so it 
seems, Lucian) from using the same term, when speaking about the nature of God. 
5.5.4-PARTICIPATION 
Arius and much of early Fourth Century Christianity, had begun to work within a specific 
paradigm granted to it by the classical tradition. We see a tension between twin pillars in Arius 
and his contemporaries: How can a purely, simple substance, a substance that is 'beyond Being' 
participate in anything" Arius' God and the God of Athanasius and Arius' other Alexandrian 
contemporaries, is not the God of Aristotle (pure Being). Instead Arius particularly approximates 
the Christian God closely to the God of Plotinus: God is beyond Being. Now the Aristotelian 
tradition states that the one dimension of an entity that grants it individual status, is its intelligible 
form as a substance. Yet if God is beyond Being, we cannot speak of God's form in the 
traditional sense, of' getting an intellectual handle on God.' The implication of this therefore is 
that the Plotinian God cannot be a substance. The classical tradition, both Neoplatonic and 
Aristotelian states that in order for something to be part ofreality, (Being) it must be abstracted 
intellectually. Yet unique to Neoplatonism is the belief that in order to keep to this order of 
things, there must be something even more real than Being (and naturally even more abstract) 
that, which is beyond Being. This brings about the need for an intermediary, metaphysical Logos, 
in order to make the unknowable, knowable. 
The doctrine of the self-identity of God in Arius, is also more Plotinian, than Aristotelian. 
Aristotle saw unity as indicating numerical oneness, but with Plotinus, unity is pure simplicity, 
immutability. Now the classical tradition accepted that all intellectual language (scientia) is the 
language of Being. When Plato spoke of the Good which is beyond Being, the implication is that 
even theoretical discourse fails to adequately express this dimension. From the earliest times, 
Christians would ascribe to God this Neoplatonic conception, (beyond Being) and spend much 
time trying to bring him back into the realm of Being again, in order to talk about Him. In other 
words, in the Christian God, there must be ultimately a combination of both Plotinian ideas of 
'Nous' and 'the One.' After all, Arius says that the Father 'wills' the creation of the Son and the 
world. Plotnms denied that the One willed anything. Here, most clearly, is the discontinuity 
between Arius and the Neoplatonic tradition.'" 
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Arius' view of substance, whilst not formally Aristotelian, possessed to some extent, in addition 
to the Plotinian understanding of immutability, the Aristotelian dimension of individuality. This 
means that when it came to the relation of the Father to the Son, problems arose. A substance 
cannot be attributed to another substance_ If the Son is a substance in his own right, He cannot be 
predicated of the Father. A substance cannot be asserted of a subject, neither does it exist in a 
subject. Furthermore, in essentialist epistemology, we can only know something, by knowing its 
substance, i.e., that which makes it what it is-its intelligible form_ We do not ultimately know a 
substance by its effects or qualities (contra Berkeley and the Empiricists). Arius, in his desire to 
protect the transcendence of the Father, denies that we can know His substance per se. Both Philo 
and Clement argued in a similar way and stated that the Logos, is merely the knowable side to 
God. To Arius, this compromises God's pure unity. No, the Logos must be a separate entity. The 
Father is the Monad principle, whilst the Logos is the Dyad. The relationship between the 
substance of the Father and that of the Son is a relationship between a hierarchically determined 
Unity as against Multiplicity_ Even the Logos cannot know the Father's essence; he does not even 
know his own essence. The Logos knows the Father by 'participation,' but participation that is 
not the sharing of essence, but that of the creator-creature distinction. It is the same thing for the 
believer. We only know the Father by a vague participation in His effects on creation. This results 
in the harsh criticism of Athanasius_ For Athanasius and Irenaeus, 'participation' has 
metaphysical as well as soteriological consequences_ In order for the believer to participate in the 
divine nature, through the redemptive work of the Logos assumed flesh, that same Logos must 
truly participate in the eternal life of the Godhead. If this is not the case, salvation (deification) 
cannot be possible. 
Another problem is that of the creation of the Son in Arius. At some point before time, the Son 
'was created,' or 'came into being.' By the early Fourth Century, Christian thinkers began to 
move away from the classical idea of the eternity of the world and to accept the argument for 
creation 'ex nihilo.' To preserve the Father's absolute transcendence, Arius refuses to see the Son 
coming into being in any way other than by the free creative will of the Father. The Father does 
not necessarily create, nor is the Son an emanation from the Father, he is 'created' by the free will 
of the Father before all ages. 
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Arius is an example of the beginnings of a pattern that was to emerge in the Church, a pattern that 
reflected the ongoing attempt to harmonise Biblical theology together with Hellenistic 
philosophy. From the purely metaphysical side of the question, Arius inherited the same 
philosophical tensions as other early Christian thinkers. His uniqueness lay in his way of dealing 
with them. Although seldom at that time, were the technical terms used with any philosophical or 
logical thoroughness as we find in Augustine and the Cappadocians, the tension that arises when 
one combines the traditions of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism are clear. Aristotle uses the idea 
of substance in describing clear individual things, mostly in the physical world. Plato is not so 
clear in his usage of the term. On the contrary, the clarity of individual things resides in their 
participation in the ideal world of the Forms, not in their own right as 'substances.' This 
Aristotelian preciseness, surrounding the language of the world of 'Becoming,' does not fit well 
when applied to the Plotinian world of the One which is 'Beyond Being.' This has already been 
pointed out. In the system of Arius, all reality only has its reality as in some way it derives such 
reality from the creative Being of God. This Being is beyond Being, and as such resists 
conceptual closure. It is a continual principle of deferral. Because all other principles, such as the 
Logos, possess their being from that which is beyond Being, this closure problem becomes part 
and parcel of all beings in the continuum of the created order. Arius seemed to appreciate this 
intrinsic problem by strongly separating the realm of the Father from everything else, whereas 
others felt that incorporating the Father, Son and creation into the same ontological reality, was 
vital in order to preserve the theological-soteriological interests of salvation and creation. 
Aristotle's hierarchical metaphysics is not nearly as intrinsic to Arius' system as is the 
metaphysics of Plotinus. In the case of Aristotle, with the comparison of substances, we simply 
look at their secondary attributes, their qualities. Entities do not have to 'participate' in each 
other, in the same way as Plotinus, in order for us to understand them. The intelligible form 
within a substance, makes it a substance, not the fact that it 'participates' in another substance or 
hypostasis, such as Nous in the One. With the Plotinian tradition a level of reality or hypostasis, is 
real not so much because of its own intelligible form but because of its participation in another 
higher hypostasis, hierarchically determined. Aristotle criticised the idea of an intelligible form 
outside of the world of becoming. 
When we have a determining hierarchy in which one hypostasis precedes another, in the direction 
from Unity to multiplicity, it becomes difficult to conceive of a Son, specifically related to 
creation, who is at the same time on the same level of the Father. The other purely philosophical 
(as opposed to Biblical) question that more recent students of the Trinity might pose to this type 
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ofNeoplatonism is the question of a Trinity leading to multiplicity. If we have pure Unity, 
leading downward towards multiplicity in the other hypostases, why just have three? Why not an 
endless number of principles leading to a theological philosophy of total differentiation?'" 
Augustine and the Cappadocians later, continue to retain a strong apophatic conception of the 
"otherness' of God, but part company with the external triadic structure of the Plotinian cosmos, 
replacing it with an internal triad of self-relatedness. If God's triadic make-up is first and 
foremost, his internal, subsistent, relational structure, not his relatedness to an external world, 
much of the problem seems to be solved. Primal unity is upheld, but consists (from the creaturely 
perspective) of a pattern of relations, but these relations are not a real multiplicity in God. 
PART TWO 
'GOD IS TRUE BEING' 
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PART TWO: AUGUSTINE TO AQUINAS. 'GOD IS TRUE BEING.' 
CHAPTER SIX: AUGUSTINE' 
6.1-AUGUSTINE AND BEING 
6.1.1-THE BACKGROUND 
Historically speaking, Augustine is at the end of one era and at the beginning of another.2 He is 
also arguably the most influential ancient Western writer of them all, possibly having a greater 
influence on the history of Western dogma, than all others outside the canon of Scripture.' 'It can 
certainly be allowed that a part, at least, of the commanding position held by St. Augustine was 
due to his place in the ancient West at the moment of its dissolution and to the survival and wide 
distribution of his voluminous writings .. _' 4 By the end of the Fourth Century all the churches of 
the Roman Empire had for the most part, accepted the Nicene faith according to the interpretation 
of the Cappadocians and Athanasius_ Thus, when Augustine arrived on the theological scene, 
(about 390) there was an already established idea of the orthodox Trinity, which even the political 
authorities called upon as a means to justify the basis of political unity in the Empire_' 
6.2-DISTINGUISHING ASPECTS OF AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY 
Philosophically speaking, Augustinian scholars place Augustine in the tradition ofNeoplatonism, 
although there is some debate as to how his Neoplatonism fitted into his conversion as a 
Christian.' In 1888, Harnack put forward the view that Augustine only after some time 
subsequent to his conversion, abandoned Neoplatonism for the Christian faith. 7 Most scholars 
incline to the view that he accepted both as a synthesis throughout his Christian career. This is not 
to detract from the fact that at critical junctures in his thinking, Augustine would abandon the 
Neoplatonic view, in order to uphold his faith_ Before we tum to a detailed study of his 
Neoplatonism, firstly some attention will be given to Augustine's general philosophical 
orientation_ 
Augustine's system is not nearly as 'closed' as that of Aristotle or Aquinas.' Rather it retains 
some of the non-systematic openness of Plato. Augustine did not set out to write a theological 
textbook, 'secundum quad congrnit ad ernditonem incipentium,' (in such a way that befits the 
instruction of beginners) as did Aquinas. It is clear to Aquinas, that there is a clear order of 
knowing, based on sensible things, proceeding in the Neoplatonic theological order: proceeding 
from God to creatures and then back to God through Christ. His method is clear: to proceed in 
such a way that is 'according to the order of learning,' (secundum ordinem disciplinae). We do 
not (says Aquinas) proceed in a haphazard manner. 
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As with many of the Platonic dialogues, much of Augustine's work does not answer all questions, 
or settle problems once and for all. Instead he often opens up new avenues of direction, new 
problems. The openness of Augustine's system, has allowed many diverse thinkers after him to 
label themselves' Augustinian. ' 9 However, as we shall see, many issues in Augustine's oeuvre, 
were systematised and refined in the Summas of the later medievals, especially Aquinas. Yet, 
Augustine does not employ the clear oppositional method of Aquinas: Natural man\Saved man, 
nature\Grace, Faith \Reason and so on. 
We do not see, in the thought of Augustine, a dichotomy or conscious division between terms 
such as 'philosophy,' 'truth,' and 'faith.' Augustine does not see 'philosophy,' in the same 
technical sense, as do the later Schoolmen. Says Gilson: 'To the extent that philosophy is defined 
as a purely rational and theoretical attempt to solve the most general questions raised by man and 
the universe, Augustine' doctrine proclaims the insufficiency of philosophy at every page ... there 
is no Augustinianism without the fundamental postulate that true philosophy implies an act of 
adherence to the supernatural order which frees the will from the flesh through grace and the 
mind from scepticism through revelation.' 10 
Yet Augustine's conversion to Christianity in no way diminished his pursuit of reason. 11 Of 
course, by the time he came to write the 'Confessions,' Augustine was fully aware that a 
philosophy unenlightened by the light of faith was of no avail. 12 Faith does not overrule the 
mind's processes, and Augustine's search fortruth was one that drew its stimulus from an 
intellectual need. This was the case even if at times reason was a guide which led to the necessary 
parting of the ways with the priority of faith, if such reason proved itself to be erroneous. 
Augustine does not set out to 'write philosophy,' he sets out to write about God, in a 'reasonable 
manner 
Augustine did not feel that faith is that which must be exercised without any rational reason at all. 
One must know why one believes. 'Before faith, understand in order that thou mayest believe. 
After faith, believe in order that thou mayest understand. Before faith thou comprehendest the 
reason for believing. After faith, thou dost taste and penetrate the contents of faith. But only in 
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heaven shall the mystery be revealed.' 13 Faith is grounded in reason and vice versa, but Augustine 
does not attempt to evaluate this problematic relationship systematically, as its true nature will 
only be understood in heaven. His famous motto is thus, 'crede. ut intelligas. verbum Dei. ' 14 
6.2.l-THE MYSTICAL 
In summarising Augustine's philosophical approach, Stob" highlights the following key 
elements. Firstly (as we have seen) Augustine's style is fragmented, lacking in systematic 
structure. Secondly, it retains a decidedly religious character in that its ultimate object is God. 
'This means that Augustine's philosophy is predominately metaphysical, as opposed to practical 
or physical. But the metaphysical object or principle is personal.' 16 This is the Lord Himself, as 
revealed authoritatively in His Word. All reason then, is to be submitted to this authority. 17 There 
is therefore the closest possible unity between the philosophical and the religious, or between 
'philosophy' and 'dogmatic theology.'" The other identifying factor is the inwardness of 
Augustine's approach. 19 There are, generally, two ways to seek the path to truth. The one method 
leads up through nature and the senses, and the other way employs the mind and reason. Those 
employing exclusively the latter type are generally classed as idealists or rationalists. Generally, 
Augustine falls into the second group. 20 Combined however with idealism, in Augustine, there is 
also a strong sense of Plotinian mysticism. For our somewhat narrow purpose, we shall merely 
highlight certain key aspects of some of these elements as they unite into Augustine's outlook. 
The two Loci in Augustine's theology are the soul and God, and the need to unite the two. 'Thou 
hast made us for thyself and our hearts are restless till they rest in thee. ' 21 Stob comments here on 
Augustine's struggle to retain a Biblical, Theo-centred theology, whilst still reflecting a strong 
influence of the anthropocentric nature of Greek thought. 12 Louth indicates that. one important 
area where Augustine does differ from the Neoplatonists, is the strong communal nature of his 
mystical thought. 23 This is not only due to biblical parameters, but also to the fact that Augustine 
was a Roman, operating in a Greek paradigm.24 This produces a curious conflict; that of the 
social dimension of Roman thinking, opposed to the other-worldliness of Plotinus. 
Yet the social concern in Augustine was to strongly impact his doctrine of the Trinity, where he 
pays attention to the 'communal' dimension in God, solving many problems that Arius failed to 
solve. Today, the Western orthodox doctrine of the Trinity is frequently criticised for lacking any 
social dimensions or relevance. However, any perusal of Augustine's writings on the subject, 
reveals that this was scarcely his intention. Another important issue is Augustine's belief in 
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memory as one of the 'paths,' to God. This was to also further his understanding of the relations 
within the Trinity. The 'De Trinitate ·itself reflects both a mystical methodology and structure. In 
fact, the first seven books of the 'De Trinitate ·discuss how it is that God has revealed Himself. 
Unlike Plotinus, we do not ascend to God without the assistance of His revelation of Himself in 
the Scriptures and the Church." The latter part of the treatise, approaches the subject of ascending 
to God. The key to understanding Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity is his Trinitarian 
psychology. The Trinity is imprinted on the soul of man, enabling him as created in the image of 
God, to understand the Trinity. Because God is a Trinity and man is in the image of God, that 
image is Trinitarian. 26 This means that the treatise is not merely a study on the doctrine of the 
Trinity, but it is also a study of the doctrine of the true man (Barth). This is reminiscent of 
Calvin's remark: 'Nearly all the wisdom we possess, that is to say, true and sound wisdom, 
consists of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves.'27 
With Augustine, the stamp of the Trinity in man, even precedes man's knowledge of God, as it 
forms the very psychological make-up of the personality in man. The mind in man has to reflect a 
Trinitarian structure before it can begin to understand God as Trinity. Books VIII-X of 'De 
Trinitate 'are concerned for the search of the true Trinitarian image of God in man. This 
Trinitarian psychology within the mind of the theologian forms the true theological 
prolegomenon. In Augustine's theology, there is the tendency towards the 'Trinification of the 
world.' Barth in a different way manifests the same inclination. 
Before the soul can return to its archetype, God, it needs to tum inwards and truly understand 
itself, first. It needs to perceive itself in a 'spiritual manner,' not a 'material' one. 'The way 
Augustine treats this image of the Trinity he has now discovered in man is guided by his principle 
that this image will only reflect God truly, if it is a true image. It will only be a true image if the 
third element of the image, self-knowledge, is genuine. If, say, the mind mistakes its own nature 
and thinks of itself as material, then the Trinity in the soul will be imperfect. If, on the other hand, 
the soul thinks of itself as divine there will be a corresponding imperfection in the image."' One 
important area where Augustine differs from the 'books of the Platonists,' is his belief in the need 
for God's assistance. This enables man to know himself and then enjoy the beatific vision of God. 
'Plotinus would doubtless have agreed with Augustine's emphasis on the brevity of experience 
and with the emphasis on the shock or "check" encountered by the soul, as Ennead 4.8.1 
indicates, but he would not have shared Augustine's conviction that that the vision was brief and 
imperfect because of sin, both inherited and personal... For Plotinus, the soul, however fallen 
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always remains capable of lifting itself up to the vision of God because it is of divine origin, for 
Augustine the soul is a fallen creature, bound by both original and individual sin, and hence any 
such elevation is always a result of God's action in us."9 
6.2.2-AUGUSTINE, THE GREEKS AND IRRA TIONALISM: A RECAP 
There are many aspects to Augustinianism that clearly link him to his time. We have seen that he 
displays the typical pro-praxis, societal concern of the Romans. Yet the most decided classical 
dimension within Augustinianisrn, is the use of reason, as a means to the pursuit of truth. In fact, 
it is this characteristic of the ancient Greek culture, certainly by the Fifth Century BC, that is 
universally recognised by scholars. To speak of Greek culture, is to speak of the rational 
foundation on which the modem age is built. Classical culture is synonymous with reason. 
However, says Dodds in his text, 'The Greeks and the Irrational:' 'But in the period between 
Aeschylus and Plato ... the gap between the beliefs of the people and the beliefs of the 
intellectuals, which is already implicit in Homer, widens to a complete breach, and prepares the 
way for the gradual dissolution of the Conglomerate. The "Aufklauring" or Enlightenment was 
not initiated by the Sophists ... The Enlightenment is of course much older; its roots are in sixth-
century Ionia; it is at work in Hecataeus, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus, and in a later generation is 
carried further by speculative scientists like Anaxagoras and Democritus. Hecataeus is the first 
Greek who admitted that he found Greek mythology "funny," and set to work to make it less 
funny by inventing rationalist explanations, while his contemporary Xenophanes attacked the 
Homeric and Hesiodic myths from the moral angle. More important for our purposes is the 
statement that Xenophanes denied the validity of divination. ' 30 
Our two key-concepts of 'substance' and 'participation,' are the very cornerstones of this rational 
age. The very two thinkers who polished the two terms, Aristotle and Plato, lived at a time when 
Greek rationalism appeared to be on the verge of final triumph, the 'great age' of intellectual 
discovery that begins with the foundation of the Lyceum about 335 BC and continues down to the 
end of the Third Century. This period witnessed the transformation of Greek science from an 
untidy jumble of isolated observations mixed with a priori guesses into a system of 
methodological systems-"1 That which is supremely real, (Being) is not real because it 'exists,' 
but now because it is supremely rational. 
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Yet scholars make the mistake of concluding that the rational element in classical Greek society 
was a homogenous concept. Dodds illustrates that this was not the case. We take up his 
discussion of what might perhaps betermed one of the most 'rational' of all the Greeks, Plato-" 
Says Dodds of Plato: 'He grew up in a social circle which not only took pride in settling all 
questions before the bar of reason, but had the habit of interpreting all human behaviour in terms 
of rational self-interest, and the belief that "virtue," "arete," consisted essentially in a technique 
of rational living. That pride, that habit; and that belief remained with Plato to the end; the 
framework of his thought never ceased to be rationalistic. But the contents of the framework 
came in time to be strangely transformed. There were good reasons for that. The transition from 
the Fifth Century to the Fourth was marked ... by events, which might well induce any rationalist 
to reconsider his faith. To what moral and material ruin the principle of rational self-interest 
might lead a society appeared in the fate of imperial Athens; to what extent it might lead the 
individual, in the fate of Critias and Charmides and their fellow-tyrants. And on the other hand, 
the trial of Socrates afforded the strange spectacle of the wisest man in Greece at the supreme 
crisis of his life deliberately and gratuitously flouting that principle, at any rate as the world 
understood it. '33 
He then goes on to conclude, significantly as follows: 'It was these events, I think, which 
compelled Plato, not to abandon rationalism, but to transform its meaning by giving it a 
metaphysical dimension. '34 
Firstly, Plato accepted that the rational path was not for everybody, the common man still needed 
to consult the gods and pursue truth through 'ritual.' The 'dictum · was rationalism for the few, 
magic for the many." More than this, Plato also to a limited extent, recognised the role of the 
irrational even in his own mind, albeit that this 'occultic' element needed to stand the test of 
reason, in order to be substantiated. As soon as he turned from the occult idea of the self to the 
empirical man, he found himself driven to recognise an irrational factor within the mind itself, 
and thus to think of moral evil in terms of psychological conflict. 36 However: 'To the intuitions 
both of the seer and of the poet he consistently refused the title of knowledge, not because he 
thought them necessarily groundless, but because their grounds could not be produced ... Socrates 
had taken irrational intuition quite seriously ... and Plato makes a great show of taking it quite 
seriously too ... Of the pseudo sciences of augury and hepatoscopy he permits himself to speak 
with thinly veiled contempt, but the "madness that comes by divine gift," the madness that 
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inspires the prophet or the poet, or purges men in the Corybantic rite-this, ... is treated as if it were 
a real intrusion of the supernatural into human life."' 
A similar paradox is recorded by Laurent Deveze, French Cultural Attache and director of the 
French Institute, in his unpublished paper, delivered at the University of South Africa, entitled: 
'Myth in Platonic Philosophy."' Deveze begins his study by pointing out that the Platonic corpus, 
as a general rule, frowns upon 'mythological discourse,' as the discourse of people with 'no 
Logos.' The contents of myth are the rhetorical tricks of the Sophists. Myth is employed by the 
Sophist as a theatrical means to impress people in the agora. The philosopher on the other hand, 
appeals to the truth as a means to convict. Socrates condemned the mythical discourse as being 
counter-progressive, preserving the inadequate, crumbling traditions of the past. On the contrary, 
the way of Logos, is the way of the philosopher. The philosopher trusts the self of sovereign 
reason, contrary to the sovereignty of the mythological, pseudo-religious past. 
The paradox, however, in Plato (after all this has been said) occurs, for example in the 
'Symposium,' where Socrates employs myth, himself, as a vehicle for truth. Socrates appreciates 
the use of Aristophane's speech (i.e. myth) as a means of conveying esoteric truth at the 'limits of 
normal, rational language (philosophy).39 Myth is used when philosophical speech (Logos) cannot 
be categorically reduced. In this case, only poetic-mythical discourse can help. This reflects a use 
of myth that goes beyond the Sophists. It is here employed as a means to go beyond Logos 
(nevertheless as a handmaid to Logos). The use of the myth, however, by the philosopher is never 
as a closure speech. Instead it is employed as a means (where necessary) to go beyond Logos, 
when Logos is insufficient. In other words, in the midst of the most scientific of discourses, there 
is a perceived need to 'go beyond Being. '40 
We need to now relate the above material concerning the irrational, to our own particular 
discussion. Although the language of Being (substance and participation) is the quintessential 
language of the age of reason, we have glimpsed an 'irrational' element juxtaposed into the 
picture. Dodds describes the cultic-intuitive irrationality in Plato's thought, and goes onto speak 
about the esoteric, linguistic elements of irrationalism, also within the Platonic corpus. We, in our 
description of the Good (or the Plotinian One) as beyond Being, (in both Plato and Plotinus) point 
to the irrational element in the First Philosophy of the Platonists, and their progeny. Plato never 
systematised the concept of the Good, but Plotinus placed the idea of the One at the very pinnacle 
of his system. In fact, it is the single, 'irrational' principle on which everything depends. The 
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rational depends on the irrational or the beyond rational. This paradox is inherited to a lesser or 
greater extent, by Christian Neoplatonists (including Arius and Augustine). Arius reflects this 
'irrationalism' in his paradoxical conception of the Father as 'beyond Being.' This is his 
determining principle which he tries to integrate into a rational theological system, which 
attempts to describe the nature of the Godhead rationally (using the language of Being). 
After this somewhat lengthy diversion, we need to conclude by returning to Augustine. Does 
Augustine reflect a similar paradox? In a reduced manner, we think yes. First there is the paradox 
in Christian epistemology. He believes in the strong role of reason (scientia) as a contributing 
impulse in the road to truth, but Logos (scientia) needs to give way to wisdom (sapientia) in the 
final analysis. Then secondly, (and more pertinent to our purposes) there is the paradox in 
Augustinian, Trinitarian metaphysics. Although (as we shall see below) Augustinian scholars do 
not identify Augustine as describing God as 'beyond Being,' the mystical element in Augustine, 
together with the influence of a transcendent God in Biblical theology, in effect brings the same 
idea into his doctrine of the Trinity. 
6.2.3-AUGUSTINE: SAP!ENTIA AND THE REFORMATION OF CLASSICISM 
The great exponents of 'Logos' had as their ultimate goal, the reformation of society. Plato again, 
can be quoted as one important example. His philosophy was not an end in itself, but a means to 
reform a decaying society, built on the superstitions of unreason. The transformation of the 
society would take place through the rule of the Guardians, men of reason. Plato's way to reform 
society-is not a total rejection of the past, nor a search for entirely new first principles. Neither is 
it a drive to eradicate entirely the 'superstitious elements.41 The focal point of his new 'State 
Church' is to be a joint cult of Apollo and the sun god Helios, to which the high Priest will be 
attached and the highest political officers will be solemnly dedicated. The joint nature of the 
influence of both Zeus and Apollo is significant: Apollo represents the traditionalism of the 
masses, but Helios stands for the new rational religion of the philosophers. In his later works, 
Plato moved away from the 'Republic's idea of the rule of the philosopher-king, towards a more 
theocratic ideal state, where the rationalists, although still theoretically retaining the reins, would 
operate less directly. Says Dodds:' ... it is Plato's last desperate attempt to build a bridge between 
the intellectuals and the people, and thereby save the unity of Greek belief and of Greek 
culture. ' 42 Again, the trained philosopher can cleanse his mind without recourse to myth and 
ritual, but in order to retain control of the masses, ritual catharsis must remain. 
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Augustine, even more than Plato, had a dream to transform the aged and decaying culture into 
which he was born." Being a true Roman Christian, this was for him, the true task of theology. 
Augustine was not a Plotinus, almost ignoring the problems and structures of everyday life, in 
order to pursue the otherworldly, the mystical. The mysticism of Augustinianism was indeed 
otherworldly, but only in order to know the transcendent God, before bringing the knowledge of 
him to the world. It is difficult for us today, after two thousand years of 'Christian history,' to 
fully comprehend the far-sweeping reforms that Augustine had in mind at the time, reforms that 
for centuries after his death, became a unique reality (with its own problems), in the medieval 
West. Augustine was about to enter into his life's work just as twilight descended upon Rome. 
As with Plato, Augustine did not wish to completely do away with classical thought and life 
altogether, indeed such a task would have been impossible for obvious reasons. Nevertheless, his 
reforms envisaged far greater changes than Plato's did. Augustine advocated a reform of first 
principles. One famous work where this is evidently intended is 'The City of God. ' 43 This is a 
general philosophical assault upon the rational foundations of' Romanitas,' or the 'City of Men,' 
ofVergil. The 'City of God,' does not just present a 'new, Christian philosophy of history,' it is 
an offer of escape from the unsolved riddles of classicism, seen in the light of a new 'Arche, ' or 
first principle ( principium'). The problem with the moral decay in the Empire stems from an 
immoral view of reason, as a sovereign principle. Augustine identifies the classical problem as 
the attempt to find a rational form in both things and events (individuals), and then to synthesise 
form with an overall purpose of process, the so-called Apolline and Dionysiac elements in life."" 
We can interpret this problem as that of substance (the form in being\s) and participation. To 
solve this riddle, we need to bring in 'faith,' (sapientia) as our first principle arising from absolute 
reality, God who is true Being. Faith must replace the sovereign reason of the classical mind, not 
as a replacement of reason itself, but as a replacement of reason as the foundation of rational 
thought. The claim of the heretics and the classicists was that they would dispense with faith, 
teaching nothing except what was clear and evident to reason." We are not dealing here with an 
individual who sought to found a new intellectual system, but a member of the universal Church. 
Augustine is thus a possessor of no 'private' knowledge but knowledge of the truth that needed to 
be shared out. 'Accordingly, the appeal of Augustine was not, as it had been with Tertullian, 
purely and simply to the individual, conceived as an "independent" vessel of the Spirit. It was 
rather from one kind of authority to another. What is thus involved was the substitution of new 
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standard of objectivity for that proposed by classical scientia, this objectivity was that of history, 
envisaged as a progressive disclosure of the creative and moving principle. '46 
Plato had identified the three traditional problems with the inherited classical tradition. None of 
the 'archae,' so far put forward transcended the limits of that which is mere opinion (doxa). 
These were merely 'hypothetical,' and not perfectly established. His second problem was that no 
intelligible solution had been found to the problem of relating Being to movement or process in 
Being. The reason for this, he put down to some defect in the third 'archae,' that of order. In his 
opinion, this was because of the divergence in the sensory experience of individuals. This led 
Plato to conclude that the sensory realm must therefore be an illusion, and dependent upon 
'Ideas,' each of which is autonomous with respect to the phenomenological world.47 The question 
is, how are the Ideas to be tested or established? Plato answered by positing an ultimate, 
determining principle, the principle of unification and verification, the One or the Good. Yet to 
Augustine, the weakness in the Platonic (specifically Neoplatonic) system was the failure to relate 
the principle of Unity to the multiplicity of the real world. The Platonists begin by identifying the 
creative principle with the conception of unity, as the origin of numerical series, from whence all 
other numbers come. The existence of the 'many,' is explained by the Neopythagorean 'Dyad,' 
duality being understood as a 'second,' derivative principle. The 'Demiurge' is the divine 
intelligence, the creator and the first offspring from the One.48 The problem was how do we relate 
this second creator to the real world? This brought about the doctrine of 'Soul,' the function of 
which was to establish contact between the changeless world of the Ideas and the world of sense. 
This arbitrary positing of Soul did not fully solve the problem of relating the many to the One. 
Augustine describes his reluctance in accepting this doctrine in the thought of Porphyry, as an 
example: 'Now we know what he as a Platonist means by principles. He means God is the Father 
and God the Son, whom he calls in Greek the intellect or mind of the Father; concerning the Holy 
Spirit, however, he says either nothing or nothing directly, although I do not understand whom 
else he means when he speaks of one midway between these two. For if, like Plotinus when he is 
discussing the three principle substances, Porphyry too meant us to understand by the third term 
the elemental soul, he certainly would not use the words "midway between these two," that is 
between the Father and the Son ... Consequently in discussing God I do not speak of two 
principles, or three, any more than I may lawfully say that we have two gods or three, although 
when we speak of any one of the persons, whether Father Son or Holy Spirit, we freely declare 
that each singly is God ... ' 49 Commenting on the Platonic triad, Augustine insists that the third 
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principle is ambiguous and does not serve as an effective mediator between the principle of Unity 
and the world. 
Augustine's answer to classical thought, is the first principle of the Christian God, not the 'One' 
of Plato and the Neoplatonists. Most importantly, the Christian God is a triune God. This is not 
simply an idea of a new divine being that can effectively answer the Neoplatonists. To conceive 
of true divinity is to accept the reality of the divine God. The Trinity is the perfect reply to the 
classic deference of the sovereign, autonomous reason (scientia). The triune God is reflected in, 
and indeed presupposes man's ability to reason in the first place.'0 The Trinitarian principle is not 
a new way of doing science, it is that structure that is imposed on the intelligence, enabling any 
science possible. 
The Trinity provides an intriguing alternative to classical scientia, as it propagates both 'scientia,' 
and 'sapientia,' each in its place. To think in a Trinitarian marmer is to think correctly with in-
built checks and balances. It is to accept the inevitable irrational paradoxes in human thought, 
when thought is unaided by sapientia. In the Trinity, reason and unreason meet. On one level, it is 
dogma revealed in Scripture, and formulated scientifically by the Church. But on the other hand, 
it is the rejection of scientific dogma, because the process of science carmot exhaust its 
significance and comprehension. Augustinian Trinitarianism (as with Barth, later on) provides an 
alternative to classical science and classical, autonomous man. The view of 'sapientia,' or 
Christian wisdom as the basis of knowledge, 'beyond science,' is also a repudiation of the 
Plotinian view of 'ecstatic' experience 'beyond science.' Superficially, Augustinian sapientia, is 
the equivalent of the 'Nous,' of Plotinus. Plotinus, however, in his view, claimed that union with 
the One could only be achieved momentarily, ecstatically. Augustinian, Trinitarian knowledge, 
also aspires beyond scientia, but does not lose its sights of the material world, or even scientia 
itself. 
In addition, the Plotinian triad, especially with 'Nous' coming about through the moving away 
from the One, implies that the location of the origin of evil is within the godhead. This is 
unacceptable to the Christian. 
The Platonists' great mistake was that they failed to appreciate the perfect solution to the problem 
of the One and the Many, brought about in the incarnation of Jesus Christ. It is understanding the 
incarnation that enables us to try to make sense of the falleness of the phenomenological world, 
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and its relationship to the perfect Unity, the Father. 'But Porphyry was in the thrall of malicious 
powers and he was both ashamed of them and at the same time held them in too much awe to 
dispute them freely. He chose not to see that the Lord Christ is the principle by whose incarnation 
we are purified ... It is obvious that pride blinded Porphyry to the great sacred truth, the same 
pride that our great and gracious Mediator cast down by his humility, when he showed himself to 
mortals clothed in that mortality for the lack of which malevolent and deceitful mediators too 
proudly lauded themselves and spoke as immortals to wretched souls with promises of help that 
were only a snare."' 
6.2.4-THE DEBT TO PLOTINUS 
Because Neoplatonism has such an eclectic character, it is not true to say that Augustine was 
indebted to Plotinus alone, with respect to Neoplatonism. By the time he began his academic 
career, Neoplatouism had become a system in its own right. Indeed, it had been a system of 
thought for a sufficiently long time to enable the framework to have gained an established 
position as part ofNeoplatonism as system, rather than being the work of a particular writer. 
However, two Neoplatonists are particularly important for our understanding of the influence of 
Neoplatonism upon Augustine. These are definitely Porphyry and Plotinus." 
In addition to this, we must not discount the influence of the Christian Neoplatonists as well, 
especially that of Basil, both Gregories, Athanasius and Origen. For our purposes, we have 
decided to concentrate on Plotinus as an important influence on Augustine, the Christian thinker, 
despite his (Augustine's) many criticisms of the N eop latonic tradition. ' ... Augustine accepted the 
Neoplatonic doctrine of an incorporeal creator, the immortality of the soul, and the existence of 
Providence and mediatory salvation. Porphyry appeared to Augustine to espouse something like 
the Christian Trinity, and a rudimentary notion of Grace.'" The 'Enneads' 1.6, probably also 
assisted him in giving up materialism as an ultimate system of thought. There are also some 
similarities with the Plotinian idea of ecstasy, in Augustine's descriptions of the vision at Ostia. 
In fact, Armstrong ' 4 points out that it is this ecstatic element in Plotinus passed onto Augustine, 
that places Plotinus at variance with classical thought. We have seen that this methodology or the 
desire to move 'beyond scientia,' is common to both Augustine and Plotinus, but both work the 
idea out differently to each other. O'Meara also points out that there are certain connections 
between the concept of 'conversio,' as found in Plotinus and Augustine. Dodds, recognised 
further Neoplatonic features in the work of the bishop of Hippo. He states that Augustine had an 
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'ontological,' interpretation of Christianity, and a downgrading of the phenomenological." 
O'Meara also suggests that Porphyry and his translator, Victorinus, may well have been agents 
through whom the idea of the unknowability of the One was transmitted to Augustine. ' ... At any 
rate Augustine even in the early "DeOrdine " speaks of God as "known better in not being known, 
qui scitur melius nesciendo.""6 Also, Augustine shows his debt to both Plato and Plotinus in that 
he accepted the Platonic theory of the Ideas, with the revision characteristic oflater Christianity, 
namely that these ideas reside in the mind of God. 
Augustine said: 'Let every good and true Christian understand that truth wherever he finds it, 
belongs to the Lord. " 7 Brunner rejects those Augustinian interpreters who suggest that 
'._.everything in Augustine which is Platonist, or Neoplatonist is, for that very reason and for no 
other, unscriptural. _ It is true that Augustine will have been aware why it was that he gave up his 
Neoplatonism in the last period of his development, but not the truths which he had gained from 
Plato and Plotinus. "' Although we have seen that Augustine always sought to subordinate 
Platonic truth to Christianity, certain Platonic features remain. 
6.2.5-A NEOPLA TONIC TRINITY: INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
Concluding our assessment of the Neoplatonic influence on Augustine, we now intend to take 
note of Plotinus' specific influence upon Augustine's conception of the Trinity." Wassmer claims 
that Augustine did not have an exhaustive reading of the 'Enneads' as a whole, but 'came to 
know Plotinus in a very few treatises of that work (certainly 1.6 "On the Beautiful" and quite 
probably VJ, "On the Three Hypostases") in the Latin translation of Marius Victorinus .. , This 
impact of the mind of Plotinus upon the mind of Augustine was a decisive one because Augustine 
found a very great area of agreement between the teaching of Plotinus and that of the Scriptures 
as expounded by St Ambrose, above all the Gospel of St John. ' 60 
_.you brought under my eye some books of the Platonists, translated from Greek into Latin. 
There I read, not of course in these words, but with entirely the same sense and supported by 
numerous and varied reasons, "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and 
the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without 
him nothing was made_ He was in the beginning with God. __ "'61 'In reading the Platonic books I 
found expressed in different words, and in a variety of ways, that the Son, "being in the form of 
the Father did not think it theft to be equal with God"___ But that "he took on himself the form of 
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a servant and emptied himself, was made in the likeness of men and found to behave as a 
m 
,,,62 
an ... 
Augustine, in debt to Plotinus, stresses the Unity of God as above the plurality, as the 
transcendent principle of all order and number, and so also of Being itself. The Trinity is a Trinity 
in unity. 'Unus quippe Deus est ipsa Trinitas. et sic unus Deus quomodo unus creator. ' 63 The 
Cappadocian Fathers and the East, of course, were to lay the stress rather on the plurality of the 
persons. Because of the fact that the Trinity is a unity, the three persons have 'ad extra· only one 
will and operation. Wassmer points out here that in this Augustine diverges from his 
predecessors, and their interpretation of the Old Testament theophanies. It was not (argues 
Augustine) the Word that appeared to men at various times, but the entire Trinity.64 This is 
circumincession: 'semper in invicem, neuter solus. -65 
The conception of the absolute self-sufficiency of God is also Plotinian, but Augustine does not 
view creation as a type of reflex action that follows Nous' contemplation of the One. 
Furthermore, because God is triune, the unity of God is not to be seen as the negation of 
multiplicity in Augustine. Here Augustine had conceived of a new idea of unity. What enabled 
him to achieve this without falling into the same trap of Arius or into the trap of modalism, was 
his artful use of the concept of 'relations.' The persons are relations and relations are not 
identified with the substance or the nature since they are not something absolute-'° The Holy 
Spirit is a person, other than the Father and the Son. He is neither Father, nor Son. 
He is another person, but not another thing, as he is like the other two, the simple God: 'Alius est 
autem quam Pater et Filius, quia nee Pater est nee Filius: sed "alius" dixi. non "aliud, "quia et 
hoc pariter simplez pariterque incommutabile bonum est et coaeternum. Et haec trinitas unus est 
Deus: nee idea non simplex, quia trinitas. ~7 Plotinus in his own triad, did not perceive the unity 
of the three subjects or hypostases in this manner. Fundamental to his philosophy and cosmology 
is the fact that each hypostasis is distinct from the others, hierarchically arranged. In Plotinus' 
case, the hypostases certainly do not represent the same substance or essence. The sense of 
subordination is strong in his thought. 
This means that with Augustine the generation of the Son and the filiation of the Spirit is 
conceived of in terms very much different to the 'emanation' theory of Plotinus. What, however, 
is interesting, is the psychological structure of the mind in Augustine. This is used as an analogy 
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to understand the Trinity. This analogy of the human soul of knowing and loving itself, in the 
memory, intelligence and will, (mens. nolilia, amor. Haec tria unum atque una substantia) does 
recall the Plotinian idea of the relating of the three hypostases to each other, through the interplay 
of subject-object. 
6.2.6-MARIUS VICTORINUS 
'Victorinus and Augustine were remarkably alike: both men were products of an exclusively 
literary culture. For both of them, philosophy was an "outside interest," which deepened, hand in 
hand with their interest in religion. They lacked both the caution and the exclusiveness of 
established professors of philosophy such as continued to exist in Athens and Alexandria at the 
time. Like Cicero before them, these Latin amateurs never committed themselves to the ideas 
they handled. ' 68 What is known about Victorinus' life is provided for us by Jerome in his 'De 
viris illustribus. ' 69 Victorinus' purpose in the theological controversies of his time (specifically 
Arian), was to defend the Nicene affirmation of the consubstantiality of the Father with the Son. 
This included the 'homoosion' formula. Because Victorinus shared the same (or similar) 
theological heritage to other Christian Neoplatonists, his thought displays the tension between the 
desire on the one hand to equate the Father and the Son, but on the other, we see the tendency to 
subordinate one divine hypostasis to another. 
In his doctrine of the Trinity, Victorinus defines the Father as 'Esse,' whilst the Son is the 
movement of the act that defines the 'Esse,' of the Father. This movement is a double one: a 
movement of life and a movement of knowledge. Life is the movement by which 'Esse,' ('to be') 
communicates to itself; knowledge is that movement by which it returns to itself 70 The triune 
God is not part of the created modes of being, he is above them, and thus is 'above Being.' 
Together with Augustine (as we shall see), Victorinus seems at times, to portray God as very 
Being itself, other times, he speaks of the divine essence as 'beyond Being. ' 71 Clark,72 however 
maintains that 'there is some difference between the negative theology of Plotinus for whom the 
One is beyond Being and that ofVictorinus for whom the one is "to be."' 73 
Important for its influence on Augustine, is Victorinus' modification of the idea of the Plotinian 
'One.' Says Victorinus: 'True substance on high is movement and not only movement but first 
movement, which is a kind of movement which is also a state of repose, and for that reason, is 
substance itself' 74 He abandoned the old belief in the first, immobile God, and then the second, 
creative God, as in the 'Parmenides.' The 'One' for Victorinus, combines both the immutable, 
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and the active, both divine simplicity and activity, in himself. Thus, Victorinus, more under the 
influence of Porphyry here, places act before substance (esse).7' Henry76 describes Victorinus' 
view of the being of God as 'self-creating.' God is 'tridunameis. ·or 'tripotens. ,n This was to 
have an important influence on Augustine. 
The Son is Form, or Life, whilst the Spirit is Knowledge or Concept. Each of the three persons 
shares these principles, alike, but each one is specifically associated with a particular person. The 
active constitution of the Godhead is a folding and unfolding. 'The Father is silence, rest and 
immobility, the procession of his power is a Word, movement and life: this is the Son, a "Form of 
God."'" The Son is the determination of God, he is perfect 'being,' the unfolding of the being of 
the Father. This reminds us of the Porphyrian metaphysics of 'esse-vivere-intelligere.' The 
distinction between Father, Son and Spirit proceeds from predominance. Each one is all three, but 
has its name, based on the nature of its predominance. The Father is seen as 'to be,' (esse) the Son 
is 'to live,' and the Spirit is 'to know' (intelligere). 79 Victorinus here is using Neoplatonic 
categories. Nevertheless, although the relation of the Father to the Son, is similar to the 
relationship between the 'One,' and 'Nous,' Victorinus does not subordinate the two principles, 
each are co-equal. Because of the fact that Victorinus interprets Being in this dynamic fashion, he 
is able to assert the substantial unity of substance in the Godhead 
6.2.7-AUGUSTINE ON BEING 
Being, (or the meaning thereof) as we have seen up to now, is a question that is very much part of 
the subject matter of our study because it equates to an understanding of metaphysical 'substance' 
and 'participation.' The question of Being, in the Western tradition, is indeed the question of the 
nature of substances, and of their relations with other substances and Being itself. The problem, 
as Heidegger was to illustrate, however, is clear: What is Being? Even by the time of Augustine, 
this has become an enormous problem (perhaps the problem) of metaphysics. The definition and 
the understanding of First Philosophy, from Aristotle, through Plato and Plotinus has undergone 
much complicated development. Generally, and in the broadest sense, we can state that the 
question of Being, is the question: 'Of what does the universe comprise?' Augustine provides 
more than one answer to this question. Our concentration, due to our specific interests, will be 
placed mostly upon Augustine's usage of the term (Being), in the context of his Trinitarian 
theology. 
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Like most ancient thinkers, Augnstine divides the universe into those things which are material, 
and those which are not. 80 Says Stead: 'Augustine has a clear and consistent view of material 
things, which appears several times in the City of God, there is an ascending scale ofvalue ... But 
if we look for a similar brief outline of this higher world, we shall be disappointed ... The reason 
for this is that for the material world Augustine can draw upon a well-established tradition of a 
sea/a naturae which goes back to Aristotle, and sees the natural world as arranged in a series of 
levels ... But if we look for a similar diagram of the higher world, we find no such consistent 
scheme. God, the universe itself, the divine Ideas, the soul of the world, star gods, demons, 
angels, demi-gods and heroes, appear and disappear in a bewildering variety of combination ... It 
seems then that in Augnstine's time there was no commonly accepted map of the intelligible 
world, and the reason probably lies in the perplexities of Platonist philosophy. ' 81 Plato's work is 
very non-systematic in nature. Further, the fact that he attempted to solve many problems, 
together with the different interpretations of his work, by his followers, leaves a thinker like 
Augnstine with no set model upon which to draw. 
We can thus conclude that Augnstine, although presupposing metaphysical views at every tum in 
his theology, did not in fact present a systematic metaphysics in the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
fashion (a science of Being, attained in the light of reason). Augustine's thought, including its 
metaphysical elements, is all subsumed under the highest goal: to pursue a personal union with 
God. He did not work out a formal distinction between the discipline of 'theology,' with faith as 
its first principle, and theu 'philosophy,' having reason as its first principle.82 Although Augustine 
uses Neoplatonic ontology to work out his metaphysical framework, he was not a Neoplatonist in 
his metaphysics, argues Anderson. 83 This is because Augustine does not see God as being 
'beyond Being,' as do the Platonists. 'It is clear then, that Augustine's philosophy was largely 
independent of these great Neoplatonists. So far as I can discover, he does not describe God as 
"beyond Being," on the contrary, he tells us, "Deus est esse."84 If God in Exodus 3: 14, declares 
Himself to be very Being, and the Bible states that there can be nothing transcendent to God, then 
He who is very Being itself, has to be the highest possible existent. It is here, according to 
Anderson," where Augustine departs from the Neoplatonist tradition: instead of seeing God as 
'beyond Being,' God is identified with 'Being itself' 
We can understand why Augnstine had to make this move. Plotinus had argued that nothing can 
be predicated of the One, as a subject. The One is ineffable, beyond Being. This means that one 
cannot strictly speaking say anything of the One. Even calling the One, the 'One,' is a mistake 
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(but an unavoidable mistake). Therefore, every term that we apply to the One, must be 
equivocal.86 Now here as we have seen, Plotinus gets himself into all kinds of trouble. How can 
we ascribe anything to that of which nothing can be ascribed?87 Victorinus, struggled to equate 
God with pure Being, because he is the 'eminent' cause of Being, yet beyond Being. 
Nevertheless, if we see the Biblical God as 'beyond Being,' strictly speaking, no analogy can be 
applied to the One at all. Augustine can clearly see the problem: the Bible often ascribes certain 
predicates to God. Therefore God cannot be the 'One' of Plotinus. Our problem with Augustine is 
that although we do accept that he avoids terming God as 'beyond Being,' formally, he speaks of 
God at times in such as way as if God is beyond Being. This affects (unofficially) Augustine's 
entire doctrine of the Trinity. Firstly, those who posit the ultimate hypostasis as being beyond 
Being, inevitably posit the secondary principle (Logos-Nous) as the 'explicator' of Being, and 
thus necessarily inferior to it. Witness the Western view of the jiloque, which places the Father as 
the true 'source' of the Godhead from whom both the Spirit and the Son are 'generated.' 
Augustine's view of creation, also inclines towards placing God into the category of 'beyond 
Being.' Everything in existence, other than God, is defined as 'not-being' (non-esse). The 
creature participates in Being (habens esse). Only God has (or accurately is) Being, but the rest of 
creation possesses being, by virtue of being created by God. God's Being is Being, precisely 
because his being is different to all other beings. God's essence is immutable, but the essence of 
other things is not. However, one important difference in the Augustinian definition, is the fact 
that God's Being is what it is, not because of some supreme logical principle of form, as with the 
classical tradition, but because 'it is' (existence). As first pointed out by Etienne Gilson and some 
of his contemporaries, God's essence 'is' because of his existence. 'God is His immutability, but 
He is immutable because He is; He is, not because He is immutable; God is Himself (or His own 
essence, as the Thomists would say), but He is, not because He is Himself. .. Thus Augustine's 
statement that "eternity is the very substance of God" ("aeternitas ipsa Dei substantia est") 
cannot mean that eternity is formally that which God is in Himself ... On the contrary, eternity, 
like immutability and self-identity or simplicity, is one of His pure perfections or attributes, 
identified with Himself. ' 88 
All God's attributes are part of the divine essence, but if there is one attribute, that is at the back 
of the others, it is the pure existence of God. 'Participatione ... ipsus esse,' as Thomas was to say 
at a later stage, in somewhat more technical vocabulary. Nevertheless, we assert that even if this 
is the case, then the Being of God must necessarily be totally different from that of other beings, 
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who derive their Being from him. His Being is not only different by degree it is 'beyond other 
beings.' God then is 'pure act' (borrowing from the Thomistic and then Barthian framework). 
Mutability in Augustine's thinking is defined in terms of'Being' (vera esse) and 'not Being' 
(non-esse). Esse in the full sense of the word can only be God, and in God, both 'esse,' and 
'subsistere' mean the same. Here, we have the genesis of the Thomistic existential identification 
distinguishing essence and existence. This means that God cannot be a 'substance,' i.e., 
conceived of as a substrate with accidents, for he has none.89 'While Augustine does not expressly 
say so, it is evident that the term "substance," as signifying subsisting being is for him 
analogically said of God. Since substance as designating subsisting being is properly predicated 
of God, the first Being, this is objectively its primary meaning. As signifying a subject or 
substrate for accidents, the term "substance" in itself has but a secondary role, though this is its 
more customary implication. That is why, in speaking of God, the word "essence" seemed 
preferable to Augustine from the standpoint of the common usage of his day. ' 90 
6.2.8-AUGUSTINE AND BEING: CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
Augustine, as we have attempted to demonstrate, set about on the ambitious project of reforming 
classical thought (scientia). This proposed reformation was not one of total abandonment, but one 
that proposed the biblical supplanting of 'scientia,' with 'sapientia.' This is the supplantation of 
Greek science with biblical wisdom. Part of this reformation required the elimination of the 
Plotinian 'One,' and the substitution of the biblical 'vera esse.' The ironic thing was that even the 
Biblical conception of God, also required a view of transcendence, a view of 'vera esse,' that is 
(in its own context) also 'beyond Being.' Although the biblical language does not presuppose a 
Plotinian ontology, it does allow for the idea of the transcendence of God, via the employment of 
a language ofnon-closure, with respect to the divine person. A cursory glance at both Testaments 
reveals that this is indeed the case. This is why, in our opinion, the biblical language partly resists 
the application of Greek metaphysical-ontological categories, especially with respect to speaking 
about the triune God, even the biblical language suggests that God in a sense, is 'beyond Being.' 
One of the main reasons why the One ofNeoplatonism, has always been attractive to Christian 
theologians over the centuries, is because of the very nature of the biblical language about God. It 
is a language, which resists closure, especially when we try to speak about God, using 
essentialist, ontological categories. This is the language of Being. In his biblical reformation of 
Neoplatonism, Augustine, to be sure, brought about important changes. God's Being was now to 
be interpreted as 'vera esse,' rather than 'beyond Being,' In addition, God's Being was now to be 
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interpreted existentially, instead of according to the principle of immutability, or pure form only. 
This was to influence Thomas later, to a large extent. Yet Augustine's reformation merely re-
invented the same Neoplatonic problem in a new 'biblical' guise and paradigm. This was to be a 
problem that would resurface again and again in the Western tradition, whenever theologians 
would try to speak of the transcendence of God in ontological categories. 
With the Trinity as we shall see, Augustine and the West after him, were to come up with an 
ingenious answer to the problem of combining the Neoplotinian 'One,' and the biblical 
transcendent God. This answer surrounded a new interpretation of the unity of God. 'The 
recognition of the predicateless unity or pure self-identity of the "arche" lay at the root of the 
entire Neoplatonic tradition: in its utter simplicity, raised above all duality-even the primary 
differentiation of the intelligence from the intelligible world-the "arche" retreated into 
inaccessibility and unknowability. ' 91 The great problem, as a consequence of this, was trying to 
relate the supreme principle of the 'One,' to its many derivatives, without compromising its 
transcendence. At the same time there needed to be the retention of the intelligible nature of the 
derivatives. The Neoplatonic triad was one such attempt. Each graded level of Being helps to 
explain the next and so on. It is this outlook that led, Damascius to double the first principle, and 
posit another 'One,' beyond the first 'One.' In order to protect its unity, he will not even allow the 
term 'transcendence,' to be posited of this other 'One,' at all. To some extent we have in 
Damascius, the Platonic 'Third Man Argument' problem all over again, but in a different form. 
Damascius' radical Neoplatonic scheme operates as follows. In order to have understanding of 
Being, one ontological level is not enough. We have to keep ascending the scale of the 
hypostases, because each one is slightly defective, and has need of a higher one to explain it, and 
so on. The result in Neoplatonic ontology (as we have observed) is that although 'officially,' 
substance, is 'prior' to participation, in practice, things are not like that. 'Participation' actually 
supplants substance ontologically, as each substance in the chain, is only 'real,' through its 
relationship to higher realities. Then, ironically we finally arrive at the highest reality, only to find 
that it has no substance at all, it is beyond substance. By moving away from the One, through 
Nous, then Soul and finally arriving at the created order, it was hoped that both principles of the 
simplicity of the One and the multiplicity of the created order could be preserved. 
The Trinitarian, Christian 'arche,' by contrast, tries to reconcile the requirement of unity with that 
of differentiation, within the Trinitarian Principle itself. 'Such a position requires a very different 
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interpretation of the relation between the principle and its derivatives than that fonnd in 
Neoplatonism: the manifestation of the "arche," in the sensible and intelligible orders belongs to 
its essential nature as principle-the principle is essentially self-revealing. Accordingly, the 
procession of all things from the "arche" as their source and their return to it as their end have to 
be understood as constituting its very identity. ' 92 The difference between the Trinitarian theology 
of Augustine and that of Christian orthodoxy, and the theology ofNeoplatonism is that with 
Neop latonism, nnity is that of indeterminate self determination, as is the sonrce of all other 
unities and differentiations, even that of subject-object. With Christianity however, the nnity-
concept employed is that of self-determination. Determinateness, does not fall outside of the unity 
of the principle: rather in differentiation, the principle returns upon itself, is one with itself.93 This 
principle forms a central part in Barth's theology. As ingenious as this Trinitarian solution might 
have seemed, to some extent, it simply compressed some of the problems facing the Neoplatonist 
triad, into a single principle or unity, whilst bringing along some new problems of its own. 
6.3-'DE TRINITATE': PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 
Before we ourselves, tum to an examination of the technical aspects of Augustine's doctrine of 
Trinitarian substance, we need to place such interpretative analysis into the contemporary, 20th 
Century discussion of Augustine's place in this subject. Our own analytical remarks should in 
some sense, reflect the current controversy surrounding the 'De Trinitate' of Augustine. In our 
commencement of this task, we need to summarise the arguments of two seminal, but opposing 
viewpoints on the subject of Augustine's Trinity Our first article is that of Collin Gunton: 
'Augustine, the Trinity and the theological crisis of the West.' Introducing the conference on 
'Trinitarian Theology Today,' held in 1990 at the Research Institute in Systematic Theology at 
King's College, London, Christoph Schwabe! said:' It would not be a gross exaggeration to see 
the mainstream of the history ofWestem Trinitarian reflection as a series of footnotes on 
Augustine's conception of the Trinity in De Trinitate. Augustine's emphasis on the unity of the 
divine essence of God's triune being, his stress on the undivided mode of God's relating to what 
is not God and his attempt to trace the intelligibility of the doctrine of the Trinity through the 
Vestigia Trinitatis in the human consciousness ... defined the parameters for the mainstream of 
Western Trinitarian reflection. The majority of recent studies in Trinitarian theology are 
characterised by a critical attitude towards Augustine's conception of the Trinity. ' 94 
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6.3.l-GUNTON ON AUGUSTINE 
Gunton, speaking at this conference, subscribes to this negative view of Augustine's Trinity . ., 
Gunton is concerned with the current crisis in theology which he sununarises as a tendency 
towards atheism, or the struggle to attain any true knowledge of God. 96 To a large extent, Gunton 
places the blame for this at the foot of Augustine's doctrine of the Trinity. Gunton posits various 
reasons for this. Firstly, there is in Augustine's teaching, a strong disavowal of the material 
world, due to his strong Platonising tendency-" This results in the removal of God from the real 
world of the material. It also 'flattens out the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity, a 
process which can only encourage belief in the irrelevance of conceiving distinct persons and 
therefore of a doctrine of the Trinity."' Here, Gunton suggests that Augustine departs from his 
Western predecessors, Tertullian and Irenaeus, who taught the involvement of the Word in the 
material order. This suspicion of the material world is one of the reasons why Augustine draws 
his principal Trinitarian analogy from the human mind, rather than creation. 99 
Although Gunton acknowledges the Scriptural exegesis of the De Trinitate, 'he maintains that 
the ultimate criteria with which Augustine is operating, are rational, not Biblical. 100 In fact, his 
Neoplatonic assumptions are such that he did not fully understand the Trinitarian theology of his 
Western predecessors, as well as those theologies from the East. 'By the time of the 
Cappadocians, the Greek "hypostasis" had come to be used in distinction from "ousia," to refer to 
the concrete particularity of Father, Son and Spirit. Whatever the origin of the term it is now no 
longer adequate, as some commentators do, to translate it as individual, simply because the three 
are not individuals but persons, beings whose reality can only be understood in terms of their 
relations to each other, relations by virtue of which they together constitute the being (ousia) of 
the one God. The persons are therefore not relations, but concrete particulars in relation to one 
another.' 101 Gunton accuses Augustine of a movement towards modalism. In his discussion of the 
ontological status of the three persons, Augustine does not ask the question of the Cappadocians: 
'What kind of being is this that God can be found in the relations of Father, Son and Spirit?' 
Instead, Augustine looks at the problem as a logical one: What kind of sense can be made of the 
apparent logical oddity of the threeness of the one God in terms of Aristotelian subject-predicate 
logic?'°' 
Augustine uses the concept of relation to speak of that which can be predicated of God in the 
plural, but which is yet not accidental. Here, according to Gunton, Augustine is taking a step back 
from the Cappadocians, '03 who see the person of God as being constituted by His relations. The 
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relations qualify the three persons ontologically, they are their relations. For Augustine, however, 
the relations of the three persons are logical predicates, not ontological ones. This diminishes the 
identity of the persons in and of themselves. They are all diminished, and disappear into the all-
embracing oneness ofGod. 104 This, again, manifests an inclination towards modalism. 
One of the most illuminating comments that Gunton makes is that concerning the reason why to 
him, Augustine's God is ultimately unknowable. The being of Augustine's God, does not underlie 
the threeness of the persons. ' 0' The substratum of the Trinity is not identified with the Father, as 
in both Tertullian and Origen, but with something underlying both the Father and the Son. 'In that 
case, the danger is that the being of God will either be unknown in all respects-because it 
modalistically underlies the being of the three persons, or will be made known otherthan through 
the persons, that is to say, the economy of salvation. ' 106 
According to Gunton, Augustine's movement away from the material world is also seen in his 
teaching on the Trinitarian analogies. The primary of these is to be seen in the Trinitarian 
conception of the three-fold mind, rather than in the economy of salvation. 
As with many others, Gunton also criticises the role of the Spirit in Augustine's Trinity. Firstly, 
the idea that the Spirit is the bond of love between the Father and the Son, is fraught with 
problems. The initial problem is that this argument again does not base itself upon any economic 
Trinitarian modes. Moreover, Augustine's idea of the Spirit bringing about the 'unity' in the 
trinity, is more of a Platonic conception of unity, not an agapeistic one. When Augustine speaks 
about the role of the Spirit in bringing about unity between man and God, he does not include the 
idea of the incarnation here at all. In giving the Spirit the role of bringing about the unity of the 
Godhead, he minimises the hypostatic uniqueness of the Spirit. Similar criticisms are made of 
Barth. The emphasis is overly on the unity of God. Even in terms of the biblical basis of the Spirit 
as love, inadequacies appear. The language of the Scriptures speaks particularly of the sending of 
the Son as a gift of love to us, not the Holy Spirit. Also, Augustine's doctrine does not allow for 
the important role of the Spirit in eschatology, nor in the resurrection. 107 As we have intimated, 
Gunton reflects a good overview of much of the criticism levelled at Augustine, in recent years. 
6.3.2-BARNES ON AUGUSTINE 
The other important interpreter of Augustine, is Michel Rene' Barnes. 108 Many of Augustine's 
enthusiastic supporters, support him from a strong Roman Catholic position, and their support of 
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him is somewhat coloured by their ecclesiastical loyalties. '°9 Barnes, however, provides different 
reasons for his repudiation of much ofthe contemporary rejections of Augustine's Trinitarianism. 
In taking a different stand to Gunton, Barnes suggests 'My purpose in this article is to examine 
many of these recent theological works for what they reveal about the methodological 
presuppositions operative, more or less, in most systematic treatments of Augustine today, and to 
critique those presuppositions from the point of view of a historical theologian whose speciality is 
patristic Trinitarian theology.' 1 '° 
Barnes suggests that much of modern readings of Augustine on the Trinity are subject to certain 
sweeping statements and beliefs, that do not fully account for the complex nature of the times in 
which Augustine wrote, or the nature of history as a whole. Barnes is here criticising systematic 
theologians particularly, who run very sketchily over the facts of history in order to favourably 
interpret such facts in the light of a prior ideology or pet issue. 
'Similarly, these contemporary appropriations share the same two presuppositions: the first is that 
characterisations based on polar contrasts are borne out in the details that are revealed clearly and 
distinctly through the contrasts, and the second is that the same process of presenting doctrines in 
terms of opposition yields a synthesising account of the development of doctrine.' 111 Barnes 
suggests that modern, reconstructions of doctrine are artificial, in their passing over of minutiae 
and their sweeping assessment of ideas and schools, with respect to oppositional thinking. Barnes 
states there is a penchant among systematic theologians for categories of polar opposition, 
grounded in the belief that ideas 'out there' in the past really existed in polarities, and that polar 
oppositions accurately describe the contents and relationships of these ideas. 112 This argument he 
applies to common perceptions about the Cappadocian\Augustinian paradigm, Greek\Latin and 
the Economic\Immanent paradigm.113 Within this conceptual, architectonic way of describing 
things, is the idea that Augustine 'starts with the unity of God, whilst the Cappadocians start with 
the diversity in God.' We cannot help but wonder, whether or not Barnes has read Derrida! 
One fascinating point that Barnes brings to the fore is that up until the end of the Nineteenth 
Century, the belief that Western Trinitarianism was fundamentally different to Eastern 
Trinitarianism, did not exist. 'A belief in the existence of this Greek\Latin paradigm is a unique 
property of modern Trinitarian theology. This belief, and the associated diagrams that one finds in 
de Margene and La Cugna, or the "plurality-model\unity-model" jargon that one finds in Brown, 
all derive from a book written about I 00 years ago, namely Theodore de Regnon 's studies on the 
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Trinity. For it is de Regnon who invented the Greek\Latin paradigm, geometrical diagrams and 
all. De Regnon's paradigm has become the sine qua non for framing the contemporary 
W1derstanding of Augustine's theology.' 114 Barnes shows that this Latin/Greek paradigm is not as 
straightforward as it seems as there was a close affinity, for example, between Alexandrian 
(Greek) and Latin theologies, a generation before Augustine."' 
Barnes also goes on to mention the work of Christos Yannaras, 116 whose recent accoWJt of the 
influence of Augustine, argues that the rise of 'logocentrism,' (which he seems to suggest is a 
specifically Western problem) is due to the influence of Augustine upon the intellectual culture of 
the West. ' .. each historical epoch is defined by Yannaras by the way it purifies and enlarges as 
an idea of the scope of what was originally a doctrinal insight by Augustine. ' 117 Barnes rightly 
describes this as an extreme compliment to be placed at the feet of only one man. Therefore, with 
respect to much modem, systematic appraisals of Augustine: 'the integrity of the discipline of 
historical studies is ruptured by the need to find a 'bistorical" account which is already cast in 
idealistic terms.' 118 
Barnes warns that proper descriptions of Augustine's Trinity much take into account two things: 
firstly such descriptions have an important 'doctrinal dimension,'(notjust philosophical) as well 
as a 'polemical' one. 119 On the doctrinal side, he states that we must not simply try to W1derstand 
the 'De Trinitate. 'from the perspective of Augustine's indebtedness to philosophy alone (such as 
Neoplatonism). One needs to W1derstand Augustine from a doctrinal perspective as well, with 
doctrinal priorities and motives. Furthermore 'Most systematic treatments of patristic Trinitarian 
theology generally and of Augustine's theology specifically are characterised by an avoidance of 
texts in the genre of Trinitarian polemic, and a fuilure to take the polemical context of such 
writing seriously.' 120 Ba mes suggests that when one interprets particularly the economical 
passages in the De Trinitate' in their correct polemical context, the final view arrived at, 
concerning the Augustinian economy (or the lack thereof), might tum out to be decidedly 
different. 
6.3.3-SUMMARY: THE TRINITY AND THE ECONOMY OF GOD 
In our own assessment, we wish to plot (if that were possible) a 'via media,' between the two 
positions of Gunton and Barnes. The Augustinian texts which Gunton and other critics make use 
of, in supporting their position, are substantial and thus, their critical thesis concerning the nature 
of Augustine's Trinity, cannot be so easily dismissed. 121 We do however, find Barnes' comments 
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on the interpretative importance of the polemic nature of'De Trinitate 'as being convincing. 
However, we do not interpret Barnes as denying everything that Gunton actually says about 'De 
Trinitate. ' His suggestions however, call for the employment of much more caution, when 
seeking to understand Augustine. 
Barnes, provides us with an important clue in understanding Augustine's full Trinitarian genre 
when he says this: 'If one compares the number of Augustinian texts consulted in contemporary 
accounts of his Trinitarian theology to the number of Augustinian texts in accounts from I 00 
years ago, what one finds is that the number has shrunk drastically. Hardly anyone refers to the 
last Trinitarian writings by Augustine anymore, those against Maximinus ... Given that systematic 
reconstructions of Augustine's Trinitarian theology are not made on the basis of the single text, 
De Trinitate, or, not uncommonly, a canon of selections from this single text, we can conclude 
that the actual reading of Augustine has been made functionally superflous.' 122 
6.3.4-EARL Y TRIADS IN AUGUSTINE 
In her article on the relevance of Augustine's Trinity for today, Mary T. Clark, 123 engages 
Augustine's thought precisely in the way that Barnes suggests is the most helpful. She employs 
various Augustinian texts for her purpose. She firstly points out that Augustine made use of 
various triadic ideas throughout his life's work, and there was some development. Clarke 
illustrates that his first triad appears in the 'Contra Academicos,' and the 'De Ordine, ' 124 namely, 
Principle, Intellect and Reason. This is a direct correspondence with the Plotinian, One, Nous and 
Soul. Together with Victorinus, the early Augustine identifies the Spirit with Reason, but this 
changes to Love later. In the 'Confessions,' we have another triad: Eternity, Truth and Love. 125 
In the 'Libero arbitrio,' there is an emphasis on the Son as God's Wisdom leaving traces in 
creation. In the 'De quantitate animae,' we read of a metaphysics of creation, based on Romans 
11:36: 'All that exists comes from Him, all is by Him, and in Him.' 126 As with Barnes, Clark 
suggests the importance of both biblical and doctrinal elements behind the Trinitarian 
hermeneutic of Augustine: 'This evidence shows that Scripture rather than the "Enneads" is the 
source of Augustine's growing understanding of the Trinity. His expressions of the Trinity found 
at the end of the "De Ordine," and the "Beata vita" show a non-Plotinian way of understanding it; 
and a linking of the Trinity with creation is present in "De moribus," "De libero arbitrio, 1-11," 
"De quantitate animae" and is clearly asserted in the "Literal Commentary on Genesis. " 127 In "De 
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Vera religione," God creates things by his wisdom and conserves them by his goodness. Things 
therefore have these three aspects: Existence, species and value. 12' 
Clark's point, with which we concur, is that Augustine's works abound with the effort of 
constantly trying to locate the Trinity in the economy of God, and in creation. Right from his 
earliest period as a Christian thinker, Augustine found traces of the Trinity in the created order. 
Says Clark further, 'Augustine's strong desire for an experience of God accounts for his interest 
in the Trinitarian economy of our union with God.' 129 She then says: 'This puts in doubt the very 
prevalent opinion that the Western Fathers began with the nature of God while the Eastern 
Fathers began with the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.' 130 As we shall further argue below, this 
earlier work of Augustine casts further light on the structure and purpose of the 'De Trinitate.' If 
his earlier work was so strongly pro-economic Trinity, then why does the economic Trinity, not 
feature so much in the 'De Trinitate?' 131 There is no sign that Augustine changed his earlier 
views, therefore his reasons must have been applicatoryto his then current purpose: to discuss the 
relations specific to the immanent Trinity, 132 in his apology against the Semi-Arian Eunomians. 133 
6.4- 'DE TRINITATE': STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE 
One might say that Augustine's purpose in the treatise 'De Trinitate. ·is provided by Psalm 105 
(104): 3,4: 'Let their heart rejoice who seek the Lord; seek the Lord and be strengthened; seek his 
face always.' 134 Another commentator, Merriell states: 'The De Trinitate is a search, an inquisitio, 
as Augustine puts it. It is the embodiment of a principle of Catholic theology that Augustine 
constantly invoked and that St Anselm later formulated: faith seeking understanding.' 135 Burnaby 
shows that the treatise seeks to solve built-in questions that might arise from Catholic doctrinal 
beliefs, such as the fact that there is one God, manifest in three persons, and so on. 136 However, 
Augustine admits that the ultimate search of the 'De Trinitate' is a failure. 'Verum inter haec 
quae mu/ta jam dix et nihil il/ius summae Trinitatis ineffabilitate dignum me dixisse audeo 
profiteri, sed confiteri potius mirificatam scientiam ejus ex me invaluisse, nee posse me ad illam 
(Ps cxxxix,6); o tu, anima mea, ubi te esse sentis, ubijaces. ubi stas, donec ab eo qui propitius 
factus est omnibus iniquitatibus tuis, sanentur omnes languores tui (Psal ciii,3)?' 131 Augustine 
starts his attempt at searching for God, with a definition of the Catholic Faith, 138 but sets his task 
as seeking to understand or give reasons (reddere rationem) for the one and only true God being a 
Trinity, reasons that are demanded by a perverse love of reason which he has been busy 
castigating in the first pages, and which we are meant to understand as also being the mark of the 
Arian beast. 
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Because Augustine only started composing the treatise shortly after 400, and only completed it 
some time around 420, many scholars question just how systematic and purposeful the work 
really is. LaCugna goes as fur as to say that at times it seems in his later flow of argumentation, as 
if Augustine has forgotten what he has already written. 139 Hill discerns two main parts to 
Augustine's document, with the second part starting at Book VIII or IX. 140 Books I-Vlll (IX) deal 
with the establishment (initium fidei) of the fuith position, including some exegesis of Scripture. 
In Books I-IV, Augustine shows that Scripture does indeed teach the mutual consubstantiality and 
divinity of the three persons, although the Son is less so according to his humanity. 141 In these 
books, Augustine demonstrates how to interpret the Scriptures according to the rule of fuith. Our 
concern is with Books V-VII, which specifically concern themselves with a rational defence of 
Orthodoxy against the Arians, using chiefly Aristotelian terminology and predication. Here 
Augustine tackles the heretics on their own ground, with the usage of traditional Greek 
philosophical concepts. However after Augustine has finished his rational argumentation, in 
support of his view of the Rule of Faith, he expresses a certain dissatisfuction with his 
achievements. Despite all of the exercise of 'ratio' in books V-VII, he feels that he has still failed 
to perceive with the mind the very essence of the truth which is the Holy Trinity. 142 From Book 
VIII, Augustine tries to tum his quest for God in another direction, reason ultimately being 
unsatisfactory. 
Thus in Book VIII, Augustine states that it is now his purpose, God willing, to address himself to 
the same question, through the employment of a more 'inward route,' (modo interiore) whilst not 
at the same time, abandoning fuith, even if we do not understand: 'Nunc itaque. in quantum ipse 
adjuvat Creator mire misericors, attendamus haec, quae modo interiore quam superiora 
tractabimus. cum sint eadem: servata illa regula, ut quod intel/ectui nostro nondum eluxerit, a 
firmitate fidei non dimittatur. ' 143 This is about to culminate with the search for the image of the 
Trinity, in the mind of man himself. Says Hill, 'Book VIII is in fact crucial, it is the key-stone of 
the bridge; it does not belong to either half, but binds the two halves together.' 144 He claims that 
the overall structure is chiastic in that in the work he goes full circle and ends off where he 
started. 145 
Augustine, in response to the Arians, starts off his argument with the affirmation of the equality 
of the divine persons, after which he discusses the respective missions of the Son and the Spirit. 
The logic here is that if the Father in some way 'sends,' the Son of the Spirit, this implies a 
certain inequality between the persons. In dealing with this, Augustine proceeds from the 
examination of missions in Book IV, to an examination of the processions. The temporal, 
historical missions of the persons, lead from the eternal processions of the persons. 140 
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In the next three Books, Augustine then moves away from the processions themselves and 
concentrates, instead, upon the relationships that arise from them. Books V-VII comprise a 
technical discussion of linguistics, using the rational terms of fourth Century metaphysics. It is 
only after this discussion, that he turns to a study of the Trinitarian image in man. Aquinas in his 
work, operates in precisely the opposite direction to that of Augustine. Thomas works a priori 
from processions through to relationships, and then only deals with the divine missions in an 
appendix. Thomas' treatment of the Trinitarian image in man, is to be found in another sector of 
his work entirely. 147 
6.4.1-EXPLAINING IBE UNITY IN GOD 
From the first moment when the early Church began to reflect on the nature of God, in the light of 
the New Testament, she decided that although pagan polytheism was taboo, so too was Judaistic, 
unqualified, non-relative monotheism. Both John the Apostle as well as Paul affirmed the divinity 
as well as the pre-existence of the Son. This meant that in explaining the generation of the Son, 
something contrary to Basilides' belief in the Son's creation from nothing, had to also be found, 
as this was also to prove unacceptable. 148 The Fathers were unanimous. In the generation of the 
Logos, we are dealing with something incorporeal, not with a material notion. 
This led the Church away from Aristotle, towards the language and conceptual apparatus of 
Neoplatonism, which, in its triad, spoke of the non-materialist emanation of Nous, from the One. 
However, when it came down to actually explaining the difficult, logical relationship between the 
oneness and the threeness of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit, the Church would have to return to 
Aristotle again. This is because Aristotle had said that any entity of, which it can be said, is 
different in number from another entity, must have matter. 149 This led speculative theology into 
an intriguing situation when describing God. It would employ the concepts of two totally 
different metaphysical systems, when speaking about the divine. It would use a rational, 
materialist terminology (Aristotelian) in order to solve the logical problems in describing an 
immutable, incorporeal subject. Speaking of God as incorporeal and immutable, means using 
Neoplatonic language. In the first four Centuries, the clear 'limiting concepts' of the discussion 
wou Id be clearly laid out. The Godhead does not simply compose itself of three, non-ontological 
persons, whose individuality are merely three different ways of the single God expressing his 
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unity. This is Sabellianism. No, the three persons are really three individuals. On the other hand, 
the individuality of the persons is not so radical, so as to deny the equal divinity of the persons, 
and their constituting the one God. This is Arianism. 
In fact, the individuality of the three persons was clearly established by the Apologists, from the 
earliest of times, through a careful study of the economy of salvation. However, the next problem, 
that of the unity of the Godhead, was going to take considerably more mental exertion and time to 
solve. Just about all of the Fathers, would call on Aristotle to help them with the problem. 
In the 'Metaphysics,' Aristotle spoke of five possible ways in which we might ascribe unity to 
two terms of entities. " 0 These Aristotelian terms were used in some way, by the Fathers, to 
explain the unity in God. The terms over the years took on slightly different meanings, and by the 
time of the Cappadocians, attempts were made to standardise the terminology. Sometimes the 
Greek term 'ousia,' is used of the Aristotelian 'second substance,' and can mean either 'species' 
or 'genus.'"' In the case of the Latin paradigm, the equivalent is 'substantia,' which also can 
mean 'second substance,' or it can also mean the same as the Greek 'hypostasis,' (in the sense of 
non-proximate 'hypokeimenon' or 'substratum'). There is a primary etymological link between 
'hypokeimenon,' and 'hypostasis.' In Aristotle the terms: 'substratum,' 'species,' and 'genus,' can 
be interchangeable.m Aristotle describes an individual ('atomon') as a 'first ousia' and also as a 
'hypokeimenon.' Wolfson"' points out however, that 'hypokeimenon' in Aristotle can refer to 
either a common substratum of different individual substances, or it can refer to an individual 
substance constituting the common substratum of accidents. 
When Origen refers to the term 'hypostasis,' in the speaking of the three persons of the Trinity, 
Wolfson,,. shows that Origen is using Aristotelian language to speak of real individuals, (first 
substances) not 'seeming realities.' Now the question is: how does Origen explain the unity in 
God? Because he sees the individuals of the Trinity as being individual species, the term of 
commonality must include the idea of species, but also that of genus as well. Such a term he 
found in 'ousia,' in the sense of'second ousia.'"' The term 'species,' speaks of the threeness, but 
the term 'genus,' speaks for the unity. Tertullian's solution is different. He also affirms, with 
Origen, that each individual person, is a real person. They are real, individual species <Persona). 
To describe their unity, Origen uses the term 'substantia.' Here, substance means 
'hypokeimenon,' in the sense of being a proximate-unity (underlying substrate). The common 
substratum, providing the unity to the Godhead, is that which underlies the three persons. Here, 
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Tertullian departs from the Aristotelian usage of the term. With Aristotle the common substratum 
of oil and wine, is neither oil, nor wine, but water. Yet unlike Augustine, Tertullian identifies the 
substratum with the Father, whereas Augustine identifies the substratum with a substrate that 
underlies the entire Godhead and is not to be reduced to any of the three persons themselves. " 6 
Augustine's vocabulary is what he sees to be the Latin equivalent of the Greek: 'one ousia,' 
'three hypostases.' The Latin is: 'one essence (substance),' 'three persons-"" In the 
uncompounded, simple nature of the supreme being, although there is One God, there are three 
persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit."' Wolfson has shown that Augustine was also aware of 
Aristotle's teaching on different types of unity. " 9 Augustine chooses to term the three individuals 
of the Trinity as three persons, and the unity (essence) as a unity of 'substratum.' 160 
6.4.2-PREDICA TION ISSUES 
In the sixth chapter of the seventh book of the 'De Trinitate,' Augustine introduces the problems 
in the role of Trinitarian predication. Here, he shows a familiarity with Aristotle's doctrine, 
reflected in the first four chapters of the 'Metaphysics. ' 161 As we have discussed, Aristotle in his 
theory of predications, discerns between the types of predications we can make, according to the 
questions: What is it0 (substance), How big is it? (Quantity), What kind is it? (Quality), and so 
on. Moving up and down within the tree of any category, we find genera and species. 162 From 
here, we can distinguish between horizontal and vertical predications. In the predication, 
'Abraham is a man,' the predicate is precisely that of which is predicated, it is 'said of the species 
and individual below it. 163 These kind of predications are all 'substance predications.' On the 
other hand we have also, horizontal predications, such as 'Abraham is white.' Here, we are 
attributing a quality, a 'non-substance predication.' 164 Ifwe then say, 'God is a substance,' this 
appears to be a vertical predication, not horizontal. What about 'God is Father, Son and Holy 
Spirit?' Are these horizontal or vertical predications? No, because these are relational 
predications, they are horizontal ones. What about 'God is person'? To Augustine, this is not said 
of God relationally, it is a 'substance-predicate,' a vertical one. 16' 
Yet, involving standard talk, if we say that the statements: 'God is one substance,' or 'God is 
three persons,' involved vertical predications, problems develop. The statement that 'God is three 
perscns' actually cannot involve a case of vertical predication. Ifwe give 'essence,' a generic or a 
'specific name,' we land up in heresy. 166 Augustine's situation is such that neither vertical nor 
horizontal predication can be used of the statement: 'God is three persons.' He continues to use 
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essentialist, Aristotelian terminology: 'One essence and three persons,' but accepts that the 
standard Aristotelian predication is incomplete, when applied to the Trinity: God is more trnly 
thought of than spoken of, and he more truly is than is thought of (Verius enim cogitatur Deus 
quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur). 161 Rather, in solving the problem, we must try to give 
explanations of within what conditions a certain claim is made about God. 168 Again, Augustine's 
dilemma is clear: God is actually, in the final analysis, above the categories. 169 Now according to 
our terminology, this confession is very close to stating that 'God is beyond Being.' Yet, 
Augustine also states that God is that which is most truly substance, and therefore cannot be 
above the categories (Being). He, who is God, is unchangeable essence, Being itself, the most 
appropriate example of what true essence is. 170 Therefore he cannot prevent himself from using 
the language of being to speak about God. 
Does Augustine solve the dilemma? To some extent at least, he thinks he does, with the use of 
Aristotelian non-standard predication. 171 Aristotle has argued that standard predication is either, 
vertical or horizontal. In neither case can that which is at the bottom of the substance tree 
(primary substances) be predicated of anything else. 'For there is something of which each of 
these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each one of the categories; because all 
other things are predicated of substance, but this is predicated of matter. 
Thus the ultimate substrate is in itself neither a particular thing nor a quantity nor anything 
else.' 172 We can say: 'This flesh and this bone is Socrates.' These are not cases of vertical 
predication, for although Socrates' species is man, the species of flesh and bone is not man. 173 
Again, says Augustine: 'We do not use these terms ("essence" or "substance") according to genus 
and species, but as it were according to matter that is common and the same. Just as, ifthree 
statues were made of the same gold, we should say three statues one gold, yet we should not be 
calling gold the genus and the statues the species, nor gold the species but statues the 
individuals.' 174 The unity of God's essence in this case, is that of unity of substratum. 
6.4.3-THREE-PERSONED SUBSTANCE 
Lancaster, in her article: 'Three-Personed Substance: The Relational Essence of the Triune God 
in Augustine's 'De Trinitate,' 'offers an alternative interpretation of Augustine's understanding 
of substance and person as it is stated in 'De Trinitate. ,rn Lancaster, in her interpretation of 'De 
Trinitate, 'wishes to contend with La Cugna and others, who state that Augustine's priority is 
substance before relation-"• 
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Lancaster insists that the real context of the more technical books of the 'De Trinitate' (V-Vll), 
lie in the whole of the work 177 She suggests that to claim that Augustine rejects the temporal 
dimension of the Trinity, in favour of the eternal, fails to read the entire work contextually. With 
regard to the mediation, the temporal nature of such mediation is there to lead us to eternal things. 
'The temporal mission acts as a bridge to eternal truth because it manifests the divine procession 
of the Son from the Father. " 1' Lancaster is also aware of the problem that LaCugna raises about 
Augustine's 'De Trinilate. 'This is to reduce the significance of the persons, by relating them to 
the unifying 'substance,' of the Godhead. Father, signifies Father, not in such a way as to indicate 
a separate substance. In other words, Augustine is saying that anything that is said properly or 
particularly of any person (Father, Son or Spirit) is not said with respect to that person himself, 
but the other. 'Other things, such as "Good," "great," "eternal," or even "God,'' are said with 
reference to substance and are said with the others. ' 179 The discussion of how things are said of 
God with reference to substance has two dimensions: one is about multiplicity in God and the 
other is about how substance predicates apply to the three persons. Augustine takes up the 
problem of the assertion of a quality of, say 'wisdom,' and God. Automatically, Augustine, 
because of his view of the simplicity of God, would claim that each of the three persons, is wise. 
The problem comes in, with Bible passages such as 1 Cor 1 :24, where the Son is portrayed as the 
wisdom of God. 180 Augustine considers this problem. Ifwe say that only the Son is 'wisdom,' and 
that the Father begets wisdom, instead of being wise, problems develop. Ifwe substitute 'great,' 
and 'God,' for wisdom, we land up in the absurd position that the Father is great only with the 
greatness that the Father begets and that the Son is the Godhead of the Father. 
Augustine's solution to the problem is to state that 'every being that is called something by 
relationship is also something besides that relationship.' 181 We see this matter taken up in Book 
Vll. Chapter Two. 182 'Augustine has tried to show that when one talks about the substance of 
God, there is both an aspect of speaking of each person with reference to self and with reference 
to each other.' 183 This teaching of Augustine forms the heart of Lancaster's response to 
LaCugna's accusations against 'De Trinitate. ''Because for Augustine God is Trinity, I do not 
think it is accurate to say that essence precedes relation. Nor is it accurate to say that "person" is 
simply equated with absolute "substance." Rather the persons, which are defined by their 
relations, are nothing other than that which the substance is. It is not that "person" equals 
"substance," but that the substance is three-personed.' 184 
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Lancaster's point is that when Augustine does attribute, say 'wisdom,' to the Son, such an 
attribution is not only to the substance (essence) of the Godhead. It is also partially (and in a 
particular sense) a relational attribution as well. It also refers to the Son as a person, individually. 
In the case of the attribution applying to the Son, it specifically applies to the Son as the Wisdom 
of God in his incarnate state. Trinitarian substance in Augustine, therefore, is not simple as some 
of his critics make out. 
6.4.4-SUBSTANCE, PARTICIPATION AND THE TRIPARTATION OF BEING 
The interpretation of being as triadic, is an important part of the Neoplatonic tradition, as derived 
from Plato. Aristotle on the other hand rejects the triadic interpretation of reality: there is no need 
for any mediation between prime matter and form."' As an example, in the 'Timaeus,' we have 
the tripartite reality: Matter-Demiurge-Ideas. Such a proportion implies three terms and is of the 
general form, a:b=b:c. 186 The system is firstly, dyadic, dealing with two poles. These are then 
joined together through a third, intermediary. Again, consider the Platonic creation. The 
'demiurge' brings together the idea and the material. The ideas are linked to the material through 
'participation.' In the case of Plotinus, the triad is very clear: One-Nous-Soul. Yet, Allers 187 
shows that triads pervade the metaphysical schema of Plotinus. The same as we have seen, occurs 
with Augustine. 
There are, of course, various differences between the Trinitarian triads of Augustine and Plotinus. 
Participation, with Plotinus, is a dubious thing. The One does not truly, ontically 'participate,' in 
the other hypostases, the way we see participation occurring in Augustine's Trinity. The 
Plotinian, absolute One, does not allow any predication by means of the 'intermediary' 
hypostases. Neither is anyone hypostasis responsible for the 'generation,' of another 
hypostasis. m There is also as we have seen, another problem with the Plotinian triad. This is the 
different ontological level on which each hypostasis finds itself Because the One is 'beyond 
Being,' it becomes considerably difficult to provide any real mediation principle, from the One to 
the world. It cannot be said that there exists a real relationship of participation between the One 
and Nous-Soul, as this would imply a loss of transcendence on the part of the One. 
'Consequently, neither is there a possibility of speaking of Vestigia Trinitatis within the 
framework ofNeo-Platonism. '' 09 
With Victorinus, Augustine portrays his Trinity as a Trinity of dynamic operations of mutual 
participation, not in the static sense as does Plotinus. 190 We have active, impartation of being, as 
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opposed to inert being in Plotinus. In this way, Augustine's idea of the supreme being, is very 
different to that of Plotinus. Obviously, it is also different in that Augustine's 'hypostases,' each 
share the same ontological status as one another, through their mutual operations (perichoresis). 
In other words, although Augustine accepts the dynamic nature of the three persons and their 
operations, such dynamism does not detract from the ontological status of the persons in any 
way. 191 Allers indicates that even those philosophies that place 'becoming,' above 'being,' still 
require some type of substratum to anchor or contain the principles ofbecoming.192 We have seen 
that this is indeed the case, even at times in those metaphysical systems that place the pre-
eminence on Being above becoming. Plato spoke of the Receptacle as the 'nurse of all 
becoming.' Augustine's 'essence,' or the 'unity-principle' of the Godhead, is conceived of in the 
light of the Aristotelian substratum. This might lead some interpreters to view the persons within 
the Augustinian triad as the 'dynamic,' or 'relational,' 'becoming-element,' and the 'essence,' as 
the 'being-element.' However, Augustine argues that this is unacceptable: both the persons and 
the essence retain both dimensions. 
Neoplatonism, in recognising both the necessary unity and diversity in the universe, sought to 
account for this with triadic ontologies, embracing both unitary, as well as participationary 
elements. Augustine, as well as the Cappadocians followed with their view of God. 'The monad 
is set in motion in virtue of its richness; the dyad is surpassed (for the deity is above matter and 
form); the triad contains itself in perfection, for it is the first which surpasses the composition of 
the dyad.' 193 Any triadic ontology, prioritising being over becoming, involves the two, dyadic, 
metaphysical components of 'substance.' Then there is need for the third, mediating participation-
component (the Holy Spirit). Generally, the substance components are the two differential poles, 
with the 'participation-element,' joining the two together. Says Allers: 'We believe that the 
triadic structure and the related notion of mediation are basic characteristics, in St Augustine's 
thought, of both being and process. ' 194 The significant aspect to the Augustinian triad is the 
raising of the mediation <fandamentum relationis) component, to the same ontological level as the 
other two hypostases. This brings about an indissoluble whole. In other words, the triad cannot be 
seen as the sum of two dyads, but forms a unity of its own.1., 
There are also interesting variants, with respect to the idea of 'participation,' as applied to the 
Augustinian triad. The concept of 'perichoresis, ' 196 or 'co-inherence,' might serve as a synonym 
here for the mutual participation of the persons of the triad. Now, as a general rule, the conception 
of participation, as used in Neoplatonic Greek thinking, and in Early and Medieval philosophical 
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theology, applies not to the Trinity, but to the relationship between the divine and the creation, 
and the involvement of the former in the latter. However it is our conviction that the language 
employed by Christian theologians to speak about the mutual co-inherence of the three persons, 
did not just come from nowhere, but was borrowed from the Neoplatonic doctrine of 
'participation.' 
Part of our argument has been to show that Neoplatonic participational thinking found its way 
into the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, not only through the doctrine of creation, but also via 
the metaphysical triads of the Neoplatonists. \Yith the Christian Trinity, however, we have seen 
an elevation from what was first a discussion of the problematic relationship between the two 
antipodes of the 'One,' and creation. This was elevated towards a new discussion, grappling with 
the problem ofreconciling the antipodes within the composite being of the Trinity itself. This 
meant that Augustine and others would have to bring about a substantial revision of the 
traditional language of participation, both Neoplatonic and Christian, in order to make it fit into 
language about the Trinity. 
To illustrate this revision, we now compare briefly Gregory of Nyssa's language of participation 
together with that of Augustine Gregory employs a technical usage of 'participation,' as it refers 
to the doctrine of creation, as a means of describing man's relationship with God. Augustine uses 
the same concept when speaking about God's relationship with himself in the Trinity. 197 Balas 
identifies two types of participation in Gregory: 'Horizontal' participation and 'Vertical' 
participation. Vertical participation is that sharing between the created and the uncreated, the 
relationship between God and spiritual creatures. Horizontal participation is found on each level 
ofreality, and consists in the sharing of the common nature of the species. 198 We have observed 
that in Augustine's Trinity, both immanent and economic, both types of participation are present. 
The first fundamental meaning in Gregory's doctrine is that man does not have the nature of God, 
naturally, but only as received from above. 199 Within the Augustinian Trinity, there is a shared 
interpenetration of the divinity of the natures. In the East, a certain pre-eminence was attributed to 
the Father, as the source of the Godhead, but with Augustine, all three persons 'co-inhere' in the 
underlying substratum. 
Secondly, (speaking about man and God) Gregory teaches that participation 'implies a real 
distinction in the participant. '200 In other words, the subject of the participation is 'one thing,' and 
that within which it participates, is another. Not so with Western Trinitarian doctrine. Although 
142 
we identify within the Godhead, three real persons, this identification is one of relation only; all 
three are the same God. Thirdly, ' 01 Gregory's view of God's participation in creation implies the 
limitation of Being in creation. We have seen that Augustine says the same thing. Created 
intellectual being can only become 'greater' or 'lesser,' depending on its participation in the 
Godhead; it does not contain perfection in itself. The participation of the created in the Creator, 
implies the limitations in the created world. Again, not so with the Christian Trinity: The mutual 
indwelling of the persons, implies their perfect being, not their limitations. Fourthly, in Gregory's 
teaching, the participation of the divine in man, anticipates room for that creature to change, to 
grow in the knowledge of God, to 'share in the divine nature.' With the Trinity, precisely the 
opposite is true. The mutual perichoresis within the Godhead, means that no change is needed, 
God is immutable. Finally,202 the one common element in the Christian view of both God's 
participation in himself, and God's participation in man, is the 'personal' element. It is not 
merely, as with the Greeks, an ontological exchange of Being. However, as we have had occasion 
to observe, in the Trinity (especially in the West) there is also a genuine sharing of Being, in the 
Godhead. However, Augustine and his school clearly argue that man participates in the divine 
nature through grace only, there is not ontological deification. According to certain proponents of 
the Eastern tradition, the doctrine of deification can imply a certain amount of ontological 
overlap, especially in the doctrine of soteriology. 203 
6.5-CONCLUSION: AUGUSTINE ON TRINITARIAN SUBSTANCE AND 
PARTICIPATION 
Augustine's thinking as a Christian theologian, must not be isolated from his classical 
background. ' 04 His thought is to be interpreted as the attempt to reform classicism, through the 
supplantation thereof, with Sapientia. Sapientia does not completely replace the classical mind, it 
merely cleanses and completes it, by pointing out its weaknesses. Sapientia, finding its basis in 
God's revelation and the sinfulness of the human being, is also significant as a force in the 
Christian tradition. As such, it works against the possibility of exhaustive knowledge.'0' With our 
brief remarks on the classical paradigm upon which Augustine drew, we have attempted to show 
that it was not a tradition that slavishly worshipped reason or dogmatic assertion at all cost. 
This is a necessary observation, especially in the light of contemporary critics of 'Western 
thought,' writing from the revisionist, pragmatist perspective. These critics have a one-sided view 
of the Greeks, accusing them of the great idolatry of worshipping the Logos. The truth is 
different: classical thought was not only about getting at essences. This is well argued by 
Armstrong in his article; 'On Not Knowing Too Much About God. " 06 Armstrong points to the 
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fact that although Hellenic philosophers were in the habit of making extremely definite 
statements about everything, philosophy for them was a conversational activity.207 It is also 
important to observe the attitude of Socrates, the 'hero' in the Platonic corpus. Socrates was 
renowned for his wisdom, which partly stemmed from his professed ignorance about final truth. 
This, for later generations of philosophers, became the paradigm in which true philosophy was to 
be practiced. This was the case especially with respect to transcendent realities.'0' One sees that 
to some extent this intellectual diffidence gave rise to the apophatic way of Plotinus and his 
followers. Yet as Armstrong says: ' ... if one is following a way of negation one has to have 
something solid to negate; a negative theology needs a positive theology to wrestle with and 
transcend. " 09 These are precisely the forces we find working together in the 'De Trinitate. ·In his 
great work, Augustine is seeking for closure, whilst at the same time, paradoxically, denying its 
possibility. Fascinatingly, Augustine saw this paradox not as problematic, but as a sign of a 
deeply spiritual theology. In addition, the apophatic elements of theology do not negate the 
kataphatic issues either. Just because God in himself is unknowable does not mean that dogmatic 
certainty, concerning his character and creation cannot be arrived at. Barth, in an even greater 
sense, incorporates this paradox into his entire theological programme. 
Furthermore, classical scepticism did not seek to present scepticism as a system or even a 
collection of anti-dogmatic statements, supported by conclusive arguments. 'For Sceptics, all 
arguments, including their own, are inconclusive: The investigation must always be pursued 
further. "'0 Nevertheless Annstrong illustrates that there is, in the classical tradition, a significant 
difference between Scepticism and the Negative way. 'All Sceptics operate entirely on the level 
of discursive reason, which the followers of the Negative way are trying to go beyond. " 11 We 
find both elements in the 'De Trinitate. ·Not only is Augustine, pursuing a healthy ignorance that 
seeks further knowledge, he also wants to pass beyond knowledge, in order to apprehend 
ecstatically, a view ofGod.112 We have, therefore, these two important strands in the 'De 
Trinitate. ·These are the demand for closure, and the denial of closure. At the same time, it needs 
to be said that the former strand is the more prominent of the two. Augustine never gives in to 
negative theology at the expense of reason. 
Western thought can be interpreted as the search for certainty, the search for truth. This is brought 
about, in ancient Greece, through the swing from a 'mytho-religious' worldview, to a 
'philosophical' one.213 Although the 'philosophical' outlook did not entirely strip 'a/etheia' from 
its religious dimensions, it did introduce to 'truth,' a new dimension. This was ontology, the 
seeking to locate certainty in a certain type of metaphysical dimension. This was immutability 
and self-subsistence, whether manifesting itself in the One of Plotinus, the realm of Being in 
Plato, or even in the primary substance of Aristotle. 
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Augustine represents a change, with his unique application of biblical theology to Greek 
'Scientia,' or 'truth.' With sapientia, no longer is the ontology of substance, a true guide to truth. 
The true source and guide, is the God of the Old and New Testaments. 'Truth' is no longer the 
exclusive domain of the philosopher-kings as in Plato. It is to be located in the revelation of the 
Old and New Testaments, as interpreted by the Church. In the De Trinitate, 'the nature of this 
God is specifically revealed in two types of thinking_ Firstly God is, more than anything else, true 
'Being,' or true 'Existence.' He is the very source of 'Being.' This means that we can know him_ 
It means that we can predicate qualities of him. Unlike other classical thinkers in the nominalist 
tradition, (Neoplatonism excluded) Augustine (and Thomas later) did not believe that every 
existing entity shares the same 'Being.' Some entities have more 'Being,' than others, depending 
on their relationship to God who is pure 'Being.' On the other hand, when Aristotle speaks of 
'Being,' he speaks of all that can be intelligibly seen 'to be.' 
Nevertheless, God is not just 'Being,' in Augustinianism. Secondly and paradoxically, God is 
more than just 'Being,' in another sense, he is 'Beyond Being.' God's Being moves beyond 
definition, towards transcendence_ Here, Augustine is acknowledging the transcendence principle, 
Scripture uses, when speaking of God. His way of describing God as 'Beyond Being' differs to 
that of Plotinus. Firstly, Stead and others have shown that Augustine does not employ the same 
terminology, as does Plotinus. He does not actually ascribe to God, the epithet: 'Beyond Being.' 
Nevertheless, Augustine has a way of speaking about God's transcendence in a way that points to 
the One of Plotinus. 
Secondly, Plotinus insists that we cannot ascribe any description, any predication to the One. The 
transcendence of the One depends on this important factor. Augustine, on the other hand, whilst 
maintaining the transcendence of God, insists that we can ascribe certain predicates to Him, even 
to his nature as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. If this were not so, God could not be known at all. 
This means that like Barth but unlike Levinas, Augustine tries to paradoxically portray God, 
using a language of both 'hiddeness' (Beyond Being) and 'revealdness' (Being). This is God on 
the ladder and God beyond the ladder. 214 All language about Him ultimately fails to perfectly 
refer, but in another sense it must. Nonetheless, when Augustine speaks about the 'revealdness' 
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or revelatory component to God, he reflects his belief that God reveals himself in a manner that is 
not altogether foreign to classical ontology I Although he is being true to the Biblical language in 
affirming both the concrete existence of God, as well as the transcendence of God, Augustine 
failed to work this issue through consistently, philosophically (Indeed, some would state that this 
is impossible). 
As with Victorinus, Augustine's doctrine of the 'Being,' of God, is a movement away from a 
static ontology. Augustine might use static ontological language, but Victorinian influence, 
together with his Biblical theology and his view of the Trinity, pressurise Augustine to adopt a 
dynamic view of God. 
Of course, Augustine does not go as far as Whitehead and Barth, but we can see that he struggles, 
in his Trinity, to juxtapose act (participation) and substantiality in the Godhead. The reason for 
his need to place an emphasis on the inter-Trinitarian 'acts' of God is that Augustine needs to 
overcome the oneness\threeness problem of the Trinity. This he does through his modification of 
a totally static essentialism, to include the mutual participation of the three persons, in the one 
Godhead. As with Plotinus, but in a different way, Augustine plays lip service to the 'prior' 
nature of the metaphysical 'purity' of 'substance,' but fails to uphold this 'purity,' in his setting of 
it in a 'participational' context. 
There is, therefore, a decided element in Augustine's thinking in the 'De Trinitate' that points to 
the problem of closure, when speaking about God. Augustine grapples with this problem. On the 
one side, he speaks of God as if he can be analysed and studied as if under a microscope, and then 
on the other, Augustine admits that God is beyond such analysis. Ayres"'argues that Augustine's 
exegesis is based on the a priori principle of man's incapacity. Therefore 'transcendence is 
always going to be at the core of the human experience.' 116 
Edmund Hill is wrong, argues Ayres. There is no actual tension in the 'De Trinilate. 'We do not 
have in it, the contrast between the attempt to get to know God, and then the denial that such 
knowledge is possible. Augustine is merely wishing to show the impossibility of such a task. 217 
This might be true, but there remains a tension between the technical language of closure in the 
'De Trinitate, ·and the argument that closure is not possible. Here, Augustine's view of the will is 
important. The eschatological nature of the human will is that it desires to be united with God, but 
cannot do so yet. There is a concreteness about the fallen world, a concreteness that even extends 
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itself to the inadequate descriptions man makes about his world (such as the metaphysics of 
substantia). The will however, guided and assisted by the sapientia of grace, is man's redeeming 
quality. 
'For Augustine the description of the will is used to show up the inconsistencies in a theology 
reliant on a metaphysics of substantia. ' 218 Augustine accepts the necessity of two worlds. There is 
the world of metaphysical ontology, bequeathed to us by the Greeks. This is the fallen world 
within which we must work. Then, there is the redeeming world of'sapienlia,' in contrast. The 
sapientiaportion, engages in 'rhetorical criticism,' ofthe 'scientia' portion.219 
What is meant by 'rhetorical criticism,' is that the 'sapientia' portion does not totally eliminate 
the 'scientia' component. ' ... complete refutation of what is criticised is not intended-yes and no 
is said at once."20 We might call the Augustinian conception of the will of'sapientia,' 'de-
ontological.' Augustine uses his rhetoric to draw us away from an attachment to a carefully 
circumscribed, all encompassing metaphysical scheme, whilst admitting that we are inescapably 
bound to it. 221 We frequently find the same idea in the theology of Karl Barth. Augustine's 
thought has in its roots, a similar tension found in much of the West, including the contemporary 
proponents of Postmodernity. This is the tension that comes about in wanting to 'throw away the 
ladder,' whilst admitting that it is impossible. However, this desire always recurs in different 
forms and modes: Once reason has served its purpose, we need to abandon it, for higher modes of 
consciousness (whatever this might be).222 In Augustine, the power of grace-induced sapienlia is 
such that it will eschatologically, overcome the limitations of language about God, and human 
incapacity. 223 
Because of man's ontological and created limitations, the world of true Being even if it is 
described by Augustine as being different to Plotinus, remains unattainable. With Augustine, the 
primary cogito within man provides not only awareness of self, but also of the hierarchy of Being, 
and his own lowly place on that hierarchy. We have here what we might term the theological 
roots to what was to become an important tenet of Postmodernity: Reason is wonderful, but it is 
never enough. 
Unlike Plotinus where such an idea is very difficult, in Christianity, man can 'participate' in the 
first principle of the divine, as a child of God. He can do this through soteriology. Yet with a 
strongly apophatic theology, the Plotinian problems are not solved. In the case of Augustine, a 
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further problem develops, not found in Plotinus. Because the Trinitarian structure of God 
(ultimately unknowable) is reflected in the human mind, there is always the danger that man also 
becomes unknowable to himself. 
One point that Gunton does raise with which we fully agree, is the fact that in Augustine's 'De 
Trinitate,' God moves towards becoming 'unknowable.' Why is this? Gunton points out that the 
reason is because the 'ground,' or the metaphysical 'basis' of the Trinity of three persons, is the 
substrate. This is the impersonal, metaphysical 'stuff' from which the persons 'arise.' The point is 
that although in some sense, even ifthe substrate is to be identified with the Father, or the fount 
of the Godhead, it is also the 'substrate' from which all the three persons are based. It is the unity 
of the Trinity, or a 'unity of substrate.' We saw that Augustine had to retreat to this Aristotelian 
conception of the unity of God, due to the complicated problems that one can get into, when 
trying to defend both the unity of God and the differentiation in God. 
There is, in Plato and Aristotle, an intriguing connection between the 'receptacle,' and the 
'substrate,' respectively. We will recall that in the ontologies of both thinkers, the 'Logos' (the 
intelligible) is centralised, and the 'non-intelligible,' is marginalised. What is really prior, is that 
which provides 'logical form.' This form might take the shape of the intelligible form within the 
primary substance, or the world of 'Being,' in whose shape the intelligible particular is moulded. 
Also, in the landscape of the metaphysical world, in order for something to be intelligible, it must 
also, 'stand out,' as it were. It must have, not only 'intelligible' form, but it also must be 
'something.' It must have a 'beginning and an end,' it must have 'boundaries,' or a continuant. 
Thus with Aristotle, a primary substance is a 'thing' with boundaries. It must be clearly 
demarcated. 
Nevertheless, having said all this, it is significant to remember what we have already argued 
concerning the roles of the 'receptacle,' or the 'substrate,' in each respective system. Because 
neither of these concepts have 'intelligible form,' and because they have no distinctive shape, 
physically or otherwise, they are marginalised in both the systems of Plato and Aristotle. Neither 
substrate, nor the receptacle is brought to the fore, when these two philosophers discuss 'Being' 
in general. 
However, the reality, in our opinion, is very different. Both Aristotle and Plato felt it necessary to 
posit some kind of 'setting,' or 'anchor' for individual entities, or 'beings.' Intelligible beings or 
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entities need some kind of 'stuff, some type of 'context,' in which to subsist. This 'anchor,' is the 
'substrate,' or the 'receptacle.' Each of these three aforementioned concepts, in their own context, 
fit this idea. It seems then, that in Plato and Aristotle the 'centre' which is the form, or the 
substance, the realm of Being and so on, is not so central after all. They can only be portrayed as 
centres, because of that in which they must subsist for survival. This is the 'marginal,' the 
substrate, (receptacle) or the 'nurse of all becoming.' 
We now return to the 'De Tnnitate' of Augustine, and the criticism of Gunton. Augustine wishes 
to acknowledge the persons of the Godhead as real entities. In order to place the three persons, 
into the Godhead, as real persons, Augustine has to do so without losing sight of their unique 
metaphysical unity. After investigating the different possible models of unity, Augustine finally 
decides on a 'unity of substrate.' As with Aristotle and Plato, this 'undergirding metaphysical 
stuff,' is marginalised in Augustine's 'De Tnnitate. ·He only brings the substrate into the 
discussion as a 'stop-gap,' when he is trying to solve the oneness\threeness problem. Otherwise, 
in his general discussion of the Trinity, Augustine grants the 'substrate' no real role at all. 
The emphasis is on the three persons of the One God, none of which is at any time, ever 
portrayed as lacking individuality or intelligent personality. Yet when logical push comes to 
shove, Augustine retreats to the 'anchor,' the substrate. Yet, the substrate is impersonal, lacking 
real 'Being,' individuality or form. 
The substrate is self-effacement, its' identity stemming only from its involvement or 
'participation,' in the 'real,' the persons. Augustine's Trinity moves towards self-deconstruction. 
That is to say, in the oneness\threeness problem of the 'De Trinitare. ·it is the substrate that 'saves 
the day.' The personal, in order to remain personal has to be governed by the marginal, the 
impersonal. Substance, or 'individuality,' is determined by its participation in non-substance, or 
non-individuality. The centre has become a centre with no centre at all, a face without a face. A 
face that is self-effacing. 
This matter or problem has been one in which Gunton and others have identified with much of 
the Trinitarianism in the West. The matter to which we refer, is the tendency to 'anchor' the three 
persons of the Trinity, in the idea of a 'substrate,' or 'receptacle.' We have already demonstrated 
that there is a certain line of descent from Plato's receptacle, through to Aristotle's substrate. 
From here, this idea found its way into the Trinity of Augustine. Now, making the connection 
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between Plato's Receptacle, through to Aristotle's substrate, and then Augustine's Trinity, is not 
entirely devoid of potential problems. After all, we have commented on how Augustine 
transforms the logic of the secularists upon whom he builds. Nevertheless, as we have just 
demonstrated, there is a fascinating problem that, although having its genesis in Plato's 
'Timaeus,' has found its way into the Trinity of Augustine. 
Derrida, in his essay entitled 'Khora,' has provided a deconstructive reading of this concept, 
(receptacle) as found in the 'Timaeus."24 Derrida's close reading of the 'Timaeus,' seeks to 
integrate this term, 'Khora,' 'place,' 'nurse,' or 'space,' into the entire work as a whole. He 
concentrates on the self-effacing, deconstructive nature of this concept. He also ties this term up 
to the conception of myth."' Derrida points out that in the 'Timaeus,' the name of khora defies 
the logic of non-contradiction of the philosophers.226 It is neither sensible, nor 'intelligible,' it 
belongs to a 'third genus' (triton genos). 227 Derrida points out that in Plato's scheme of things, the 
'nurse of all becoming,' can be neither a 'this,' nor a 'that.' ' ... but this alteration between the 
logic of exclusion and that of participation ... stems perhaps only from a provisional appearance 
and from the constraints of rhetoric, even from some incapacity for naming. ' 228 It is alien as a 
concept, to the usual idea of a 'paradigm,' ' ... that intelligible and immutable model. And yet, 
"invisible" and without sensible form, it "participates" in the intelligible in a very troublesome 
and indeed aporetic way (aporotata, 5 ib).' 229 
Derrida points out that in the 'Timaeus,' there is a tension between the so-called 'logic' of the 
khora and the logic of the logos. We are reminded that the logic of the khora, is a 'bastard,' or 
corrupted reasoning as it arrived via the passage of a dream. 230 'Does such a discourse derive, 
then, from myth? Shall we gain access to the thought of the khora by continuing to place our trust 
in the alternative mythos/logos? And what if this thought called also for a third genus of 
discourse? And what if, perhaps as in the case of the khora, this appeal to the third genre was 
only the moment of a detour in order to signal toward a genre beyond genre? Beyond categories, 
and above all beyond categorical oppositions, which in the first place allow it to be approached or 
said?"" It exceeds the polarity of the 'mythosllogos.' ' ... but because in carrying beyond the 
polarity of sense (metaphorical or proper), it would no longer belong to the horizon of sense, nor 
to that of meaning as the meaning of being. " 32 
Augustine would probably have had greater success, by steering himself away from the logical 
problems the Trinity suggests. Instead, he might have argued that within the Oneness and the 
Threeness of the Trinity, we have both essence and differentiation, both centre and margin in 
God. 
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Furthermore as a Neoplatonist, Augustine believed in the ontological purity of the triad as a 
metaphysical structure, even outside of his view of God. Consequently, he spent an enormous 
amount of time supporting the idea of the Trinity. Of course, he did this primarily for Biblical 
reasons, but also philosophical. His philosophical love for the Trinity came from Plotinus, but his 
defense of the doctrine came from Aristotle. Philosophically, however, his Trinity had a weak 
point; the third component of the Spirit, never quite convinces his readers philosophically. It is an 
attempt to soften the contrast between the dyad of Father and Son. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THOMAS AQUINAS1 
7.1-BEING ANO THOMAS AOUINAS: INTRODUCTORY ORIENTATION 
As we now tum, in this next chapter to Thomas Aquinas, we are immediately aware of 
continuities but also great discontinuities with his past. Above all, we feel ourselves 
embraced into a unique system, the epitome of the High Middle Ages. Gone is the apparent 
'casualness' and somewhat rambling style of Augustine.2 Thomas' system is thoroughly 
integrated, and therefore no study of the metaphysical structure of his Trinity can 
commence, without some prior work on his view of metaphysics as a whole. We will 
proceed therefore, with an orientation into his general view of metaphysics (Being) before 
turning towards the specifics such as Thomas' view of substance and participation, with 
respect to his Trinity. 
A fine overview of the distinctive elements of Thomas' metaphysics is to be found in 
Clarke's article: 'What is Most and Least Relevant in the Metaphysics of St. Thomas 
Today?" As a starting-point, we shall provide a summary of Clarke's overview, before 
entering into more detailed discussions of certain points. 
Clarke's first distinguishing element in Thomas, is what he terms 'The Natural Correlativity 
of Spirit and Being. '4 Although much of the distinguishing characteristics that Clarke 
describes in Thomas' metaphysics, are basically Aristotelian in origin, one can observe 
certain important and unique elements which are distinct to Thomas alone. The description 
of Being as 'good,' and 'intelligible,' is specifically Thomistic especially when we see the 
specifically Christian angle with which he interprets all reality and existents. Thomas' 
Christian realism demands that Being is knowable, and essentially good.' Being is the 
formal object of the intellect, and truth is thus the transcendental property of all Being.6 1n 
fact, the apprehension of Being, is the first level of intellectual consciousness, 7 a 'pre-
theoretical' perception of reality. With Kant, Thomas does link the concept of Being to the 
human mind closely, but this combination lacks the latter's critical spirit, or Hume's 
doctrine of the role of mental causality. As the necessary condition to all thought, the 
existence of Being cannot be 'proven' via argument of demonstration. Instead it 
presupposes such proof Clarke's second element in Thomas is 'The Existential Analysis of 
Being.' 
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Here is represented a movement away from the merely 'intelligible' view of Being as form, 
towards a new synthesis begun in Augustine. This is the synthesis of two components in all 
of Being: Existence is firstly a dynamic principle, as well as secondly, intelligible form, or 
essence.' Essence is the intelligible, determining mode of a being. However, the act of 
existence is the central component of a being that fulfils its reality, or perfection, as well as 
enabling it to take its place in the network of other beings. Action has a close affinity with 
any being. This gave rise to the term 'Thomistic existentialism,' coined first in the 1940' s, 
by Gilson and others.9 Action is the criterion that decides whether a being is real or not. 
Action flows from any existing thing, as opposed to merely mental or possible being. In 
other words for Aquinas, true existence as a quality of a being does not stem from the 
existence of its cause, but it is an act of existence in the being itself. This characteristic, not 
just intelligible form, is needed, if we are to talk intelligibly about an entity. For our 
purposes, it is interesting to ask Thomas the question: what is more important, 'existence,' 
or 'form?' Thomas would not like to make that separation, but he does state that for 
anything to exist, it must have form. 'At the same time, since this conception of being 
includes form and essence as interior modes determining the act of existence, hence as also 
intrinsically constitutive of the real, it avoids the sharp dichotomy between essence as the 
principle of intelligibility, on the one hand, as existence as irrational brute fact, on the other, 
which we find in so many forms of existentialism. In a word, what St. Thomas has 
succeeded in doing is to shift the centre of gravity in the constitution of the real from form 
and essence to actual existence as inner act, without thereby letting go of the intelligibility 
fb . '10 o emg. 
We are not entirely in agreement with Clarke's analysis here. Is Thomas saying for 
something to be understandable, it must exist? We think not. As we shall argue, he is rather 
saying: For something to exist, it must be intelligible. The difference between the two is 
subtle, but significant. Because Thomas takes the latter position, existence is buried in form, 
or 'intelligibility.' Thomas has not moved as far from the Greeks as some would like to 
think. In addition, the first principle that allows all metaphysical and other entities the dual 
characteristics of 'existence,' and 'intelligible form,' is God the prime analogate. God as 
Pure, Subsistent Act of Existence is the only factor holding all other existent acts together. 
In Thomas' metaphysical schema, God is Pure 'is,' 'pure Being.' As with Augustine before 
him, and in order to keep the concept of God intelligible, Thomas avoids openly stating that 
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God is 'beyond Being,' but still attempts to preserve God's Biblical transcendence. As a result of 
this, we find the same tension in the theology of Thomas, as we do in Augustine. 
Thirdly, with Thomas, all beings express themselves in dynamic activity proportionate to their 
nature. This act is the act that each being engages in, proving its existence. The metaphysics of 
'act' provides the foundation of Thomas' realism. How can one otherwise know that something is 
real, if it is not able to produce another or perform an action on another? With Barth, Thomas 
believed that esse being the supreme act, the higher the act of existence of a being, the more it 
will pour out and express its perfection within itself and towards others. 11 Here, Thomas has 
reversed the priorities of the Neoplatonists: For the Neoplatonists the Good is primary and being 
is a derivative of the Good. With Thomas Goodness is not primary, as it implicitly presupposes 
the existence of that which is good. 12 Thus the Platonic choice of choosing self-identity and 
immutability as the criterion of the really real has changed somewhat with Thomas, now the 
quality of existence is included. 13 
However, with his use of the concept of beings as self-expressive, reaching their height of 
definition in their active integration into other beings, Thomas does open up the possibility of a 
revised, less isolated substantialism, together with a more effective role for participation, in his 
metaphysics. In doing this, Thomas does anticipate more recent metaphysical models of Being.14 
Thomas, does not view participation as that which participates in the forms or the Ideas, as with 
Plato. It is closer to the Neoplatonic style of participation in the 'infinite.' However, Thomas 
differs also with Neoplatonism here. In the case of Plotinus, all being in a certain sense, 
participates in the 'One.' With Thomas however, all things participate in existence, the primary 
unifying quality in the universe. 
Continuing his summary of Thomas' metaphysics, Clarke points" fourthly to a further role of the 
concept of 'existence,' as Thomas' suggested solution to the problem of the one and the many. 
All finite beings participate in existence as the central, unifying perfection of the universe. 'This 
participation is mediated through the metaphysical composition of esse, the act of existence, and 
essence as a particularly limiting mode-a composition found in all beings save one.' 16 
Says Thomas: 'Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that 
by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence 
is that which actuates all things, even their forms ... ' 17 
'All created perfections are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally 
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perfect, because He lacks not ... any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be 
seen from the following considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect 
must be found in the effective cause.. '" Ali entities in the universe that exist, (have being) do so 
through participation in God as efficient cause. 19 
Although Thomas does not approach the issue of existence anthropologically as the ultimate 
criterion, as does Heidegger, he does view the highest mode of existence as 'personal.' 'For St. 
Thomas, the person is not a peculiar mode of being added on from the outside, so to speak, to 
what would be the normal, non-personal mode of being. The perfection of a being as person, lies 
in not only its dispersion of an act of presence into the world around it, but its act of presence 
becomes transparent to itself, (self-consciousness) and master of its own actions (freedom).20' 
It is therefore Clarke's fifth notion that Aquinas's idea of substance, whilst Aristotelian, is 
nevertheless decidedly more dynamic than that of the Philosopher. Substance is no longer 
conceived of as an inert, underlying substratum, in which the accidents are inserted for support. 
This was typically Locke's criticism of the Scholastic\Descartian view ofsubstance.21 Substance 
is totally oriented towards its operations. God is the cause of action not only by giving the form 
which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of movement, but also 
preserving the forms of all things. 22 In fact, God not only gives entities form, but he also 
preserves them in existence, and applies them to act. He is himself the end of every action: 
· ... dicendum quod Deus non solum dat formas rebus, sed etiam conservat eas in esse, et applicat 
eas ad agendum. et est.finis omnium actionum. ut dictum est."' In pointing out the active nature 
of substance in Thomas, Clarke argues that although substance changes in order that it might 
effect and receive, this change is not so radical, that the substance loses its identify. Being the 
primary category, Thomas's substance only changes accidentally. 'This is not the same as to say, 
according to a common misinterpretation, that only the accidents change. Substance and accident, 
as metaphysical co-principles, ontologically interpenetrate each other, each affecting the other 
more or less profoundly, as the case may be. The Thomistic substance remains self-identical only 
by constantly being at work ... ' 24 Speaking of substance, in the Thomistic system, two further 
components need to be mentioned. These are actuality and potency. 'St Thomas accepts the 
Aristotelian doctrine of the hylomorphic composition of material substances, defining prime 
matter as pure potentiality and substantial form as the first act of a physical body, first act, 
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meaning the principle which places the body in its specific class and determines its essence. 
Prime matter is in potentiality to all forms which can be the forms of bodies, but considered 
in itself it is without any form, pure potentiality ... For this reason, however, it cannot exist 
by itself, for to speak of a being actually existing without act or form would be 
contradictory: it did not, then, precede form temporally, but was created together with 
form."' 'It will ever remain Aquinas' neatest accomplishment to have discovered the 
complementarity of the two greatest minds of classical Greek philosophy to the point of 
teaching that the Platonic philosophy of participation in being becomes viable only within 
an Aristotelian philosophy of the experience of becoming, made possible by "potentiality," 
the basis of change and continuity."' 
Sixthly, Clark turns to Aquinas' doctrine of God. He looks at two aspects: Efficient and 
final Causality and The nature of God as the Pure Subsistent Act ofExistence.27 Aquinas's 
vision of the world is a vast system of interacting substances, each performing some agency 
upon something else. All entities are under the universal influx of esse, as it is mediated 
from the one self-subsisting Being of God. Efficient causality is not merely the conjunction 
of two events in a certain time frame. It is a single event 'which is precisely the production-
of-the effect as by the agent. This takes place, not at the back in the cause, but in the effect 
as from the cause (actio est in passio). Causing and being caused constitute one single 
reality with two distinct relations, one of the effect and the other to the cause. ' 28 The centre 
of the entire Thomistic vision of the universe is God, the perfect plenitude of existence, the 
source of all Being. 29 More than that, all things desire God as their end (Sic ergo divina 
bonitas est finis rerum omnium). As we have said, we find the same tension, in Thomas as 
we do with Augustine. In speaking about God as the source of Being, the true Being, 
Thomas does not ascribe to God, the principle of the 'One,' beyond Being in a precise 
sense. After all, we can ascribe various predicates to God. Yet, Thomas places God beyond 
all form, and limiting essences. ' ... it permits at once a doctrine of God in positive terms, yet 
one that leaves intact the full mystery of God as ineffable and beyond any direct 
representation of His mode of being (or essence) by our limited concepts and categories.'30 
'This is the interpretation of the immutability of God in so absolute and uncompromising a 
way as to exclude any "real relation" on God's part toward us, whereas every creature has a 
non-symmetrical real relation of dependence on God. ' 31 
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7.1.1-THE SYNONYMOUS OVERLAP OF BEING AND GOOD 
Having provided a basic overview of the distinct features of Thomas' metaphysics, it is our 
purpose to tum now to discuss certain of these in greater detail. Firstly, we wish to highlight 
again the theory of the convertibility of being and good in Thomas.32 When the description 
is made that being is Good, this is not intended as a loose property as such, but a 'mode that 
is coextensive upon every being' (Modus generaliter consequens omne ens). This attribute 
of Being, is one of the 'transcendentals. " 3 Thomas has clearly contradicted Plotinus and 
Plato, as both of the latter thinkers ascribed to the 'good,' the epithet of 'beyond Being.' 
Now the problems with this argument in Thomas are immediately apparent. Firstly, it seems 
as if Thomas is ascribing a moral or value quantity to a metaphysical entity. Secondly, this 
approach seems to deny any possible existence of evil.34 Then there is the problem of the 
Bible ascribing goodness to God alone (Matt 19: 17), and not to everything else in creation 
as well. In other words, how can one assert that all of being is good, and not slip into 
pantheism? 
Thomas' definition of good takes its roots from Aristotle's comment," that goodness is 
what all desire (dicit quod bonum est quod omnia appetunt). Good here is perceived as 
'Being' reaching its goal, as it moves towards full actuality from mere potentiality. Good 
implies the character of the end (Bonum eum sit quad omnia apperunt, hoc autem habet 
rationem finis. man!fesrum est quod bonum ralionem finis importat). 36 'Desirable' is 
identified with 'perfection.' To be perfect, is to lack nothing. That beyond which there is 
nothing (cuius nihil ~st extra ipsum). To be perfect, is to be complete.37 Perfection, then, is 
to be identified with 'act.' Something is only perfect, when it is perfectly that which its 
intelligible form allows it, in the divine plan. Every being strives towards completion in 
goodness. To be perfect, is to attain to true 'act,' beyond 'potency.' Thus 'actuality,' is to be 
defined with Being31 . 'Being' and 'good' are convertible, because Being is perfected in 
itself by its first act of subsisting. This runs contrary to the modem idea of Being as 
'presence,' not perfection. To some extent, we possibly have the anticipatory metaphysical 
roots of the prolepsis-eschatology\ontology of Pannenberg. Thomas, brings about a new 
understanding of actuality, not found in Aristotle or any other Greek thinker. Aristotle did 
not focns on the existence of things as an actuality separate from the essence of an entity. 
Existence was seen by him as being part of the being of the thing. With Thomas' 
theological metaphysics, being is very much associated with existence. Nevertheless, no 
contingent thing has existence as part of its nature or its being. This distinction only belongs 
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to God. The actuality of an entity is interpreted by Thomas as comprising its existence. This 
is an actuality that can only come from the outside. It comes from God. With Aristotle, the 
actuality of a thing is realised when it attains to its finite intelligible form. With Thomas, it 
is only reached when it receives its actuality from the infinite Creator. The actuality of a 
thing is when its form is united to matter, by the Creator, giving it existence. Existence then 
is what truly makes something real, as distinct from a thing's nature. When we come to 
study the theology of Karl Barth, we shall see that in his own way, and using dialectical 
philosophical language, Barth has extended Aquinas' views. He has a unique idea of 
actuality as the fulfilment of a being, seen in the 'Church Dogmatics.' 
Later, we shall see that Derrida also speaks of 'potentiality,' and actuality,' even if he does 
not make use of the precise Aristotelian language in doing so. One of the reasons why he 
does not use these two terms is because he feels that the very possibility of these terms, 
require an a priori. logocentric view of time as pure 'presence.' However, the basic 
concepts of actuality-potentiality, are not completely absent in Derrida. Derrida's 
understanding of actuality and potentiality is very different to Thomas' Christianising of 
Aristotle. In his world of pure flux or pure becoming, Derrida resists any notion of the 
actualistic closure of a being. What is meant here, is as follows. Because Derrida does not 
uphold the possibility ofa theological and creationist view of being, he does not see being 
as 'good' in the sense of each facet ofreality, enjoying a theological and philosophical 
fullness or completeness, as given to it by God. Derrida inclines towards the unification of 
actuality and potentiality. His actuality is seen in his view ofreality that is 'pure' 
differentiation,' or pure becoming. His world is one of endless traces of presences that have 
been totally assimilated into differentiation. Therefore, Derrida's world is 'always on the 
way,' there is no eschatological completeness. There cannot even be any 'proleptic' hope of 
a brighter future in the eschatological sense of the word. There is no eschatological tone in 
his philosophy, no hope of 'fulfilment.' Therefore all is 'potentiality,' nothing is 'fulfilled.' 
Closure is a logocentric illusion. This means that the thought of both Pannenberg and 
Moltmann is subject to deconstruction. 
Also, it is important, to note that with Thomas, all philosophical authenticity is to be 
identified with being as good. Recent thinkers, many of whom come from what can be 
termed a 'postmodern' perspective, argue for true authenticity, without Being. Marion and 
Emmanuel Levinas are two examples of such thinkers. 
159 
7.1.2-'SEPARA TIO' AND ITS ROLE IN THE THOMISTIC METAPHYSICS 
The most important source of Thomas' opinions of the relationships between the theoretical 
sciences, is found in his Commentary on the De Trinitate. 'ofBoethius.39 ln Thomas' 
philosophy, the foundation of all consciousness is firstly the apprehension of Being. That is to 
say, the first-level consciousness of the mind is the awareness of Being in general. This level of 
reasoning is required if one is to arrive at an awareness of Being as existing as Being, as opposed 
to an understanding of Being that is merely that of the essence or quiddity,40 of an individual 
entity. 
Recently, some attention has been given to the importance of a second operation of judgement, or 
separatio, in the metaphysics ofThomas.41 The importance of ·separatio' in the metaphysics of 
Thomas, is that it forms that part of the mental processes that allows one to study Being for its 
own sake, as Being. This is not the same as that process which enables one to study a particular 
part of being such as an individual science.42 'Separatio,' enables the intellect to conceive of 
Being as existing. This presupposes a science of metaphysics. Thomas, following Boethius 
divides the speculative sciences into three. Firstly there is natural philosophy, mathematics and 
then the so-called 'divine science,' metaphysics.43 The level and manner of the separation of the 
sciences, depends upon their involvement or lack thereof with matter and motion. For example, 
some objects of speculation depend upon matter for their existence. Here, a further subdivision 
takes place. Some sciences not only depend upon matter for their continuing existence, but also 
depend on matter for their very being."" In this category we have physics. Now there are also 
those sciences that are in some way involved in matter, but yet do not depend upon matter for 
their being, such as mathematics." Then there are those sciences that do not depend at all upon 
the physical world for their esse. For example, there are firstly those that are never found in 
matter, such as God and angels.46 There are then, those realities that although sometimes found 
'in matter' at certain times, do not depend upon matter for conception. Here Thomas is thinking 
of realities such as substance, being, potency, act etc. The science that treats these matters, is 
called 'Divine science,' or 'Metaphysics. '47 Although all the sciences, in some sense form part of 
Being, metaphysics (as a philosophical discipline, as opposed to sacred theology) has as its 
subject, Being in general. 
We need to now examine the two main intellectual operations, of the Aristotelian-Thomistic 
mind. Following the 'De Anima,' of Aristotle, Thomas suggests we have firstly the process 
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of what he terms, 'abstraction.' This is the ability to comprehend indivisibles. The second 
mental operation48 is that of'judgement,' one in which the intellect 'composes and divides,' 
by forming positive and negative affirmations. These two intellectual operations correspond 
to two different issues, in reality. The first process, abstraction, is directed towards the 
nature of a thing, and as such, is capable of a certain abstraction. This first type of operation 
is directed towards a thing's nature or essence, in order that the entity might be seen for 
what it is. This is typical of Scholastic epistemology. Before the mind can grasp, say a dog, 
the 'essence' of that dog has to appear in the mind. This takes place with the everyday 
apprehension of objects. With this type of cognition, abstraction of the mind does take 
place. The 'essence' of the dog is abstracted from all the other accidental attributes of that 
dog by the mind, even though the dog in reality does not simply appear as an 'essence.' 
According to the mind's first operation one can indeed abstract things which are not 
separated as such in reality. We do not, for example see the essence of a dog walking 
around without any accidental properties. Thus when the intelligibility of that which is 
abstracted does not depend upon any other thing with which it is united in reality, such 
abstraction can take place (a dog might appear with a cat, nevertheless it does not depend 
upon the cat, in order to be seen as a dog).49 
The second operation of the mind, judgement, is directed towards a things' 'esse.' or being 
as existence. The point is that in distinction to the first, in the case of the second operation 
(judgement), no abstraction of that which is united in reality, can take place. One entity has 
to be considered with another. This operation, 'judgement' according to Thomas, is also 
referred to as 'separatio.' In his 'Commentary on the 'De Trinitate. ·Thomas goes on to 
distinguish two further subdivisions of the first operation of the intellect (abstraction). 
These two further divisions refer to two corresponding modes of union. ' 0 To the union of 
part and whole, there is the corresponding abstraction of the whole, the abstraction of the 
universal from the particular. To union of form and matter, there corresponds the 
abstraction of the form. 
We can clearly express this threefold division of firstly abstraction, and judgement 
(separatio) by referring to Thomas' breakdown of the threefold theoretical sciences. 
'Separatio' or the process of judgement concerns itself with 'joining and dividing.' This is 
the 'joining and dividing' that does not lose sight of the whole. This second operation 
(judgement-separatio) properly belongs to metaphysics.' 1 In the first subdivision of the first 
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intellectual operation, (abstraction) we have mathematics. This is the procedure, by which 
the quiddities of things are conceived which is the abstraction from sensibles. 
Corresponding to the second subdivision of abstraction, we have the mental process of 
universal from particular, and this belongs to the science of physics and to all the sciences 
in general." However, as we have stated above, 'Separatio' as a concept, is associated with 
the first science, metaphysics. Says Wippel: 'Given, this, there is a strong reason to suggest 
that an existential judgement or a judgement of existence has some role to play in one's 
discovery of being as existing according to Thomas. ' 53 In other words, one cannot identify 
an entity's logical form as an individual, without in some sense acknowledging its existence 
as part of being as Being. 
If one apprehends individual existents in a series of judgements that correspond only to the 
senses, such judgements will arrive at a sense of Being, based only upon the material, or the 
concrete." We will hardly have arrived at an understanding of Being as Being. Thus, we 
will not be able to arrive at a conception of metaphysics, as the science of Being. Separatio, 
as a form of judgement, will be necessary, in order to supplant simple abstraction. Now 
'separatio,' is a judging operation whereby one distinguishes one thing from another by 
understanding that the one thing is not found in the other. Nevertheless, the others are not 
lost sight of. 'In short, it is a negative judgement.'" As a result of 'separatio,' one can 
assert that in order for something to be real or to be part of the Real, it does not need to be 
material or changing. One can, with 'separatio,' assert the neutral character of Being. There 
are therefore, in the sciences, two basic kinds of questions. The first knows the reason why 
an entity can be recognised as something real as being (metaphysics). In order to deal 
concretely with this first question, it is not necessary that the thing dealt with be realised as 
material or changing. The second type of question searches for the reason why a given 
entity is recognised as a certain type of being. Here, Thomas is speaking of the sciences. 
Contrary to Aristotle, what a thing is, and how a thing is, are issues not handled by the same 
portion of the intellect. 
Thomas clearly states that metaphysics is the 'first' of the sciences. This is because it deals 
with the 'causes' of all entities or what we might term, the objects of the other sciences. 
Sense knowledge has to do with particulars, but intellectual knowledge, the type with which 
metaphysics has to do, deals with the universals. Therefore the science that is most 
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intellectual, treating the most universal principles, is metaphysics. Its subject matter is 
Being, The One and Many, Potency and Act, and so on. It is in Thomas' opinion, most 
qualified to rule the others. 16 ' ... one begins the science of metaphysics with its subject, the 
notion of being in general already achieved by separatio, and then, as part of the business of 
metaphysics, one seeks for the cause or causes of that same genus, that is to say, God and 
separate substances. ' 57 Metaphysics does not presuppose the existence of the causes of its 
subject, but reasons towards the same. 
Nevertheless, although metaphysics presupposes all the other sciences, we study the other 
sciences first. 'Although divine science is by nature the first of all the sciences, with respect 
to us the other sciences came before it ... the position of this science is that it be learned after 
the natural sciences, which explain many things used by metaphysics, such as generation, 
corruption, motion and the like. It should also be learned after mathematics, because to 
know the separate substances metaphysics has to know the number and dispositions of the 
heavenly spheres and this is impossible without astronomy, which presupposes the whole of 
mathematics. Other sciences ... contribute to its fullness of perfection."' 
It is probably true to say that Aquinas' most profound contribution to philosophy, is his 
metaphysical notion of Being as Being. As in Aristotle, he proceeds from the assumption, 
that our knowledge of Being begins with the senses. When we see an entity, we can detect 
the material from which it is made and its accidental and essential nature. This all begins 
through observation. This is also the Aristotelian conception of Being as well. However, 
Aristotle together with the rest of the Greeks, did not place much account on the concept of 
'existence.' A thing's 'being,' and what it really is, are the same thing. This is taken for 
granted. Because Aristotle does not argue like a theologian, he explains the efficient cause 
of the cosmos, as the originating of motion, not the bestowal of existence. Because of his 
reading of the Bible (again Exod 3: 14), Thomas reinterprets the Aristotelian picture. The 
efficient cause of Aristotle, becomes the personal God of the Scripture, bestowing being on 
the cosmos, which means creating the cosmos. 
7.1.3-THOMAS' DERIVATION OF THE CATEGORIES 
Category theory is always important with respect to the interpretation of the Trinity. 
However, this is one area in Thomas where there is little innovation from the position of 
Aristotle.,. Because Aristotle represented the most powerful intellectual synthesis in the 
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Mediaeval world, it was desirable for Thomas to set about reconciling the philosopher with 
Christianity. Thomas' basic distinction is between those beings that exist in their own right 
and those that need something else, in order to exist. The former entity is substance, and the 
latter is accidental. Although being is used in different senses, substance, is the primary 
referent to Being. 'For the subject of divine science or first philosophy is being; and 
changeable substance, which the natural scientist considers, and also quantity, which the 
mathematician considers, are parts ofbeing ... Now being is primarily divided into potency 
and act, one and many, substance and accident. ' 60 'Although the universal and particular 
exist in every genus, ( ... licet universa/e et particu/are inveniantur in omnibus generibus) 
nevertheless, in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance 
(tamen specia/i quodam modo individuum invenitur in genere substantiae). For substance is 
individualised by itself; whereas the accidents are individualised by the subject, (Substantia 
enim individuatur per seipsam, sed accidentia individuantur per subiectum) which is the 
substance, since this particular whiteness is called this, because it exists in this particular 
subject. ' 61 
Together with Aristotle, Thomas argues that substance has a stronger claim on Being than 
anything else. This is because a substance exists per se, in its own right. 62 Different modes 
of Being can be described in different ways. The first class has the weakest claim on Being, 
and exists only in the order of thought, i.e., negations and privations.63 Slightly up the 
ladder, we have a similar type of existent: generation, corruption and motion. These also in 
a sense, deal with a type of negation and privation. Thirdly, we have those accidental 
properties, that although participating in being, do not do so in their own right. Wippel 
suggests°' that the metaphysical doctrine of substance/accident in Aquinas, has its roots in a 
study oft.he natural world.6' This means that in metaphysics, Thomas takes what he sees to 
be already established in physics. 
However, in his commentary on the metaphysics of Aristotle,66 Thomas states that in 
establishing the distinction between matter and form, the substantial and the accidental, 
Aristotle appeals to the logical order of nature, not motion. So although there is this close 
affinity between physics and metaphysics, Thomas clearly appeals to the order of 
predication logic for his metaphysical system, not the powers of observation. Logic and first 
philosophy have this in common, they are sufficiently removed from the observable world 
of particular beings, enabling them to use more 'theoretical' principles. 
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In other words, when Thomas speaks about the different modes of being, he uses 
predicational logic to explain his system, not motion (change), or natural philosophy. 
Metaphysics is the employment of a logical technique, that of different types of predication. 
Thus for categorical or metaphysical judgements to be true, they must be logically 
consistent. We can arrive at true knowledge of the world, by a purely intellectual principle: 
the major ways in which predicates are affirmed of a subject. This same mentality is and has 
been applied to the doctrine of the Trinity, by Augustine, Aquinas and others. From this 
point, Thomas proceeds to uphold the same ten categories as Aristotle. 67 In our opinion, 
Thomas is not far from Kant here. Both thinkers uphold the priority of the mind in the 
categorisation of the world. The only difference is that Kant would not share Thomas' 
realism in the matter. In the case of Kant, because the mind interprets the thing-in-itself in 
this manner, this does not imply in every case that the thing-in-itself is really like this in the 
phenomenal world.6' Furthermore, Kant denied the concept of existence, as a predicate. 
The 'categories' in Thomas reflect the logic of the mind as it apprehends and understands, 
mostly, sensible things (ontology) As we shall see, in the next section, the Prodan\ 
Dionysian element in Thomas influenced his beliefs concerning the 'Transcendentals,' 
(henology) which are those elements of reality beyond the sensible. These cannot be 
discussed and understood, in the way we understand the categories. Thus a tension develops 
between these two dimensions. 
7.2-THOMAS AND NEOPLATONISM 
All the established interpreters of Thomas uphold the synthesis of Aristotle and Plato, in his 
thought. However, among Aquinas' interpreters it is not quite so clear exactly how, in this 
unique synthesis of 'Thomism,' this interaction takes place. Furthermore, many 
commentators continue to 'baptise' Thomas into a particular cause, philosophical or 
ecclesiastical. Yet, many of the more recent students of Thomas, express the desire to go 
beyond these various 'Thomisms,' in order to arrive at the 'real Thomas.' An accomplished 
scholar in this tradition is Wayne Hankey who has published several substantial articles and 
a book on these issues.69 Needless to say one's viewpoint of the type ofNeoplatonism and 
Aristotelianism in Thomas, will have a substantial role to play in the overall evaluation of 
his work. This means that our interest in the traditions of Aristotle and Neoplatonism, with 
reference to the theme of this thesis, go beyond merely introductions. We have up to now, 
already attempted to trace certain tensions between Aristotle and Neoplatonism, as each 
respective tradition has been synthesised into mainstream Christian thought. 
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There are two issues at stake. Firstly, how has Aristotle been synthesised with 
Neoplatonism, and secondly, what particular schools ofNeoplatonism are at work in 
Thomas' texts0 We have already roughly familiarised ourselves with the school of 
Neoplatonism with which Augustine worked. Augustine does not give us precise 
information about what he read, but it has been shown that he was influenced by Plotinus, 
through the mediation of Porphyry, and Victorinus.70 Although Thomas was not entirely 
unfamiliar with this tradition, he certainly did not read Plotinus himself. 71 Hankey has 
identified the importance of Proclus's 'Elements of Theology,' for the understanding of the 
Neoplatonism in Thomasn However, for some time the Neoplatonism (particularly that of 
the Arab philosophers) in Thomas was suppressed by certain official Catholic interpreters 
of Thomas, in order to concentrate on Thomas' Aristotelianism-" 
Yet the recent revival of an appreciation of Thomas' Neoplatonism, has been partly due to 
the current receptivity towards negative theologies. Many today are wishing to produce a 
Thomistic henology, thus undermining or replacing Thomas' strictly ontological 
metaphysics.74 In Thomas, we have both the Neoplatonic strains of an 'ontological' and 
well as a 'henological' approach to metaphysics. The ontological perspective, places store 
upon the traditional view of substance and essentialism, the language of Being and closure. 
The henological strand, stemming from an appreciation of the One as the source of unity 
beyond Being, adopts a fur more 'open plan,' when it comes to philosophy. 
These two strands in Neoplatonism arose when Plotinus' followers differed over how to 
interpret his system. There is firstly, Porphyrian Neoplatonism and then there is the 
lamblichan-Proclan tradition-" Augustine reflected the Porphyrian appreciation of Being, 
and his identification of this term by the infinitive 'einai, ·or 'esse, ·in Latin. 76 Hankey 
suggests that the tradition in Christian scholasticism, (together with Victorinus and 
Augustine) of the identification of God and Being, is not merely based on the interpretation 
and influence of Ex 3: 14, as some of the traditional interpreters of Thomas have pointed 
out. Thomas' philosophy of 'Esse' is not as uniquely Christian as previously argued-" It has 
been commonly suggested that it was due to Exodus 3: 14, that Thomas derived his 
Christian 'Existentialism,' as opposed to Aristotle's 'Essentialism.' The fact is, as Hankey 
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has shown in his various publications, that Thomas' identification of God and Being, is 
N 1 . " eop atomc. 
There is the same tension in Thomas, as there is in Augustine and Arius. This is the tension 
that arrives with the employment of two systems of philosophy: the one open to deferral, 
the other not. Porphyry identified the Father with Being, in his triad of Being, Life and 
Thought. 79 In doing this, Porphyry telescoped the three hypostases of Plotinus, providing 
little place for the One beyond Being. Nevertheless this Porphyrian conception of the God 
as 'einai. ·adopted by Aquinas, is not precisely the same as the Aristotelian version of the 
term.80 It is the conception of God as a transcendent Being," an activity without a predicate, 
a simplicity beyond the distinction between essence and existence.82 This is because 
Thomas, in his conception of God, is influenced by both the school of Porphyry and that of 
lamblichus. In ascribing to the being of God, the principle of radical transcendence, Thomas 
reflects the school of Iamblichus and Proclus, who strongly react against Porphyry's 
reducing the transcendence of the One. To some extent, Thomas then overcomes the 
Plotinian duality between the One as beyond Being and the Being itself (/'lous). Yet, in our 
opinion, the tensions between closure (Porphyry's school) and deferral (Iamblichus\Proclus 
school) remain. 'Following Dionysius (and Scotus Eriugena), St. Thomas inserts the 
speculative dialectics ofNeoplatonism in Christian monotheism ... Wherefore, unlike 
Plotinus and Proclus, he places Being directly in God himself and he makes being the very 
constituent of the divine essence. Therefore the Plotinian duality of One (good) and Being 
as two diverse and separate essences is completely abandoned. God is not only the Unum et 
Bonum but also the lpsum Esse ... ' 83 Scholars such as Fabro and Hankey have therefore 
shown that the conception of esse in Thomas cannot be reduced to Exodus or Aristotle. It is 
Neoplatonic. 
7.2.1-PROCLUS OF ATHENS 
What comes to Thomas from the tradition oflamblichus, is partly the translation of Proclus' 
'Elements of Theology,' by William of Moerbeke. This is evident in the reading of 
Thomas' commentary on the 'Liber De Causis.' 84 The other important source is Thomas' 
reading ofDionysius' 'Divine Names.'" Proclus' system proceeds thus. First, there is the 
One from which proceed the 'henads.' From the 'henads,' in tum, emanates the sphere of 
Nous, which subdivides into the Proclan triad of Being-Life and Thought. From Nous, we 
have Soul, dividing into divine souls, demonic souls, and human souls. Proclus also claims 
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that the One is utterly transcendent, beyond thought and all being. It is ineffable.86 In his 
commentary on the Platonic 'Parmenides,' Proclus argues that the One is beyond being and 
existence. 07 We have a similar line of argumentation in the 'Elements.' 'For if all things 
which exist desire their Good, it is evident that the primal Good is beyond the things which 
exist ... The primal Good, then, is nothing else but Good. Add to it some other character; and 
by the addition you have diminished its goodness, changing it from the Good unqualified to 
a particular good.' 88 'For what else is self-sufficient than that which has its good from and 
in itself? And this means that it is indeed fulfilled with goodness, and participates in good, 
but is not the unqualified Good itself: for the latter, as has been shown (prop 8), transcends 
participation and fulfilment ... ' 89 
The Platonists asserted that the One and the good are the most general principles 
(communissimum). They are even more general than 'Being.' Also in the Platonic view, 
Being is the first amongst created things.90 Thomas is also concerned forthat which is the 
first and the most general. With him, the principles that are first are the transcendenha, 
which transcend the categories as they go through all the predicaments. The categories are 
the categories of Being. However, the term: Being which applies to everything and anything 
in all the categories, cannot be associated or be one of the categories. Being itself, in a 
certain sense, transcends the categories and so Being is a transcendental term. 
For Thomas the first of the transcendentals are Being, One, and good. They are the first not 
because they cause all things-or because they are those from which others emanate, but 
because they are first in the order of knowledge. Plotinus asserted that the 'One' from 
which all things descend, is not found in all things, as the one and good in Thomas. The 
good in Proclan Neoplatonism is beyond ontology, but Thomas asserts the ontological 
character of the transcendentals. They are the general properties ofBeing.91 
Thomas criticises Proclan Neoplatonism, not only with respect to the nature of its 
transcendence but also with respect to the order of the transcendentals. He rejects the idea 
that the One is prior to Being (Nous).n Plotinus, Iamblichus and Proclus posit the One 
(good) as first, metaphysically. That is to say their priority is a metaphysical one. Thomas 
posits Being first, conceptually. Thomas, unlike the former, has a cognitive approach to 
priority here. Being is therefore the first and most general. In the order of the 
transcendentals the One comes immediately after being. As we have seen, in Thomas, 
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'Being' and 'One' are convertible. Thomas, here is being an Aristotelian, not a Platonist. He will 
not place the One before Being, as he rejects the Platonic idea of subsisting Forms ofnatural 
things 
Up to now we have been speaking about Thomas' metaphysics, not his view of God. God is not 
the subject of Thomistic metaphysics, except insofar as he is the cause of being as being. 
Although Dionysius names 'One,' as one of the names of God, Thomas pays no attention to this. 
An important name for God, according to Thomas however, is Being. Because Being is the most 
transcendent concept, it can be ideally used as a name of God. Thomas is well aware of the fact 
that Proclus calls God beyond Being, and he was certainly somewhat appreciative of what 
Proclus was trying to get at. He discussed the 123'• proposition of Proclus concerning the 
ineffabilityofGod.93 Even though Thomas does not call God 'Beyond Being,' with Augustine, he 
ascribes to God the quality of transcendence, recognising the negative character of God. God's 
essence remains hidden from man, which to our minds does in some sense ascribe to God a 
transcendence that implies God as beyond Being! 'In truth, the first cause is beyond Being insofar 
as it is infinite being (esse). "Being" (ens), however is called that which participates in being 
(esse) in a finite way; and this is proportionate to our intellect. Therefore that alone is attainable 
by our intellect, which has an essence that participates in being. God's essence, however, is Being 
itself(ipsum esse). Therefore it is beyond the intellect.'94 Thomas' idea of God as Being, does 
therefore capitulate somewhat to the Neoplatonic model. The doctrine of the ineffability of God 
in Thomas is Proclan. We can only know God through his effects and thus inadequately." God 
alone is being per essiam. All the rest of created entities retain being through participation. In 
their being they are dependent upon the first principle. 
Furthermore, Thomas also adopted the formalising spirit to be found in Proclus. The greatest fruit 
of this spirit in him is to be seen in the 'Summa Theologiae.' The Summa is a formalised system, 
maintaining a specific movement. It is a study of God in himself as principle and end, and it can 
be unified under one formal consideration in order to produce a science. The work looks at all 
realities, from God's perspective. We start with God, and we move backwards again to God.96 
There is precisely the same movement in Barth in an even more powerful synthesis. 
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7.3-THE DIFFERENTIATION BETWEEN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 
Thomas clearly outlines his position on the nature of theology (Sacra Doctrine), in the first 
part of the 'Summa Theologica. '91 We need to view the ten articles concerning the nature of 
Sacred Doctrine, in the light of the first article: 'Whether, besides philosophy, any further 
doctrine is required'' Thomas accepts that the human mind must not go beyond its ability. 
Furthermore, (Objection 2) the philosophical disciplines, since they are about all being and 
even God according to the Philosopher, encompass all man needs to know (Sed de omnibus 
entibus tractatur in philosophicus disciplinis, et etiam de Deo: unde quaedam pars 
philosophie dicitur theologia. sive scientia divina, ut patet per Philosophum in VI 
Meraphys). 98 Therefore it seems that theology as such is not needed. On the contrary, it is 
written that God has provided man with divine revelation. Therefore some doctrine does 
exist above and beyond the philosophical disciplines.99 God has ordained man to an ultimate 
end that goes beyond reason (Isa 64:4). If man is to attain this goal, he must know both the 
goal itself and the way to it.100 Now any theology, according to Thomas is knowledge about 
God. Therefore, philosophy to a limited extent, speaks about God (Natural theology). 101 
Sacra Doctrine however, is different to philosophy, in that it covers the revelation of God. 
The principles of sacred doctrine are not the principles, the divisions and methods of 
scholastic philosophy. In Thomas, the principles of Sacred Doctrine are those provided by 
God in the Bible. Nevertheless is sacred doctrine a science? Thomas answers yes, as it is 
like all other sciences, knowledge through causes. 102 Nevertheless this knowledge, which 
proceeds through deductions made from the principles of revelation, is subalternated to the 
principles themselves. Furthermore, it is a science because sacred doctrine, like philosophy 
is rational, consistent and coherent. 103 
This coherence does not mean that we can know God exhaustively. Since we cannot know 
God in himself, our knowledge of him is provisional, and is to be expressed in metaphorical 
language. 104 Therefore, in Thomas' conception of theology (sacred doctrine) as a science, 
two opposing components fit uneasily together. Firstly, there are the prior principles of 
revelation, upon which the entire discipline is based. In fact Thomas claims that these 
principles alone are true sacred doctrine. Then (as with any science), there are the 
deductions and arguments that arise from these principles. Because these arguments are not 
synonymous with revelation, in a certain sense, they are not synonymous with sacred 
doctrine. '0' Yet in another sense, they are. The problem here is where do we draw the line? 
At what point do we state that revelation in scripture is no longer 'pure' sacred doctrine, but 
170 
the scientific deductions from first principles? Thomas might call theology (the principles 
of revelation) 'superior' to philosophy (the principles of reason). At the same time however, 
theology 'needs' philosophy 'Among the inquiries that we must undertake concerning God 
in himself, we must set down in the beginning that whereby his existence is demonstrated, 
as the necessary foundation of the whole work. For if we do not demonstrate that God 
exists, all consideration of divine things is necessarily destroyed. ' 106 'The demonstration of 
God's existence is the necessary foundation of the whole of theology ... the proof provides 
evidence that the subject of theological science exists in contradistinction to knowledge of 
the nature of its subject.' '°7 It seems that what Thomas is saying here is that, in order for 
theology to exist, philosophy has to firstly provide the justification for that existence. 
Sacred doctrine presupposes metaphysics in order that God's revelation be intelligible. 
7.4-HEIDEGGER'S READING OF THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF BEING 
It is impossible to interact with Thomas at this current time, without some reference to 
Heidegger, even if the opportunity for a detailed reading is not presented here. However, the 
subject matter under discussion in this thesis also requires that even if briefly, we consider 
this important contributor to the debate. 
It is universally recognised that both Heidegger and Thomas were both philosophers of 
Being par excellence. That is to say, they were philosophers that concerned themselves with 
the problem of Being as being albeit in radically different ways. Of course all of Western 
philosophy is concerned with Being. After all are we not the children of the Greeks? Yet 
this is not what we mean when we say that Thomas and Heidegger were philosophers who 
concerned themselves with Being. On the contrary, both of them isolated the issue of Being 
as Being. Furthermore, in our own methodological weaving in guiding our thesis towards 
our concluding section on Derrida, the question is: What line do we draw in our movement 
from Plato, through Aristotle, Aquinas, Barth to Derrida? How do we justify this? Does 
Derrida really interact with these individuals? To be sure, in one sense, Derrida fits in with 
all of the West as deconstruction has to do the with reading of the language of the West. 
However, in what way do we trace a line from Aquinas to Derrida? Anticipating our 
conclusion, we answer by saying that Derrida as a specific commentator on Western 
ontology is tracing his path partly via Heidegger. 
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It has been clearly seen that our thesis in a certain sense deals with the language of Being. 
This is the language of substance and participation. Within these two terms lie most of the 
paradoxes and tensions that Heidegger, Derrida and others bring out. Theologically, we 
have tried to illustrate these paradoxes, with our specific focus on the Trinity: a construct of 
openness and closedness. Substance speaks of the closedness of particular things or beings, 
whilst participation concerns itself with the integration of these beings into the whole, 
Being itself 
In Platonism Being is reduced to unity, in Aristotle, it is substance. Gilson states that his 
admiration for Thomas lies in the fact that Thomas sees Being for what it is. This is Being 
as Being. It seems that in Western thought Being in general is always being reduced to 
some kind of closure, some being in particular (ousia, eidos. Gegenstand, Begriff actus 
actualitas). Gilson and other supporters of Thomas, believe that in his appreciation of the 
'existential' notion of Being, Thomas has escaped the Heideggerian critique of Being. ' 0' As 
we proceed we will examine this question further. 
Heidegger is important because firstly, as a historical commentator he also observed the 
reduction of Being in general to a particular being. Being has fallen into Seinsvergessenheit. 
As far as Heidegger is concerned the history of metaphysics is a history of how Being was 
and is perceived, if not always consciously. Thomas thought of Being in the naive sense of 
reducing it to the natural attitude of the mind, part of the perception of'Judgement.' 
Heidegger and Derrida take issue with Thomas here. Being is not just a 'natural way in 
which the mind thinks.' Being is the way the mind has been forced to think because of a 
certain metaphysical tradition. Here Thomas does not fully appreciate his 'tradition. ''09 
With the scholastics, existence is actualitas, but actualitas is related to agere, the act that 
brings something to be. Esse, is impressed upon essence, in order to bring it to be, to bring 
it forth as a being. Essence is the look which the thing to be produced has. Existence is 
actually being brought forth. 
Of course, Heidegger and Derrida do not only perceive their work as the need to understand 
the difference between Being and beings, their role is far more radical: what makes us 
desire to make the distinction in the first place? The question is not; what is Being? But why 
have Being at all? Even in his existential metaphysics, Thomas instead of moving through 
the idea of Being, still focuses on it. 
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Heidegger and Marion are looking for a 'God without Being.' Marion summarises the 
Heideggerian position as follows: 'We will ask then, if theology does not have "God" for its 
exclusive formal object, how, vis-a-vis theology, can theology be defined' Heidegger gives 
theology as such a precise and-to our knowledge-never retracted defmition: "Theology as 
the interpretation of the. divine word of revelation," or, which here amounts to the same 
thing, "interpretation of man's Being toward God." Theology does not therefore have to do 
with "God," in whatever sense one understands him. It has to do with the fact of faith in the 
crucified, a fact that only faith receives and conceives: it secures its scientificity only by 
fixing itself on the positive fact of faith, namely, the relation of the believer to the Crucified. 
Theology does not elaborate the science of "God," but the "science of faith," and only then 
the science of the object of faith, in the strict sense that this object is only elaborated in faith 
as "believing comportment.'" i rn 
Heidegger's criticism of the Scholastic notion 111 of esse-essentia is spread over a number of 
his works, proceeding roughly in line with the development of the earlier to the later 
Heidegger. The earlier, less radical criticism is found particularly in 'Die Gnmdprobleme 
der Phanomenologie,' and to some extent 'Being and Time.' The early phase treats the 
question of Being from the perspective of phenomenology. The later Heidegger is 
represented by the Nietzsche lectures of 1943, where the phenomenological perspective has 
waned and has been replaced by a view of being, as synonymous with the idea of unfolding 
'presence,' or aletheia. 
Once oriented into Heidegger's writings one is immediately aware of the post-Kantian 
nature of his thought, and the influence of the phenomenology of Husserl. Heidegger, 
however, accuses Husserl of 'reductionism,' particularly in his (Husserl's) work: 'The 
origins of Geometry.' Heidegger's task was to interpret Being in general in a way radically 
different to the scholastics, who tended to understand the term as pure abstraction. 112 
Heidegger views the scholastic 'existence,' as something not really independent as a 
concept in itself, but dependent upon the prior essence. The Heidegger in 1928, standing in 
Husserl's shadow, views the scholastic problem as failing to interpret the concepts of 
existence and essence, in the light of their origins in human experience. On this account, 
scholasticism as a school of realism, is pure objectivism. It fails to appreciate the role of the 
human mind in the bringing about the production (herstellen) of these terms. 113 In 
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Heidegger's mind, the scholastics ascribe these terms to the meaning of Being, what Being 
is chiefly made up of 
Heidegger argues for the basic nature of terms such as essence-existence, as 'produced,' by 
those who use these terms, as well as other terms that make up the theoretical description of 
Being. 114 Caputo shows how Heidegger locates the origins of the meaning of 
'essence\existence,' by way of a reference to productivity. For example in Greek ontology 
the concept of morphe signifies a structure (morphology). This is not only the structure of 
the 'shape' of a thing, but also the phenomenological sense which gives rise to the 'look of 
a thing.''" Yet the form is imposed on a thing, only to bring out a certain look. 116 Heidegger 
believes that Aquinas works within this paradigm. He proceeds firstly from the idea of what 
a being must be like 'conceptually,' in order to know it at all. This doctrine is seen for 
example, in Aquinas' view of the categories of Aristotle. 
According to Heidegger, the Greeks think in these terms not as perception, but in the sense 
of 'bringing forth,' 'producing.' We can illustrate this with the Platonic view of the creator, 
referred to, earlier. The creator or 'demiurge,' creates according to a certain eidos, a certain 
model. The eidos is that thing from which the creation is formed. Now to produce, is to 'put 
in place' (her-stellen). It means to bring or to 'place' something 'here,' so that the produced 
being 'stands for itself' Therefore, in our opinion in Thomas, essentia is prior to esse. That 
is to say, when a being is said to exist, the existence is merely added to the prior intelligible 
form of that being. 'That a thing is,' is added to 'How a thing must be, to be.' 
Heidegger's critique of the medieval and early Greek type of reflection is that it focuses on 
this speculative Being, in such a way that the world is reduced to 'thing-ness' and the self to 
a speculative subject.117 lt merely sees Being as the 'objective presence' (Anwesenheit), 
without appreciating Being as Dasein. Every being is composed of essence-existence only if 
the proper Being of every being is to be something objectivised, or brought forth, produced. 
But can the Being of Dasein, be reduced to these categories? When Heidegger states that 
Being has been 'forgotten, '(vergessen) he does not mean that Dasein is not longer there, 
that it is no longer existent, with those who do not recognise it. It is there as the true pre-
ontological, (vorontologisch) ontological nature of the world. Without Dasein, there can be 
no understanding of objective realities. However, this dimension, is just not acknowledged. 
Like every objectivism, this is naivete. It is a forgetfulness of the subject and the life-world 
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that brings objectivism about. Dasein, is not a thing, (res) it is not essence or existence. 
Neither is it a 'whatness' (Washeit). Dasein is not an instance ofa universal species, but a 
uniquely existing individualm. Accordingly Dasein itself supplies the horizon from which 
Being itself in scholastic metaphysics, is interpreted. The scholastics remain solely on the 
one side of the ontological difference, that of conceptualisation. 119 They do not arise above 
the conception of Being as Vorhandensein to question Being itself in its manifold sense. It 
has not ascended to Being itself in its manifold sense. 
In Plato, Being is the presence that abides (ousia) not in the individual thing, but in the 
Forms. With Aristotle, being is distinguished between the primary and secondary sense of 
entities. Existence in Aristotle is taken for granted. The concept of'existence' is added to 
form. Heidegger states that in Plato and Aristotle, we have the inauguration of 
essence\existence. Essentia is the possibility of what is to be made. Existentia is the 
actuality of what has been posited outside of its potency. 
By the time of the Nietzsche lectures, (1941) Heidegger had thrown off much of the 
influence of phenomenology. In his continuing critique of the scholastic essence\existence, 
Heidegger views the role of Being in Greek philosophy slightly differently. As in 1927, he 
still traces the distinction between essence\existence to Plato and Aristotle. The difference is 
that now, the original essence of Being is the process of the emergence of 'aletheia.' The 
Greeks saw Being as the process of emerging into 'presence,' and abidingthere. 120 The 
ultimate conclusion of' Being and Time' is that Being is time, in the sense that Being is 
projected upon time in as much as temporality constitutes the Being of Dasein. m 
There is much in what Heidegger says that is relevant to our specific discussion of the idea 
of substance and participation. Later, in our chapter on Derrida we shall return to some 
further discussion of Heidegger. Up to this point we have seen that various tensions exist, 
when these terms (substance and participation) together with their philosophical language 
are applied to God as Trinity. Part of the tension, is the unavoidable duality that emerges as 
soon as we speak of abstraction, (God as a person) as the separating of a being, from Being 
itself or the Whole, however this is interpreted (the unity of the Godhead). The conception 
of the Whole crops up everywhere. We find it, in Godel's set theory, for example. 'U,' the 
universal class which is not a member of any class but which contains every set (sets are 
members; classes that are not sets are not). 122 We find it with the idea of Plato's 'good,' and 
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Aristotle and Aquinas' Being Qua Being. We also, of course, find it in Plotinus' mystical 'One,' 
and Heidegger's Dasein. The inevitable problem with such a reality lies in its role in upholding 
the order in the universe. In seeking to uphold metaphysical order, or the Whole, in order to really 
'be,' the Whole, has to be apart from it (ontological Deism). The Whole has to be conceptualised 
in categories of the 'Beyond.' Thus it becomes difficult to explain how the Whole can be related 
to the cosmos at all. This problem is particularly pronounced when the One is interpreted in such 
a radical, transcendent sense, as in the Neoplatonic tradition. 
7.4.1-THE LEGITIMACY OF HEIDEGGER'S READING OF AOUINAS 
Heidegger's reading of the Western tradition, (particularly the scholastics) does not solve the 
problem, with which this thesis is concerned. On the contrary, his reading merely relocates it. 
Particularly in his early distinction between Being and beings, Heidegger continues to operate 
within the dualistic framework of ontological 'part' and 'whole.' Admittedly, his conception of 
Dasein is radically different to all the 'Wholes,' that have gone before. The order of Plato is now 
reversed. True Being is now relocated to the world of the becoming of the human being. Again, 
the problem is reversed, but remains the same: Dasein is somehow 'ontologically' prior to 
objective, intellectual experience. It thus does not fully escape the description of ousia, albeit in a 
radical new sense. Furthermore, when it comes to precisely explaining how individual cognition 
'participates' in the experience of Dasein, Heidegger's exposition is not convincing. This is 
because the very existence, the very definition of Dasein as a concept, depends upon its radical 
'otherness,' from human intellectual experience in the normal sense. 
While we accept Heidegger's call to appreciate the role of the non-cognitive experience of the 
human being in the world as a contributing factor to cognition, our problem lies with any 
conception of a 'pre-ontological' understanding. Here Heidegger himself is being 'naive.' There 
is no such thing as a 'pre-ontological' experience, or 'pre-intellectual' world of mystical 
'innocence,' to which we together with Rousseau must return. 
In addition, Caputo argues that Heidegger does not completely succeed in his reading of 
Thomas. 123 He suggests that although Aquinas does conceive of essence\existence within the 
schema of cognitive objectivism, his view of esse cannot be simply reduced to the idea of a 
'production,' of the subject, despite his upholding of the idea of creation. When 
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Aquinas speaks of esse, he does so according to an order of actuality that goes beyond 
simply that of 'matter' and 'fonn.' As we have seen, Aquinas speaks of an act of esse which 
is not a form but the simple act of being itself."' 
7.5-THOMAS ON THE TRINITY 
In turning to Thomas on the Trinity, we firstly point out that his writings on the subject are 
far more systematic than the 'De Trinitate,' of Augustine, although he does stand in the 
Augustinian tradition. Furthennore, Thomas covers the subject in various ways, scattered 
over many of his works. Two texts however, are especially important. These are his 
commentary on the 'Sentences' of Peter Lombard, and the 'Summa Theologica.' 
The precise structure and purpose of these two works, together with their historical context 
are not as controversially determinative upon their actual content, as the 'De Trinitate ' of 
Augustine is. Aquinas is operating in what he sees as a set tradition. Therefore, in the case 
of Thomas, we will not be spending as much time with these textual issues as we did with 
Augustine (or for that matter, Arius). 
7.5.1-THE TRINITY AND EPISTEMOLOGY WITHIN THE LATE THIRTEENTH 
AND FOURTEENTH CENTURY DEBATES 
The various debates surrounding the doctrine of the Trinity from the end of the Thirteenth 
Century to the Fourteenth, not only reflect the general developments in scholastic thought, 
but also the problematic relationship between theology and philosophy."' The issues of this 
basic debate were foundational to the cultural and philosophical changes taking place in a 
sweeping movement, from the Thirteenth Century to the end of the Fourteenth. By the time 
of Aquinas, a certain 'philosophy' or metaphysical conventionalism had become so 
entrenched in the theological system known as scholasticism, that it had become decidedly 
difficult to conceive of a theology without Aristotle. Yet having said this the ironic issue 
was that, increasingly so towards the end of the Fourteenth Century, the scholastics became 
fully aware of the tension between Aristotle and the Bible. Yet to give up either, meant 
giving up being a theologian. The parameters were thus set. The question was how to live 
with the tension-"' This tension was compounded as ahnost all the scholastics accepted, 
with Roger of Holcot that all truths were compatible with other truths. 127 ln Thomas' case at 
the end of the Thirteenth Century, the issues were not seen to be too much of a problem, as 
he was happy to uphold the distinct worlds of 'theology' and 'philosophy.' However, as we 
have seen, the tension is certainly there in Thomas, as this 'division' was not quite as 
straightforward as he made out. 
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Gelber points out that during the classical period of medieval scholasticism, epistemological 
issues and distinctions were employed as a means to solve the logical problem of the 
Trinity. It was not that the incomprehensible was to be made comprehensible, but rather that 
the attempt should be taken towards conceptual approximation! The language is far more 
sophisticated than that of Augustine, and reflects great ingenuity. The two important 
examples of the Via Antiqua are Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. 128 In his lectures on the 
'Sentences,' Bonaventure speaks of three models of diversity. 129 Firstly we have the 
occurrence of diversity through a diverse mode of being (modum essendi). This type of 
diversity does not occur in the person of God, as it is an essential diversity. Secondly we 
have diversity through the understanding (modum intelligendi). This type is the diversity 
that the mind appreciates. The divine attributes fall into this type of diversity, as although 
the essence of the divine person is one, the attributes differ in their cognitive meaning. 
Thirdly, we have the diverse mode of reference (modum se habendi). This type sits in 
between the other two types. It is less than the diverse modes of being, but amounts to more 
than the diverse modes of understanding. A diverse mode of being entails a true essential 
distinction, which this type does not. However, the diverse mode of understanding involves 
no real distinction in that which is understood. The third mode of diversity, (modum se 
habendi) involves both unity and plurality, unity with respect to absolute nature, but 
plurality as far as being related to each other. 130 It is with respect to this third mode of 
differentiation, that we talk of the three persons, as distinct within the divine essence. 
Aquinas also explains the distinctions in God, in his own 'Commentary on the Sentences' 
(1254-1256). 131 Together with Bonaventure and orthodoxy, he asserts that all the attributes 
and persons in God, are not diverse but one and the same thing. Again, he also moves into 
the realm of the phenomenological mind, to explain the unity of God and therefore reflects 
an encapsulation that was probably already a tendency in Augustine. The differentiation is 
to be attributed to the meanings of these attributes, (ratio) not only with respect to the 
human mind, but even within the divine essence itself. This prevents the unity and the 
simplicity of God being prejudiced by the plurality of the attributes as they are only plural 
to ratio or reason. 132 
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When Thomas speaks about the intellectual understanding of the triune God, the meaning 
that he ascribes to the term ratio, is of importance. Ratio, is the defining signification of a 
noun. 'If a noun can be properly defined, then the ratio of that term is its definition. ' 133 But 
the term ratio has a wider definition than just the signification of a noun, as not all terms 
have proper definitions, but yet what they actually signify are still apprehended by the 
intellect. Ratio, is therefore 'a term of second imposition, that is it is a symbol of a 
conventional grouping of words whose donation is not determined by a single concept or 
act of understanding, but by convention and by enumerating the particular things they 
denote.' 134 Thus ratio does not signify any given mental conception (such as 'wisdom' 
whicb is a first imposition). Rather ratio signifies the meaning of a given mental concept. 
'goodness' would be a term of first imposition, ratio as a term of second imposition, covers 
instead the meaning of goodness. It is possible for many terms to signify the same reality 
(for example, goodness and other synonyms, meaning the same thing). At the same time the 
intellect can also have diverse apprehensions or rationes of these meanings. 
There are different ways in which a mental concept is related to that which it signifies. 
There is a certain continuity between the sign in the soul and the thing signified. This causes 
the intellect to understand the entity in its true manner. 135 The noun signifying this type of 
entity would be that of first intention, because of the similarity between the sign and the 
signified. Secondly, a mental conception might be one of 'second intention.' This means 
that the conception, unlike the first type, does not have an exact similitude to the thing 
signified, but aligns itself with the 'mode of the understanding of that reality,' such as the 
genus, or the class to which it belongs. Such a conception, depends on the first order 
imposition, as it is one step removed from the entity or object. Thirdly, a mental concept 
might have no foundation in external reality, and thus would be a false conception. 
Now in Thomas' epistemology, a ratio in signifying the meaning ofa certain mental 
conception, is in a certain sense, related to external reality in the same sense that its concept 
is, ifthat concept is a similar to the object perceived. Because God's being exceeds man's 
understanding, man has a plurality of apprehensions about the divine perfections. This is 
because the human mind cannot understand the being of God in one mental conception. 
Thus because there are diverse conceptions about God, there are also diverse ratios that 
man has about God. These terms are not synonyms because they speak of different rationes 
and conceptions about God. 136 These rationes are not only the product of the mind, they do 
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indeed correspond to something in God. In Thomas's Trinitarian 'lexicon of signification,' 
this is not a correspondence to any plurality in God, but to the fullness of his perfection. 
The essence, properties and persons do not differ when it comes to their esse. as they are all 
one thing. Nevertheless they have different rationes. These rationes differ also with respect 
to each other. The ratio of property and the ratio of person differ as the rationes of diverse 
genera, because the categories of relation and of substance are applicable to God. The ratio 
of property and the ratio of person differ as the rationes of abstract and of concrete, within 
the same genus .137 However, it is important to note that there is a greater rational distinction 
between the rationes of essence and of the properties or relations of the persons, than that 
which exists between the rationes of the persons and their personal properties. 
Now having reproduced Thomas thus far, it seems that there is a definite diminishing of the 
ontological persons in themselves within the Godhead, to the mere status of 
phenomenological cognition. As far as Thomas is concerned this is not the case. Indeed, the 
'Summa Theologica,' clearly articulates real distinctions between the persons. In his 
'Commentary on the Sentences,' Thomas seems to be saying that before the real 
distinctions between the persons can be appreciated, there has to be some specific 
differentiating capacity of the mind, enabling it to appreciate the distinctions between the 
persons. Yet, there are tensions. Like Bonaventure, Thomas says that compared to the 
essence, relation is only distinct as ratione, yet when compared to its correlative opposite, it 
gives rise to a real distinction. 138 
7.5.2-RELATIONS 
In the Thirteenth and early Fourteenth Centuries thinkers argued for different theories 
concerning the ontological status ofrelations. We have briefly seen that in trying to solve 
the logical problem of the Trinity, the theologians of the High Middle Ages, centred on the 
inter-Trinitarian relations of the persons. These relations were discussed with regard to their 
relation to the human mind. That is to say, the schoolmen chose this particular aspect of 
'relations,' rather than some other dimension to the doctrine of the Trinity, such as the 
natures, or 'substances' of the persons. As we have seen in Aristotle, 'relation,' is one ofthe 
weakest of the categories, as it does not indicate anything 'behind' it, i.e. the substance 
upon which it is based. Instead the relation indicates how that substance, relates to, or in a 
sense 'participates,' towards another substance. Yet starting with Augustine, but particularly 
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developed in Thomas, the category of 'relation' in Aristotle, becomes the supreme 
ontological, Trinitarian category. That is to say, 'substantiality' in the Trinity of Thomas, is 
subtly giving away to 'participation,' or a category of differentiation. Or perhaps we can 
term it thus: the relations are aspiring to substance status. 
In discussing this solution in Thomas, we are not wishing to remove his treatment of 
relations, from the proper context of his thought. We are aware of course, that Thomas in 
his Summa does not speak firstly of the 'relations,' in God but rather (as we shall see) of the 
unity in God: de Dea uno. However we are of the opinion that Thomas' view of the 
Trinitarian relations, more than that of the 'persons' is intrinsic to his entire Trinitarian 
theology. The relations are the focus of Thomas' logical answer to the oneness-threeness 
problem, together with his discussion on the interrelation of the 'substantiality,' and 
'participation' components of the three persons. Because of this, we have chosen to 
concentrate specifically on this aspect of his oeuvre. 
A renewal of the idea of relations in.the High Middle Ages was becoming increasingly 
important, specifically in the light of the doctrine of the Trinity. Augustine was the stimulus 
in his raising of the concept, to a full ontological status, namely subsistent relation. 139 The 
concept of relation, has much bearing on the type of ontology and conceptuality that gave 
rise to theory of substance and participation. This is partly because normally, relational 
theory in the later middle ages was indebted to an ontology of the substance-accident 
distinction. This approach meant the treatment of a relation as an accident existing in one 
subject. The demand was to then explain how the relation's character involves more than 
one thing. Thus, in the medieval theory we have two relational components: a being-in 
(esse-in) and a being-toward (esse-ad). 
In one sense, participation particularly implies a certain relationship. This is the bringing 
together of substances as distinct units of disclosure or presence. We have argued that in the 
West the logocentric notion of presence tended to grant substance the preeminence, above 
the notion of participation. Participation became marginalised. In our opinion, this is clear 
for example, in Aristotle's theory ofrelation. The relation is only granted 'accidental' status 
in the categories. 140 Nevertheless we have also identified a tension in Aristotle. In order to 
identify individual entities, their identities inadvertently were found to be subtly dependent 
upon their 'participation,' in their metaphysical foundation. 141 This is the 'substrate,' that 
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gave them birth to full presence. 142 Historically, this 'substrate,' differs depending on the view of 
the philosopher. It might be 'Dasein,' 'the transcendental consciousness,' the 'Forms,' the 
'process of History,' and so on. The problem is clearly placed into sharp perspective in the 
doctrine of the Trinity. In order for one to be 'orthodox,' in the traditional sense of the term, one 
cannot attribute prior privilege to substance, without attributing similar honour to 'participation' 
or differentiation into the whole. This brought about the landmark move of Augustine, to promote 
the concept of differentiation or 'relation,' to 'ontological' status. This was done in order to 
answer the logical problem of the Trinity (Although in all fairness, we must remember 
Augustine's Neoplatonism and the fact that in Plato, the relations between the Forms, are Forms, 
themselves). Augustine fell down, however. In order not to posit the idea of four Gods, he refused 
to grant the 'substrate,' any real status. The 'foundation,' on which his Trinity rested, remained 
indeterminable, leaving him open to Gunton's criticism. 
7.5.3-TRINITARIAN RELATIONS: GOD AND THE WORLD 
Thomas' general view of relations, with reference to their ontological status, is essentially in 
harmony with Aristotle. 143 His discussion of inter-Trinitarian relations was conducted against the 
backdrop of both Aristotle's categories and Augustine's view of non-accidental relations. 144 In 
speaking about the Trinity, Thomas had to formulate an understanding of relations in such as way 
as to reshape the Aristotelian idea of inherence in a substance which normally characterised 
accidents. As we have indicated, one way to do this was to distinguish between the ratio or 
fundamental intelligibility of the relation (the esse ad) and its esse, or the esse in the case of 
accidents. 145 Thus the divine relations share the intelligibility of relationships in general but they 
differ from other relations in that the esse of a divine relation is not an esse in but is rather 
identical with the divine essence. This distinction between ratio and the esse of relations parallels 
the real distinction between essentia and esse of Thomas' thought and represents part of the 
Christian transformation of Aristotle necessitated by the faith. 146 
This leads us to the distinction between real relations, and other relations that are merely 
'logical,' in nature. The ratio or mental apprehension of a relation, implies three constructs. First, 
we have the subject (the man who is a father). Then, secondly we have the term (such as the 
child). Thirdly, we have the foundation (which is the generation of the child by the father). 147 In a 
real relation, all three of these components are real, they have esse, 
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'existence.' If any one of these three components are not real, then we have a relation by 
way of 'reason.''" A real relation is caused by and depends for its existence on some real 
extra-mental foundation in the subject of the relation. 149 Now depending on the way these 
three components of a particular ratio, participate together, different types of relationships 
result. For example, my knowledge of a certain immutable truth depends on the existence of 
that thing, but that thing's existence does not depend on my knowledge. My knowledge has 
no 'real relationship' to the thing known, it is only a rational relationship. This asymmetry 
occurs only when the two terms in the relationship are not of the same order. This causes 
Thomas to come up with the problematic view that God has 'no real relationship to the 
creature.' The creature only exists by the mind and intention of God, and thus its relation to 
the creator is that of reason only. With the triune God, this is not so. The relations between 
the three persons, are symmetrical. If then the fatherhood and sonship are not real relations 
in God, it follows that God is not the Father or Son in reality but only because our minds 
conceive him so, which is the Sabellian heresy. If however, the Trinity's relationship with 
the world is also 'real,' then the world is 'erected' as a fourth person in the Trinity, and this 
is impossible. This is certainly problematic. Thomas, in order to uphold the doctrine of 
mutual participation of the Trinitarian persons, is forced to separate the Godhead from the 
world. This means that the general, Neoplatonic theory of the 'participation' of God in the 
world, is to be distinguished from the mutual Trinitarian 'participation' within the Godhead. 
7.5.4-RELA TIONS AND PROCESSIONS IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA 
In his earlier works Thomas began from God the Father to then speak of the generation of 
the Son, and then the procession of the Holy Spirit. " 0 The Summa rejects this possible 
conception of a logical extension of becoming in God. The starting point in the Summa is 
God, the Trinity. The first question is not whether there is a procession from God the 
Father, but whether there is a procession in God. After establishing the unity in God, his 
existence and attributes, the Trinity is looked at. Interestingly, the relationship between faith 
and reason, in Thomas' Trinity is a reversal to that of Augustine. The movement of faith 
towards understanding in Augustine's 'De Trinitate, ·is a movement that involves not only 
understanding the unity of God, but also the plurality. Both de Deo uno and de Dea trino in 
the treatise of Augustine, are dimensions in the Godhead that can only be arrived at by faith, 
prior to understanding. With Thomas, the first treatise of de Deo uno, can be arrived at by 
'understanding.' It is only the plurality in God that requires faith, in order to understand.'" 
The processions are examined in God. Then the existence of real relations is treated. Only 
after both processions and relations have been treated, is the question of persons raised.'" The 
two processions give rise to the four relations. The relations then bring about the three persons. 
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Thomas' movement in his Trinitarian theology is similar to that of Proclus, reflecting the infinite 
and finite, i.e. of exitus and reditus. Says Hankey: 'So the form of the de Deo of the Summa 
Theologiae involves both a development from divine simplicity, the first predicate under which 
Thomas considers what God is, and a series of exit and return motions ... In the tradition of 
thinkers like Boethius and Avicenna, who also drew together Porphyry's identification ofthe One 
and the act of being with Proclns' opposing system in which the One is utterly beyond Being. 
Thomas identifies essence and existence in God's simplicity.'m In speaking about God, Thomas 
thus combines the transcendent qualities of the Neoplatonist One, together with those of 'being,' 
namely the Porphyrian philosophy of esse or einai. This is the source of the paradox in Thomas' 
Trinity. On the one had we can ascribe logical relations to it, but on the other hand we cannot. 
Thomas' thought on the Trinity went through some development over the years, but his mature 
thought is reflected in the 'Summa Theologica_ ' 154 The first question concerning itself with the 
plurality in God, is not that of the relations, but the processions in God."' Aquinas' treatment of 
how we can come to know God, is not based upon the events of salvation-history, but upon God 
being relational towards himself. " 6 The questions in the 'Summa. 'concerning the plurality in 
God, model those on the unity of God. The unity of God is God-to-be, but to be God, means 
essentially to be self-related. 157 The relations rely upon the underlying processions. 
In the section on the processions in the Trinity, Thomas is firstly concerned about 
describing the meaning of the word 'procession' when ascribed to God, and then arguing for just 
two processions within the Godhead."" The divine processions can be derived only from the 
actions which remain within an agent. In an intellectual nature, there are two such actions: 
that of intellect and will. It follows that no other procession is possible in God but the procession 
of the Word, and of Love ('Relinquitur igitur quod nu/la alia processio possit esse in 
Deo. nisi verbi et amoris '). 159 'Thus, as the divine processions must be denominated from certain 
actions; no other processions can be understood in God according to goodness and 
the like attributes except those of the Word and oflove, according as God 
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loves and understands His own essence, truth and goodness ( Unde. cum processiones 
divinas secundum aliquas actiones necesse sir accipere. secundum honitatem et huiusmodi 
a/ia attributa non accipiuntur aliae processiones nisi verhi et amoris, seczmdum quad Deus 
suam essentiam. veritatem et bonitatem intelligit et amat.)' 160 
7.5.5-RELATION OUA RELATION 
We have already touched upon the fact that in Thomas' treatise on the One God, there is 
this important distinction between de Deo uno, (Q.2-27) and de Deo trino (Q.27-43). 
Thomas is said to be the originator of this fundamental structure in the Summa 
Theologica. 161 Hankey locates this habit of Thomas, not in Augustine, but in Dionysius who 
separates the non-differentiated and the differentiated names of God. 162 The highest 
consideration of God, must be kept above multiplicity. On the other hand, the medieval 
Augustinians, like Abelard and Lombard, treat the one and the three together. The second 
source of the division within the de Deo uno, has its origin in Aristotle's distinction 
between the first and second acts of the soul. 163 'Bernard Lonergan has shown how the de 
Deo trino describes a great circle which begins in the processions, formed from the intrinsic 
operations, passes out to the plurality of the distinct persons and returns to its origins in the 
notional acts which are the same as the processions_ Within this there is the lesser circle 
developed in the questions on the distinct persons and evolved in understanding the Spirit as 
unity of the Father and Son. " 64 
The real relations are the subsistent, divine persons. In his Trinity, Thomas explains the 
plurality in God, in terms of opposite relations. In other words, relation is central to his 
Trinitarian theology in a way that person and procession is not. 16' The uniqueness that 
Thomas brings out, is that a relation can only exist with respect to something else, or its 
opposite. 166 A relation, considered by itself, separate from its opposite, is a logical 
impossibility. The relations do not consider the terms in and of themselves, but only their 
relationships with respect to each other. Within the Godhead, there cannot exist distinct 
entities that relate to each other in God without compromise to the divine simplicity. 
Therefore there can only be relative distinctions in God_ The unity of God is absolute, and 
the distinctions in God are relative, respecting the divine essence.167 There are four relations 
in God; paternitas, jiliatio, spiratio and processio. The basis of these processions and 
relations are the notional acts of the Godhead, those oflntellect and Will. The relations are 
the Begetter to Begotten (Father-Son), Begotten to Begetter (Son-Father), then Spirator to 
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Spirated (Father and Son-Holy Spirit), Spirated to Spirator (Holy Spirit-Father and Son). 16' 
Father and Son are not constituted by their joint spiration of the Spirit, only by relation to 
each other. 
7.5.6-TRINITY AND TRANSCENDENTALS 
Norman Kretzmann has illustrated further connections between the language of the Trinity 
and the language of being in Thomas Aquinas. Much of what he suggests, is pertinent to our 
interest. Kretzmann suggests that there is a connection between Thomas' Trinity and the 
medieval conception of the transcendentals. 169 
He begins his paper, by again establishing Thomas' position concerning the Trinity and 
natural reason. We cannot 'prove' aliquam radicem that the divine essence is triune. 170 We 
can only prove that God as a single divine essence exists. 171 We have said that Thomas' 
Trinity is accessible via revelation, not reason. How is it that Thomas devotes seventy-seven 
articles in the Summa using tightly packed logic to speak of the Trinity? The answer is that 
although he acknowledges that reason cannot prove the plurality in God, it can articulate 
and clarify, that which has been already established in revelation. 
Nevertheless, we believe that there is a tension in this clear delineation that Thomas makes 
between the 'primary' role of reason as applying to the understanding of the single essence, 
and then reasons' 'secondary role' in applying the understanding to the plurality in God. 
This tension is clarified when we examine Thomas' teaching on the divine attributes. There 
are, first of all, those attributes of the divine essence (essentialia or communia). 172 
Particularly in this division, we have power, knowledge and goodness. In Thomas' opinion, 
these are discoverable by reason. 173 However, the attributes 'proper' to the specific persons, 
are not accessible to the mind. These are patemity-filiation and spiration. These 'proper 
attributes' are none other than the constitution of the relations. They are identical with each 
person, and are not as accidents inhering in a subject. 
Associated with the proper attributes are the proper names (nomina propria). 174 These 
names (Unbegotten, Word and Love) are the special names given to a particular person, 
distinguishing him from others. Where there is a cross-over between the treatises de Deo 
uno and de Deo trino, is the transferral of the attributes of the essence to the proper 
attributes of the persons. Since each divine person is God, the attributes common to the 
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essence of the Godhead, are also applicable to the persons. However, some common 
attributes, although applicable to all the persons, are specifically suited to one specific 
person. For example power, an attribute of the essence, seems specifically suited to the 
Father. Power then becomes an 'appropriated attribute' to the Father. Because Thomas has 
suggested that the common attributes are rationally accessible, and because these attributes 
can be transferred from de Deo uno to de Deo trino, we have a certain 'transfer of 
reason.' m To appropriate is to draw a common attribute towards a proper attribute 
(commune trahere ad proprium). Although we cannot get all the way to the proper 
attributes of the persons through unaided reason, we can look for a similarity to the persons 
in the appropriated attributes_ Now the three most commonly used 'appropriated attributes' 
are power, wisdom and goodness. 176 
Having established his argument thus far, Kretzmann continues to then carefully compare 
these commonly used 'appropriated attributes' to the three 'transcendental terms,' of 
Medieval philosophy. 177 These are 'one,' 'truth,' and 'good.' 178 The first of Aquinas' 
'Disputed questions about truth,' is the question of whether truth is the same as Being. 179 
'The transcendentals express modes in which Being occurs in everything considered in 
itself: one for instance, expresses the undivided characteristic of everything conceived of as 
being. Others expressed modes in which being occurs in everything considered in relation 
to something else. One crucial relationship of this sort is a conformability of one being to 
another, a relationship that obtains just because there is one sort of being, the rational soul, 
that is suited by nature to conform in either of two ways to any other being. And so the 
transcendental ''true" expresses conforrnability between absolutely any being and the 
intellect, the rational cognitive faculty, while the transcendental "good" expresses 
conformability between absolutely any being and the will, the rational appetitive faculty.'"0 
Aquinas, in his 'Commentary on the Sentences,' considers the transcendentals among the 
names applied to God. Says Kretzmann; 'There is no mention of the Trinity in this 
discussion of the transcendentals as applied to God, but Aquinas is clearly treating them 
here as attributes of the essence, common attributes that are in principle available for 
appropriation to one or another of the persons. Furthermore, the appropriation of"one," 
''true," and "good" to the first, second, and third persons respectively seems to have been 
current when Aquinas was writing.''" 
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7.5.7-SUBSTANCE AND PARTICIPATION IN THOMAS 
Aquinas, firstly in his doctrine of creation and his metaphysics of Being in general, unites 
the opposing Platonic idea of participation, to the substantiality of Aristotle. In his doctrine 
of the Trinity, Thomas makes use of the same synthesis, but in a unique and more radical 
manner. It is with this Trinitarian branch of his thought that we are concerned, as it arises 
from his overall inclinations, together with his modification of them. 
Aristotle"' himself subjected the Platonic Forms to strong criticism, arguing that the 
'substance' of an entity cannot exist in separation from that entity. Furthermore, Aristotle 
clearly stated that his own view of substance, is contrary to that of Plato. Te Velde, 
however, has succinctly shown that Aquinas was not unaware of the inherent tension 
between the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition at this point.'" In his non-Trinitarian 
solution to the problem of combining Aristotelian substance and Platonic participation, 
Thomas introduces a third factor. This is his theological doctrine of creation. We see this in 
Thomas' study of the 'De Hebdomadibus · ofBoethius. In this work, Boethius reflects upon 
a question put to him by John the Deacon: 'How substances are good in virtue of their 
existence without being substantial goods. ' 184 It is in his commentary on the 'De 
Hebdomadibus ·that Thomas begins his reflection on the issue of participation. The debate 
is in the context of the doctrine of Creation. Is an entity of creation 'good,' by substance? 
This cannot be so, as this would clash with the divine goodness. What if something is good 
by participation? This solution is also unsatisfactory as then the thing will not be good in 
itself (per se ipsa). "'Thomas, in his commentary on the De Hebdomadibus, 'indicates that 
he is not entirely satisfied with Boethius' solution to the problem, which reduces the 
'goodness' of creatures to something other than their essence. Speaking of the 'goodness' in 
creatures, Thomas the Aristotelian feels that somehow we must assume that this attribute is 
really in the creature, without losing the important idea that its 'goodness' is a goodness, 
derived from the creator. We must therefore have a sense of 'goodness,' which is a 
goodness with respect to substance which is more than merely an intrinsic relation to the 
first good. 186 
Thomas' solution is found in his specific view ofBeing, or the 'participation of Being.' 
Something is good or has goodness essentially and through participation. This is because 
something is already good as a substance and a being, because as a substance it has being 
by participation. Thomas extends participation to the being (esse) of the substance itself. He 
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is therefore going beyond the accidental character of participation and the equation of 
participation with the accidental.'" In other words the relation of the essence and the 
accident, is not what is under consideration here, but instead it is that between the substance 
and its being (esse). A being is good, not immediately because the creator is good, but 
because being itself is good as possessing Being. This theory of the possessing of being, 
through participation, would then be Thomas' answer to the problem ofthethird man 
argument, as raised in the dialogue of Plato. We can see the difference here between 
Thomas and Neoplatonism. For Plato and the Neoplatonists, beings are true, good and 
beautiful by their participating in the ideas. There is never an existential question about the 
source of the perfection of existence (act). 
Thomas' doctrine of participation, with respect to creation, presupposes the distinction 
between esse-essentia. This is the distinction between Being in general, and the individual 
subject that has being. The prior concept of being points to the abstract understanding of 
being, whilst the latter indicates a more concrete manifestation of Being in an individual 
being. 'That which is participates in being, not in the way the less universal participates in 
the more universal, but in the way the concrete is said to participate in the abstract.' 188 The 
created essence receives its esse from something else and has therefore participated esse. 
Each creature possesses true ontological being. The doctrine of participation does not 
overcome this. Yet this possession is a participated ens distinguished from God who is 
ipsum esse. 189 
Te Velde states that although very much indebted to Neoplatonism, Thomas in his doctrine 
of participation, modifies the viewpoint of the Neoplatonists. According to the 
Neoplatonists, a concrete substance which is living and intelligent, subsists by participation 
in three principles. Firstly it participates in a prior principle which is 'being itself.' Then, it 
does so secondly by participating in another separate principle that is 'life itself.' The 
individual is intelligent, finally, by participating in a third separate principle, 'intellect.' 190 
Thomas, Augustine and Dionysius correct this polytheistic tendency by identifying these 
perfections with the one true God. 'The perfections such as goodness, being, life etc, are not 
to be regarded as so many separate forms, but must be attributed to the first cause of 
everything from which things receive such perfections.' 191 
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In our opinion, the mode of participation is the very central tenet of Aquinas' system. 
Furthermore, we can also explain the nature of his doctrine from the perspective of the 
distinction between act and potentiality within being itself. In fact, participation is at the 
very heart of Thomas' unique notion of Being (esse) as intensive act. 192 A being reaches its 
perfection as a being, as it is realised in the act of being (esse as actus essendi). Act is the 
perfection of affirmation of esse while potentiality is the capacity of that being to receive 
that perfection. Primary matter or pure potentiality, is a subject with no act of its own. 193 All 
actuality comes to it from the imposition of form. The esse of an entity properly belongs to 
its form which is its act. What belongs to a thing by virtue of itself is inseparable from it, 
but existence only belongs to the form of a thing, which is an 'act.' TI1erefore matter 
acquires actual existence as it attains form, but is corrupted if this connection is lost. 
'Manijestum est enim quod id quod secundum se convenit alicui. est inseparabile ab ipso. 
Esse autem per se convenit formae, quae est actus. Unde materia secundum hoc acquirit 
esse in actu, quod acquirit jormam: secundum hoc autem accidit in ea corruptio, quod 
separatur forma ab ea.' 194 There is a real distinction in creatures between the essence and 
the act of being (esse) which is the end result of the new concept ofact. 195 The essence of 
creatures is related to esse as potency to act. This means that all creatures are beings by 
participation in that their essence participates in the act of esse. ' ... the Thomist doctrine of 
existence may be represented as the necessary consequence of the view that all similitude, 
all relations of unity to plurality, must be explained in terms of ontological 
participation ... .It is only in this case, therefore, that participation generates a real distinction 
between the "subject" (essence) and that which it "receives" (existence). ' 196 Thomas rejects 
the tyranny of essences, realising that the most important dimension to reality is 
'theological.' This is something which cannot be reduced to a concept. 
The first and most fundamental type of participation, metaphysically, is 'transcendental.' 
This deals with esse and the perfections that all entities obtain from it. Then there is 
(besides the causal type) also 'predicamental' participation.197 Thomas denies that common 
forms are separate entities. There is no objectively real idea of 'animal,' for example, in 
which all animals participate. These 'universals' only have reality in so far as the intellect 
perceives them. 193 
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7.6-CONCLUDING SUMMARY 
7.6.1-THE LOGICAL PROBLEM 
As long as the Trinitarian doctrine of God is perceived as a 'logical' problem of 
'Oneness\threeness,' (or any other logical problem for that matter) some kind of 
metaphysical concepts will have to be employed, in order to solve the problem. Thomas is a 
primary example of this paradigm. In fact, more than his Christian predecessors, (such as 
Augustine and Richard of St Victor) Thomas delves into the rational mind as a vehicle to 
understand mystery. However, it is fascinating to observe how certain later humanists, and 
scholars of the Renaissance tried to reject the entire Scholastic paradigm, whilst still 
retaining the central burden of solving the 'logical' problem. Lorenzo Valla is one 
outstanding example. 199 In another sense, Barth is to some extent also a 20th Century 
example of this trend. 
Valla wanted to 'solve the problem,' but from a different paradigm. This was a supposed 
anti-Aristotelian platform, based on a humanist perspective. This employed a rhetorical, 
nominalist and more language-based type of approach, instead of 'metaphysics.' Valla 
allegedly based his exposition of the Trinity on Biblical philology and a study of the Church 
Fathers.'00 Valla's concern is that 'theology,' (which amounts to nothing more than 
Aristotelian scholasticism) is purged from its philosophical elements, specifically 
Aristotle's language of Being. As far as he is concerned, the language that we must use in 
speaking about the Trinity, must be 'everyday,' and determined by 'historical existence,' 
instead of 'philosophical arrogance.' We do not intend here to expound Valla' s Trinity in 
detail. In fact his doctrine turns out to be somewhat unremarkable. We will however, make 
the following points: First of all, Valla is no less indebted to Aristotle than Aquinas, and the 
rest of the Scholastics. While trying very hard to reject philosophical terminology, Valla 
continues to use it. In fact his debt is far less ingenious than that of Aquinas. Secondly, his 
'solution' to the problem which moves towards modalism, is far less satisfactory than the 
solution of Thomas-"' This brings out the fact that there is no naked, innocent 'Trinity,' 
underneath Aristotelian and Platonic metaphysics, to which we must return. To even think 
of the Trinity, is to think of a certain theoretical 'apparatus,' in which it is wrapped. Indeed, 
recently many theologians have attempted to reposition the Trinity into a more modem 
philosophical framework. Yet it is a framework no less. It is also hardly surprising to see 
that even in these new schemes, traditional ideas (such as substance) still crop up. ' 0' 
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It is important to perceive that the great theologians of the Western tradition choose to 
remain within a paradoxical framework, when seeking to understand the Trinity. They want 
that framework. They need a certain element of 'deferral.' This paradox must be part of the 
picture. It is built into the definition of what the Trinity is. Despite all his rational language, 
Thomas falls into this tradition. Indeed, to try to find a rational way 'out of the paradox' 
implies heresy. Arius, in the eyes of his contemporaries, fell into this trap. Of course, the 
orthodox are not saying that reason must not be used. Reason can be used. Indeed, reason 
must be used, but not to the detriment of the paradox. 
Certain modem theologians, reject this 'reason within mystery paradigm,' suggesting that in 
order to be believed as a dictum of faith, the Trinitarian problem must be solved logically. 203 
Many of these critics of the traditional Western way of proceeding, will therefore clash with 
Augustine and Thomas. LaCugna,204 identifies two schools of thought here. There are those, 
representing the 'philosophers,' who attempt to use all kinds oflogic and other conceptual 
modes, as a means of solving the Trinitarian problem. Secondly, we have those who 
appreciate the 'mystery element' in the Trinity. These would argue that we cannot bring the 
matter into complete closure. We saw this in Augustine, who sought to transform classical 
reason, into 'Sapientia. ' La Cugna is correct when she states that the Trinity cannot be lifted 
entirely from its historical\exegetical context, and turned into a philosophical, quasi-logical 
problem, lacking any theological meaning. 20' This point needs to be kept in mind, especially 
since this thesis concerns itself primarily with the philosophical dimensions to the doctrine. 
It is a fundamental mistake to try and interpret Thomas, Barth and Augustine as individuals 
working merely on a logical problem. ' 06 All these great theologians did not perceive 
themselves as philosophers in the traditional sense, but Christian thinkers in the process of 
transforming classical thought. 
7.6.2-PARTICIPATION 
Thomas self-avowedly operates within the Aristotelian paradigm of substances. The 
metaphysics of substance, has persisted as long as it has in the West, because it has an 
incredibly strong explaining power, ifnot so much a visual (empirical) one. With the 
criticisms of Locke, directed against substance as traditionally perceived, we see the 
importance of the 'explaining power' of substances, replaced by more empirical priorities. 
Although Aristotle manifested mild empiricism, the birth of substance was one in which a 
rational requirement was to be satisfied. At that time, Logocentrism took pre-eminence over 
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the empirical. Logocentrism was the Greek requirement to see the notion of the enduring or the 
unchanging as the highest metaphysical principle. This is the birth of 'presence,' or the 
unconcealment of truth from chaos. Within this framework, Thomas and his predecessors inserted 
the Neoplatouic doctrine of participation. Aristotle was happy to see entities live on their own, 
but Plato had to see them partake of a far more unified and mutually dependent world. This was a 
world that depended upon the Forms. 
In our opinion, Thomas, together with Augustine, still desires to see substance at the center of the 
stage. 'Participation,' is just the glue between substantial realities, or the anchor. However as with 
Augustine, and Neoplatonism, the tension is there. Indeed it is far more present in Thomas, who 
has a greater synthesis to his system than the aforementioned individual. The doctrine of 
participation, is very close to the very centre of his system, uot substance as it was supposedly 
with Aristotle. Thomas uses participation, generally, as a means to reconcile two totally different 
philosophies, Plato and Aristotle. Additionally, participation is also used to reconcile the various 
binary oppositions in Thomas' thought. These include: faith\reason, theology\metaphysics, 
esse 1.essentia,judgement\separatio, equivocal\univocal (analogy) and so on. However, Thomas 
uses participation in this manner, without giving up the primary role of substance! Thus, 
participation is formally marginalised. He wants to retain substance as the centre of his system, as 
Aristotle did. Yet, in order to achieve this, and remain a Christian creationist, participation is 
necessary. Indeed an analysis of the practical role of participation in Thomas reveals that it is 
critical to his system's survival, even more so than substance! Yet Thomas will not grant it centre 
stage. However, as we shall see below there is one exception to this: Thomas' Trinity. 
7.6.3-PARTICIPA TION AND THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD IDE DEO UNO! 
Participation in Thomas, is the glue needed to link an utterly simple, transcendent being, God, to 
His creation. As we discussed, Thomas reflects two Neoplatonic strands in his thought. The first 
is that of Porphyry, who reduces the first principle to Being, or an entity that is subject to logical 
language. Predications about him can be made, and so on. However, there is also 
the more radical, henological tradition in Thomas, that of Iamblichus and Proclus. These place 
the first principle 'beyond Being.' Thomas, in trying to explain the transcendence of God 
in the Bible, combines both these traditions. He incorporates both, even though each 
contradicts the other. At times Thomas's God seems to be very much attributable to rational 
insights. At other times he is beyond any rational affirmations. 
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Robert Bums successfully shows that Thomas' doctrine of the simplicity of God, is contradictory 
to his Trinitarian theology. Furthermore, it is also the reason why Thomas refuses to erect a 
natural Trinitarian theology (we see a certain overlapping with Barth here). Thomas' simple God 
also reflects the priorities of a certain Greek mathematical view of intelligibility. In order for the 
universe to be intelligible it has to appeal to an ultimate simple principle.207 
Aristotle does not uphold the monism ascribed to him by his medieval interpreters. He is sure that 
the first principles cannot be innumerable, or else Being would not be knowable. 20' On the other 
hand, a Parmenidean One would not account for multiplicity, either 'for there cannot be one 
contrary. " 09 Neither will Aristotle go the route of the early Platonic academy, positing the One 
and the Indefinite Dyad. This is because, such a principle 'would be inexplicable and so a third 
principle must be posited as a kind reconciler or stay of the two primary opposites. Thus, 
Aristotle arrives at the conclusion that ultimately only a triune structure can guarantee 
intelligibility: 'we must to preserve both assume a third somewhat as the "substratum of the 
contraries" (Physics 1.6.) which must be "different from the contraries, for it is itself is not a 
contrary" so that "there is a sense, in which we must declare the principles to be two and a sense 
in which they are three" since "there must be a substratum for the contraries, and the contraries 
must be two" (Physics' 1.7). "'0 It seems to us that Aristotle, (as well as Augustine) whilst placing 
substance at the centre, also needs a certain type of 'participation,' principle to explain contraries. 
This, in Derrida's language seems to be a kind of necessary 'supplement' to the substance. This is 
the substrate, the 'ground of substance,' receiving both unity and multiplicity. Yet it seems that 
almost all interpretations of Aristotle's metaphysics, do not seem to acknowledge the importance 
of this concept. Even in the contemporary texts on Aristotle's metaphysics, substance, is 
acknowledged to be the central tenet of his metaphysics. 
7.6.4-THE OPENNESS\CLOSEDNESS OF THOMAS' DOCTRINE OF GOD 
We have already pointed out that Thomas, Augustine and the theological West are not merely 
trying to solve 'rational' problems, when speaking about God. They are simply trying to use 
reason to understand a prior principle: revelation. Having said that, it is clear that Thomas trusts 
the power of the human mind, more than both Augustine and Richard of St Victor, in his working 
out of the Trinitarian problem. 
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This raises a question. At what point in TI1omas's doctrine of God, does faith clearly give 
over to reason, methodologically? In his doctrine of the simplicity of God, we find two 
Neoplatonic traditions alongside each other. As we have mentioned there is the tradition of 
Porphyry, equating the First Principle with Being. Secondly, we have the Iamblichan-
Proclan tradition, equating the First Principle with that which is beyond Being. This duality 
of the First Principle, brings about certain important consequences in Thomas. Firstly he 
makes a hypothetic transcendental deduction.211 Because God is Being (lpsum esse), the 
universe is therefore 'intelligible.' According to Thomas, this is 'revealed' in sacra 
doctrina. The universe is intelligible, because God, and his creation can be subjected to 
intelligible understanding or divine science_ This is Thomas' 'transcendental deduction.' It 
is the prior deduction of faith, or sacra doctrina. This is clear in spite of the Five Ways 
argunient, which presuppose God's existence, rather than demonstrate the fact, although 
Thomas does not quite see it this way.212 
In speaking of the simplicity of God, Thomas does not claim that he has gone to the 'back 
of God,' in order to see for himself that he is, indeed, sinlple_ This is also something that the 
theologian acknowledges by faith. God's 'essence' is 'unknowable_' Here, we have the 
Prodan open understanding of the First Principle coming into the picture_ 
Thomas as a Christian theologian does not have the same view of the 'openness' of God 
that the Greeks sceptics had towards philosophy_ The Greeks of the sceptic tradition, saw all 
statements (including their own) as being 'open,' or subject to reinterpretation_ Thomas' 
theological openness concerning the transcendence of the Trinity is different. It is a 
necessary openness that the transcendent tradition of the Scriptures and Christian 
Neoplatonism requires_ God is transcendental, beyond Being_ He cannot be fathomed 
exhaustively. In this way, Thomas argues for an openness in God. This desire to 
acknowledge the openness of the divine is also reflected in Thomas' esseiessentia 
argument, concerning God. Here he struggles to provide a priority of the one over the other. 
What comes first in determining our understanding of God? Both principles seem to be 
tightly interwoven, mutually dependent.m Nevertheless, by bringing in the dimension of 
God's person as being subject to the act of existence (esse), as well as to substance, 
Thomas desires to go beyond substance in speaking about God. In fact, he even posits a 
special mental process, separate from other mental activities, in the apprehension of esse, as 
an ontological reality. Again, this reflects Thomas' acknowledgement of the need for a 
certain sense of openness in language about God. 
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However, paradoxically this is an openness as well as a closedness. Not all Christian 
statements are open to complete 'reinterpretation.' To be a Christian theologian, means that 
one has to accept certain non-negotiables. These are the credal definitions of the Church. 
Statements such as 'there is one God in three persons,' are a closed book. Thomas' view of 
the transcendence of God, is therefore not an excuse for a totally open plan, with respect to 
the Trinity. Sacra doctrina provides the boundaries beyond which we cannot go. Because 
'sacra doctrina' is prior to the human mind (philosophy), the contents of sacra doctrina 
form the 'transcendental deductions,' the 'first premises' in Thomas' system. We have to 
accept the prior existence of certain, set truths of revelation. These constitute the 
'closedness' component in Thomas' theology. It is the closedness that is subject to 
reasonable statements, provided that reason elucidates but does not replace. However the 
closedness of sacra doctrina, admits a certain openness, in that we cannot completely 
understand the plurality in God. The Trinity transcends the human mind. Nevertheless as we 
have seen, the actual mode of argumentation to be employed in sacred doctrine, is that of 
philosophy! Indeed Thomas himself implies that philosophy thus comes prior to theology 
(sacra doctrina) ! 
This paradox is clearly illustrated in Thomas' division of the doctrine of God into two 
distinct treatises: de Deo uno, followed by de Deo trino. In this treatment, he reverses the 
direction of Augustine, which is Fides Quaerens Inte/lectum. Now of course, Thomas 
would not reject this dictum, but he reverses its direction in the two treatises. Thomas starts 
with reason, only to end in faith. We can prove de Deo uno, with reason, but we can only 
accept de Dea rrino by faith. Nevertheless, there is such a tight juxtaposition between these 
two principles in Thomas' overall study that, methodologically speaking, he does not 
ascribe any less 'reason' to his treatment of the plurality in God, than to his treatment of the 
unity of God. It is illuminating to compare this approach of Thomas to that of Barth, later 
on. Barth was to deny this paradox of the continuity of the unity and the plurality in God. 
He chose to start and structure the entire dogmatic enterprise, from a Trinitarian 
perspective. 
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The other interesting matter, is Kretzmann' s argument for the close affinity in Thomas, 
between the individual persons of the Trinity and the transcendentals. In Thomas' Trinity 
the first order of knowledge is that of the one God (de Deo uno). TI1is is then followed by 
the de Deo trino. We will remember that the transcendentals do not concern themselves 
with individuants, but with Being itself We have also noted that in Thomas' thought, the 
first order of knowledge is not individuals, but Being as Being. So in this close relationship 
between Trinity and transcendentals, the notion of the Trinity as a second-order discourse 
about God, perceivable only through revelation, is undermined. 
7.6.5-BREAKING OUT OF THE PARADIGM: DE DEO TR/NO 
It is our contention that in Thomas' treatise de Deo lrino, we have the beginnings of a new 
ontology of substance and participation that breaks away from the essentialist ontology of 
the de Deo uno, and his other work. Thomas' Trinitarian relations are very different to his 
view of relations defined in his categorical theory. He does not consciously searcl1 for this 
new development. However his unique subject matter forces him into the situation. In 
Thomas' general treatment of the idea of participation between two 'substances,' the focus 
is almost all of the time, upon creation 'participating' in God. This is an unequal relation, as 
ontologically, God is always greater than that which is participated. Speaking even more 
generally, when Thomas speaks about his world, substance is prior to relationality or 
participation. However, with his treatise on the three persons of the Trinity, we have a 
different situation. Thomas has to now speak of a mutual indwelling of the three persons in 
the one God, whilst at the same time upholding the independence, but equal ontological 
status of the three. In order to do this, he fulfils what Augustine began: Aquinas elevates 
relationality, to the idea of substance and beyond. In his treatise de Deo trino, substance is 
finally replaced by relationality as the primary ontological construct in God. We have 
paradoxically, a different ontology in the treatise on the Triune God, compared to that on 
the Unity of God, and the rest of the Summa n• The relationality of the Trinity brings about 
an ontological fluidity or 'oscillation' within Trinity. This tends towards a denial of 
boundaries with respect to the personhood within the Trinity. 
7.6.6-AUGUSTINE, AOUINAS AND BARTH: GRAPPLING WITH 
UN CONCEALMENT 
Bales"' argues for a close correlation between Plotinus One in relation to Being (Nous) and 
the later Heidegger's connection between Being as concealment, verses Being as presence 
or duration of unconcealment. 216 'The will to power can be understood as the absolute 
objectification of reality for the sake of the reign of absolute subjectivity. ' 217 
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The influence of Aristotle in the positing of the substance as the highest reality helped to 
eliminate the idea that the supreme reality is beyond Being.218 However, Bales suggests that 
Plotinus is an exception to the Greek inclination towards the 'forgetfulness of Being,' with 
his doctrine of the One. This is due to the fact that Plotinus preserves the absolute idea of 
unconcealment, beyond presence. Of course, within the 'Enneads 'there is that tension of 
ascribing at times to the One, certain positive predications. This seems to imply that the One 
is a metaphysical term, not a non-metaphysical one. Nevertheless there is also the clear 
teaching of Plotinus that the One is 'concealment.' As we have tried to show, this problem 
has plagued the Christian tradition, from day one. In both Augustine and Aquinas, there are 
these two elements of God as presence and concealment. Most interpreters of Augustine 
and Aquinas argue too simplistically: 'The significance of this mystical negative theology 
was obscured by the mainstream tradition upholding the traditional metaphysics of Being. 
In St. Augustine, in Aquinas, in Spinoza, in Hegel, Being and The One are identified, not 
separated. " 19 Fair enough, Augustine and Aquinas cannot be interpreted as being in the 
mainstream of mystical theology, precisely in the same sense as Meister Eckhart. Both 
move toward upholding the positive nature of Being, more so than the negative. 
Nevertheless, to suggest that the transcendent issue, is not present in their theology is too 
simplistic a view. 
In our next chapter on Karl Barth we shall specifically see how Barth continues to grapple 
with the concealment\unconcealment problem of Being, so manifest in Heidegger and 
Plotinus. For example, speaking about the relationship between the One and eternity (Nous) 
Plotinus says: ' ... it may fitly be described as God made manifest, as God declaring what He 
is, as existence, without jolt or change, and therefore as also the firmly living. "'0 As we 
shall have occasion to observe, Barth's Trinitarian view of revelation is grappling with this 
very problem. This is the need to conceive of the One as transcendent, concealment, but at 
the same time to speak of this One, within the categories of form and object 
(unconcealment). The relationality of the Trinity brings about an ontological fluidity or 
'oscillation' within the Trinity. This tends towards a denial of boundaries with respect to the 
personhood within the Trinity. 
PART THREE 
'GOD WITHOUT BEING?' 
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PART THREE: BARTH TO DERRIDA: GOD WITHOUT BEING? 
'Historiography is a narcotic averting us from history.'-Martin Heidegger, 'Basic Questions of 
Philosophy. " 
'Only write what is impossible, that ought to be the impossible-rule.' -Jacques Derrida, 
Circumfession: 'Fifty-nine Periods and Periphrases. ' 8 
CHAPTER EIGHT: KARL BARTH' 
8.1-INTRODUCTION TO THE TRINITY OF KARL BARTH 
Barth is our first figure (other than Heidegger) dealt with here, who operated after the 
Enlightenment. Therefore, the difference that we encounter with respect to everything that Barth 
does is radical indeed, compared to his predecessors. This is a difference, not only because of 
his writing at a truly unique time in intellectual history, bnt also because Barth is unique as an 
individual as well. Barth is a paradigm in himself, possibly to a greater extent than the other 
individuals discussed up to now. Fascinatingly however, Barth, after a fashion is also a 
traditionalist as well, both theologically and philosophically. As with Augustine, Arius and 
Aquinas, Barth consciously sees himself as continuing a line of thinking and trusting, which is 
traditionally, distinctly Christian. Also together with his predecessors, Barth sees himself as 
providing an interpretation of orthodox Christianity as a foil, even as a reformation of 
secularism (classicism) in the Christianity of his time and age. As we shall see, his 
reinterpretation represents a greater break with 'scientia'' than all of his predecessors. He feels 
even more strongly concerning the need for Christianity to be an 'alternative' (sapientia) to 
'classicism' than previous Christian thinkers. His view is not that of supplementation, but 
replacement. 
Although the doctrine of the Trinity as appearing in the 'Dogmatics,' expresses Barth's strong 
reaction to the Enlightenment,' the scope and importance of his thinking in this department 
goes beyond just that of a reaction. We find in the 'Dogmatics, 'the ontologies of both the pre-
Enlightenment and the Post-Enlightenment periods. Wrth a Trinitarianism from above, in which 
the divine takes precedence over the human, and with the traditional speaking of the one God in 
three 'persons,' (Modes of Being) Barth operates within the traditional pre-Enlightenment 
Western paradigm. In fact, Barth's Trinitarian thought goes more down the 'enhypostatic' route 
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than all before him, in that not only the humanity of Jesus Christ, but all of humanity, and 
human history becomes completely swept up into 'God's time.' Barth's concept of the 
'Trinification of the world' is far more radical than that of Augustine. Furthermore, Barth's 
Trinitarian movement from God's eternal being towards His temporal revelation in Christ, also 
reflects the Western, post-Augustinian paradigm.4 The idea of God's 'becoming' as being 
identical with who God is antecedent in himself, reflects this same picture. 
Hunsinger 'provides a helpful summary of Barth in that he places Barth's thought within certain 
limiting-loci, each having an important role in the overall fabric of Barth's system, wherein the 
Trinity plays a central part. Hunsinger' s first motif is 'actualism,' donating the strong language 
of'occurrence' in the 'Dogmatics.' This actualism resides in God's person, and proceeds from 
him through his unique revelation. God as the Sovereign One, cannot be known other than by 
his revelation. God is his revelation. Thus, the actualism motif emphasises God's freedom in the 
revealing of himself. Man can become part of that actuality in his participation within the 
Trinitarian history of Jesus Christ. All the doctrines, particularly that of the Trinity, are 
considered within this dynamic way of thinking 
Hunsinger identifies the second motif as that of 'particularism.' This reflects Barth's constant 
movement from the particular to the general. This has important ramifications for Barth's 
Trinity as forming the theological prolegomenon for any true dogmatic enterprise. We do not 
proceed with the theological enterprise after having established a basis or ground in the 'proofs' 
of natural theology, or even the basic tenets of the sciences as a whole. Our bearings must be 
taken from the particular self-revelation of God, in his Son Jesus Christ.6 
Thirdly, there is the concept of' objectivism_' 7 This is Barth's theological realism.' Knowledge 
of God is possible, because it is real, objective knowledge. This enables us to pursue dogmatics 
as a true Christian science.9 Unlike Schleierrnacher, theological knowledge is not a dimension to 
the human consciousness. It finds its roots in God alone .10 This has to be so, if we are to prevent 
theology from becoming anthropology. True theological objectivity is rooted in God's 
revelation, which itself is directed towards God in Himself in eternity_ In Jesus Christ, we have 
the full, objective revelation of God. 11 
Hunsinger's final distinguishing motif, is that of 'personalism_' In placing his emphasis upon 
the real possibility of an objective theology, Barth does not want us to land up again with a 
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static type of Aristotelian scholasticism. The Barthian, personal view of God counterbalances 
this." We encounter the objective, only through the personal, through an encounter with God 
through faith. 'In Jesus Christ, (objectivism) God establishes an active, historical relationship 
with us, (actualism) a relationship of love and freedom, and thus a relationship of the deepest 
intimacy (personal ism). ' 13 Unlike Cyprian who stated: 'extra ecclesiam nullus salus,' Barth 
responds: outside of the conscious subject and self-revelation of God, there can be no revelation 
of God. 
8.1.1-IBE TRINITY AND THE 'CHURCH DOGMATICS' 
The Trinity is the hermeneutic entrance into the 'Dogmatics.' Here, the Trinitarian, 
hermeneutical centrality goes beyond that of all those who precede Barth in the Western 
tradition. 14 'The possibility of belief in a Trinity is due to the possibility of God revealing 
Hirnselfas Himself. If we really want to understand revelation in terms of its subject, i.e., God, 
then the first thing we have to realise is that this subject, God, the Revealer, is identical with his 
act in revelation and also identical with its effect. It is from this fact, which in the first instance 
we are merely indicating, that we learn we must begin the doctrine of Revelation with the 
doctrine of the triune God. ' 15 
'The doctrine of the Trinity is what basically distinguishes the Christian doctrine of God as 
Christian, (Die Trinitatslehre isl es, die die christlichen Gotteslehre als christliche) and 
therefore what already distinguishes the Christian concept of revelation as Christian, (-sie isl es 
also schon. die den christlichen Offenbarungsbegriff als christlichen ... ) in contrast to all other 
possible doctrines of God or concepts of revelation (vor alien mog/ichen anderen Gotteslehren 
und Ofjenbarungsbegriffen grundlegend auszeichnet).' 16 
Although Barth sees himself as furthering the orthodox view of the Trinity, the Trinity of the 
'Church Dogmatics' I/I goes far beyond any other orthodox conception of the Trinity in that it 
forms the very centre of Dogmatics. It is the prolegomena which all must go through if they will 
engage in true Biblical theology. Yet, the Trinity is much more than just prolegomenon .17 It is 
the entry-point, the key to the structure and the method to be employed in the performing of the 
dogmatic task. Here, we can mention the doctrine of the Trinitarian appropriations as 
understood by Barth. Each of the themes of the entire 'Dogmatics,' is actually an outworking of 
one of the modes of being of the one triune God. 
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The Trinity is Barth's 'anti-religious' statement about God, coming firmly 'from above.' What 
is God like? Man cannot tell us, only God can. The Trinitarian structure of theology is God 
reinterpreting himself to men. In Christian dogmatics, it is pointless to ask man to tell us what 
man thinks God is like. Only God can tell us. With the Trinity, with dogmatics itself, we deal 
with God himself. 1' The Trinity of the 'Dogmatics' retains the basic anti-religious dialectic of 
the 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' 
In Trinitarian revelation the Revealer is God, the Revelation itself is also God, and the 
confirmation of the reception of that Revelation is also God. The Trinity is an explanation of 
what God is always doing, with respect to who he is (ontology) and who he is for us 
(Soteriology). God is always the God of the threefold repetition of himself, whether in eternity 
or in revelation. God is 'relatedness,' firstly to himself, and then to us. Therefore there can be 
no return to any conception ofrevelation that is 'man to do with man.' 19 
8.2-KARL BARTH ON THE TRANSCENDENT CENTRE IN THEOLOGY 
As we have seen, up to now, the conception of substance has played a major role in all Western 
metaphysics, including theology. In the case of Aristotle, substance is a metaphysical building 
block, the most basic ontological component. However, by the time of the Enlightenment, the 
notion of a 'substance,' or 'centre' has been considerably developed beyond the position of 
Aristotle's ontology. In our view, it has now taken up its place in philosophical methodology as 
well as ontology. 
We are now to speak not only of primary things, but also primary ideas, ideologies or principle 
concepts building up a system. This constitutes, in our opinion, one of the major differences 
between the great 'Summas' of the Middle Ages and some of the systematic theologies of the 
Enlightenment. The guiding principles of the Summas, roughly might be suggested as beingthe 
usual 'Biblical' format, or conceptual flesh combined with the dialectical method of Aristotle. 
We find no suggestion ofa single 'essence' or a methodological principle making up the centre 
of a summa, such as the 'kingdom of God,' the 'Fatherhood of God' etc. We do however, find 
this 'substance' (or central) approach to the methodologies of the theologies and philosophies of 
modernity. Barth is an example of this shift. Systematic theology is a discipline that unfolds 
itself according to a central hermeneutical principle. Scholars such as Nietzsche and Foucault 
have commented at length on the negative possibilities of such a system, where the central 
principle becomes nothing more than a will to power or domination. 
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A 'post-Enlightenment methodological' substance can now be loosely defined as anything 
which in itself possesses full individuality, even dominance, methodologically in a system. It 
continues to do so in a prominent manner-no matter where it finds itself in such a system.'0 
Initially, it might be suggested that because of his dynamic, actualistic view of God, Barth 
avoids such a 'substantial' way of thinking. This however, is not the case. As we shall argue, in 
the theology of Karl Barth, more than one concept can be viewed as the 'primary substance of 
theology."' 
Perhaps the first candidate for this title is Barth's Trinitarian outworking of the 'centre of 
theology. "2 Walter Lowe23 has argued that there is much in Barthian theology that is typical of 
what Derrida is trying highlight as problematic in all Western discourse. Concerning the 
Derridean perspective on 'presence,' Barth has been long accused of advocating a positivistic 
notion of revelation and the Word ofGod.24 Furthermore, linked to this notion of the centre, 
there is also an oppositional duality between man and God (whose self-revelation is this centre). 
The centre of theology is a paradoxical one, because it can never be quite identified directly 
with human witnesses to it. Then there is the 'infinite qualitative difference between man and 
God,' specifically noticeable in Barth's 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' This 
oppositionalism also follows through into the later period of the 'Dogmatics.' Says Barth in the 
preface to the second edition of his commentary: 'If! have a system, it is limited to a 
recognition of what Kierkegaard called the "infinite qualitative difference between time and 
eternity (den unendlichen qualitativen Untershied)" .. ' 25 
In speaking about a centre in theology, Barth shows a certain indebtedness to Enlightenment 
modernity.16 Most of his predecessors, including Hegel, Schleierrnacher, Harnack and so on, 
chose to speak of some 'essence,' some 'centre' of theology from which all proceeds. Sykes has 
the following to say about Romantic thought ofa 'centre' from Herder to Novalis: 'According 
to this principle, the function of a proper view of the world is to overcome irreconcilable 
contradictions by identifying and embracing the truth which lies in the middle, at the point of 
peace and reconciliation. In feeling itself there is peace and reconciliation between the finite and 
the infinite; it is moreover, "the victorious centre between knowledge and action"' and piety, the 
essence of which is feeling, is the centre of all religion whatsoever. m 
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Barth states that Melancthon's and Calvin's theological method is the only true scholarly 
method for dogmatics." This is a method that allows the freedom of the Word of God to be the 
determining centre, not any particular doctrine as such. 'The dogmatician, too, has the Word of 
God only in virtue of the freedom and sovereignty of the Word itself, and therefore in the 
hiddeness of his faith and obedience which are the gifts of the Word (Auch der Dogmatiker hat 
das Wort Gottes nur kraft der Freiheit und Herrschaft des Wortes Gottes selbst und also in der 
Verborgenheit seines G/aubens und Gehorsams als des Geschenks des Wortes Gottes se/ber).' 
There might be a centre in theology, but this is not a central doctrine_,. 
The centre of theology, is none other than that Trinitarian object, which is determinative of the 
method of theology, not vice versa as was the case with other traditional Enlightenment 
theologies. The historical reality of the Word of God as the centre of theology is not the 
historical Jesus but the Jesus Christ who is witnessed to as the risen one. We must therefore be 
careful what we place forward in advance. 'Traditional nqtions, more or less important, have to 
be suspended so that they can become a matter for vital new decision by the Word of God 
itself. " 0 
In his important book on Anselm,31 Barth suggests that true knowledge of the Word of God, is 
guaranteed by the Word. Man's true rational apprehension of God (intellectus) is grounded in 
the prior decision of God to make himself known. The on tic necessity leads to the noetic 
necessity.32 God is therefore wholly determinative of the entire Trinitarian process of self-
revelation as Revealer-Revelation and Revealdness. The starting-point of dogmatics is not 'what 
can be?' but 'what is' and 'what cannot fail to be. ' 33 
Barth's centre is entirely paradoxical in nature. It is a centre, but it is not a centre. It is not a 
centre in the traditional way of understanding a centre. It is not a doctrine or a 'method' but the 
entire determining, unfolding, Trinitarian process of the Word of God, incorporating all 
margins. It is this factor that opens the possibility of dogmatics. Nevertheless, this event-
centredness in theology cannot be reduced to any man-made concept, such as biblical 
propositions and so on. This is why Barth, if possible, avoids traditional 'locational' terms such 
as 'substance,' when speaking about God. Nevertheless, to speak of a centre to theology, in our 
opinion, implies substance language. The Trinitarian unfolding ofrevelation is much like the 
idea of a tangent, drawn past the earth, touching it, but never touching it. The world can only 
actually 'touch' the Word of God, by losing its worldly character and being swept up into the 
special history of the Trinity. Thus in a manner vaguely reminiscent of Augustine, Barth's 
Trinity also tends towards self-deconstruction. 
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Does Barth, however, really manage to keep the Word of God from becoming subject to a 
specific doctrine? 'We enterthat sphere of Christian knowledge in which we have to do with the 
heart of the message received by and laid upon the Christian community and therefore with the 
heart of the Church's Dogmatics: that is to say, with the heart of its subject-matter, origin and 
content. It has a circumference, the doctrine of creation and the doctrine of the last things, the 
redemption and consummation. But the covenant fulfilled in the atonement is its centre. From 
this point we can and must see a circumference. But we can see it only from this point. A 
mistaken or deficient perception here would mean error or deficiency everywhere.,,. 
God in his entire being, is an activity of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. What God does in himself 
and as the creator of all mankind is aimed at a particular act, that is the act of the atonement." 
Again in a paradoxical sense, we can narrow down the 'centre' towards a particular doctrine, 
that of the atonement. Yet the centrality of the atonement, is not however, the centrality of the 
doctrine of the atonement, but the centrality of an unfolding, Trinitarian act in which God is 
God. This Trinitarian act actually then involves all divisions in Systematic Theology: The 
Doctrine of the Word of God, the Doctrine of God, the Doctrine of Creation and the Doctrine of 
Reconciliation as well. 
The result is that we have a centre that is not a centre at all. It is a centre that although central, 
defies and incorporates all margins into it. It rejects all oppositions, which become subsumed 
into its centrality. This movement in the 'Dogmatics' becomes what we have already termed the 
'Trinification of the world-"6 We have then this interesting situation in Barth. On the one hand 
we can speak of a type of 'Revelatory positivism,' and closedness in Barth. Yet on the other 
hand, there is also a sense of deferral, because the centre of theology, of which we must speak, 
cannot be described. It cannot be circumscribed. Here we are reminded of what Derrida says 
about the Deconstructive process, repeated at the beginning of this section: 'Only write what is 
impossible, that ought to be the impossible rule.' Theological language becomes closed, but also 
open-textured. It is closed in that it is not free to do, as it likes. It has a specific task to do. 
Nevertheless, the task that it has is also an open one. In fact, it is an impossibly open task. This 
is not because of the nature of language itself, but because of the object of theology. 
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8.3-BARTH ON THE BEING OF GOD: FROM SUPREME SUBSTANCE TO DYNAMIC 
SUBJECTIVITY 
8.3.1-SUBJECTIVITY AND REPETITION 
We have already indicated that in Barth, God reveals himself through himself. There is an 
absolute self-identification of God's being through its triplicity.37 Barth, like his predecessors in 
the West also emphasises the unity in God. However, this is a unity that is not derived from the 
idealisation of the Neoplatonic principle of simplicity. Nor does it stem from the notion of 
numerical oneness, but it reflects a concern with identity." Barth wants to preserve the truth that 
when we meet with God's revelation, we meet with God himself. 
'Therefore if we are obedient to this revelation, we confess the one and unaltered God as 
Revealer, Revelation and Work of Revelation. Yet we cannot reduce the three questions to one, 
we cannot eliminate the need to give our one answer to the questioning of revelation three times 
in three ways. "It does not appear possible, and no attempt is made in the Bible, to dissolve the 
unity of God ... and his revelation and his revealdness into a undifferentiated sameness, to lift the 
boundaries which separate the three forms of his deity in his revelation by reducing them to a 
synthetic fourth and proper reality. "'39 The Oneness and differentiation of God is his revelation as 
testified to in Scripture. 'The doctrine of the Trinity has the function of making it clear that as 
Father, Son and Holy Spirit, God is our God antecedently in himself. '40 God is not deity. He does 
deity. God does God three times, each in a certain manner. Each, so-called hypostasis is a 
repetition of God's act. 
Barth begins his Trinitarian exposition then, with the notion of the unity of God, as the prior point 
of procedure.41 The threeness is not a 'threeness of essence. ' 42 The threeness is rather a threefold 
repetition, of the one God.43 Aquinas speaks of a threefold relation, Barth a threefold repetition. 
After the exposition of the idea of God in his threefold act, Barth enters into his discussion of the 
nature of the threefold distinction within God. He begins. his treatment with an assessment of the 
notion of the use of 'persons.' He acknowledges that traditionally, 'person,' as used by the 
Church does not refer to 'personality' in the modem sense. The meaning of the doctrine is not 
that there are three personalities in God.44 The threefold repetition, prevents the divine Lordship, 
the divine Thou, from becoming an ii, or a substantial presence.45 The nature of the threefold 
repetition of God, and the Trinitarian doctrine itself, is based on revelation. This 
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occurs through the interpretation of the Scriptures._.. It is the revelation of God as God, that 
prevents us from subordinating any of the hypostases to one another." In the understanding of 
the Trinity in Unity, we speak ofa specific knowledge of the unity ofGod.48 As we have 
remarked, this is not a unity of singularity or isolation.•• The concept of the unity of the 
revealed God does not exclude, but rather includes a distinction or order in the essence of God 
('Der Begriff der offenbarten Einheit des offenbarten Gottes schlieBt also nicht aus sondem ein 
eine Unterscheiding (distinctio oder discretio) eine Ordung (dispositio oder oeconomia) im 
Wesen Gottes ).'0 
8.3.2-SEINSWEISEN IN GOTT 
This distinction is the order of the traditionally known, three 'persons,' or as Barth chooses to 
call it, 'Seinsweisen in Gott"' Due to the fuct that 'person,' was never clearly understood or 
clarified by the Early Church, and due to the fuct that the modem notion of 'personality,' is very 
much different from what the term meant traditionally, Barth chooses to drop the term, in 
fuvour of his 'mode of being. ''2 This is how God is thrice God as the Father, and the Son and 
the Spirit (So ist er dreimal Gott a/s Vater. Sohn und Geist)." The truly material determinations 
of the principle ofthreeness were derived neither by Augustine, nor Aquinas, via the concept of 
'person.,,. Thus the term, 'mode of being,' 'expresses the idea, not absolutely but "relatively 
better" and more simply and clearly the same thing as is meant by "person."'" In his choice of 
the new term, Barth claims 'we are not introducing a new concept but simply putting in the 
centre an auxiliary concept which has been used from the very beginning and with great 
emphasis in the analysis of the concept of person. ''6 Now the modes must not be confounded or 
exchanged. In all three modes, God is the same one God. However, this one God is three times 
in different ways, different in that it is through this threefold difference that God is God. This 
threefold difference is essential to his being as God-" 
For this reason, the three modes of being are not three attributes or three parts of a divine 
property as three compartments or segments. 'No attribute, no act of God is not in the same way 
the attribute or act of the Father, the Son and the Spirit.'" As with Aquinas and Augustine, 
Barth suggests that the distinguishable fuct of the three modes of being is to be understood in 
their distinct, genetic relations to one another. The three modes stand in dissimilar relations of 
origin to one another. 'Aber dieses relativ unterschiedene Offenbarwerden der drei Seinsweisen 
besagt nicht ihr entsprechendes Unterschiedensein in sich selber. ' 59 
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Uniquely however, Barth argues that the formal difference between the three modes is to be 
sourced in revelation.60 Here, Barth moves away from the role of the mind's way of 
distinguishing things, as expounded by Aquinas partly as a means to understand the Trinitarian 
differentiations. Barth instead chooses to apply the terms of revealer, revelation and revealdness. 
Here we have the 'source,' and authorship, a ground ofrevelation, 'a revealer of himself just as 
distinct from revelation itself as revelation implies absolutely something new in relation to the 
mystery of the revealer. '61 For this unique situation, there can be no analogies, no vestigia 
trinitatis. 'This, then, is the repetition in God, the repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate, by which 
the unity of the revealed God is differentiated from everything else that may be called unity. ' 62 
Barth falls firmly onto that side of interpreters who strongly uphold the mystery of the Trinity, 
and the limitation of rational definitions, as necessary as these might be in their place. Care must 
be taken to ensure that the mysterium trinitatis remains a mystery (Es isl also von alien Seiten 
gesorgt dafar, daB das mysterium trinitatis Mysterium bleibt).63 
Concerning the triunity, Barth goes on to state that God's essence is one and the different 
relations of origin do not entail separations. Instead, they imply a definite participation of each 
mode of being in the other modes of being. ' ... indeed, since the modes of being are in fact 
identical with the relations of origin, a complete participation of each mode of being in the other 
modes of being. ' 64 'To the unity of Father, Son and Spirit among themselves corresponds their 
unity ad extra. God's essence and work are not twofold but one.'6 ' The triunity of God is revealed 
to us only in his works. This is why ultimately the factor oftriunity is incomprehensible to us_.. 
We, thus differentiate between the three modes on the basis of the revelation that comes to us, 
according to our human capacity. 67 
In his discussion of the three modes of being, Barth seems to avoid all traditional 'substance 
language.' God is not a substance with attributes, he is a deed.68 Barth only uses traditional terms 
in the 'Dogmatics,' such as 'homoousios,' etc, in order to grant certain concessions to traditional 
orthodoxy. He is not violently antagonistic to traditional substance terms. In fact, in an important 
way, Barth continues the Western tradition. Much of Barth's discussion of terms such as 
'perichoresis,' 'appropriation,' and 'relation,' indicate that his Trinity might merely be an 
unexceptional continuation of the Augustinian-Aquinas paradigm. This is not a true assessment. 
Because Barth's Trinity is so much integrated into his entire oeuvre, and because that oeuvre is 
unique, these surface continuities do not detract from Barth's uniqueness. He is indeed, 
continuing the Western tradition, but in a radical new way. Traditional terms are 
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reinterpreted according to an actualistic ontology. The tendency to grant a certain pre-eminence 
to the idea of participation, a tendency that we have identified as present in Aquinas' doctrine of 
the Trinity, (and as a tension throughout the West) seems to move towards fulfilment in Barth. 
Barth's theology, superficially, seems to be a theology of participation, not substance. The 
divine modes of being are to be understood as dynamic inter-participative modes, rather than 
three separate entities. 
'The Idealist obsession with what has been called the "concrete universal" arose from the desire 
to ground knowledge securely in an ontology of participation; das absolute Wissen, Hegel's 
final synthesis of consciousness and self-consciousness, is the level at which the divisions and 
contradictions of prior levels are overcome by the finite subject's identification with, 
recognition of itself in, Absolute Spirit, the one and universal self-thinking thought. It is the 
finite self's participation in the One. Barth substitutes the Word for the Hegelian pan-unity ... ' 69 
As we shall see below, Barth continues to operate within the same tension area as the other 
figures discussed in this thesis. This is the tension between Being\Beyond Being, with the 
former, somewhat determined by the latter. However, we shall also see that the suggestion that 
in Barth's case, a 'participation-ontology' has completely replaced the older 'substance-
ontology,' is misleading and a superficial interpretation of the 'Dogmatics.' 
In his 'Persons in Communion,' Alan Torrance provides a penetrating insight into Barth's 
doctrine of the 'modes of Being. '70 As with Aquinas, Barth places the unity of God before the 
plurality-" Williams72 makes the important observation that in doing this, Barth does not claim 
that there can be some general, 'religious' or 'interfaith' conception of monotheism (de Dea 
uno). There is no preliminary treatise de Deo uno as a 'neutral' prelude to the plurality in God. 
Torrance says that the use of seinsweisen 'opens the door' to functionalist interpretations in a 
way that personen does not." 
However, he is not in agreement with Barth's statement that the usage of 'modes of being,' is 
based upon the Biblical concept ofrevelation. Says Torrance: 'This, he conceives, however 
independently of the whole biblical testimony to the intra-divine communion as the ground of 
God's reconciling Selfgiving for epistemic communion. In other words, it seems at this point 
that Barth risks fuiling to be true to the content of Biblical revelation through his concern with 
the Biblical concept of revelation.' 74 Williams criticises Barth in this area as well. He states that 
despite all of Barth's attempts to insist that any theology be determined by a preceding 
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revelation, before Barth actually seeks to expound the revelatory texts themselves, he is already 
indebted to a prior view of what revelation is. 
' . .it can be shown that Barth is actually operating (even unconsciously) with a concept of 
revelation defined in advance of his exegesis ofthe records of revelation, substantial questions 
are raised about not merely the ground but also the shape of his articulation of that doctrine.' 7' 
Torrance claims that in his choice of seinsweise, Barth illustrates a certain indebtedness to 
Enlightenment Cartesianism in which a kind of '/-centre' is attributed to God. 'His professed 
concern to express by the term Seinsweise "relatively better and more simply and clearly the 
same thing as is meant by person" thinly veils the influence on Barth's thinking of the 
conception of God as singular subject.' 76 Has Barth, in making this adjustment from the earlier 
concept of God as absolute substance, completely avoided the substance mentality? To some 
extent, yes, but interestingly, the idealistic conception of the 'absolute subject' turns out to 
retain more of the traditional substance 'boundary mentality,' than even the traditional view of 
God as substance. We have suggested that what particularly characterised the Aristotelian 
substance, was its 'concrete separatedness,' as an ontological reality. Barth's movement from 
depicting God as absolute Object-substance to the idea of God as absolute Subjective-substance 
has not done anything to diminish this. In fact, God as 'Absolute Subject' is a God who is even 
more 'separate,' more 'ontologically independent' from the rest ofrealitythen traditional 
metaphysical views of God. Instead of absolute 'objective substance,' we have the absolute 
'thinking substance,' of Descartes. 
As with many of Barth's other interpreters, Moltrnann demonstrates that in the area of 
pneumatology, Barth's doctrine of the Trinity particularly falls down. If, as in the Augustinian 
tradition, the Spirit is merely the unity of the difference between the Father and the Son, the 
same danger that most Western theology is faced with, becomes eminent in Barth as well. This 
is a concept ofTriunity which at heart, is nothing more than the attempt to reconcile a dyad of 
'differences.' We have already suggested that, philosophically speaking, it is hard to speak of 
triads, without them being actually reduced to thinly disguised dualities. That is why Derrida 
highlights binary distinctions, not triadic ones. In the metaphysics of the West, dualities 
(differences) are more entrenched than triads. The third mode of being does not add anything 
special and individual to the Revealer and his Revelation. 77 It is the glue between two absolute 
substances-" In the reflection logic of the absolute Subject, Barth is speaking about God who 
discovers himself as two 'oppositions.' ' ... the Son is nothing other than the self of the divine 
·'J,"the counterpart, the other, in whom God contemplates himself, finds himself, becomes 
conscious of himself and manifests himself. ' 79 
8.4-BARTH. HEIDEGGER AND PLOTINUS 
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We have here with Barth an interesting variation of triadic, Plotinian unfolding, joined together 
with Enlightenment idealism. Both prior philosophies are placed into the Barthian perspective 
of Christian theology. Plotinus, we have documented, interprets the universe as an ontological 
unfolding of transcendence (Beyond Being) into the world of Being. Plotinus did this also in an 
actualistic sense (witness this outworking in the ontology of Marius Victorinus). At times, one 
is tempted to conceive of the One of Plotinus as possessing a certain 'I-consciousness,' as well. 
However, the unfolding of Plotinus is not that of a subject discovering itself in 'otherness,' as 
we find with Barth. It is rather the 'ecstatic unravelling' ofa higher ontological level to a lower, 
in three, self-reflexive steps. 
However in this process, as with Barth, there is also a certain process of opening up or 
'revealing.' However unlike Barth, with Plotinus, man's 'time' in all ofthis remains man's own 
time. He must, in his own time and world, seek through contemplation, the 'One,' who is 
ineffable. Ultimate and real communion with the One in this life is very difficult, but not 
entirely impossible. Plotinus also uses his triad to secure the 'otherness' of his One. In other 
words both Barth and the Plotinian tradition, are working with the same philosophical problem 
of trying to integrate two 'infmitely qualitative differences.' In the case of Plotinus, there is no 
concept of 'theological grace,' to assist man in this task. With Barth however, grace does not 
'perfect nature,' it completely overrides it. The One paradoxically moves man out of his own 
time into God's time, bringing about the union between man and God, which is the fulfilment of 
the covenant in Christ. In this sense, Barth's One seems to be even more radically transcendent 
than that of Plotinus as the only way for man to conceive of him, is for man to lose his own time 
as it were. 
Both Barth and Plotinus operate from an avowed prior ontological presuppositionalism. Plato 
sought to understand the contingent world, by moving towards transcendence, but both Barth 
and Plotinus presuppose the infinite as the starting-point for philosophy. Plotinus however, 
thinks like a philosopher. He asks the same question as his great predecessor. What is true 
reality? Barth's programme is thoroughly theological. His question is how can man know the 
God of absolute freedom? Nevertheless, within the Barthian scheme ofthings this does boil 
down to a certain quest for reality as welL In Barth what is truly real is man replacing his 
anthropological reality with a theological one. 
212 
As we have mentioned, both Barth and Plotinus operate within the framework of an ontology of 
total qualitative difference, although with Barth it is a theological ontology. It is this framework 
that brings about the corollary starting point of ontological presuppositionalism. Plotinus' 
authority is reason, as was Plato's. Generally, Plotinus' place for reason (nous) is high indeed. 
Yet, it is a reason somehow allied to a mystical vision. For Plotinus the One gives rise to eternal 
Mind. Barth's authority is also reason, but a radically new reason. Almost impossibly, Plotinus 
fits more into a type of 'nature-grace' scheme, than does Barth. In Plotinus admittedly, 
knowledge that brings about union with the One, is beyond normal reason. Yet, in arriving at 
special knowledge, we start with normal reason before we go beyond it, before we throw away 
the ladder. We have identified the same paradoxical view of reason in the Platonic binary view 
of Logos'Mythos in the 'Symposium.' We start with Logos, but under certain circumstances we 
can graduate beyond it towards special mythical knowledge. This mythical knowledge is only 
legitimate, however, if we retain the foundation of the Logos. Mythos that does not retain 
Logos, is bad Mythos. Aquinas and Augustine are doing the same thing, but theologically. 
Sapientia is the fulfilment of the classical Logos. 
Barth, however rejects this classical 'logos' paradigm entirely, and in doing so, is probably 
slightly more consistent than Plotinus in the working out of his own 'infinite qualitative 
difference' schema. In Barth, only idolatry starts with the ladder of the classicists. Theology is 
not the perfection of nature, it is the inauguration of a new nature, the nature of grace. Grace 
replaces nature. The post-Reformational Barth has less confidence in man's intellectual 
capacities than does the Greek mind. As an unconscious result of this, his ultimate principle is 
even more 'transcendent' than Plotinus' One. 
Nevertheless, there is an interesting fact about Barth's view of reason. This is as follows. When 
we deal with he who is on the other side of the line of total qualitative difference, God himself, 
we might well be entering into the realm of beyond Being. Yet, we are not going into the world 
of beyond reason. Plotinus' view of the world of the One is that it is indeed, a world in which 
reason does not operate. We cannot make rational, predicative statements about the One. Indeed 
with Plotinus, we cannot traditionally affirm anything of the One at all. When we speak of the 
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One, we must enter into the dimension of 'non-reason,' the language of the mystical. Now it is 
significant to observe that although Barth's God is just as wholly other as the One of Plotinus, 
Barth's theology is not mysticism. Why is this? One would have thought, superficially, that 
Barth might have taken this path. Many philosophies arguing for the existence of two utterly 
opposite realms, inevitably land up in some type of mysticism. Barth is the exception here 
because, the inner life of Barth's God, is not beyond reason. It has its own unique reason. It 
might be a reason that is different froll). man's reason, a unique reason, but it is a reason 
nevertheless. With the overshadowing of the Word of God, and through the enabling of grace, 
man can come to know this reason! God as indissoluble Subject does the impossible. He 
objectifies himself for man. 
Now in our opinion there are certain interesting overlaps here between Barth's notion of'God's 
reason' and Plato's A{vthos in the 'Symposium' (although, of course, we must not press the 
comparison too far). Plato's Myth here is a type of 'reason,' but a different type, even a superior 
type. It is that special type of knowledge, attainable by human beings, 'superior' to the Logos, 
coming 'after it.' Barth goes to elaborate lengths in trying to tie up this part of his argument. Yet 
as Van Niekerk has shown, here Barth gets himself into difficulties. To ascribe a 'reason' 
(objectification) to the inner life of God, to then allow man 'access' to this reason, whilst 
continuing to affirm God's total transcendence, becomes problematic. 
Plotinus' triad consists of three separate 'hypostases,' closely related. Yet each is its own 
independent paradigm, despite a mutual dependence of the two upon the One. In Barth's case, 
the triad is a mere repetition of a single paradigm (subject). In our opinion, Barth is closer to 
modalism than both Augustine and Aquinas. Plotinus speaks about an element of illegitimate 
self-assertion (tolma) that brings abcut the two subsidiary hypostases. This is absent in Barth. 
The achievement of the immanent Trinity is to reconcile the illegitimate self-assertion in man, 
not in God's modes of being. 
Plotinus's doctrine of simplicity struggles to speak of the One as exhibiting any 
'consciousness.' With Christian theology, by the Seventeenth Century it was no problem to 
reconcile the idea of a sitnple deity together with personal consciousness. Both the 'One' of 
Barth and Plotinus is utterly transcendent. It is 'beyond Being.' However, instead of using the 
term 'beyond Being,' Barth chooses the 'Freedom of God' or the 'Lordship of God.' As in the 
case of Plotinus, Barth is also using the concept of the triad to try to relate absolute sovereignty 
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to the world without losing that sovereignty. In the case of Plotinus, we must not lose the idea of 
God's immutability and simplicity. With Barth, we must not lose the idea of God's eternal 
subjectivity. He who is 'Thou,' must never become an 'It.' 
Plotinus and Barth both stand in a long line of tradition in Western theology that is reluctant to 
speak of God as substance, yet cannot help but ascribe substance terms to him. The 'One's' of 
Barth and Plotinus are not, the unmoved mover of Aristotle. Both thinkers seek to transform in 
his own way, Aristotelian essentialism. Substance-language places 'boundaries' on God. Barth 
and Plotinus have a certain principle of deferral built into their theology. Because God is 
beyond Being, normal language fails to refer entirely to him. As in the case ofPlotinus, Barth's 
God is never to be identified with the world, with history, human words and even with the 
human body of Jesus Christ. Barth's notion of God can never be reduced to an idea ofa single, 
static substance. God is only known in his dynamic unfolding of himself. Here, Barth moves 
away from Aquinas, whilst building on his foundation. Aquinas' God manifests the unique 
principles of essence and existence. Both principles are included in his definition. Aquinas 
synthesises both 'closedness' and 'openness.' Philosophically, Barth goes beyond this. God is 
pure actual existence, not substance.'0 Barth does not want to ascribe any closedness to God. 
There might be a place for credal definitions in the faith of the Church, but true dogmatics is not 
about definitions. It is not about closedness. Substance brings about a closed view of God. With 
Barth then, Aquinas' essence has been absorbed into 'actual existence.' 
At the same time, as we have said, both Barth and Plotinus find it difficult at certain points, not 
to use substance language when speaking about God. For example, in the case of a theologian 
who self-consciously upholds 'orthodoxy,' how can there be talk of God without bringing in 
substance-language? Both Barth and Plotinus deal with the problem by suggesting that when the 
word 'substance' or 'hypostasis' is used of the One, it is used in a manner very different to the 
same word as applied to other objects (subjects). Here, Barth and Plotinus both disagree with 
Aristotle. True Being is not substance. This brings about a systematic diminishing of the 
material universe. In both the cases of Barth and Plotinus, all modes of Being ultimately depend 
upon the prior principle of the One who is vastly removed from the material universe. With 
Barth man retains true human substantiality only through his participation in God. 
For this reason, we do not find Barth speaking too much about Being in the traditional 
Aristotelian sense. Although we will examine this issue below in detail, some preliminary 
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comments can suffice here. In Barth, true Being comes from God, who although cannot be 
reduced to Being himself, confers true meaning or true self-identify on man. Barth does not 
entirely escape Heidegger's critique here. Being is reduced to something. Human being is 
reduced to its participation in God's 'Being.' Together with Heidegger however, Barth's being 
is also a sense of actualistic, authentic human existence. It is never a theoretical 'category.' True 
'Being' or the understanding of being is never an understanding of an 'object,' or a 'theory.' 
True reality is not a 'whatness, or an 'isness.' Again, as in the case of Heidegger, Barth 
perceives true reality as concrete human existence. Yet, Barth says this is never man by himself 
True 'human being' is to be found only in the true man as transformed by grace, subsumed by 
it. The true man discovers himself as he encounters God in the Ii ving Word and the 
proclamation ofthe Church. In the case of Barth, both Aquinas' notions of'Separatio' and 
Judgement are united in the new man in Christ. Both are controlled by Revelation. Both are 
equally only authentic in God's time. 81 
Heidegger's chief criticism of the scholastic tradition was that it impressed upon existence, an 
overarching theoretical concept. Does Barth escape this critique? In our opinion not as the 
overarching reality of Revelation is the principle that dictates man's existence. This is 
unavoidably a theoretical notion. It is the true 'theological form' of 'human matter.' Man finds 
his true 'form' in God. Even Barth's exegesis of the so-called revelational text of theology, is 
determined by a prior view of Revelation. Barth (and with Heidegger, as we have seen) 
therefore also operates with a 'pre-ontological' (vorontologisch) understanding of the world. 
This is not so much the Heideggerian Dasein but God's Lordship in his Revelation. We also 
have the concept of 'Herstellen,' in Barth as well as with the scholastics and the Greeks. A prior 
'form' gives impetus to the individual's concrete existence. With Aquinas, but in a different 
way, Barth also thinks of what God's revelation must be like before God actually tells man what 
that revelation is. It turns out that in Barth, the principles of Anwesenheit and Dasein are 
combined. 
As with Plotinus, Barth is reluctant to interpret God as a plural. God is not plural, he repeats 
himself three times. From the Neopythagoreans onwards, there is a fascinating characteristic of 
Western theology. This is to commence with the notion of a prior unity, moving towards 
differentiation (Indefinite Dyad) and then returning to that unity, again. This, as we have 
identified, means inevitably that the conception of substance will precede participation, which 
then becomes a second-order construct. This always brings about the danger of 
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subordinationism in Trinitarian theology. With Barth however, although there is a 'difference' 
in God, that 'difference' is not radical differentiation. It is merely God knowing himself as 
'other.' The Father is not differentiated in the modes of Son and Spirit. He is repeated. In order 
to be known by man, God is not to be radically differentiated. Differentiation in this sense is 
anthropology, not theology. 
Plotinus does make some capitulation to immanence in his philosophy. 'Nous' and 'Soul' are 
not as transcendent as the 'One.' The Plotinian transcendent\ immanent line can be thus 
diagrammatically depicted as follows: 
A-PLOTINUS 
ONE 
---------------- TRANSCENDENn IMMANENT LINE 
NOUS 
SOUL" 
In Barth, when we speak about God there is no capitulation to the immanent world at all. If man 
is to know God, man must move upwards into Trinitarian time. There can be no overlapping 
between man and God's times. The role of the Son in the 'Dogmatics' is therefore primarily 
ontological as well as salvific. It is to bring about the impossible: unity between man and God. 
We can express this as follows: 
B-BARTH 
FATHER 
SON 
SPIRIT 
------------------ TR~SCENDENn IMMANENT LINE 
HUMANITY 
The transcendent\immanent line in Arius can be expressed as follows: 
C-ARIUS 
FATHER 
----------------- TRANSCENDENT\ IMMANENT LINE 
SON 
SPIRIT 
HUMANITY 
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When Barth tries to achieve unity between man and God, he does so without any identity 
between the man Jesus Christ and the eternal Logos, in achieving this unity. Between man and 
God, there cannot be any real identity. Therefore with Barth, between the human man Jesus and 
the eternal Logos,"' any real unity is also a problem. 
8.5-BARTH ON PARTICIPATION 
8.5.1-TRlNITARIAN PARTICIPATION AS KO/NON/A 
Torrance" rightly points out that Barth's Trinitarianism cannot be completely reduced to 
philosopbical idealism. Barth himself is aware of the various Trinities in the idealist tradition 
and clearly places them into the category of the vestigial trinitatis of Augustine." However, 
says Torrance: 'In sum, the manner in which Barth conceived of the logic of revelation means 
that the suggested parallels between Hegel's treatment and Barth's, even if they reflect different 
intentions and are given a different kind of warrant, may not be ignored.'" 
Torrance points out that Barth's conception of the unity in difference of the three modes, 
contrasts radically with the ontological participation (methexis), as used for example by Plato in 
the 'Syrnposium.' 87 There is no reai ontological connection, in Torrance's opinion, between the 
Barthian Trinitarian participation and that of the Platonic corpus. The relations in the 
'Dogmatics,' move beyond Aquinas as well, towards a view of 'relations of communion' which 
is different from natures of origin. 'Barth's explanation refers to the unity of the Father, Son and 
Spirit as oneness of essence. However, he also speaks of fellowship (Gemeinschaft) and definite 
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participation (eine bestimmte Teilnahme) of each mode of being in the other modes of being, 
and, indeed, since the modes of being are in fuct identical with the relations of origin, a 
complete participation of each mode of being in the other modes of being, where this 
participation is to be conceived as a "co-presence" (Mitgegenwart) of the modes of being in 
each other.'88 The conceptual 'overlapping' of the modes, is not discussed merely as a 
philosophical problem ofperichoresis. Instead, Barth conceives of the intertrinitarian life as that 
of a mutual fellowship. However, he does not do this at the expense of traditional ontological 
terms which also feature in his outworking of interpersonal participation. Torrance" feels that 
Barth should have more effectively integrated the notions of koinonia with essence or being in 
his Trinity. ' ... this would have opened the door to a conception of the divine economy which 
involved a richer integration of communion and communication, a participative "worship 
model" in interaction with his "Revelation model" in terms of the mutuality of the divine 
communion. We need to therefore interpret seinsweisen in theological, relational terms, not just 
according to those of philosophical idealism. ' 90 
8.5.2-GOD AS 'BEING' 
In the Aristotelian and Platonic traditions, there has been a close affmity between Being and 
substance. 'Being,' is that which is 'really real,' whereas 'becoming' is that which is not so real. 
We have already seen that with the idea of God being a 'first substance,' problems develop if 
we want to speak about God in a Trinitarian manner. God can be depicted as a first substance in 
that he exists concretely. Yet, is it not also characteristic of the Aristotelian first substance, not 
to be related to anything else (pros Ii)? We saw in our exposition of Aquinas' Trinity, that he 
has no problem in speaking of de Deo uno using first substance type of terminology. In the 
treatise de Deo trino, he is forced to move out of traditional substance language. Even generally 
speaking, the Church has found it difficult to reconcile the Biblical language of God as a 
relational being with God being a 'first substance.' 
Barth might call God true Being, if by Being we mean 'that which is really real.' However, 
Barth's view of the being of God is radically different to other conceptions of Being that have 
gone before. We can therefore almost use Jean Luc Marion's book title of Barth's God: 'God 
without Being,' although, in saying this, Barth's notion of God is very different to that of 
Marion. We have said that at times, Barth does make use of traditional terms in his Trinity. 
However, this usage fits into a new, overall Barthian conception of God_ Barth will not rid 
himself of the view that God's being is Being (really real). Nevertheless it is a unique type of 
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being that is (to use Jungel's words) 'In Becoming. ' 91 We need to be careful here. Barth in 
describing God's being possessing the characteristics of Becoming, does not bring God down 
into the world of Becoming. God still remains sovereign in his 'Freedom,' he does not lose his 
transcendence. It is however a transcendence that manifests a 'becoming' without loosing it's 
Being. 
This means that Barth feels that we cannot, if we are true to God's revelation, have a prior, 
scientific conception of God as static 'substance.' ' .. one will not then be able to conceive God's 
being as subsistence in the way in which Plato conceives ousia ... Such a being as subsistence 
excludes event from itself, so that such a subsisting being cannot reveal itself. ' 92 So with Barth's 
doctrine of the 'three persons,' he is not able to deal with them as persons which subsist, as in 
Aquinas. This way of speaking was possible for the medieval scholastics and Augustine, 
because of their substantial conception of God. Barth, on the other hand, speaks of God 
according to a 'Becoming,' or an 'Event' conceptuality. As God is always becoming in himself, 
it is the nature of his becoming, that we can identify his being. The unity that we perceive in the 
being of God is based upon his unique differentiation or difference. This is why Barth prefers 
relational language to that of essence discourse. 'Essence' sharply divides the idea of static 
being, from the existential acts of such a being (essence and existence). 
One of the reasons why we must see God's being as becoming, is because revelation insists that 
God is like this. We do not operate from some philosophically conceived prior conception of 
God, towards an understanding of what God is like. On the contrary, we start and end with 
revelation. The 'becoming' we see in God is based on the becoming which happens in 
revelation. To conceive of God according to 'categories,' (which is nothing other than the 
analogia entis) is to limit his happening in the present and future, according to a certain 
preconceived, logical paradigm. God is not a transcendent being, but a transcendent happening. 
His transcendence is that of radical temporality, not timelessness. The appropriations in God are 
the descriptions of God's triune life. Now, if God's becoming in revelation is identical to his 
essence, then why have a distinction between the economic and immanent Trinities?" This is in 
order to retain God's freedom. God's act depicts God's essence. However, his essence is not 
exhausted by his acts. Barth makes his movement from becoming to being. 
It therefore seems that in speaking of God, Barth has seemingly moved away totally from the 
idea of Being which somehow has its origin in Greek metaphysics. The 'Dogmatics,' 
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nevertheless makes ontological statements all the time_ Barth nses traditional ontological tenns 
such as 'subject\predicate,' 'subject\object,' and so on. This is unavoidable. Indeed, one might 
tenn the 'Dogmatics' as a 'Christian ontology' (although one can be sure that Barth would not 
appreciate this epithet)_ Be this as it may, Barth's view of God's person does not employ the 
concept of being in the sense of a general doctrine of Being_ 94 Unlike Augustine and Aquinas, 
Barth is not trying to formulate a doctrine of God's being which has its origins in a general idea 
of Being_ Barth is very wary of reducing the doctrine of God to a 'doctrine of Being_' 
Says Barth: 'In the preceding chapter we have already had to resist the threatened absorption of 
the doctrine of God into a doctrine of Being and we shall have to do this again. ( ... zu nehmen 
gegen das drohende Aufgegen der Gotteslehre in einer Seinslehre und wir werden das gleich 
wieder zu tun haben)_ '''However, Barth is not afraid ofa doctrine of Being in the right 
circumstances: 'Yet we must not yield to a revulsion against the idea of Being as such (Wir 
durfen aber einem Ressentiment gegen den Seinsbegriff .. ).'96 'At the same time we must be 
quite clear on the other side, that our subject is God and not being, or being only as the being of 
God (Wir mussen uns aber nach der anderen Seite daruber im Klaren sein, daB Gott unt nicht 
da " . ) ,97 s0em ___ . 
'And this concretion cannot take place arbitrarily, but only from the Word of God, as it has 
already occurred and has been given to us in the Word of God. ' 98 Traditional dogmatics was 
right to define God as a type of 'essence,' but this ought never to have been done in isolation 
from the Trinity, the revelation of God, ofhimself. 99 This position is to our thinking, 
problematic. Let us assume that God reveals himself to human beings through some type of 
language, even human language that has come under the control of God's Revelation. This 
human language must presuppose some type of ontology, that is 'human_' Indeed, it can be seen 
that Barth's view of God's being is not entirely based on only revelation. It is revelation as 
Barth himself understands it. There is also the clear influence of his academic predecessors and 
contemporaries. Barth is therefore naive to assume that he can proceed from 'scratch,' with a 
new type of Being, entirely based on revelation. 
Now ifBarth in his idea of God as unique being, does not shy away from the language of being 
completely, then he must be thinking of God as some kind of 'object.' How can this be the case 
when we consider Barth's view of God? The answer is in Barth's unique understanding of 
God's being as 'self-interpretation.' This means that God 'objectifies himself,' to himself. He is 
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the object of his own knowledge insofar as he has interpreted himself. 100 Insofar as God 
interprets himself in his revelation, he has also made man, through participation (see below) the 
subject of the knowledge of God. Before God 'objectivises' himself to man, he firstly 
constitutes the man as the knowing subject of himself (as God). When man apprehends God as a 
'being,' this is not the result of human objectification of God, the way a human being objectifies 
other objects in the normal phenomenological sense. This is not possible. God is always 
indissolubly Subject. It is only as human beings through Christ, 'participate' in God's 
knowledge of himself, is man through grace, entitled to know God as 'object.' 'The taking up of 
man into the event of the knowledge of God is grounded in the taking up of man into the event 
of the being ofGod.' 101 This is not to be viewed as deification but as the very salvation of man. 
8.5.3-BARTH ON HUMAN PARTICIPATION 
It is our view that Barth's strong theology from above, safeguarding the infinite qualitative 
difference between man and God, downgrades the sensible world, which can never be identified 
with God in anyway. Barth's view of the independence of God, together with the strong 
determining role of the Word, places man's autonomy in jeopardy. This, admittedly is putting 
the matter somewhat simplistically.102 The truth is that Barth actually has no intention of 
bringing about the loss of freedom on the part of the creature in her participation in the Word. 
He reflects both the Enlightenment and Reformation concerns of avoiding the reduction of 
human freedom through ecclesiastical or even theological autocracies. Nevertheless, Barth is 
also adamant that if man is to have a freedom, it is to be based on the freedom and the 
transcendence of the triune God. It shall be a freedom that is given and determined on an a 
priori basis. 
It has already been suggested that Barth is operating within precisely the same duality as his 
other predecessors discussed in this thesis. In Barth's case the immanent Trinity can be 
described as dwelling in the realm of 'beyond Being,' whilst the economic Trinity enters into 
the world of Being, but does not become identical to it. However, unlike modern theologians 
such as Moltmann, Pannenberg and Junge I who accept Karl Rahn er' s argument for an identity 
between the immanent and the economic Trinities, Barth separates what he calls God's eternal 
history from his temporal acts. '00 
' ... but absolutely essential that along with all older theology we make a deliberate and sharp 
distinction between the Trinity of God as we may know it in the Word of God revealed, written 
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and proclaimed, and God's immanent Trinity, i.e., between "God in himself' and "God for us," 
between the "eternal history of God," and his temporal acts .. _ In so doing we must always bear 
in mind that the "God for us" does not arise as a matter of course out of the "God in himself," 
that it is not true as a state of God which we can fix and assert on the basis of the concept of 
man participating in his revelation, but that it is true as an act of God, as a step which God takes 
towards man and by which man becomes the man that participates in His revelation. This 
becoming on man's part is conditioned from without, by God, whereas God in making the step 
by which the whole correlation is first fashioned is not conditioned from without by man. For 
this reason __ . theology cannot speak of man in himself, in isolation from God. But as in the strict 
doctrine of the Trinity as the presupposition ofChristology, it must speak of God in Himself, in 
isolation from man. We know ourselves only as those addressed by God's Word, but precisely 
as those addressed by God's Word we must know God as the one who addresses us in freedom, 
as the Lord, who does not exist only as he addresses us, but exists as the One who establishes 
and ratifies this relation and correlation, who is also God before it, in Himself, in His eternal 
history.'",. 
Barth neither identifies, nor separates these two dimensions in God_ To do otherwise, would 
compromise God's freedom-"' In fact, man's ability to know God in any way, for man to even 
speak properly about God, means he must first acknowledge the priority of the Word of God. 
This is why although Barth does make use of some traditional, technical language in speaking 
about the Trinity, this is not nearly as much as is the case with Aquinas and Augustine. The 
'logical' problems, stemming from the Trinity, with which the later medieval Church grappled, 
are almost entirely absent from Barth's writing. They are certainly, not a priority to him. This is 
because, with Barth, the fundamental error of the past was to begin the doctrine of God by 
deducing the doctrine of the Trinity on the basis of logical distinctions. 'Barth insists on the 
positive and negative aspects of the divine freedom by emphasising the irreversibility of 
analogous concepts in the doctrine of God and by underscoring both the anhypostasis (God 
actually becoming flesh for us) and the enhypostasis (Christ's humanity draws its meaning from 
the immanent Trinity and not from history) in his Christo logy_' 106 
This all translates into a seeming reduction of autonomy on the part of the creature. Not so, says 
Barth. 'There can be no doubt that with an autonomous reality God does give to man and to all 
His creatures, the freedom of individual action.''°' In fact the supremacy of the Word and the 
Spirit does not detract man from his freedom and responsibility_ On the contrary the Word of 
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God establishes the freedom of the creature and confirms her freedom as his creature. 108 He who 
intends to assert his autonomy, independently of God, loses his freedom. Freedom is therefore 
the gift of God, operating through the doctrines of election and salvation.109 Freedom is 
achieved through the movement of God into human history via the work of Christ on the cross. 
'The outcome is that according to Barth, one must be "determined" in order to be free. But 
unless it is God who determines us, we are under the power of a demon, not the truth.' 110 
Barth's view of human freedom in God, as participated freedom, is far more of an ethical-
theological view of participation than that of Aquinas and Augustine. Here Barth is closer to the 
views of Levinas. The freedom of man in Barth, is the freedom of obedience to the Other. Yet, 
this still seems to be a type of freedom granted by 'absolute decree.' If everything has been 
determined by God in advance, what kind of human freedom can there be? Barth denies that the 
predetermined nature of human freedom, is a predetermination of autocracy on the part of God. 
Creation is the giving of space to autonomous man, so that the creaturely person is not violated 
by the action of God as Son and Spirit. Barth here is trying to uphold the freedom of the 
creature under God, whilst rejecting the Schleiermacher view of 'absolute dependence.' 
Nevertheless, readers of Barth continue to see inconsistencies in this department. 
In his view of human sharing within the Godhead, Barth goes much further than his 
predecessors, in his view of participation. In line with his general suspicion of traditional 
ontologies, and as we also find in his discussion of'Being,' Barth's perception of participation 
reflects also this suspicion. When we read Barth discussing human participation, the discussion 
is within more of a 'theological-ethical' framework, than the Aristotelian\Neoplatonic 
metaphysical framework of Augustine and Aquinas. 
Generally in this thesis, we have identified two main but distinct types of participation. Firstly, 
there is i:he intertrinitarian participation within the Godhead. This expresses the relationships 
among the persons themselves. Then we have another type of participation, normally spoken of 
in a different language to this type. This is the participation of man or creation in God. 
Traditional thinkers such as Aquinas, keep the two types well apart in their discussion. With 
Barth there is a newness, in that he radically combines both types, synthesising them into one. 
Whereas in classical Trinitarianism, philosophical relations are read up into God, in Barth's 
case, a specific theological view of relations is read from God, back into man and all created 
reality. There is as we have seen, an essential 'relatedness within the divine reality.' This 
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relatedness includes a fundamental relatedness to men. In the theology of Barth, paradoxically, 
although there is this powerful ontological divide between God and creation, more than any 
other orthodox theologian, Barth integrates the human being into the very life of the Godhead 
itself. As we have intimated this takes place only at the expense of man's time and temporality. 
The integration or participation of the human race into the Godhead, is not a process of 
deification. It takes place via God electing the entire race of humanity, in the election of the 
man Jesus Christ. Man's participation in the Godhead occurs without in any way, God crossing 
the transcendence\immanence line and compromising his freedom. God's free and gracious 
choice for relations with a reality that is other than himself is what makes it possible for him to 
be both fully related and yet ontologically distinct. 111 
8.5.4-FROM HUMAN BEING TO BEYOND BEING 
We have therefore, in Barth's discussion of being a somewhat unbalanced situation. His view of 
being is an entirely theological one, which, despite his disclaimers, has no real appreciation for 
any type of being that is not of the theologically determined type. True being is that which is 
God, and all other entities that subsume themselves beneath this prior, theological principle. The 
implication is, that all other realities outside of this framework, are not true 'being' at all. When 
the truth is told, the theological view of being, for all its apparent involvement in humanity and 
the world, (becoming) is actually totally transcendent to it. The system dehumanises man. 
So Barth's God actually turns out not to be without Being, (Marion) but more like 'Beyond 
Being.' Barth is struggling with the same problem as his predecessors, and even though his 
theology is remarkably unique, the basic dnalistic paradigm is the same. However, what is 
particularly unusual, is the way Barth solves the problem of the participation of man in God. He 
tries to do uphold the possibility of man's participation, without taking away the transcendence 
of God. To a grpter extent than that of his predecessors Barth's view of humanity is such that 
human beings are lifted up from their position of authentic 'this-worldness' into the Godhead 
itself. 
In the case of the Trinities of Barth's predecessors, in some sense the triad involves an 
ontological 'downgrading' of normally one hypostasis' (particularly the Logos becoming flesh) 
enabling God to 'reach down to man,' but obviously without losing his deity. Barth will have 
none of that. Barth's Trinity does not play the traditional role of relating man to God. His 
Trinity is there to enable God to relate to himself, something within which man can have the 
225 
privilege of participating, ifhe is prepared to pay the price. Although the Barthian view of the 
incarnation does represent a movement from top to bottom, the real movement in the 
'Dogmatics' is actually from bottom to top. Jesus does not really bring God down to man's 
level, he actually lifts man up to God's level. The price? Man joins God in the world of 'Beyond 
Being.' There is an almost total downplaying of creation (becoming) in the 'Dogmatics.' 
Although God is 'in becoming,' his becoming is ultimately not the same becoming as Plato's 
becoming of creation. God's 'becoming,' is actually a becoming that wishes to move evefYthing 
up into the theological world of Being. It is a 'becoming,' that is totally separated from the 
traditional world of 'becoming' (Creation). In order for man to really accept his salvation, he 
has to lose his own 'human being,' in order to enter the transcendent world of God. This is a 
world which can in traditional language be termed as 'Beyond Being.' This is the clear 
implication in Barth's thought. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that Barth insists that 
in joining himself to the Word man actually discovers his true humanity. This is not taken away 
from him. We need to also observe that because Barth's God is 'temporal,' it is not so easy to 
speak of his theological universe as comprising of two clear levels of being and becoming as we 
can in Plato. Despite this, we do still feel that these basic tendencies in Barth, do remain. 
8.6-THE SUBSTANTIAL NATURE OF TIME 
We have already suggested that although Barth seems to eschew traclitional concepts of 
substance in the immediate, Aristotelian sense he has not succeeded in avoiding a substance 
paracligm. Barth's theology is no less a metaphysics than the theologies of Aquinas and 
Augustine. It is merely a theology in which the concept of substance has been rearranged. The 
term now becomes even more of a 'presence.' It seems to be even more all-embracing and 
totalitarian. The 'substance' is the act of God's self-revelation in Christ, which is the all-
consuming centre of theology. Barth's 'substance' terms do not come in when he speaks about 
the composite nature of God, as with his predecessors. This is due to his actual ism. 
Nevertheless, once the actualism is understood, it can be seen that the substance-language has 
merely been relocated into Barth's discussion of God's revelation. We have shown that the first 
canclidate for the term 'substance' in the 'Dogmatics,' is the so-called 'centre of theology.' 
8.6.1-TIME AS ANCHOR AND CONTINUANT 
Robertsm has convincingly shown that Barth's concept of time in the 'Dogmatics,' also 
performs the role of 'substance.' We concur with this view for mainly two reasons (which 
Roberts himself to some extent does not fully draw out). Firstly, the doctrine of time supplies a 
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neutral, impersonal under-girding to the dogmatic enterprise. It is the 'substrate,' the 
'receptacle,' or necessary 'supplement' to Trinitarian dogmatics. In the case of Plato, the 
receptacle is the 'nurse of all becoming.' In Barth the receptacle (time) is the under-girding of 
all being, both the being of God and the being of man. With Barth's Trinity, the concept of time 
or God's 'radical temporality' is the anchor behind the self-unravelling of God, and as such 
plays roughly a similar role to that of the 'substrate,' in the Trinity of Augustine. Again, as with 
Augustine's substrate, Barth refuses to grant time centre-stage. God's self-Revelation as Father, 
Son and Holy Spirit, together with his involving of himself with men through Jesus Christ, 
occupies centre-stage. Nevertheless, the silent anchor of all this is not the unravelling of the 
Triune God, but the special 'time of God.' This is the glue, binding all of the 'Dogmatics' 
together. 
It provides the continuity between the doctrines of man, Creation, God, the Trinity, Christology, 
Soteriology and that of the Resurrection. Without the special role of time that Barth grants to his 
view of the Trinity, his dogmatic enterprise becomes totally untenable, incomprehensible. 
Time's overall position as metaphysical anchor, with respect to Barth's Trinitarian ontology, is 
therefore similar to that of the First Substance in Aristotle. 
Secondly, the role of time in Barth, performs also the role of continuant behind 'accidental' 
reality. One of the greatest criticisms levelled against the Aristotelian first substance, is that it 
remains an inaccessible, mysterious reality that allegedly remains behind the accidents that 
come and go from out of it. As we have observed, similar criticisms can be made of the idea of 
a 'substrate,' or a 'receptacle.' In the case of Barth, the particular 'accidental reality,' with 
respect to God's time, is man and his reality. In the entire outworking of the 'Dogmatics,' it is 
clear that God's reality, God's time is 'substantial,' whilst man's is 'accidental.' This is why, 
for example in the 'Dogmatics,' grace precedes and drowns out almost completely, the 
doctrines ofhumanity, creation and the sciences. This remains the case, despite Barth's efforts 
to the contrary. 
Barth's strong division between time and eternity, is firstly evident in his landmark 
'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' In fact the entire commentary, whilst not being a 
traditional exposition of the letter, deals with how revelation can operate in temporality. 113 
Idealist thought also concerned itself with the same problem of the antitheses of eternity and 
time_ In his 'Critique of Pure Reason,' Kant argued for an antinomy between finite and infinite 
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space and time. He stated that this problem was insurmountable, as these aspects were 
metaphysical problems imposed upon the mind by the reason itself. 114 On the other hand, Hegel 
attempted to solve this problem. ' ... Hegel of course also affirmed Kant's transcendentalism. He 
did so in the same sense that Fichte did; following in his footsteps, but excluding, admittedly, 
the specifically ethical tum Fichte had given to his affirmation. Reason critically understanding 
itself is reason which is self-established and liberated, which is now as a matter of principle the 
master of all things.''" 
'It has been regarded as Hegel's greatest achievement that in his concept of reason, which also 
embraced historical reality, he finally and justifiably overcame the dualism of transcendental 
and historical-empirical thought, the dualism of the eternal truth of reason and the accidental 
truths of.history ... '"6 His rediscovery of the doctrine of the Trinity assisted him in this. In his 
dialectical view, Hegel subsumed all aspects of reality, including those in a state of apparent 
contradiction, such as time and eternity, into a single, over-all process of noetic realisation. 
Barth does something similar in his notion of realised eschatology, synthesised with the 
principles of justification and election on the basis of Christ's death. Thought and being enter 
into identity as the being of God and the being ofman. 117 'The exploitation of eternity as the 
true indweller of the transient temporal present in the "Church Dogmatics" owes much to Hegel 
but is given its dynamic impulse by the principle of analogia jidei as Barth attempts to 
propound the nature of God's revelation in Jesus Christ.' 118 
By the time of the 'Church Dogmatics,' Barth had abandoned the earlier annihilation of time by 
eternity as outlined in the 'Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans.' Instead, we have the 
time of eternity, sweeping man's time into itself, reshaping it."' In the incarnation, God is with 
us. This has indeed occurred in human history. At the same time, it has not occurred as other 
events occur in history. 'Time is not eternity. Eternity itself is not timeless. It is the simultaneity 
and co-inherence of past, present and future. Thus eternity is the dimension of God's own life, 
the life in which He is self-positing, self-existent and self-sufficient as Father, Son and Holy 
Ghost ... But we do not speak of God's abstract eternity, but of the eternity of His free love, in 
which He took and takes and will take time for our sakes, in which he wills to be for us and also 
wills that we should be for Him and therefore in mutual fellowship.' 120 It is through his doctrine 
of the 'act' of God as a dynamic principle that Barth seeks to overcome the threat of time into 
eternity. 121 
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Briefly, it is interesting to relate Barth's doctrine of time to that of Derrida's view. Derrida 
believes that the unstable indicative power of signs is partly overcome by the metaphysical 
notion of time. This version of metaphysical time is the time scheme of the present. This comes 
about due to a certain preconceived view of the subject, which brings about time as a type of 
object. Each new 'now' appears before the knowing subject as an eternal being or a produced 
object. We can compare Derrida's view of metaphysical time to the action of a photographer, 
photographing an object moving at high speed, with a strobe lamp. Time appears as a 
hypostatised series of instants that can be frozen, the way the camera and strobe light stops the 
differentiating movement of a fast-moving object. When we look at the photograph, we do not 
see the true reality of what is produced. We do not see the actual movement of the photographed 
object. htstead, we see it portrayed as an eternal present, in the photograph. The photograph is 
therefore an imposition on a prior reality. This imposition does not record the process of that 
reality as it really is. However, in order to make that original movement 'knowable' to the 
subject viewing the photograph, the process is changed. This is exactly how the notion of God's 
'time' functions in Barth's theology. ht revelation, God through grace enables man to perceive 
his eternal dynamic movement, as an instant 'object' to be understood as such. God makes 
himself become an 'object,' suited to man's faculties. 
8. 7-CONCLUSION 
8.7.1-BARTH AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM 
Barth's intellectual perspective was very much part of the sweeping crisis in Germany that took 
place during the first part of the Twentieth Century, and indeed, has extended to the present 
time. This is the dissolution of, or the crisis of historicism. This is the bulwark behind not only 
most German metaphysical systems, (such as Hegel's) but indeed, to some extent all of 
metaphysics since the Enlightenment. ht fact, we might suggest that the real substratum of all 
metaphysics from that time has often been a specific view of history or time. 122 One might 
suggest, that modernity's perspective on history has fulfilled the search for the category of 
'ultimate substance.' Of course, the Christian worldview has also made an important 
contribution to the Western understanding of historical linearity. It is this view of history that is 
needed to support any view of an eschaton, or an 'apocalyptic tone' that Derrida sees in much 
of current philosophy. History has often been perceived as the ultimate continuant, the reliable 
medium of superlative reference and stability. For Hegel it is the superlative noetic movement. 
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In Hegel's renewal of the doctrine ofthe Trinity, Augustine's substratum is replaced by history 
itself. For history to be the linear concept that it has been conceived to be, it has to firstly 
presuppose the possibility of the transcendentalisation of the conscious subject from it. This 
demands the prior possibility of meta-narratives or supra-historical perspectives. Nietzsche's 
view of nihilism served as a catalyst forthe beginnings ofa postmodern approach to history. 
We need to place Derrida as well as Heidegger into this reactionary camp, operating contrary to 
this perspective of history. 
Barth might not have been directly dealing with the 'philosophers of crisis,' in his country, 
during his career. Yet, his oeuvre reflects the crisis. Barth's history might be a unique reversal 
of Kant, placed in a specific theological environment, but the historical problem in his work is 
not unique. The crisis of the modem view of history and its overthrowing by Heidegger, 
Nietzsche and others, has essentially brought about the 'end of history.' This is the postmodern 
era. Now there can be no real discussion of the category of substance, without in some way 
linking it (even briefly) to the problem of history. The problem of modernity is none other than 
the problem ofhistory. The essence of modernity is the essence of historicism. To uphold the 
existence of substances as spatio-temporal continuants, implies also a certain linear view of the 
historical process. 
With the postmodern perspective, such truths no longer are easily sustainable. 'Since the notion 
of truth no longer exists, and foundation no longer functions (insofar as there is no longer a 
foundation for a belief in foundation ... ) there can be no way out of modernity through a critical 
overcoming, for the latter is part of modernity itself. It thus becomes clear that an alternative 
means must be sought and this is the moment that could be designated as the moment of the 
birth of postmodemity in philosophy.' 123 
It is worth applying this astute statement of Vattimo to Barth's theology. This is because we 
believe that Barth is grappling as a theologian with precisely these problems of overcoming the 
problem of theological truth. His answer or solution (ultimately unsatisfactory) is a sharply 
theological one. Barth hoped that his theological answer, would allow him to bypass or 
immunise himself from the problem of history. Barth is a powerful exponent of theological 
monovalence. This is a theological-positive account of reality, which acts as an ideological 
screen, attempting to relocate and obliterate problems. 
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Because 'reason' is the bastion of the old view of history, the alternative means of history that 
must be sought cannot be a 'reasonable, critical overcoming.' This would inaugurate another 
Enlightenment view. That just pushes us further into the problem. We need an entirely new 
paradigm. In Barth's mind, this was not to be postmodernity, but a specifically theological 
paradigm in which God radically breaks into our time with His time and all human questions are 
'destroyed' by a prior act of God. This is what prevented Barth from moving into a postmodern 
view of history. Instead, he chose a radical theological alternative view of history. This turned 
out to be even more of an authoritarian view, (history as 'presence') than the views of his 
predecessors and contemporaries within modernity. 
8.7.2-BARm AND DECONSTRUCTION: A CENTRELESS CENTRE? 
We have already, in a previous article,124 observed continuities between Barth and certain 
proponents of deconstruction. These continuities must not be allowed to deter one from the 
strong and obvious divergences between the two positions. When we speak of certain 
proponents of deconstruction, we refer mostly to some of those less circumspect disciples of 
Derrida. These disciples, together with Barth in his theology, use deconstruction as a type of 
epistemological positivism. In the following chapter we shall attempt to demonstrate that 
Derrida himself does not uphold this idea. 
Of course, such disciples of Derrida would aggressively retort that such an accusation of 
positivism misunderstands the entire point of deconstruction as a discipline. Deconstruction is 
about the denial of any Bourgeois notion of centres, together with the roles they play in 
metaphysics and other disciplines. However, we are not entirely convinced that certain brands 
of deconstruction escape from falling into the very trap they place before others. Let us look at 
this problem firstly from Barth's perspective. Barth's centre of theology, which is the 
unravelling of the Word of God, is the over-arching, theological and methodological prior 
principle that determines all dogmatics. All dogmatics is determined in this prior manner. This 
is because Barth (despite disclaimers) feels that he has the monopoly on how the Word himself 
wants to do dogmatics. Criticisms thereof are automatically excluded on the basis of the a priori 
principle. The Word has spoken, and has determined on his own, not only the structure, but also 
the method of dogmatics. Thus, critics, be gone. 
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Concerning certain proponents of deconstruction, we have a similar situation. Any reasoned (in 
the traditional sense of the term) attack upon deconstruction, brings about gales of derisive 
laughter from these said proponents. After all, to criticise their position is to assume the 
possibility of truth, of reference, of premises and conclusions. These are the very things that 
deconstruction suggests are futile and irrelevant. By pointing this out, deconstruction thus 
deconstructs and subverts my own discourse, leaving me speechless. In continuing Foucault's 
programme of the undermining of power as dominion, these deconstructionists replace one type 
of authoritarianism with another type. 
There are also certain fascinating affinities between certain interpretations of Derrida's 
comment "ii n 'ya pas d'hors-texte,m and Barth's notion of reality. In the case of Barth, 'there 
is nothing outside of the Word.' The Word is the entire determinant of all reality. All of life, all 
of thought is to be determined by the Word. Any thought, any science or view of human 
existence that does not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Word, is inauthentic. There is 
'nothing outside of the Word.' 
8. 7.3-ECONOMY OF DIFFERANCE TOGETHER WITH A THEOLOGICAL 
SUPPLEMENT 
Barth has his own view of theological differance. As with Derrida, (but according to a totally 
different agenda) Barth also wants to uphold a radically open-ended view of divine self-
communication. God's Word also consists of a certain type of deferral because of the Object to 
which it attests. The Word of God can never be reduced to a certain human structure, such as 
writing or even preaching. In the understanding of God, there is always 'newness,' nothing is 
ever completed. Yet, we cannot locate Barth's work as just another type of negative theology. 
Barth's discourse is not an apophatic mode. We can see and say the Word of God, even if we 
can only say it indirectly. It might employ writing as one of its vehicles, but it can never be 
reduced to writing. It seems that in Barth, the Word is both 'presence,' (only through grace as 
God for us) and 'trace' (as God in Himself). Unlike Derrida, Barth outlines this view of 
theological language, in order to uphold the freedom of God from being reduced to man's 
strictures. Derrida on the other hand, maintains the doctrine of deferral in order to uphold the 
possibility of man becoming free of his own strictures. 
Barth understood theology as a necessary but impossible task. Says Ward: 'Karl Barth's whole 
theology of the Word in words, his Christology and the whole edifice of his incamational 
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theology are theological readings of a law of repetition, representation and textuality described by 
Jacques Derrida as the economy of d(t}erance. Or, put another way, Barth has shown how the 
unerasable theological questions inherent to all discourse can become the basis for a 
dogmatics ... Barth provides Derrida's economy of difference with a theological supplement.' 116 
This, Barth does through his Trinitarian theology. With respect to truth, chapter five of the 
'Church Dogmatics' stresses that for the theologian there are two antithetical positions, a 'double 
reading,' working concurrently. Firstly, we have to acknowledge that truth is never immediate, 
but mediated to us. Secondly, with this mediation appropriate to us we have to do with the truth 
of the truth itself. 'The first position is related to the second through a Trinitarian openness, but it 
is antithetical to the second because Barth insists there is no third term between ourselves and the 
truth. ,121 
God gives himself to be considered (anschauen) and conceived, but this certainty is mediated. 
Barth as we have observed is very careful in his language describing the participation between 
God and man. He purposefully preserves a certain openness or non-continuity. The form of 
representation that is important is not that of any overlap, but immediacy in revelation. All that 
revelation does is to represent to us, a repetition of the past. What follows can only be a sequel 
(Falge) and explanation of this initial truth. 128 We handle not revelation itself, but only a memory 
of revelation as 'trace.' It is a re-representation of the presentation, the trace ofa trace. 
Theological discourse is a constant negotiation and re-negotiation of a situation that never can be 
solved, nor should it be solved. This is the analogia fidei. 'He takes words freighted with 
epistemological weight and places them within a theological context which displaces or disrupts 
their common meaning without his actually defining their new theological sense. ' 129 
Paradoxically, Derrida might well have been referring to Barth himself when in the first chapter 
of 'OfGrammatology,' he refers to the: 'End of the Book and the Beginning of writing.' Derrida 
points out that 'theology' has been a major contributor to 'book mentality,' or the traditional 
perspective of textual closedness. You will not, suggests Derrida, find any logocentrism without 
there being the notion of an absolute logocentric presence. 
We are reminded of our reading of Plotinus, in which we stated that all being and the world of 
contingency finds its 'truth' in an eternal concept, that of 'Beyond Being.' Now as we have said, 
Derrida might well in principle be speaking of Barth here, as Barth probably more than 
any other theologian, insisted that all truth and reference depends on the prior transcendent 
'Logos,' the Word of God. 
8.8-REITERATING THE PAST: SUMMARY OF SOME KEY POINTS 
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We now move to conclude this chapter on Barth. In this last section, we wish to provide a 
summary of some of important basic lines presented and developed in this thesis. We shall 
reiterate these under a few focusing points, and then in a preliminary manner discuss how these 
points will be relevant to our next chapter. At the same time, we shall commence our discussion 
on Derrida by briefly outlining his approach to the problem of closure. 
Undertaking a study of the doctrine of the Trinity is a highly complex task, requiring insight 
into a vast array of disciplines. Such study needs to show sensitivity towards historical, cultural 
and metaphysical aspects. The real, historical world of the development of ideas does not come 
pre-packaged for later university study. 
Our focus on the concepts of Trinitarian substance and participation, has revealed that these 
two terms fit into a certain encompassing philosophical and cultural view of reality. This is 
comprised of more than one facet. This perception of reality is highly compact, as each of these 
facets is indispensable to the basic picture and totally bound up with one another. As such, these 
make the existence of a notion of a substance and that of participation, possible in the first 
place. When we speak about these facets, we are not speaking about the Trinity only, but some 
of the philosophical assumptions that underlie Trinitarian thought. We have in the preceding 
pages, sought to highlight some of these, as they pertain to our subject matter. Some of the most 
important ones are reproduced now, below, as follows: 
8.8.1-CENTRE AND SUPPLEMENT: THE TYRANNY OF ESSENCES 
A substance or essence ontology proceeds by starting from scratch. Whether Aristotelian or not, 
it produces a central cornerstone on which all depends. This can be an ontological (pre-
Enlightenment) or methodological (Modernity) substance. The search for a centre is based upon 
the underlying opinion of the unity of reality whether ideal or real. This unity is usually 
expressed in a self-proclaiming presence of some type. However, in this way of thinking, 
tensions develop. For example, how can unity stem from only from self-identity? If an entity is 
both a unity, and itself, and in some kind of relationship to subordinates, can it really then be 
purely self-authenticating in an autonomous manner? 
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Because of the traditional emphasis on a single, central principle, differentiation, although 
acknowledged necessary, is slightly frowned on. We see this particularly in the Platonic 
tradition. Even in certain Western notions of the Trinity, differentiation is only acknowledged 
within an overarching unity. Because the nature of an entity is determined by its relationship to 
the Forms, not other beings, horizontal sharing of being is not encouraged. 
Derrida states that centres always imply supplements. Supplements are there, in an inferior way 
(such as writing to speech) to supplement the centre of reality. Supplements are also 
marginalised. Yet, as we have attempted to show, the story is not that simple. Often as Derrida 
has shown, the supplement is central, or as central as a cornerstone of a system. Can we really 
say that the Aristotelian substance can survive without the substratum or the accidents? Without 
the accident, where is the substance? (Locke) The other problem (acutely recognised by 
Descartes) is, if we say that God is the centre of things, if God is that which is most truly self-
authenticating substance, then how can other, more marginal entities be substance? What is then 
the difference between created and non-created substance? 
In all our thinkers examined up to now, usually 'participation' as a concept is treated as the 
supplement to the substance. If we commence a study with an a priori notion of an underlying 
view of the unity of reality, we will tend to commence with one central thing, one idea. This 
results in substantiality before participation. Yet within the context of Trinitarian theology as it 
developed over the years, participation refused to take a subordinated position. By the time of 
Thomas, participation and relation has been fully elevated to take the same ontological status as 
that of substance. This was the case in Thomas' Trinitarian theology. However, in his other, 
general thinking, substance continues to take pride of place. Yet, Thomas' elevation of relation 
to full ontological status, as forced upon him by his Trinitarian theology is unique. We do not 
find this same elevation in the rest of his work. In our view, this is a uniquely Christian 
contribution to the doctrine of relations, not paralleled elsewhere at the time. As a unique view, 
it came about due to the special nature of its subject matter. 
The Third Man argument is an interesting example of the tensions developed in this type of 
system. What is central in Plato's system? Many Platonic scholars would deny that this question 
is valid. After all, Plato is renowned for his lack of systematic presentation. Be this as it may, as 
an individual philosopher, he thought very much according to centres. In our view, the 
authenticating 'centre' of Plato's system is often portrayed as the world of the Forms. Yet again, 
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the story is not as simple as this. For in order for the Forms to be sustained, there is the need for 
the 'One,' a 'receptacle,' and so on. The Third Man Argument (loosely understood) reveals that 
in a closed system there is often a call for further differentiation. 
With the Christian Trinity, we have the rise of a unique effort of employing an idea of a single 
centre (one God) of diversity (three persons). 
8.8.2-SHOWN, NOT SAID: DERRIDA. THE TRINITY AND THE PROBLEM OF 
CLOSURE 
Although the Western world has had an ongoing love affair with the Logos, there is always that 
propensity to acknowledge a dimension of reality that cannot be perceived through merely 
logical means. This is particularly clear in the Trinity. Various thinkers, in diverse manners, 
accept that the time does come when we must 'throw away the ladder.' Wittgenstein's 
'Tractatus,' is just one example of this. Many of the readers of the Tractatus, particularly those 
of the Vienna Circle such as Carnap, railed to understand what Wittgenstein was actually 
saying. The 'Tractatus' does seem to follow a positivistic line in its emphasis on human 
experience in its picture theory of meaning and its apparent downplaying of metaphysical 
statements. The reality however, is different as the final section of the 'Tractatus' shows. 
Wittgenstein is not stating that all that there is, is subject to scientific verification. In fuct, the 
thesis of the 'Tractatus' is opposite to that of logical positivism, which stated that all truth must 
be reduced to 'scientific truth.' Wittgenstein, on the other hand, suggests that what can be said 
at all must be said clearly through propositional statements. Yet, once this has been done, we 
must throw away the ladder, as the most important things in life cannot be shown through 
propositional language at all. These issues can only 'be shown.' This is the so-called 'mystical 
element to the Tractatus.' 
In this sense, Wittgenstein's project was similar to Kant, whose 'Critique of Pure Reason,' has 
also been misunderstood. Kant was not trying to argue that all of reality is a creation of our 
minds. Neither was he portraying a relativist view. Furthermore, Kant was also a theist. His 
'Critique,' was also trying to outline the limits to the authority of empirical language. Our 
perception of the world is only that which our sensory apparatus allows. This does not mean 
that there is no other reality, that there is no 'Beyond Being.' On the contrary, Kant's study of 
the moral imperative indicated that there is much of reality that lies outside our normal 
observation. He believed that one way of access to this dimension is through the moral centre of 
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man. The reason why we have tried to highlight this ongoing transcendent tradition in the West 
rejecting the tyranny of centres, is because we believe that to some extent Derrida has not 
sufficiently acknowledged this tradition, in his critique of the West. Derrida often seems to imply 
that the West has perennially been in constant search for closure, all of the time_ The Trinity 
shows that this is not always the case. We believe that the Trinity provides a challenge to many of 
the criticisms that Derrida has made. In our final summary, we shall return to this matter. 
" .. .It is decreed by divine law that Being shall not be without boundary .... There is a Limit 
(perias), it is complete on every side, like the mass of a well-rounded (eukukleou) sphere. It is all 
the same to me from what point I begin, for I shall return again to this same point.' 130 
Throughout this study we have seen that all our thinkers discussed, are grappling with this issue 
in different ways. Each in his own way, acknowledges a dimension of'Mystery,' 'Mythos,' 
'Beyond Being,' 'Deferral,' and so on. The Trinity particularly illustrates this problem. The 
question then remains, how do we incorporate this important dimension within normal, rational 
discourse? Many thinkers (Mystics, the early Wittgenstein, Kant, Plotinus and possibly Plato) 
tried to suggest that this dimension is somehow outside of normal language and thinking. As 
such, it is 'Beyond Being.' These thinkers admit that there is a part to reality, that denies closure. 
Therefore, we must not try to speak about it according to the normal cognitive modes employed 
in everyday speech. Others such as Porphyry, preferred to limit reality to Pure Being, or pure 
reason and not go beyond it. In the next chapter, we shall be examining Derrida's position 
concerning this matter. 
We believe that the Christian Trinity presents itself as a totally unique discourse, grappling to 
embody both elements of transcendence and reason. Over a very long period, the Church has 
constantly attempted to attain a balance between these two principles in the concept of the 
Trinity. Initially, thinkers such as Arius wanted to work everything out rationally. Yet by the time 
of Augustine, we have a developed concept of 'faith' or 'Sapientia' which legitimises a necessary 
openness within a rational language of closure. There is a carefully measured deferral that cannot 
go beyond 'orthodox bounds.' Arius' situation is undoubtedly both theologically and 
philosophically fraught with problems. All our thinkers discussed here believed in the necessary 
existence ofa transcendent dimension, (philosophical or theological). Each thinker also insisted 
that in some way, (whether via mystical, moral, pragmatic or revelatory means) 
this dimension, in order to make philosophical sense, has to 'participate' in our world. Barth and 
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Arius, particularly struggled with this. The transcendent cannot be so removed from our 
everyday experience that there cannot be any link between humanity and the transcendent. Even 
Plotinus who was an extremely 'other worldly' thinker, acknowledged this. The transcendent 
reality in some way must move downwards, from above. It must move over the transcendent\ 
immanent line in order to manifest itself to human beings. There has to be this movement over 
the transcendent \ immanent line. Barth and Arius are the exceptions here. With the case of 
Barth, (as we have seen) this is not possible. For the transcendent God to move in this manner 
compromises his transcendence. Instead, Barth prefers man, through grace, to do the moving 
upwards, over the line. 
Arius' system is the most problematic. Arius' Monad is completely transcendent. It is 'above 
the line.' Even the logos has no share in the Father. Fallen humanity cannot ascend over the line 
to participate in the Father through grace. This means that the Father cannot 'participate' in 
creation at all. 
8.8.3-DERRIDA ON HUSSERL'S 'L 'ORIG/NE DE IA GEOMETRIE' AND THE 
TRINITY 
We can look at the concept of'closure' (cloture) in different ways. Spatially, the idea involves 
the encompassing that encloses and co-ordinates the constituent parts of a finite territory. m 
Temporarily the definition can mean the end to an activity or process, bringing it to its 
conclusion. In a preliminary sense, preparatory to our next chapter, we now wish to illustrate 
how Derrida approaches the problem of closure. Here he is studying a problem also clearly 
grappled with by Augustine and his successors. Derrida's discussions of this issue are relevant 
to the Western concept of the Trinity, as we have expounded it up to now. We shall briefly 
discuss Derrida's approach to the problem by referring to one of his earlier works. This is his 
introduction and commentary on Husserl's 'Origin ofGeometry.' 132 
Derrida points out in the opening of his essay on Husserl that he (Derrida) had a marked 
aversion towards the philosopher's wish to close the debate on origins by offering 
conclusions. 133 
In his early study of closure, Derrida is wishing to use Husserlian phenomenology as a means to 
counter the possibility of closure in Saussurian structuralism. Thus, Husserl could be said to 
reject 'Speculative closure' (la cloture speculative). 134 Particularly in Derrida's early work there 
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is a fascination with the concept of a type of closure or a finite totality which is continually 
being breached by a movement towards infinitisation. As we have observed, throughout this 
thesis, this is precisely the area within which each of our speculative thinkers, Christian and 
Non-Christian, have been working, with particular respect to Trinity-thinking. In fact, this 
problem takes on a unique dimension, in the area of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. In his 
'Origin of Geometry,' Husserl locates the origin of this mathematical discipline in a pre-
scientific community with its own Lebenswelt. Geometry as a discipline, originated with the 
beginnings of the process of philosophical idealisation, or the transcendence of the infinite over 
the finite. 
'Thus the institution of geometry could only be a philosophical act. Husserl, who often speaks 
of "Platonising geometry," always assigned to this instituting act a contemporaneity of sense 
with the "school of Plato," "Platonism," the Greeks "guided by the Platonic doctrine of Ideas," 
and so forth. The philosopher is a man who inaugurates the theoretical attitude; the latter is only 
the spirit's radical freedom, which authorises a move beyond finitude and opens the horizon of 
knowledge as that of a prehaving, i.e., of an infinite project or task (Vorhaben). Thereby, the 
theoretical attitude makes idealisation's decisive "passage to the limit" possible, as well as the 
constitution of the mathematical field in general. Naturally, this passage to the limit is only the 
going beyond every sensible and factual limit. It concerns the ideal limit of an infinite 
transgression, not the factual limit of the transgressed finitude.'"' 
Says Husserl, 'Of course, the ancients, guided by the Platonic doctrine ofldeas, had already 
idealised empirical numbers, units of measurement, empirical figures in space, points, 
lines ... and they had transformed the propositions and proofs of geometry into ideal-geometrical 
propositions and proofs. What is more, with Euclidean geometry had grown up the highly 
impressive idea of a systematically coherent deductive theory, aimed at a most broadly and 
highly conceived ideal goal, resting on "axiomatic" fundamental concepts and principles, 
proceeding according to apodictic arguments-a totality formed of pure rationality, a totality 
whose unconditional truth is available to insight and which consists exclusively of 
unconditioned truths recognised through immediate and mediated insight. But Euclidean 
geometry, and ancient mathematics in general, knows only finite tasks, a finitely closed a priori. 
Aristotelian syllogistics belongs here also, as an a priori which takes precedence over all others. 
Antiquity goes this far, but never far enough to grasp the possibility of the infinite task which, 
for us, is linked as a matter of course with the concept of geometrical space and with the 
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concept of geometry as the science belonging to it. ' 136 Derrida comments on this passage as 
follows, 'On the basis of a finite a priori system, an infinite number of mathematical operations 
and transformations is already possible in that system, even if they are not infinitely creative. 
Above all, despite the closedness of the system, we are within mathematical infinity because we 
have definitively idealised and gone beyond the factual and sensible finitudes.' 137 
Says Critchley: 'The distinction between antiquity and modernity could be said to be drawn 
between two notions of infinity: (1) the finite infinity of antiquity's creation, whereas the 
flowering of mathematics and geometry overcomes the closed finitude of the empirical and 
constitutes an a priori system which is itself a finite closure. (ii) An infinite infinity of the 
Copernican revolution of modernity which arises from within the finite closure of antiquity, but 
which overcomes that closure and opens it to the infinite task of scientific knowledge.' 138 
However, later on in Derrida, 'closure' takes on a new dimension, for example in the essay, 
'Violence and Metaphysics,' which appeared in the book 'Writing and Difference. ' 139 Here 
Derrida concerns himself, (as he will now do with much of the rest of his work to follow) with 
the paradoxical captivity of all Western discourse to its own metaphysical finitude, despite its 
demand for escape. 'And, if you will, traversing the philosophical discourse from which it is 
impossible to uproot oneself totally, to attempt a breakthrough towards what is beyond it, the 
only chance of reaching it within language (Levinas recognises that there is no thought before 
or outside it) is by formally and thematically posing the problem of the relations between 
belonging and the breakthrough, the problem of closure.' 140 
Levinas wishes to make an ethical break from the ontological and phenomenological tradition. 
This he can only do by the rejection of the linguistics of that tradition. This, obviously, he 
cannot do. In order to perform this 'reaching out,' he has to use the tradition itself, the very 
metaphysical language of the tradition from which he wishes to break free. Levinas' texts like 
all, similar Western texts engaging in the same task (including Derrida himself) are caught in a 
'double bind,' of 'belonging and breakthrough.' We have then, this 'play,' this 'double gesture.' 
The play of 'belonging,' but 'not belonging. ' 141 
Let us now briefly relate this to the problem of the Trinity. Derrida's immediate concern of the 
'double bind,' is exactly the concern of the Trinitarian theologian. Firstly, as with any 
theoretical thought (such as mathematics), the doctrine of the Trinity, as we have seen, concerns 
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itself with careful axiomatics, rules and logical laws. These have been established over a great 
deal of time, by the Church through its interaction with the Bible, Greek rationality and 
tradition. These 'axiomatics,' result in the 'finite,' theoretical nature of Trinitarian discourse. 
This is afinitely closed a priori. Influenced by the Greeks and the study of the Bible, the Church 
had idealised the idea of doctrine, as a priori troth that takes precedence over all others. It is a 
universal truth, (credalism) true in every instance, beyond the personal experience (a posteriori) 
of the believer in God. The Trinity is a finite totality in which the infinite necessarily operates. 
The church always believed that there is more to the Trinity than just the axiomatics themselves. 
Augustine with his notion of sapientia wishes to build upon the foundation of the classicists, but 
transform it radically, and through grace go beyond it into the mind of God himself, ifthat were 
possible. 
8.8.4-THE TRINITY AND DERRIDA'S CRITIQUE OF THE NOTION OF BEING: A 
PRELIMINARY GLANCE 
Readers of Derrida will discover that he wishes to deconstruct the problematic Western view of 
Being as 'logocentrism,' or as presence. It is with the use of these terms that he focuses his 
critique. Metaphysics is the notion of a transcendent centre, self-authenticating that dominates 
all interpretations of the text. It is the hope of a single, stable focus of meaning from which the 
unity of the text and the world derives. It is against this notion of Being that Derrida brings his 
arsenal of terms such as 'differance.' 'supplement,' 'dissemination,' and so on. 
In his texts in which he provides a critique of 'theology,' these terms also apply. In other words, 
(and this shall result in a fundamental part of this thesis's response to Derrida) Derrida's general 
critique of theology employs the same type of approach as his critique of a general Western 
metaphysics. 
This opinion of Derrida is problematic as he fails to appreciate the possibility of a uniquely 
theological view of being. Aquinas saw the need for this possibility. Theology indeed, might 
share a common heritage together with Western metaphysics. However, must we then reduce 
theology's significance to merely that of secular metaphysics? We question this view. To be 
sure, we have already supported the view that the Western doctrine of the Trinity borrows 
heavily from metaphysics. Yet, does this view of metaphysics exhaust the Trinity's 
possibilities? Is there nothing more to the doctrine of the Trinity, than just the Western 
perception of being as presence? We think not. Here Derrida reveals his roots as non-
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theological. Although recent Derridean scholarship has pointed out the important role of 
religion in his writing, Derrida remains primarily a non-theologian in his critical approach, and 
anti-metaphysical style. That is to say, he does not have a possible understanding of Being that 
is uniquely theological, that includes possibilities absent in purely secular metaphysics. Can we 
reduce the notion of the Trinity to merely a philosophical one? The answer is in the negative. 
8.8.5-THE TRINITY AS A 'KIND OF WRITING?' 
Up to this point, much of our focus on the Trinity has been upon metaphysical and ontological 
matters, in the mode of the analytical tradition. Now as we approach the views of Jacques 
Derrida which are decidedly 'literary' in their focus, we need to in a preliminary manner, ask a 
'literary question' of those great theological treatises on the Christian Trinity. Can it be said that 
the great expositions of the Christian Trinity possess a certain literary character as well as 
ontological? Do these great expositions have their unique style, as opposed to other types of 
literature" On one level, the answer is assuredly no. The literary styles of Arius, (as much as we 
can ascertain his style) Augustine, Aquinas and Barth are widely different, spanning a period of 
fifteen hundred years. Can we not however, identify certain characteristics or features in their 
writing on the Trinity, that are shared in common? Derrida has shown that literary style is often 
closely linked to certain metaphysical assumptions, assumed by any piece of writing. We shall 
bear this issue in mind in the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER NINE: JACQUES DERRIDA 
'No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the splendour of the Three; no sooner 
do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the One.' -Gregory ofNazianzus. 'Oration. · 40.41. 
Der, der, deary didi! Der? I? Dal Deary? Da! Der I, didida; da dada, dididearyda. Dadareder, 
didireader. Dare I die deary da? Da dare die didi. Die derider! Didiwriter. 
Dadadididididada. Aaaaaaaaa! Der I da. 1 
9.1-THE FRENCH SITUATION 
Derrida is important do our discussion for more than one reason. Firstly, his thinking, commonly 
termed 'deconstruction,' has had enormous impact on the intellectual scene, theological and 
otherwise over the last twenty or so years. His thinking is at first glimpse, so different to inherited 
modes of analysis. One of the additional, negative spin-offs of this is that Derrida's thought has 
also become the fashion in many quarters. Derrida's 'method' has been often used by many in the 
theological-philosophical 'revisionist' camp to settle their own personal issues, without any real 
attempt to understand what Derrida is actually saying. Theologically inclined thinkers have 
employed the Derridean method to destroy traditional Christian doctrines. Others, due to a great 
suspicion of Derrida, have determined to avoid him altogether. We believe neither of these two 
routes are advisory. 
Secondly, (and closer to our purpose) Derrida does seem to advocate a truly revolutionary 
approach to substances and differences. We wish to analyse this difference and apply its insights 
to the theological doctrine of the Trinity. 
In this final section on Derrida, (before applying his thought to the Christian Trinity) we shall 
firstly spend a fair amount of time, placing him into his intellectual context. We shall define what 
it is that he is actually doing when he speaks of' deconstruction.' This shall be done not only by 
reading Derrida himself, but also through keeping abreast with some of the current discussions 
and recent developments in deconstruction, particularly the ethical and religious dimensions to 
Derrida's thought. Up to recently, these have been paid scant attention. Attention will also be paid 
to important formative influences on his work as well as an exposition of certain terms such as 
'differance,' and their function within his writings. Efforts will also be made to argue or justify a 
certain type of understanding or 'interpretation' of Derrida, adopted in this thesis. This, in our 
view, is particularly important as there is so much 'fashion-philosophy,' surrounding Derrida_ 
There is often much heat but little light when it comes to discovering what it is that Derrida is 
actually saying. We shall seek to justify our own view of Derrida's work before placing him into 
our discussion of substantiality and participational thought. 
It can be said that the overall 'logical' style of this written thesis inclines towards the Anglo-
Analytical approach in philosophy and literature. When as an individual acquainted with this type 
of approach, reads Barthes, Foucault or Derrida for the first time, he might come away with a 
certain sense of confusion. One is being confronted with type of literature (especially in the case 
of Derrida and Lacan) that defies anything that she has ever read before. There is not only a 
problem with understanding what is being said (if one's reading ever gets that far, most readings 
do not) but also the very style and manner in which the thoughts and sentences are laid down. The 
very genre with which one is being confronted, seems to completely defy normal levels of 
informed discourse itself, let alone philosophy_ There seems to be a problem in trying to combine 
the notion of 'philosophy,' (traditionally a reasoned, disciplined search for truth) with the very 
'non-philosophical' French perforrnative style of doing philosophy_ The French seem to have a 
referential detachment to the traditional, 'analytical,' 'ordinary language' style of practising 
philosophy. 
This has lead many philosophers in the Anglo-analytical tradition to abandon the belief that the 
'mischief-making' French are 'doing philosophy' at all. 2 In this introductory section, we shall 
attempt to provide a brief understanding of the unique ethos of contemporary French thinking_ 
Although the French scene is not entirely responsible for who Derrida is and what he is doing, 
nevertheless it forms the cultural context of his work We make this point because Trinity 
language for the last two thousand years has for the most part been, broadly speaking, 'analytical' 
in style. 
This means that we are not only going to apply some of Derrida's opinions to the traditional 
perceptions in Trinity-language. We are also going to be looking into the subsidiary question, of 
what insights a broad French approach (insofar as they are present in Derrida's writings) to 
thinking has to offer in advancing our insights into the Trinity. 
Although it can be said that Descartes was the first real French philosopher,3 the French cultural 
and intellectual setting of the Nineteen Fifties and onwards (where we can place Derrida) is very 
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different, even violently opposed to much of Descartes' assumptions. French theories ofa 
postmodern break with reason and history have partly to do with the rapid modernisation France 
experienced after the Second Word War.' Prosperity soared, and a new Western lifestyle was now 
possible as never before. This newness also brought with it challenges to much of the accepted 
French habits of doing things. There was a dramatic sense of a new radical, political and 
intellectual consciousness in France. This was partly produced by the events in 1968. It was at 
this time when a student rebellion almost brought the entire country to a standstill.' In fact, 
French intellectual currents are far more closely related to contemporary cultural and political 
events, than much intellectualism elsewhere in England and America. Intellectual movements in 
these other countries proceed in a manner often isolated from general cultural goings-on. Roland 
Barthes and others (such as Baudrillard, Lefebvre) carefully dissected the way in which this mass 
culture idealised a new social configuration through 'mythologies' which provided propaganda 
for the new consumer society. 6 
Immediate post-war France was dominated by Ideologies such as Existentialism, Marxism and 
Phenomenology. By the 1960's, although the influence of these philosophies were by no means 
completely eradicated, they tended to be replaced by a more linguistically-oriented approach to 
theory. This marked the beginning of structuralism, which advanced new theories of mythology, 
language, subjectivity, society and so on. The hey-day of structuralism did not last too long as 
more radical intellectual elements, later to be termed poststructuralism, challenged the very 
fundamental beliefs of the structuralist system. The critiques of structuralism were to be found in 
the contributions of Barthes, Derrida, Kristeva and Lyotard. The structuralists still believed in a 
type of foundationalism, in their desire for a scientific basis of studying culture. They confined 
the play of language to within a closed setting of oppositional structures such as pre\post civilised 
realities (see terms such as Levi-Strauss' 'The Raw and the Cooked').The structuralists still felt 
that in some sense, signifiers came to rest in the signified of the conscious mind. In the case of 
poststructuralists such as Derrida, the signified is only a moment in a never-ending oscillation of 
signification. Meaning is produced not in a stable, referential relation between subject and object, 
but within an infinite interplay of signifiers. 7 
There is also much talk today in philosophy about the difference between so-called 'Continental 
Philosophy,' and the 'Anglo-Analytical tradition.' In the medieval period, Western philosophy, 
written in Latin was a universal phenomenon. However, by the end of the Second World War this 
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inclusiveness had deteriorated to some extent. The distinction between Continental and English-
speaking philosophy is often traditionally described as follows: ' ... philosophy as an academic 
discipline is still largely divided between the analytic tradition as it is practised in the English-
speaking world and continental philosophy as found in France and Germany. The result is that 
names that are marginal to English philosophy like Hegel and Husserl bulk largely on the 
continent, while the reverse is also true, for example in respect of Frege ... For, whereas English-
speaking philosophy's preoccupation with linguistic analysis has produced a degree of 
technicality that has prevented any major influence on other disciplines, continental philosophy's 
turn instead to an analysis of experience (as in the Phenomenology of Husserl to the 
Existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre which grew from it) has had considerable ramifications on 
the intellectual climate as a whole, not least in theology.'' However, circumspection is needed 
here. 
'Modern French philosophy is usually thought to be part of "modern continental philosophy," 
which is contrasted with "Anglo-American Analytical philosophy." This distinction does not 
stand up to geographical, historical and philosophical scrutiny. ' 9 History is not as neatly divided-
up, as systematic thinkers might think. There have been times when continental ideas did make 
their way across the channel (Existentialism, Frege, Logical Positivism etc) and vice versa. 
Furthermore, there are certain 'French' modes that do not easily fit into the assumptions of other 
continental philosophies, and so on. We must also say that, in the ultimate philosophical sense, 
the French tradition is dealing with similar problems as is the analytical tradition. 
Nevertheless, one can make certain generalisations in comparing the two traditions of French and 
English-speaking philosophies. English-speaking philosophy has followed to some extent, the 
purposes and precision language of the positivistic sciences in its rational pursuit of truth. 
Obviously, one's overall philosophical style is largely influenced by the type of truth one is 
pursuing. On the other hand, the French viewpoint at this late stage (Fin de Steele) has become 
increasingly suspicious of traditional, classic modes and their 'a/ethic' view of truth. It is far less 
confident, with sweeping, systematic ideologies purporting to supply the transcendent 'key,' to 
knowledge. lltis is due to a greater appreciation of the epistemological difficulties confronting 
philosophy in a Post-Kantian environment and the important role of the conscious subject in all 
thinking. 
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Thus, it is not surprising when we find a conscious, stylistic divergence from traditional 
philosophies, on the part of the French. We do not fmd a desire to aspire to the rigor and precision 
of the natural sciences. Instead, we find a more presentational and aesthetic form, other than a 
discursive form of thought. The French have often sought to view philosophy as akin to art and 
literature. We find particularly from structuralism onwards, a breakdown of the traditional strict 
barriers between philosophy and other types of writing (literature). 
It is particularly the 'continental' perspectives of phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, 
structuralism and poststructuralism that have rejected traditional 'substance philosophies. ' 10 
' ... all three illustrate how such innovations in methodology mark a transition from the traditional 
philosophy of substance (which assumed that the truth of a being exists in itself prior to its 
relationship to other beings) to the modern philosophy of relation (which argues, contrariwise, 
that the truth of a being is only constituted in and through its relationship to beings, or to systems 
of meaning, other than itself).' 11 
Derrida's philosophy is specifically scathing in this area, roughly terming a substance-mentality 
as a 'presence' mentality and relation-mentality as 'differance.' Like most traditions, the French 
intellectual scene is extremely fashion conscious and much influence here is exerted by Paris as a 
centre. Says Bersani: 'The influence of New York in American cultural life is almost negligible 
compared to the monolithic power of Paris. There is simply no way to resist that power, no other 
centre of diffusion; in France, Belgium and Switzerland the attention of Paris is the only sign of 
success.' 12 
9.1.1-JACQUES BOUVERESSE: 'WHY I AM SO VERY UNFRENCH' 
Those with a French background in philosophy, maintain a different spirit in France, (and world 
wide) compared to the analytic tradition. However, Jacques Bouveresse is an exception. He is an 
example ofa Frenchman, educated as a philosopher in some of France's finest institutions. As 
such he is able to throw some light on what particularly makes the French way of doing 
philosophy, specifically French. He does this, in an unexpected article entitled 'Why I am so very 
unFrench.' 13 Although Bouveresse is French in education and culture, he operates from within the 
Anglo-Saxon tradition, and reflects that tradition's criticisms of French philosophy. For the 
purposes of this introduction, his criticisms therefore provide some valuable insights. Bouveresse 
admits that his position is, 'unorthodox in relation to his own philosophical milieu. " 4 He then 
goes on to state that he has found much of the philosophical literature produced in France since 
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the 1960's as 'idiosyncratic,' 'provincial' and 'unreadable.' 1' French philosophy tends to consist 
of a more 'sociological' and 'documentary' character. It is 'historical' in its appreciation of 
thinkers. It places them into their own epoch, and resists the possibility of any trans-historical 
truth. It hardly seems to be philosophy at all, says Bouveresse. It is certain here that we have in 
Bouveresse's criticisms of his French colleagues, a thinly disguised criticism of Derrida. 
French philosophical styles in particular, have brought about what today has caught on world-
wide. We refer here to the discourses of postmodemity. Postmodemity tends to treat the notion of 
the pursuit of philosophy as 'an exact science' as being 'positivism' or 'scientism.' 16 There can be 
no 'logical' foundation to philosophy. 'From Sartre to the 'new philosophers,' contemporary 
French philosophy has been largely dominated by an instinctive refusal and a panic-like fear of 
scientific and technical culture and by an exasperated resolve to affirm its radical heterogeneity 
and its absolute superiority in relation to a discourse whose platitude, vulgarity, pre-critical easy 
conscience, utilitarian preoccupations and compromises with the political powers-that-be are too 
obvious to give rise to anything but mistrust and disdain.' 17 'The collapse of Marxism, the 
"discovery" of the cause of human rights and the replacement oftheoreticism and scientism by 
moralism and the rhetoric of prophecy have obviously changed nothing of any consequence in 
this state of affairs, since commitment to the service of a great political or humanitarian cause 
continues to be considered capable in and of itself of taking the place of philosophy and of 
dispensing one from the necessity of observing the most elementary rules of argumentation and of 
critical discussion.' 1' 
It is Bouveresse's view, that French philosophy is obsessed with the decline and exhaustion of 
future possibilities. It preoccupies itself with a recurrent pessimism concerning the future of 
philosophy in general. It submits itself to the notion of afait accompli, as philosophy has now 
reached its end. This is the haste to give in to the necessity of the epoch and its decision not to go 
beyond what it considers to be, the limits of historical observation. 19 
Undoubtedly, Bouveresse' s coverage of French thinking today is biased and one-sided. 
Nevertheless, it is a bias that stems 'from the inside.' It stems from a French philosopher, 
working in France today. If his basic thesis is right, then those French thinkers who fall into this 
paradigm of which he is critical, will only be able to adopt the role of criticism, not advancement 
in philosophy. 
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Of course having heard Bouveresse's critique, it must be borne in mind that writers such as 
Foucault, Lacan (whose style is notoriously difficult) and Derrida offend against the canon of 
clarity for very good reasons. They are not choosing to write in an obscure manner merely for the 
sake of offending the establishment beyond the channel. They simply do not accept that so-called 
'clarity' (la clarte) is the universal virtue that it is claimed to be. Barthes claimed that le clarte' 
was adopted as a national virtue as the bourgeoisie had opined that it was a virtue appropriate to 
any class anxious to impose its will on those beneath it. Writers such as these, are entirely 
conscious of what they are doing when they offend so egregiously against the high canon of 
'lucidity. " 0 
9.2-SAUSSURE AND STRUCTURALISM: 'LANGUAGE IS A FORM. NOT A 
SUBSTANCE' 
Having sketched very roughly the general kind of intellectual background that forms the context 
to Derrida's work, we now concern ourselves with some particular influential factors and figures 
themselves. Our first port of call, is the famous linguistic figure of Ferdinand De Saussure (1857-
1913). Here we shall provide an extended reading of not only Saussure's own position, with 
respect to general linguistic theory, but we shall also provide a summary of Derrida's critique of 
Saussure. This provides a helpful introduction to Derrida's method, as Derrida himself admitted 
that his deconstructive program itself is indebted to structuralism. 
Saussure's importance to both structuralism (Levi-Strauss, Lacan and to some extent Foucault 
and the early Barthes) and poststructuralism (such as Derrida) lies in the fact that the pioneers of 
these disciplines applied his findings to more general and concrete modes of study. Saussure's 
linguistics supplied structuralism with a method, not so much its content. Above all, structuralism 
is method. Levi-Strauss operated in the realm of anthropology, Lacan with psychoanalysis, 
Barthes with culture and literature, and Foucault in the area of power. Of these thinkers, perhaps 
Levi-Strauss worked most faithfully within the structuralist paradigm. Barthes, Foucault and 
obviously Derrida, moved beyond the 'scientific' claims of the system to a more self avowedly 
poststructuralist positionn 
9.2.1-SAUSSURE AND SEMIOLOGY 
Language theory since Aristotle, confined itself to the relationship between the world outside of 
language, and how language referred to that world. Saussure recognises three stages in which 
linguistics developed. First, we have something called 'grammar,' based on logic. 'Its only aim 
was to give rules for distinguishing between correct and incorrect forms; it was a normative 
discipline, far removed from actual observation, and its scope was limited. ' 22 
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The categorical theory based upon Aristotle, with which both Aquinas and Augustine operated, 
with respect to their Trinitarian theologies, falls into this first linguistic type. 
Next appeared philology. The early philologists sought to comment on written texts, relating 
them to history, psychology and so on. When dealing with linguistic questions, this was primarily 
for the purpose of comparison of different texts from different historical periods. 23 The third stage 
is what Saussure calls 'comparative philology.' This was the science of illuminating one language 
by comparing it to another. 24 Generally speaking, it was suggested that the scientific basis of such 
study is to show how the correspondence theory between language and the world is 'fixed.' 
Saussure's theory atthe time was a revolutionary shift from this position. Normally, a science 
will work with objects that are given in advance. These objects can be considered from different 
viewpoints. This is not the case with linguistics. The language itself creates the object. 23 
Saussure's new linguistic theory was called semiology or the science of signs. It was his purpose 
to suggest that language is a system of self-regulating signs, rather than a referential system of 
signs 16 In his new discipline, he produced a system of new terms. Firstly: signifier and signified. 
Then langue and parole, paradigmatic and syntamatic, synchrony and diachrony. The signifier 
(signifiant) is the sound made by the speaker, and the mental concept to which it refers is the 
signified (signifie '). The actual thing in the world, to which the sign refers, is granted only 
secondary status. The signified is not to be identified with the words, referent, or the object to 
which the word refers. On the contrary, it is what Frege called the expression's 'sense,' the 
concept expressed by the sign. 27 
9.2.2-'PAROLE' AND 'LANGUE' 
Saussure's second set of terms, form the differentiation between speech (parole) and language 
(langue). Language is the normal manifestation of speech.18 It is the totality of all possible 
linguistic uses. 'It is not to be confused with human speech, of which it is only a definite part, 
through certainly an essential one. It is both a social product of the faculty of speech and a 
collection of necessary conventions that have been adopted by a social body to permit individuals 
to exercise that faculty. ' 29 Saussure makes the distinction between the study of the language-
system, and parole. The latter is the individual act of communication, which the system produces 
or conditions. Langue, not parole must be the primary object of a science of language. 30 
Therefore, historic dimensions of speech, although important are not primary in a study of 
linguistics. Historic speech instances do not determine the rules as to how language works. 
Individual speech instances, form the multiplicity of parts, operating in the whole (langue). 31 
9.2.3-THE ARBITRARY NATURE OF THE SIGN 
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Now, as intimated, where Saussure moves away from traditional, referential models of language 
is when he denies the importance of the view of construing the sign as a name, referring to a 
certain thing in reality. The linguistic sign is the relation between a form, or acoustic image as 
expressed by the human voice (the signifier) and the correlative mental concept formed in the 
mind (the signified). 'The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a 
sound-image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological 
imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. The sound-image is sensory, and 
if I happen to call it "material," it is only in that sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term 
of association, the concept, which is generally more abstract. ' 32 
Signs are arbitrary in that there is no necessary connection between a sign and its referent.33 
Language is a self-regulating system of signs, complete in itself This is why we must not, in the 
proper study oflanguage, concern ourselves immediately with language's relationship with other 
disciplines, such as sociology, psychology and so on. The structural relationship between the 
signified and the signifier is 'arbitrary.' 'The bond between the signifier and the signified is 
arbitrary. Since I mean by sign the whole that results from the associating of the signifier with the 
signified, I can simply say: the linguistic sign is arbitrary. The idea of "sister" is not linked by 
any inner relationship to the succession of sounds s-o-r which serves as its signifier in French; 
that it could be represented equally by just any other sequence is proved by differences among 
languages and by the very existence of different languages; the signified "ox" has its signifier b-
o-f on one side of the border and o-k-s (Ochs) on the other."4 
Once a sign has become fixed in a particular linguistic community, no individual can change it. 
'The signifier, though to all appearances freely chosen with respect to the idea that it represents, 
is ·fixed, not free, with respect to the linguistic community that uses it. The masses have no voice 
in the matter, and the signifier chosen by language could be replaced by no other... We say to 
language, "Choose!" but we add: "It must be this sign and no other."'" We have an implied 
rejection of the individualistic romantic and existential view of the individual as the centre of 
meaning." Furthermore, this view also reduces those 'theological,' or 'metaphysical' 
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perspectives on language. These would place the referential nature between signifier and signified 
at the feet of Ideas in the mind of God, and so on. Meaning in language is generated from within 
that language itself, not from a primary, metaphysical outside source. Here we have the origins of 
the postmodern critique of the 'meta-narrative.' The emphasis is away from a substantial but 
towards a 'relational' view of language. The meaning in a language is not produced by some 
substantial significance in a word, but through its relationship to other words. We have a 
movement away from what Saussure calls a diachronic approach to language, towards a 
synchronic view. The diachronic position emphasises the 'historical' dimension to language. 
Here, what is important is the development of the language, its philological roots and so on. With 
the synchronic approach, the important issue is not the historical factors, but the internalised 
structure, the etemalised present of the language. 
We also have here, the origins of Derrida's 'Differance.' Saussure's views also seem to reject any 
one single hermeneutical opening, or window into language. There is no key, only a sense of 
meaning generated by the 'whole.' In this 'holistic' theory of meaning, the meaning of any 
individual term can only be given by considering its difference from other terms in the language 
or sentence. ' ... in language there are only differences. Even more important: a difference 
generally implies positive terms between which the difference is set up; but in language there are 
differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has 
neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic 
differences that have issued from the system. ' 37 
9.2.4-STRUCTURALISM. THE TRINITY AND CRITICISM 
Throughout the history of the West, starting with Plato and the Sophists, through to the New 
Criticism, there has always been the question of whether certain types of texts, due to their 
'aesthetic,' or 'poetic' nature, are immune to normal 'rational' criticism. Plato criticised the 
Sophists for the fact that in their rhetorical schemes, they denied true 'Logos.' In other words, 
Plato had already decided what kind of interpretative principle needed to operate in order to 
vindicate discourse, or to condemn it. This was the principle of universal reason. The orthodox 
New Critics liked to believe that with the language of poetry we are dealing with autonomous 
structures that go beyond normal, '/ogocentric' interpretative techniques. Fundamental to 
Derrida's interpretative technique is the conviction that all Western texts are subject to the same 
metaphysical problematic. This would include traditional theological constructs, such as the 
Trinity. 
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The significant issue that Saussure raises is the self-vindicating nature of meaning, in a particular 
discourse. Meaning in a certain text is to be found, primarily within that text itself, not so much 
from other sciences external to it. Nevertheless, we need to be careful as to how far we wish to 
take this notion of internalisation. As Godel warns us: No text is 'an island.' 
This insight can be applied to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, provided it is done in a 
defined, careful manner. For example, we have seen in our analysis of the Trinity of Thomas 
Aquinas, a specific development in his Trinitarian 'participational' language. This is evident in 
his raising of the status of relation to that of'substance' in his Trinity. This development is not 
found in his general theological discourse. This was because Thomas was moving within unique 
cognitive (Trinitarian) parameters, not found in his general theological discourse. Augustine 
learnt to radically reapply Aristotle's categories, (as did the Cappadocians and the rest of the later 
West) in his doctrine of the Trinity, precisely because of the unique nature of the Trinitarian 
discourse in itself. 
Many, non-Trinitarian or secular disciples of Aristotle would not approve of what Augustine did 
here. Probably Aristotle himself would number among the discontents. In fact, one cannot 
understand this reapplication of Aristotle, as an Aristotelian, unless one possesses some basic 
insight to the unique issues that the doctrine of the Trinity presents to logical categories. It is our 
view in this thesis that the Trinity is a unique type of 'literary' and 'logical' discourse, with its 
own 'aesthetic nature,' subject to paradoxes and problems, unlike any other Western discourse. 
Any commentator on the Trinity, needs to take this into account. 
We do believe a certain amount of insight can be gained here from Saussure. The problem of the 
'logic of the Trinity,' is not a problem that can be seen to apply to all texts, all realities. In other 
words, there is a sense in which the meaning of the Trinity, is somewhat 'internally determined.' 
It is synchronic, in that its meaning resides partly from within the fundamental and unique 
definition of Trinitarian discourse per se, despite the fact that as a discourse it also borrows from 
general metaphysics. 
Implied here is the fact that we need to acknowledge both synchronic and diachronic dimensions 
to a study of the Trinity. Certainly, Trinitarian discourse is unique and therefore an understanding 
of its axioms, needs to in some sense, operate from within the discourse internally. At the same 
time, there is a certain amount of danger, if we limit such a study to internal issues. Any discourse 
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is also historically conditioned, and must be appreciated as such. One of the weaknesses in 
postmodern thinking is the inclination to separate certain modes of thinking from the history that 
precedes them. We believe that in making an important point, Saussure's pendulum swung too far 
over to the a-historical perspective_ 
Because Western theology is part of a history of general Western metaphysics, the Trinity despite 
its unique status is not immune to the Derridean critique of metaphysics. This would be a 
position, too naive to sustain. However, we need to apply a deconstructive reading of the Trinity 
in a circumspect manner. We need to take, in doing this, full cognisance of its unique nature. 
Later, below, we shall also have to ask whether or not Derrida displays sufficiently, the necessary 
theological insight, as a theological commentator. 
9.2.5-DERRIDA'S CRITIQUE OF SAUSSURE 
Critiques of structuralism are to be found in the texts of Barthes, Foucault, Kristeva, Lyotard and 
Derrida. Although Saussure advocated a certain amount of 'play' in the determination of 
meaning, this play took place within certain strict parameters. It was not a case of 'everything 
goes,' as per the language of Feyerabend_ Derrida praises the internal linguistic system of sign, 
signifier and signified, as contributing to the diminishing of the traditional metaphysics of the 
transcendental signified. However, Derrida's critique of structuralism partly lies in his nominalist 
manoeuvre, of placing more emphasis on the signifier over against the signified. Saussure still 
argued that signifiers come to rest in the signified of the conscious mind. For poststructuralists, 
the signified is only a moment in a never-ending process of signification, within an infinite 
intertextual play of signifiers.38 
'Since there is no presence before and outside semiological difference, what Saussure has written 
about language can be extended to the sign in general. Language is necessary in order for speech 
to be intelligible and to produce all of its effects; but the latter is necessary in order for language 
to be established, historically, the fact of speech always came first. ' 39 'If by hypothesis, we 
maintain that the opposition of speech to language is absolutely rigorous, then differance would 
be not only the play of differences with language but also the relation of order to speak, the 
detour through which I must pass in order to speak.""' 
When Derrida denies the possibility of the 'transcendental signified,' he is not critiquing the idea 
of God. It is a statement critical of structuralism and Husserl's notion of phenomenological 
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intuition. What he is saying is that that there is no access to some kind of signified which, in 
itself, does not make use of linguistic signs. We have to make use oflanguage even if we wish to 
speak of a so-called 'non-linguistic' thing. There is no signified thing stripped of all elements of 
signifying. Here, we can immediately see how Derrida will criticise thinkers such as Plotinus, 
who try to advocate a reality, 'outside of all textuality,' such as the 'One.' 
This is what Derrida means when he states 'there is nothing outside of the text.' He is merely 
stating that linguistic issues pursue all human endeavours, operating in all categories. There can 
be no observation of something that is not in some way, mediated to us by language. This 
includes ideal objects. Nothing is 'present' to us outside of this reality. Now at this stage, we can 
certainly ask Derrida whether or not this is demonstrably the case. Later, we shall have occasion 
to term this part of his philosophy, as semiological reductionism. Are our first apprehensions of a 
thing, such as a dog, immediately perceived as linguistic realities? When we see a dog, do we 
immediately in our minds, perceive a linguistic reality? Do we receive a semiologically shaped 
sensation? Derrida will have to demonstrate that this is the case. Of course, it might be true that as 
soon as we begin to reflect upon what we see, the linguistic reality does come in, but only as a 
mode of internal discourse, secondary to immediate perception itself 
9.2.6-THE SIGN AND THE BINARY PROBLEMATIC 
Derrida attacks Saussure's identification between the binary signifier\signified.41 It is from this 
identification, that Saussure develops his general laws of linguistics. His view of 'difference' also 
operates within this prior metaphysical framework, which means that his difference is limited in 
its application. 'At the point of which the concept of difference, and the chain attached to it, 
intervenes, all the conceptual oppositions of metaphysics (signifier\signified; sensible/intelligible; 
writinglspeech; passivity\activity; etc.)-to the extent that they ultimately refer to the presence of 
something present (for example, in the form of the identity of the subject who is present for all his 
operations), present beneath every accident or event, self-present in its "living speech," in its 
enunciations, in the present objects and acts of its language, etc.)-become nonpertinent. '42 This is 
the possibility of objective description, based upon the notion ofa subject-object differentiation. 
Also, Derrida feels that the 'textuality' factor is not only to be applied to 'texts' but to other 
realities. Most importantly, the textual reality is not only to be applied to the 'object,' but also to 
the 'subject' as well. It also applies to the subject of studies. One must recognise that every 
signifier is in the position of the signified as well.4' Derrida finds the concept of the binary sign 
itself, (signifier\signified) is also committed to a science ofpresence.44 
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9.2.7-PHONOCENTRISM 
This brings us to the heart of Derrida's deconstructive criticism of Saussure (and indeed, many 
other Western figures). This is his observation of the inclination to 'elevate' speech over writing 
(phonocentrism). The launching of the structural method meant an 'inflation of the sign 
language,' and thus, as we have seen, an inflation of the sign itself 'This inflation of the sign 
"language" is the inflation of the sign itself, absolute inflation, inflation itself.'., 
'On the one hand, true to the Western tradition that controls not only in theory but in practice (in 
the principle of its practice) the relationships between speech and writing, Saussure does not 
recognise in the latter more than a narrow and derivative function. Here Saussure is in the same 
tradition as Aristotle; "Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are 
the symbols of spoken words.'""' Saussure: "Language and writing are two distinct systems of 
signs; the second exists for the sole purpose of representing thefirst.'"47 'Why does a project of 
general linguistics, concerning the internal system in general of language in general, outline the 
limits of its field by excluding, as exteriority in general, a particular system of writing, however 
important it might be, even were it to be in fact universal?"'48 
'When Saussure speaks of the science of signs, (the semiological project) he is referring primarily 
to linguistics as its centre and telos. Even though semiology was in fact more general and more 
comprehensive than linguistics, it continued to be regulated as if it were one of the areas of 
linguistics. The linguistic sign remained exemplary for semiology, it dominated it as the master-
sign and as the generative model: the pattern (patron). '49 
'The concept of the sign (signifier\signified) carries within itself the necessity of privileging the 
phonic substance and of setting up linguistics as the "pattern" for semiology. Phone, in effect, is 
the signifying substance given to consciousness as that which is most intimately tied to the 
thought of the signified concept. From this point of view, the voice is consciousness itself. When 
I speak, not only am I conscious of being present for what I think, but I am conscious also of 
keeping as close as possible to my thought, or to the "concept," a signifier that I hear as soon as I 
emit it, that seems to depend upon my pure and free spontaneity, requiring the use of no 
instrument, no accessory, no force taken from the world. " 0 
The built in tension found in Saussure's discourse is that he wishes to marginalise writing in order 
to uphold the primary nature of speech. However, he does not acknowledge that his method 
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involves the possibility of the contrary. Says Bartlies: 'A language does not exist properly except 
in "the speaking mass;" one cannot handle speech except by drawing on the language. But 
conversely, a language is possible only starting from speech; historically, speech phenomena 
always precede language phenomena (it is speech that makes language evolve), and genetically, a 
language is constituted in the individual through his learning from the environmental speech.'" 
'For Derrida, there is a fundamental blindness involved in the Saussurian text, a failure to think 
through the problems engendered by its own mode of discourse. " 2 
Derrida suggests that the desire for 'presence' or the notion of meaning as a self-immediate 
concept, demands 'immediate access' through the pure self consciousness of presence (the 
signifier as a mental notion of immediacy)." The reality is not as simple as this, as Bartlies' quote 
illustrates. 'Textuality' involves all modes ofhuman discourse, whether speech and writing." It is 
not a simple task, merely isolating the one, whilst leaving out the other. Textuality does not only 
involve the 'object' of discourse, but also the 'subject' of that discourse as well. Although 
Saussure does speak of the notion of 'difference,' his difference 'only goes so far.' Meaning and 
reference are still possible within his oppositional structure. 
It is true that the meaning of the phonetic signifier is subject to a differential nature, with respect 
to its relationship to other phonemes in the discourse. Yet, it is still possible that within this 
difference, there is the possibility of direct reference to the signified. The signified can have a 
direct referential link to the signifier, making 'meaning' possible. Derrida wishes to go beyond 
this perception of 'difference,' to 'differance.' It is with 'differance,' that the science of 
grammatology takes over and pushes to its logical extreme, the science of linguistics. Among 
other things, 'differance,' acknowledges that there can be no 'presence,' before difference. 
Although Saussure does acknowledge the principle of difference in meaning, this does not go 'all 
the way down' (using the term of Stanley Fish). Difference as a methodological term in Saussure, 
does not apply to the 'speech\writing' binary itself. Difference only comes afterwards, as in 
Saussure's discourse, speech comes first. 'Nothing-no present and in-different being-thus 
precedes difference and spacing. There is no subject who is agent, author, and master of 
difference, who eventually and empirically would be overtaken by difference."' 'I would wish 
rather to suggest that the alleged derivativeness of writing, however real and massive, was 
possible only on one condition; that the "original," "natural," etc. language had never existed, 
never been intact and untouched by writing, that it had itself always been a writing. " 6 'If 
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language were not already, in that sense, a writing, no "derived notation" would be possible; and 
the classical problem of relationships between speech and writing could not arise.'" 
9.3-INTRODUCTION TO THE TERMS: 'DECONSTRUCTION' AND 'DIFFERANCE' 
In placing Derrida into the context of the theme of substance and participation, we have chosen to 
focus on two of Derrida's terms, which are roughly dealing with these same two philosophical 
issues. These are the Derridean terms 'presence,' and 'd!fferance.' These two terms will be 
examined below. 
Because the famous (or infamous?) Derridean term of Differance, is a neologism stemming 
directly from his interaction with Saussure, now is the opportunity to expound the way in which 
this term functions in Derrida's reading. However, before we commence with this, we need to 
firstly provide some kind of definition of what Derrida means when he speaks about his general 
project which he terms, 'deconstruction.' Derrida believes that we must not think that the term 
'deconstruction' corresponds in 'French to some clear and univocal signification_"' 
Nevertheless, in the broadest of terms we can say that deconstruction as reading, is seen as a 
critique of metaphysics. This is not only a critique of Western philosophy but also of everyday 
language as well. Deconstructive reading is a vigilant type of reading that is open to the 
observations of problems, tensions and contradictions within a text, not overtly accepted by the 
actual text itself. In the way that it proceeds textually, deconstruction is open to the observation of 
certain types of marginal structures and 'unthought axiomatics,' dwelling within texts. These are 
ultimately problematic, and crop up frequently. They are problematic due to the fact that they can 
operate outside of authorial intention, as well as functioning in a manner, contrary to authorial 
intention. 
These 'axiomatics' are often structured within dichotomous modes such as: good\evil, 
essence\accident, writing\speech and so on. These polar terms do not stand together in the 
discourse as equals. On the contrary, one term is always the 'other.' The more important, 
'substantial' term is superior to the accidental. The second term of the binary pair is the negative 
or 'corrupt' opposite. Binary terms are arranged in a hierarchical manner in which the one term is 
given priority. Yet, the reason why the one term is given the pre-eminence is not always apparent 
in the text itself. It is not noticeable through a normal reading of the text, as the so-called 'normal' 
way of reading, presupposes this distinction in the first place. In general, according to Derrida, 
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this carefully structured system of privileges: substance over accident (and participation), unity 
over disunity, presence over absence, truth over error, and so on, is there for a reason. It is not an 
arbitrary set of priorities, but it is there in order to uphold a certain received and prior 
metaphysical view of things. This Derrida recognises as a metaphysics of 'presence.' 
A metaphysics of presence is a particular interpretation of reality, relying upon a sovereign centre 
in the text. It often functions as a hermeneutical locus, transcendent to the discourse itself, but 
determining all its possibilities. This is the apperception of being as presence. Here, Derrida 
borrows Heidegger's terminology. It is a mistake to conclude that Derrida is trying to reverse the 
received priorities, i.e., to privilege writing over speech. Deconstructive reading does not intend 
to point out the weaknesses or the stupidities of a certain writer. Instead, deconstruction illustrates 
that the necessities or priorities argued for clearly by a text, are based on other necessities, other 
'underlying' priorities which are not seen or immediately acknowledged by that text and it's 
readers or author. 
A 'deconstructive reading,' would be different from a 'structural' reading. Kant's philosophy 
speaks ofa structural technique, involving the putting of parts together in order, arriving at the 
form of an object. Kant's reading involves the description of an object that contains a 
'constructive definition,' which speaks of the rules or components that bring about the 
'production' (herstellen) of that object. The opposite of Kant's constructive approach, is a 
'deconstructive' reading. This is a 'destructive' description of the object. However as such, the 
term does not mean 'destruction.' The intention is not to destroy traditional meanings. In a 
deconstructive reading, one concentrates instead upon the rule of an object or concept's 
production, or the process of it's 'coming together.' This is done, in order to reverse the process 
of its construction, illustrating the method and the underlying assumptions of the construction 
employed in the first place. Despite this difference, where Kant and Derrida have a common 
purpose, is that both seek to place limitations on the role and powers of reason, as traditionally 
construed, in philosophy. 
'Among other things, I wished to translate and adapt to my own ends the Heideggerian word 
Destruktion or Abbau. Each signified in this context an operation bearing on the structure or 
traditional architecture of the fundamental concepts of ontology or of Western metaphysics."' 
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Deconstruction is an activity which is very much tied up with the texts that it interrogates. It can 
never set itself up as a closed system of a priori, operative concepts. This is why Derrida is 
sceptical of the notion of looking on deconstruction as a methodology.60 He is therefore, very 
suspicious of descriptions that run something like, 'deconstruction is X.' To define it thus, is to 
miss the point. 'It can thus be seen that deconstruction is a form of what has long been called a 
critique. A critique of any theoretical system is not an examination of its flaws or imperfections. 
It is not a set of criticisms designed to make the system better. It is an analysis that focuses on the 
grounds of that system's possibility. ' 61 It as an approach to reading which shows that often the 
inner 'logic,' of a text can undo itself due to other issues or assumptions, marginalised in the text. 
We can approach a text ostensibly to try to 'discover' the original meaning or truth. Then there is 
the other approach to interpretation, a prospective approach, which welcomes the possibility of 
another meaning or the indetermination of meaning, not always aware of by the author, or the 
intended audience. One example of this, is Derrida's reading of Husserl in 'Speech and 
Phenomena.' Here, Derrida studies Husserl's philosophy of signs and the role of voice and 
presence in his system of phenomenology. 62 Husserl's account views signs as derivative and 
dependent indications of meaning. This meaning in tum is seen as what is present to 
consciousness atthe moment of utterance. Derrida shows that by Husserl's own account of time, 
meaning can never be as he wished it to be. Meaning is not something given in and of itself, but is 
always part of a system of 'traces' and contrasts which exceeds any present instant. Derrida's 
analysis is a 'deconstruction' of Husserl's text. It is a demonstration that the logic of Husserl's 
argument 'undoes' itself It does this because the argument includes within its own ontworking, a 
central paradox or self-contradiction, which underlies its basic insight into the matter under 
discussion. 63 
Because Derrida is obviously doing something new, the issue of the neologism does arise. It is 
inevitable that there will be new terms and new ways ofreading, in Derrida's program, compared 
to general, received ways of doing philosophy. Later we will examine the criticism that 
deconstruction is nothing more than a sophisticated form ofrelativism, clothed in a new guise. At 
this point, let us ask the following question. What does Derrida think of his own style? Is he 
purposefully trying to pursue :fume through purposeful complexity? 'I assure you that I never give 
in to the temptation of being difficult for its own sake. That would be too easy. I believe only in 
the necessity of taking the time-, or, rather, of leaving it, of not ironing out the wrinkles, the folds. 
For philosophical or political reasons, the problem of communication and admissibility, with its 
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new techno-economic givens, is more serious than ever before, for everyone. ' 64 Derrida is not 
stating that we have to abandon the search for determinative meaning. He concedes that the use of 
such a view of meaning is very useful, even indispensable in the real world. 
Is deconstruction nothing more than a strategic reversal of the current state of affairs? Does it do 
nothing more than just reverse the oppositions? Instead of presence on top of absence, we choose 
absence over presence, and so on? We trust that by now we have to some extent, dispensed with 
this view. This is not the case. Deconstruction instead, seeks to dismantle these oppositions, or 
their power as much as possible. Derrida accepts that he cannot 'venture outside of the text, 
outside of metaphysics' to do this. Therefore, he must engage in a type of reading from within in 
which he seeks to render powerless the hierarchical oppositions, which can then be reinscribed'' 
within a different order of textual signification. There is even to the casual observer, a clear 
preoccupation with the text in most of Derrida's writings. This is so, even though Derrida can be 
termed a philosopher in that he is dealing with what might be termed the perennial problems of 
philosophy such as truth, reference and so on. Why this textual preoccupation? Derrida feels that 
this is necessary, because we are all subject to textuality, or to 'writing.' There is often a tension 
between the rhetorical and the logical elements in a given text, between what it often clearly 
means to say, and what it is nonetheless constrained to mean. 
Derrida's point is that many philosophers in the traditional understanding of the word fail to 
understand this. They feel that somehow in their rigorous discussion methods, they can by-pass 
the textuality of their own thought and the limitations to which that textuality is subject. 
Philosophy, in the interests of truth, cannot bypass or annul its textual reality. 'Hence the many 
passages in Derrida that effectively reproach philosophers for not having read the central texts of 
their tradition with an adequate sense of their full rhetorical complexity. What is called for is a 
slow, prudent and careful reading.'66 Derrida's reading proceeds as follows: He firstly provides an 
exemplary reading of a text, according to what we might term the traditional requirements of the 
upholding of authorial intention. Here, traditional grammatical and historical hermeneutical 
principles apply. Derrida plays by the 'rules' imposed by the author herself. Contrary to those 
critics who have not actually read Derrida, the initial task of deconstruction is to understand the 
text, 'in the normal' sense. Deconstruction's task is to engage in a level of reading, according to 
the very highest of received 'analytical' standards. We observe Derrida using this highly 
'analytical' style in his initial critique of Austin's model of speech-act theory. It is only later that 
he adopts what we might term a 'playful' mode in 'Limited Inc,' when he responds to Searle's 
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criticisms of his interpretation of Austin. There is therefore, more than one side to Derrida's 
discourse. In this initial sense, Derrida is by no means wishing to 'abandon' the traditional 'laws' 
of interpretation, or of reading. He by no means intends the 'death of the author' in the sense that 
his reading totally disregards what it is that the author actually intended to say. Take, briefly as au 
example, his reading of Plato in 'Dissemination.' His reading of Plato's text is up to the highest 
technical standard in every way. Only after au initial, 'traditional' reading, according to the most 
exacting standards, cau deconstruction then proceed to engage in its follow-up program, in its 
second stage. This follow-up program is a deconstructive reading, based on aud supplementing, 
the initial reading itself. 
In a preliminary sense we cau ask a question of Derrida here. If, in order to engage in a proper 
deconstructive reading of a text, we need to initially depend upon the existence of a 'received,' 
'normative,' mode ofreading, problems might develop. If the 'normative,' reading needs to be 
deconstructed, if our very process of deconstruction depends on the prior possible existence of au 
'inconsistent' normative reading, are we not running in to inconsistencies? For example, before 
Derrida cau deconstruct Plato's writing in the 'Phaedrus,' he has to first supply to his own 
intended reading audience, Plato's own intended view of what he (Plato) means to say, when he 
uses the term pharmakon.' Derrida first has to tell his audience how Plato himself intended his 
own text to be read, and how many of Plato readers have read it, before deconstruction actually 
came along. 
If deconstruction suggests that ultimate, received possibilities of meaning are naive, that the 
possibility of a unified possible understanding of a text is problematic, how then cau Derrida 
depend upon such a prior possibility, needing deconstruction in the first place? Derrida is not 
entirely ignorant of this tension, but in our view does not fully succeed in supplying an answer to 
it. 
When we speak of Derrida's writings, we are tempted to speak of a specific oeuvre, a corpus, a 
canon, or unified body of thought. Now in some sense, this is au unavoidable reality, but we need 
to remember that Derrida writes in such a way so as to free himself from auy obligation to be 
'true to his oeuvre.' One of his specific purposes is to avoid this trap. Derrida is not trying to be 
consistent in this way. He is not wanting to bring out a new systematic philosophy that accords 
itself with 'common sense. ' 67 Furthermore, although he concerns himself greatly with language or 
writing, he is not seeking out a new 'philosophy of language.' 'He is, however, protesting against 
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the notion that the philosophy oflanguage, pursued "realistically" as the study of how language 
hooks onto the world, is something more than one more quaint little genre, that it is first 
philosophy. But the protest is not because he has a different candidate for the position of "first 
philosophy," it is against the notion of"first philosophy." His attitude towards centuries of worry 
about the relation between subject and object, representations and the real, is like the 
Enlightenment attitude towards centuries of worry about the relation between God and man, faith 
and reason ... The secularists I speak of were continuously assailed by the question: "What 
argument do you have for not believing in God?" Derrida is continuously assailed by the 
question," What argument do you have for saying that we should not refer the text to something 
which is not a text?" Neither has any interesting arguments, because both are not working by the 
same rules, as their opponents. ' 68 
9.3.1-THE NOTION OF 'DIFFERANCE' 
'Differance,' is a term reflecting Derrida's radicalisation of Saussure's view of 'difference.' 
Macann places Derrida's fundamental criticism of Saussure into perspective as follows. ' ... ifthe 
doctrine of "/' arbitraire du signe"the object of which is to stress the arbitrary connection 
between the sign as a physical and as a meaningful unity, was intended as a further exclusion of 
the material or sensible element in language from the internal system of "la langue," then it also 
leads to the paradoxical conclusion that in this respect there is no essential difference between the 
sign as a phonetic and as a graphic manifestation of a meaningful context, as both phonemes and 
lexemes stand in this same arbitrary relationship to the meaningful unity that they represent. But 
if as Saussure holds, the phonetic significant and the meaningful signifie' are two aspects of one 
and the same linguistic reality, such that the identification of the one necessarily presupposes the 
identification of the other, then the same must in principle apply to the other graphic 
significant. '69 
9.3.2-'DIFFERANCE' AND TRACE 
Although Derrida's perception of dijferance is not identical to that of the trace, there is some 
overlap. 70 The sign is what Derrida calls a trace. This is a term, he has borrowed from Levinas. 
The trace is a 'past that has never been present.' The present is determined through a differential 
network of traces. In order for there to be a notion of being as presence, ('to be') this presence has 
to, in a sense, be that which it is not, something dijferant, not present. 'An interval must separate 
the present form from what is not in order for the present to be itself, but this interval that 
constitutes it as present must, by the same token, divide the present in and of itself, thereby also 
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dividing, along with the present, everything that is thought on the basis of the present, that is, in 
our metaphysical language, every being, and singularly substance or the subject.' 71 
'The hinge marks the impossibility that a sign, the unity of a signifier and a signified, be 
produced within the plenitude of a present and an absolute presence. That is why there is no full 
speech, however much one might wish to restore it with or against psychoanalysis. Before 
thinking to reduce to it or to restore it the meaning of the full speech which claims to be truth, one 
must ask the question of meaning and of its origin in difference. Such is the place of a 
problematic ofthetrace ... Thus, I relate this concept of trace to what is at the centre of the latest 
work of Emmanuel Levinas and his critique of ontology: relationship to the ilteity as to the 
aherity of a past that never was and can never be lived in the originary or modified form of 
presence ... the undermining of an ontology that, in its innermost course, has determined the 
meaning of being as presence and the meaning of language as the full continuity of speech. '72 
Derrida is clearly saying that the concept of the trace is that concept that reminds a metaphysics 
of presence (substance) of the need for differentiation, (participation) that is already implied in 
the presence itself 
9.3.3-EXPOSITION OF DERRIDA'S ESSAY: 'DIFFERANCE' 
Because Derrida feels that there can be no such thing, as a single word or concept that is not 
dependent upon differences, he chooses to work with terms such as trace and differance. The 
trace is a 'ghost,' of presence. The presence of the trace is shown as an absence. On one level, the 
term means that a word shows up as a trace when we read it in a manner, sensitive to Derrida's 
theory of differences. Ifwe are aware of the differential nature of the word in the 'system,' we 
perceive it as a trace, not a presence in itself but a word whose meaning can change, depending 
on the system within which it operates. Secondly, the trace refers also to differance itself There 
can be no fixed system of differences in a text either. Even the play of differences is not fixed, but 
also dependent upon the system. This is what Derrida calls the 'weave of differences.' Two issues 
come to mind. Firstly, is not Derrida close to a linguistic equivalent of Harnack here? Just as 
Harnack speaks of a pure 'gospel' before Hellenistic metaphysics, is not Derrida implying the 
existence of a 'pure' or 'purer,' better language-possibility (a clearer possibility of differences) 
than existed before metaphysics? Derrida would deny this, as he does not uphold the historical, 
'epochal' view of a history of metaphysics. In fact, this is one of the main reasons why he rejects 
the categorisation of his work as 'postmodern' This is a capitulation towards a linear view of 
history. 
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The other issue is that of the Aristotelian categories of part and whole, or Being and beings. 
Derrida wishes to avoid a reduction of a system of differences to these two notions. Yet, when he 
speaks of a word's meaning being located in a system of differences, (as constituting the entire 
discourse as a whole) are we not coming close to part and whole language? 
We shall confine ourselves in our definition and exposition of differance, mostly to Derrida's 
essay with this title. With Derrida's 'definition' of the term, it is easy to be very much taken up 
with the seemingly purposeful obscurity in Derrida's conversation. We might be tempted to think, 
'much ado about nothing.' Indeed, many critics of deconstruction believe that this is exactly what 
it is, namely a great deal of conversation concerning itself with 'endless genealogies,' but lacking 
any substance. Specifically, why does Derrida write so obscurely? Why does he seem to 
circumvent the central issue at hand, rather than wade in and make a commitment? We see this 
approach in his essay on differance. He seems to spend most of his time speaking around his 
subject, rather than about it. One answer might be to point readers to the work of Lacan. If one 
thinks Derrida is obscure, try reading Lacan! Neologisms are often employed by those who would 
gain a sense of fushionable recognition in philosophy. Often work on this level, lacks substance. 
Is Derrida one of these individuals? 
However, neologisms will be inevitable in the legitimate sense, if one is genuinely introducing a 
new mode, an entirely fresh way of approaching philosophy. Neologisms will be inevitable if one 
is trying to speak about philosophy in a language that can really understand forgotten dimensions 
about philosophy as a discipline. This is a language that, operates from inside of a philosophical 
discourse, and yet does not become trapped by it. This is a kind of language that evades 
traditional categories via oscillation and dissemination . 
Derrida's comments on the neologism of differance are extremely self-effacing as this term is 
very much bound up with the entire 'method' of deconstruction. He himself admits that the 
possibility of 'standing clear of the term,' in order to provide a summary or definition, is 
irnpossible.73 The purposeful replacement of thee with an a, in differance is only really 
appreciable in the graphic or written context. This distinction is not heard. In fuct it is not 
'understood,' in the general sense of 'comprehension,' either. 74 Differance therefore, cannot be 
demonstrated by giving a speech on the subject. Derrida acknowledges this, even though he was 
attempting to do this at that time. 7' !fin any sense, differance can be 'demonstrated,' it can only 
be so, in an appreciation of how writing has been taking place. To be receptive to differance, is to 
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'keep watch over a text in a certain manner. ' 76 Indeed, d(tferance, keeps watch over our own 
texts, even the discourse Derrida now gives on the very issue. Yet we must not speak of expose, 
because this speaks of the possibility of bringing something into a presence. D(tferance, 
acknowledges the play of differences, which is the condition of the possibility and functioning of 
every sign, as Saussure taught. 77 Derrida wishes to go beyond Saussure in relating the reality of 
difference to both spoken and graphic textuality. 
' ... a difference which belongs neither to the voice nor to writing in the usual sense, and which is 
located, as the strange space that will keep us together here for an hour, between speech and 
writing, and beyond the tranquil familiarity which links us to one and the other. Yet in this we 
must be reminded that differance, is not, does not exist, is not a present-being (on) in any form, 
and we will be led to delineate also everything that it is not, that is, everything, and consequently 
that it has neither existence nor essence.' 78 Derrida even avoids the descriptions of negative 
theology as in his mind to state what a thing 'is not,' is to state an absence of Being, which is 
bringing us again within the realms of ontology. As a reality, differance, although in some sense, 
'within an ontological discourse,' 'exceeds it without return. ' 79 
So in an unravelling of the term, there are no axioms, nor definitions. There are not aims. There is 
no specific telos or theme of domination. We do not operate by' ... proceeding along the 
discursive lines of a linear order of reasons. ''0 Telos, askhaton, ousia and parousia search for a 
present. In this sense, d(tferance does not precede the text-it is inscribed with the text, in a certain 
space within the text, not seen by traditional modes of ontological and metaphysical discourse. 
The concept of play prevents this. In fact, even the term d(tferance, may very well ' ... indeed, 
must, one day be superseded, lending itself if not to its own replacement, at least to enmeshing 
itself in a chain that in truth it never will have governed.'" 
Again, all this needs to be placed in the Saussurian context, and the problematic of the relation 
between speech and writing. The sign is usually that which takes the place of the thing-in-itself. 82 
The thing-in-itself is the referent. 'The sign represents the presence in its absence.'" When the 
present cannot be present, we go through the detour of the sign. The sign, is deferred presence. 
Yet this desire for the representation of presence, is not 'in the language itself.' Derrida argues 
that the sign which defers presence, is conceivable only on the basis of the presence that it defers. 
The sign is dependent upon a 'moving towards the deferred presence that it aims to 
reappropriate. ' 84 'And thereby one puts into question the authority of presence, or of its simple 
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symmetrical opposite, absence or lack. Thus one questions the limit which has always constrained 
us, which still constrains us-as inhabitants of a language-and a system of thought-to formulate the 
meaning of Being in general as presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness 
(ousia). '" Derrida admits that his critique of metaphysics, is close to the Heideggerian notion of 
the forgetfulness of the distinction between Being and beings. Differance is atthe heart of this 
distinction (ontico-ontological difference). 
The arbitrary and differential nature of the sign effects both the signified and the signifier. ' ... The 
signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that would refer only to 
itself Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which 
it refers to the others. It refers to other concepts, by means of the systematic play of differences. 
Such a play, differance, is thus no longer simply a concept, but the possibility of conceptuality, or 
of a conceptual process and system in general. ''6 
The differences of language are effects. Yet not effects of an 'origin,' or a prior 'arche.' 'This. 
does not mean that the differance that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple 
and unmodified-in-different present. D!fferance is the non-full, non-simple, structured and 
differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name "origin" no longer suits it. '87 The differences 
of which we speak are produced, but they do not find their origin in a subject or a substance. 
They do not find their genesis in a being that is somewhere present in a 'pre-determined' manner, 
a presence that somehow alludes difference. Thus, there is no 'trace,' which itself is not the trace 
of a 'hypokeimenon,' a self-subsistence. We must take this beyond just language. ' ... what 
Saussure has written about language can be extended to the sign in general.'" Any language, 
code or system, is subject to this difference. 
Time or the perception of the present is also part of the overturning that the term differance brings 
about. As a term, it upholds the dual notions of spacing and temporalisation. 89 This means the 
trace (breaching) is inseparable from differance. There is no breach without difference and no 
difference without trace. This difference is not a function of the speaking subject. He is already 
inscripted into the language itself He becomes a speaking subject only after making his speech 
conform to the language system. Derrida seems to be saying that it is impossible to have any 
notion of presence outside of this system of differences. We do not therefore have a notion of 
some kind of prior Being, that then gives rise to differences. 
268 
Let us return briefly to Heidegger's suggestion that the forgetting of Being lies in the forgetting of 
the distinction between Being and beings. We shall further, below, consider the relationship 
between Derrida and Heidegger in more detail. At this stage, certain general comments will 
suffice. To be the Being of beings is the matter of Being (die sache des Se ins). The very idea, 
expressed in the genitive, ' ... Being of beings,' indicates a genesis, an emergence. 90 This is the 
emergence of what is present from presencing. Yet the essence of this emergence remains 
concealed (emphasis ours).'91 
'Even the relationship between presencing and what is present remains unthought. Presencing 
becomes what is present. Yet, the distinction between present and presencing remains forgotten. 
The oblivion of Being is oblivion of the distinction between beings and Being. " 2 Derrida then 
points out that, in his opinion, Heidegger's view of the lost distinction between Being and beings, 
or the forgotten of metaphysics 'has disappeared without a trace. ' 93 The very trace of the 
difference has submerged. 'Ifwe maintain that differance (is) (itself) other than absence and 
presence, ifit traces, then when it is a matter of the forgetting of the difference (between Being 
and beings), we would have to speak of a disappearance of the trace of the trace. ' 94 
'Since the trace is not a presence, the simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces 
itself, refers to itself, it properly has no sight-erasure belonging to its structure.,., It seems that 
Derrida's discourse acknowledges via the insights of Heidegger, the possibility of the 
transcendent. Is he acknowledging the existence of what we might term, a dimension Beyond 
Being? Does not the dis of differance refer us beyond the history of Being, and also beyond our 
language, and everything that can be named in it? Here, Derrida seems to be close to the mystical 
element of the 'Tractatus,' of Wittgenstein. The trace seems, in Derrida, to reflect a longing for 
something else, a longing for a dimension that nonnal discourse cannot provide. 'How to 
conceive what is outside a text0 That which is more or less than a text's own, proper margin? It is 
a certain that the trace which "quickly vanishes in the destiny of Being (and) which unfolds ... as 
Western metaphysics" escapes every determination, every name it might receive in the 
metaphysical text. It is sheltered, and therefore dissimulated, in these names. ' 96 
Let us now bring this part of our discussion of Derrida to a close. In conclusion, Derrida admits 
that differance, 'remains a metaphysical name, and all names that it receives in our language are 
still, as names, metaphysical.,., Because the trace, differance, lie on the threshold of Being and 
beings, they cannot escape entirely any 'reference' to their world. Differance, is almost idyllic in 
Derrida's exposition_ It is 'Older than Being itself ' 98 Such a differance, has no name in our 
language 
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'But "we already know" that if it is unnameable, it is not provisionally so, not because our 
language has not yet found or received this name, or because we would have to seek it in another 
language, outside of the finite system of our own. It is rather because there is no name for it at all, 
not even the name of essence or of Being, not even that of "Differance" which is not a name, 
which is not a pure nominal unity, and unceasingly dislocates itself in a chain of differing and 
deferring substitutions. " 9 Derrida also claims that differance is not just another description of an 
'ineffable Being,' or God for example. The play to which Derrida refers, makes possible nominal 
effects, those things that we call names. This is the nominal effect within which differance, is 
inscribed'. just as a false entry or a false exit is still part of the game a function of the system.' 100 
In our view, Derrida is not that far from Plotinus here (although Derrida is critical of Plotinus). In 
his description of differance, Derrida is also struggling with our language, in order to speak of a 
dimension of which 'nothing can be predicated.' In this broad sense, there is a certain 
commonality between Derrida and the other figures featured in this thesis. 
9.3.4-DIFFERANCE AS ITERABILITY101 
Derrida insists that there are only differences in language without positive terms_ 102 That is to say, 
when we do find a positive term, this is only because of the prior existence of differences that 
make this possible_ When we understand the real function of differences in language, we accept 
that the 'presents' we necessarily make use of, are not nearly as 'present' as we think. The trace 
itself is only a ghost of presence_ Its presence is shown as that which is not there_ It is a 
'simulacrum' of its presence. As a presence, it 'dislocates, displaces itself and refers itself It 
properly has no site and erasure belongs to its structure_' 103 
As in the case of Heidegger's notion of Being as 'revealing,' with Derrida, we have the same idea 
of 'opening up,' or 'revealing.' This idea occurs in Derrida's understanding of differance as 
iterability. 104 Therefore with Derrida, we have a notion of Being that is closer to the philosophy of 
Democritus then that of Aristotle. Democritus' being is a continual chain of oscillations, a 
perpetual flux of repetitions_ The location of truth is never in one sentence, or in one term. It is to 
be located instead, as a trace within the entire discourse itself As we have seen, Derrida has a 
very broad definition oftextuality, so broad that it might well be impossible to place boundaries 
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or limiting points on what constitutes the whole discourse_ Being is discourse, the textuality of all 
texts. 
Iterability reveals best Derrida's sense of the constant change of charged differences. Put another 
way, iterability shows that language or any meaningful practice can only manifest itself if 
structured by differance. All human speech-acts are in some sense, trying to repeat an original_ 
We mark the experience in a way that is independent of the individual itself. Abstraction, namely 
a repetition of the individual, has to take place. 
Now we might respond to Derrida and question his suggestion that each person repeats or 
conceptualises an experience according to his own received view oftextuality. Is the notion of 
textuality a first-order mode of experience? For example, most communications that take place 
between human beings, on a day to day basis seem to convey real understanding. ' ... for the most 
part, the identities remain fairly stable, or else change occurs in a predictable ways as words are 
reported from context to context.' 105 It is here where of Derrida's critics bring forward their 
refutation of his position, which many perceive to be that of extreme 'nomina!ism.' 'Common 
sense' informs us that language does not work the way Derrida suggests. In fact, ifit did, no life 
situation would operate effectively in the real world. Even when people of similar cultures, but in 
slightly different contexts meet up with each other, comprehension is possible. It is at this point, 
where Derrida's account of language has been rejected as being 'unrealistic_' 
However, if one assimilates what Derrida is trying to say, we discover that he does not deny the 
successful, 'functional' nature of everyday language_ 'Derrida claims however, that the changes 
in meaning attendant upon iterability are more radical than our simple commonsensical account 
would expect.' 106 Derrida acknowledges that in a particular community, the norms of minimal 
intelligibility change slowly.107 Yet the principle of the iterability of all language would be far 
more apparent, and would show up far more easily, if it were not for the strong 'limiting factors' 
that normal, Western discourse places upon language. Language ifleft to its own nature would 
change far more quickly than we think What keeps this real nature of language somewhat 
hidden, is metaphysics. It is the metaphysical framework that we impose upon language that 
keeps it stable enough for us to 'understand it,' as presence. 
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9.4-DERRIDA AND HEIDEGGER 
More than Husserl, and possibly even Saussure, 108 Heidegger rates as the most influential figure 
behind Derrida's work. Here we shall sketch their relationship in a very limited way, determined 
according to our own purpose. Our interest lies in Derrida's 109 use of Heidegger in his outworking 
of the 'end of metaphysics theme,' a theme quite prominent in philosophy today. This obsession 
of' overcoming closure,' is one in which all our thinkers covered up to now, have each displayed, 
albeit in their own way. Plato posited the One as a means to hold his system of the Forms 
together. Plotinus systematised Plato's view in an even more radical way. Arius viewed the 
Father as being 'beyond closure,' to such an extent that there was no real possibility of an 
economic theology in his system. Augustine tried to uphold both possibilities of using conceptual 
language about God, whilst at the same time arguing that God was not subject to such language. 
Similar tensions are found in Barth and Aquinas. 
Derrida continues to grapple with the same problem but in a non-theological setting. We shall 
attempt to show that Derrida's view in this department, in our opinion, throws definite light on 
the unique nature of Trinitarian language. Heidegger and Aristotle, define the central aspect of 
philosophy as the issue of Being as presence. 110 In his early work on the Aristotelian categories in 
the philosophy of Duns Scotus, Heidegger was impressed by three aspects of Scotus' opinions. 111 
Firstly, he noticed that Scotus insisted that Aristotle's way of perceiving the world according to 
certain categories, was not the only way the world might be so assessed. 
Secondly, Scotus appreciated the mind's involvement in our perception of the categorical 
structure of the world_ Thus from Scotus to Kant, and then to the phenomenology of Husserl, the 
role of the mind became increasingly understood to be playing a large role in the way we 
constitute our world. This meant that the metaphysical realism of Aristotle and Aquinas, was seen 
to be a naive understanding of our environment. 112 Real meaning, for Heidegger and Husserl was 
therefore largely an imposition of our categories upon the world. 'Following Scotus, Heidegger 
came to dismiss "mirror theories" of language and truth early on.' 113 The categorical structure of 
the world is also therefore a categorical structure of the subject, living-in-the-world. 
Both Derrida and Heidegger appreciate the important work of phenomenology. Their criticism is 
that Husserl did not get beyond the theoretical conception of being as the perception of a present, 
'eternal' object to the consciousness of the subject_ Heidegger felt that the consciousness is not a 
pure, Descartian 'I,· or the 'always present_' This is the idea of an impersonal, transcendent 
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ego. 114 The objects of our experience are not appreciated to be perceptions influenced by our life-
situation, (whether perceived as the 'textuality of life' by Derrida or the 'workshop' of life as 
seen by Heidegger). An object is what it is in our consciousness, as the result of us living in the 
world in a certain way. This way is the way of differentiating experiences.'" 
Both Derrida and Heidegger, therefore have a systematic suspicion of the traditional theoretical 
perspective. The question of Being, soon after the Greeks, became a theoretical understanding of 
life, an abstraction from the life experience of the subject. This is the kind of viewing of things, 
which perceives entities as presence-at-hand. "'Yet presence-at-hand" is the kind of Being which 
belongs to entities whose character is not that of Dasein.' 116 Both Derrida and Heidegger believe 
in the possibility that there is a 'primal' experience of Being. This precedes, and is masked by the 
development of theorisation (metaphysics). Here we need to make an important point. Heidegger 
and Derrida are by no means saying that we must do away with theory. They are simply saying 
that the problem arises when theory becomes the pre eminent mode of experience. to the 
detriment of other experiences. 
Both Heidegger and Derrida therefore feel that we need, in some sense, to return to an 
understanding of the broader, theoretically 'invisible' form of life, in order that we might see how 
traditional theorising forms problems. Both of them come up with essentially the same 
conclusion: the most basic and constitutive part of our life (whether Being, or the Text) is not at 
our disposal, rather it disposes of us. 
This is what Heidegger means when he speaks of buried trn1h-"1 The key to understanding being 
requires a prior understanding of the human subject's relatedness to the world (Dasein). Only 
then can we proceed to a 'fundamental ontology.' We can see how substantiality as a way of 
thinking has become somewhat problematic to both Derrida and Heidegger, and much 
postmodern thought, whilst 'participative' (differential) thinking is deemed to be far more 
ontologically acceptable. 
It has also already been observed that Heidegger is engaged in the Destrnktion of Western 
metaphysics. This is necessary, so that we might reacquaint ourselves with what we have 
forgotten. This is the meaning ofBeing. 118 As with Derrida, it is not the intention of Heidegger to 
'destroy' metaphysics. The critical approaches of Derrida and Heidegger towards the West are 
subtler than the critiques of other 'post-modernists' and revisionists such as Richard Rorty. 
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Destruktion as opposed to a 'constructive' understanding ofa structure, reflects an intention to 
discover the rule or method employed in the production (herstellen) of that structure, rather than a 
definition of that structure's generic properties_ Heidegger subjects the continual history of 
metaphysics, from Plato to Hegel, to his method of Destruktion_ 
In addition to this, Heidegger also speaks of the traditional type of metaphysics being that of 
ontotheo/ogy_ This perception of metaphysics is one in which all hope of theoretical reflection has 
to be based on a firm ground_ This is the ultimate ground of Being. Being in this sense, is not 
considered as Be-ing (as a type of present entity), but Being as the ground of all things. In our 
own study, we have seen in Aristotle an early definition of Being_ This was not merely an entity, 
but also: 'all there is_' From here, we illustrated with our chapter on Plato, how Plato moved from 
asking 'what is x?' to 'What is X-ness?' (ousia)_ Because of Plato's unique way of seeing things, 
'X-ness' was seen as an eternal Form. Being is now perceived to be eternal and Beyond everyday 
beings. Individual entities are therefore based on the realm of eternal Being. Being is now (in 
ontotheo/ogy) the Being of beings'" or as 'a supreme Being.' We are reminded of Heidegger's 
critique of scholastic theology. 
In his essay: 'The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics,' Heidegger asks the question: 
How did God get into philosophy? 'He answered by saying that God got into philosophy because 
of the unthought difference between being and beings and between God and supreme being. It 
was an unthought difference in the sense that no one in that metaphysical tradition, thought of 
raising the question of whether being could be equated with a supreme being and whether a 
supreme being would be the same as God.' " 0 
In this present work, we have made a modification of Heidegger's thesis. What we have tried to 
show is that there was a propensity in theology to engage in a double gesture. This is to identify 
God with that which is Beyond Being, despite also ascribing to him the epithet of Being. This 
meant that, built into the idea of closure when it came to speaking about God, there was also the 
call to a transgression 'beyond the limits' of Being. Barth, as we saw, is an interesting case here. 
He tried to get out of the problem by his emphasis on God's 'Otherness.' When he did ascribe the 
categories of metaphysics to God, he tried to avoid the problem by stating that these categories 
had been baptised by God's prior Word and were thus immune to normal metaphysical criticism 
(deconstruction). 
Nevertheless, as we shall argue below, we find this double bind of Being\ Beyond Being with 
respect to talk about God, (particularly as Trinity) does open up a partial way out of the 
Heideggerian \Derridean critique_ 
9.4.1-BEING AND THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE 
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Let us now turn to a closer look at Heidegger's problematic of the 'ontological difference.' 121 
We need to see that Heidegger speaks of the forgetfulness of being in a twofold manner. Firstly, 
there is the forgetfulness of our everyday, multifaceted, experiential life that does not even try to 
gain a 'theoretical' apprehension of the world_ This dimension merely operates according to the 
'unthought' conventions that are part of the world in which we live. These have a fundamental 
contribution to our understanding of the world_ Secondly, there is the more specialised 
forgetfulness of the philosophers. This is the reducing of being to 'presence-at-hand,' instead of 
appreciating the more differentiated 'readiness-at-hand' of the world_ 
Heidegger, is also in his own way working with margins and centres_ Furthermore, (as is the case 
with Derrida) Heidegger believes that what is 'marginal,' is also of great importance. Heidegger 
feels that a certain experience is 'marginal' because human beings have made it such. What 
human beings have marginalised (due to an unhealthy interest in theorising) is the concrete and 
open experience of humans in the world_ This is Dasein_ It is Dasein, that opens human beings up 
to experience the Being of beings. 
In 'Zur Seinsfrage,' (1955) Heidegger writes to Ernst Junger concerning his essay, 'Uber die 
Linie.' The term 'Uber die linie,' can also mean 'metalinea_' Aristotle, in his 'Metaphysics' states 
that, in order to understand the underlying principles of the world, he needs to go above them. 122 
In the Heideggerian response to Junger, the term: Uber die Linie has the following dimensions. 
Firstly, we are engaged in a discourse on the line. Secondly, we go across the line, and thirdly we 
stand above or oversee the line. 123 There is a certain line in which all three of these philosophical 
senses are seen to co-exist_ It is a line of differentiation or a line that differentiates one type of 
concept from another. This is the line that differentiates Being from beings. 
Heidegger is wanting to show that the relationship between Being and beings is a complex one 
and in articulating this relationship we must not fall into the traditional traps of the past. 
Silverman puts it this way: 'The Being of beings (Sein des Seienden)-the is-ness of that which is-
establishes a line of difference between what is and its Being_ This line of difference is not 
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anything-Heidegger reaffirms that it is nothing of content or even of substance-and yet there is a 
difference between Being and beings, a difference in the relation beings have to Being.' 124 
Heidegger proposes to speak of the Being of beings by speaking of Being, (as opposed to beings) 
as a double line. This is what we might term, the crossing of Being. He does this to indicate the 
enigmatic nature of the Being of beings. Being is a double line. It is a crossing (trans uber), and a 
crossing over and out of two lines. m This is the way Heidegger tries to show that although Being 
has a very close relationship to beings, it is always beyond or above beings. Yet, at the same 
time-it must not be termed as 'above beings' in the traditional metaphysical way. ' ... it is not a 
matter of abandoning finite Dase in in quest of infinite Being but of seeing ever more lucidly the 
limits within which beings as a whole come to appear.'"6 
Heidegger attempts to use (as did the later Wittgenstein) 'common language' in speaking about 
how human beings actually operate in their world. This is because thinkers such as Heidegger and 
Wittgenstein, wish to go beyond the need to speak in traditional metaphysical language. In 
showing how human beings operate, Heidegger uses practical illustrations from rural life. 
Heidegger shows that thinkers work according to standard modes of production. Things are 
produced in order that they might be 'completed.' They are to be 'manufactured,' or to 'stand 
alone,' once finished. They are crafted into the present. 127 In the workshop, there are certain 
received rules, regulations and paradigms that we employ in 'manufacturing' a certain received 
type of meaning or reality. Yet, like Derrida, Heidegger does not see that the solving of the 
problem of Being, is merely a matter of placing one's finger on the problem and arguing for a 
return to the Greeks. Together with Derrida, he also feels that it is crucial to study the marginal 
realities in Western thinkers. In the margins, things are revealed in ways that do not fit in with the 
dominant understanding of productive practices. 128 Derrida performs a similar critique. Derrida 
does this through the context of the textuality of human experience instead of Heidegger's rural 
analogies and parables. 
Critchley has shown what is meant when Derrida and Heidegger speak about the 'end of 
metaphysics.' They do not mean what is popularly meant in the thinking of their more exuberant, 
less circumspect disciples."' 'What is meant by the talk about the end of philosophy? We 
understand the end of something all too easily in the negative sense as mere cessation, as the lack 
of continuation, perhaps even as decline and impotence. In contrast, what we say about the end of 
philosophy means the completion of metaphysics. However, completion does not mean 
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perfection, as a consequence of which philosophy would have to have the highest perfection at its 
end ... ' 130 Bernasconi suggests that the 'end' in Heidegger, relates closely to 'closure' in 
Derrida. 131 Derrida pointedly uses the word 'closure,' in order to correct certain misreadings of 
Heidegger that suggest that Heidegger is saying that the entire task of philosophy is over. 132 Both 
Derrida and Heidegger are engaging in far more subtle argumentation. They are stating that 
metaphysics overcome, does not disappear. 133 
Says Derrida: 'Heidegger ... says that the thinking of Being was lost ... when, at the birth of 
philosophy, Being was determined by metaphysics of presence, as the proximity of the being 
before the glance (eidos, phenomenon, etc) and consequently as ob-ject. This determination of 
Being as pre-sence and then of presence as the proximity of the being to itself, as self-
consciousness (from Descartes to Hegel) would outline the closure of the history of 
metaphysics.' 134 This means that Derrida and Heidegger operate with this double gesture. There 
(firstly) is the need to necessarily stay within the metaphysical world, the metaphysical world of 
presences in order to (secondly) overcome it. Where, Derrida does criticise Heidegger, is when 
Heidegger talks about the history of metaphysics as an 'epoch.' This, to Derrida, is almost like 
conceiving history as a linear time-line, from Plato to the present. In Derrida's mind, Heidegger 
has succumbed to a type of historical 'presence' himself. 
'What is being challenged by Derrida is the unilateralism of Heidegger's claim that there is a 
sending (envoi, Schiclcung) of Being from the Greeks through epochs of increasing oblivion, 
which is gathered into the destiny or destination of Being (das Seins-Geschick) at the end of 
philosophy. The epoch of metaphysics is addressed by the Greeks and destined for "us," the 
sending of Being is always assumed of reaching its destination.'"' 'To the original "Envoi" of 
Being, Derrida opposes a plurality of "envois," inassemblable singularities, post cards, which are 
not assured of reaching their destination and which cannot be gathered into a unitary history 
(Geschichte) of Being.' 136 
Here, a significant difference between Heidegger and Derrida can be detected. Derrida does not 
believe that it is that easy to postulate a 'possibility' for a pre-metaphysical, metaphysical, and 
then after-metaphysical history. Derrida does not believe that we can have an eschatology of 
Being that just arrives at an end or achieve its apocalypse (as the arrival of a final revelation of 
Being). Instead, it is continually breached by a postal differance which is older than ontological 
difference and which cannot be represented as a clear, unitary history. We are not sure, however, 
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if Derrida is always consistent with this idea. At times he seems to intimate that deconstruction is 
a harping back towards a possibility of an archetypal understanding of being as devoid of later 
metaphysics. 
9.5-LEVINAS, NIETZSCHE AND DERRIDA 
Our coverage of these two figures and their relationship to Derrida will be different in scope 
compared to our reading of Heidegger. Our assessment of Nietzsche will be much briefer than 
that of both Heidegger and Levinas, as his influence, while important, is not as seminal as the 
other two. Levinas for more than one reason, is also of importance, and we need to occupy some 
time with him. Both Levinas and Nietzsche have important connections to Derrida as both 
represent unique attempts to 'overcome' metaphysics. 
9.5.1-NIETZSCHE 
Nietzsche's case is unique because, unlike Derrida, he does not seem to continue to go frequently 
back to metaphysics in order to agonize over it. Nietzsche does not endlessly and sorrowfully, 
scrutinise its texts. In this sense, it might be appropriate to say that Nietzsche happily seemed to 
move on, whilst Derrida remains in the struggle. 
Says Derrida of Nietzsche: 'Radicalising the concepts of interpretation, perspective, evaluation, 
difference, and all the "empiricist" or nonphilosophical motifs that have constantly tormented 
philosophy throughout the history of the West, and besides have had nothing but the inevitable 
weakness of being produced in the field of philosophy, Nietzsche, far from remaining simply 
(With Hegel and as Heidegger wished) within metaphysics, contributed a great deal to the 
liberation of the signifier from its dependence or derivation with respect to the logos and the 
related concept of truth or the primary signified, in whatever sense that is understood.' 137 Says 
Schrift: 'The significance ofNietzsche for Derrida's philosophical project is readily 
apparent. .. While he has thus far refrained from a comprehensive examination of Nietzsche's 
thought, Derrida often avails himself ofNietzschean motifs, and Nietzsche is either named or 
implicated in virtually every work to which Derrida has appended his signature. ' 138 
Schrift identifies two areas where Derrida and Nietzsche have something in common. Firstly, 
there is the critique ofWestem binary, oppositional thinking. Secondly, both thinkers attack the 
cultural authoritarianism of the West. Often one can see that the critical strategy in Derrida (and 
Foucault for that matter) has Nietzsche's genealogical analysis as its precursor. Nietzsche 
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therefore, is not reading or analysing texts in the traditional, analytical manner. He is using the 
same critical methodology that we have found operative in deconstruction. Says Nietzsche: 'The 
fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the faith in antithetical values. It has not occurred to 
even the most cautious of them to pause and doubt here on the threshold, where however it was 
most needful they should: even if they had vowed to themselves "de omnibus dubitandum." For it 
may be doubted, firstly whether there exist any antitheses at all... ' 139 Nietzsche also discovers 
philosophers with faith in binary thinking. Whereas Derrida highlights the oscillation between 
two exclusive opposites, Nietzsche shows the way these opposites merge into one another. 140 As 
in the case of Derrida, Nietzsche operates according to a twofold method. Firstly, he overturns the 
traditional hierarchy between two terms. Then, in the second phase, he displaces the opposition 
altogether by showing it to result from a prior value imposition, itself requiring critique. 141 
Nietzsche also locates much of the problematic of oppositional thinking, in language.'"' 
Nietzsche also has spent much time attempting to deconstruct the authoritarian subject from 
discourse as well. This might take the shape of dismantling the authority of God, or even the 
authoritarian structure of traditional metaphysical language. This even holds in the case of his 
own authority as a writer. Here, he is similar to Derrida as the latter also acknowledges that his 
own work is also subject to the deconstructive method. However, unlike Heidegger and Foucault 
(see Foucault's 'The Order of Things'), 143 Derrida acutely believes that it is not possible to do 
away with the subject. Instead, he wishes to understand the role of the subject, in re-situating the 
subject.,.,.. However, it is our opinion, that despite what Derrida says, the actual effect of his work 
results in a radical downgrading of the subject. 
9.5.2-LEVINAS 
Levinas is a thinker of great originality and subtlety. Furthermore, he has a unique background in 
both French culture and that of Old Testament Judaism. His philosophy is totally French, 
particularly with respect to his Phenomenological \ Heideggerian 145 concerns and his call for 
philosophy to move beyond metaphysics as presence. 146 What is unique about Levinas is that 
although his thinking reflects the same metaphysical concerns as Derrida, he displays in his 
solutions, a lesser sense of the 'nihilistic' spirit that we find in Derrida. Also, we find in Levinas, 
an opening up of the relationship of Being (ontology) to the Good (ethics). This is partly due to 
his Old Testament, theological background. Levinas centres his thought on the importance of the 
relation to the Other as constituting the authentic experience of the subject. 
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His fundamental orientation towards otherness, as the foundation of a new view of ontology, has 
value for the future of Trinitarian theology. Yet to our knowledge, Levinas' unique relational 
ontology has never been thus applied. As we shall see, his view of relations is unique because it 
incorporates much of the current criticisms of metaphysics, providing a genuine alternative. 
Levinas also is one of few thinkers who has genuinely heard Derrida's message and has not only 
incorporated deconstruction into his work, but has also attempted to move beyond it. 147 
9.5.3-LEVINAS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A POSTMODERN TRINITY 
Levinas also seems to be more open to theological issues than is Derrida. This is, due to a 
seemingly more conscious respect for his religious tradition, than Derrida. 141 Amongst Levinas' 
most prominent works are firstly, 'Totality and Infinity.' This is followed by its sequel, 
'Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence.' 149 Here, we shall confine our summary to the second 
of the two texts. As in the case of Derrida, Levinas also wishes to move beyond both Heidegger 
and Husserlian phenomenology. " 0 His thinking, can be placed into the perspective of a radical 
critique of the phenomenological view of being and representation. Because of the specific type 
of ontology that the West has, it is incapable of speaking of real transcendence. Even the 
traditional idea of God falls into this category. 111 
We cannot therefore speak of God according to the traditional language of metaphysics. In other 
words, together with Plato, Plotinus, and Wittgenstein, Levinas somehow wants to escape 
traditional metaphysics, by going 'Beyond Being.' Here, we detect a difference between Derrida 
and Levinas. Derrida wishes to 'remain inside the text.' Indeed, he feels that it is hard to go 
beyond the being of the text. Certainly, Derrida accepts the need to abandon metaphysics. 
However, he feels that we must not do this through moving beyond the text, into a totally new 
dimension, granting us true release. We escape the text, by remaining within it, engaging in 
perpetual deconstruction. Levinas also acknowledges that we are trapped in the language and 
metaphysical world that has made us. 152 However he has a more optimistic outlook on the future 
of philosophy, then Derrida does. 
Nevertheless, the key to escaping the tyranny of metaphysics is to move from it into the ethical 
realm. Not that this is a new movement. 'In Greek philosophy one can already discern traces of 
the ethical breaking through the ontological, for example in Plato's idea of the "good existing 
beyond being."'"' To Levinas' use of Plato as an example, we can also add that of Thomas 
Aquinas. Aquinas also uniquely synthesised the concepts of Good and Being. The question is, 
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'How does Levinas feel that we can escape the problem of being, ifhe does not feel that we can 
naively just "leave it behind?"' Levinas acknowledges that there is no world 'behind being,' that 
we can go to. 1" He accepts, as does Husserl, that not every concept of intentionality is an 
objectifying one_ We have to look toward a type of intentionality that circumvents the perception 
ofa living presence. We go beyond this by appreciating that the real constituting nature of the 
subject is the human 'Other.' Levinas wants to disengage subjectivity from the traditional view of 
the 'I,' or the Descartian cogito. 'It will then be necessary to show that the exception of the "other 
than being," beyond not-being, signifies subjectivity or humanity, the oneself which repels the 
annexations by essence.' m 
There are two ways in which the self can be conceived. The self can be seen as either the 
metaphysical 'I,' or as that which is 'Toward the other.' 'The responsibility for the other can not 
have begun in my commitment, or my decision. The unlimited responsibility in which I find 
myself, comes from the hither side of my freedom, from a "prior to every memory,'' and "ulterior 
to every accomplishment," from that non-present par excellence, the non-original, the anarchical, 
prior to or beyond essence.' 156 The subject's obligation to the Other is prior to any metaphysical 
perception of presence. Levinas speaks about two synchronous ways of being human. There is the 
Said and the Saying. 
The Said represents the presence, the metaphysical 'given of ontology.' 'This is the verbalisation 
of the active essence . .tl7 Nevertheless, before the Said, there is the saying. 'Saying is not a game. 
Antecedent to the verbal sign it conjugates, to the linguistic systems and the semantic 
glimmerings, a foreword preceding languages, it is the proximity of one to the other, the 
commitment of an approach, the one for the other, the very signifyingness of signification __ The 
original or pre-original saying, what is put forth in the forward, weaves an intrigue of 
responsibility_ It sets forth an order more grave than being and antecedent to being ... The 
correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the subordination of the saying to the said, to the 
linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that manifestation demands.' 1" 
Levinas' answer is the so-called Saying component of the subject. The Saying breaks through the 
active essence. 'During the Saying, time passes by; something gets irrevocably lost, and one 
grows older. But because of this, surprises and adventures are possible-surprises and adventures 
that stand in opposition to the monotony and boredom of ontological time, in which all things are 
synchronised by theoretical overviews or practical projects.' 1' 9 Levinas wants to 'speak through 
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ontology.' This occurs in uncovering the Saying, or the Unsaid before the Said. This new way 
makes the speaking of transcendence possible. Now this is not Neoplatonic transcendence, or the 
transcendence of negative theology. Neoplatonism and negative theology, as much as it tries to 
avoid the problem, still assumes the existence of some kind of divine 'Object,' even if it asserts 
that one can only approach it in a 'negative manner.' 
To arrive at the Saying, we have to move back from the Said. Here, we have no choice. One can 
only reach the Saying laterally. One can only think back to it. 160 This we do through a process 
that Levinas calls 'reduction.' 'This gravity of the otherwise than being shows now, in a still 
confused way, its affinity with ethics. We have been seeking the otherwise-than-being from the 
beginning, and as soon as it is conveyed before us it is betrayed in the said that dominates the 
saying which states it.' 161 
The process of 'reduction,' from the Said to the Saying, does not lead to a better ontology. As 
soon as we arrive at the Saying, it immediately reverts to becoming a 'Said.' This is unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, as we engage in this process we open ourselves up to transcendence in the form of 
the 'trace.' Saying is always a speaking to someone other than the self. What Levinas means here 
is something much deeper than merely the idea of speaking language to another person. The very 
notion of communication, is a movement towards the Other. It is an orientation in which the self 
is constituted through the Other. Signification happens in the proximity of the Other. 'To say is to 
approach a neighbour, "dealing him signifyingness." ... Saying taken strictly is a "signifyingness 
dealt the other," prior to all objectification; it does not consist in giving signs ... Saying is 
communication, to be sure, but as a condition for all communication, as exposure. 
Communi_cation is not reducible to.the phenomenon of truth and the manifestation of truth .. .162 
The idealism of Kant, Hegel and Husserl, continues to operate in the realm of the ontological 
Said, not that of Saying. 163 Ethical language is therefore 'meta-ontological.' The ethical 
dimension comes even prior to speech or even questions such as: 'How should I conduct myself.' 
It is precisely at this point that the revelation of the infinite, or even God, takes place. The 
infinite, or God does not come to us as a present. No, he comes as the trace, as a nonontological 
reality. 164 We must not therefore transform the trace of God into a sign. 16' Ifwe do this, we 
reduce his illeity and we make Him into a being. 166 'The mistake of Western ontology does not 
consist in its structure and logic but in its pretence of grasping all reality and in that sense of 
embodying the absolute principle or point of view.' 167 
282 
9.5.4-LEVINAS AND DERRIDA ON THE RELATIONS BETWEEN CONTINUANTS 
In our view, both Derrida and Levinas give clear priority to differential thinking (participation), 
over substance. Here is a reversal of the other thinkers in this study, who instead marginalise the 
notion of differences (except in the doctrine of the Trinity). However, what we saw in the case of 
these other thinkers, was that although differential language is marginalised, the ghost of this type 
of language never dies. In order for substances to be central, differentiation is a prior prerequisite 
for this. The reverse also applies. Yet, often this is not acknowledged. Even in systems where 
substance is seemingly prior, differentiation turns out to be of marginalised importance. 
We have seen this fascinating tendency even in those systems of thought, such as Plotinus and 
Aquinas, where substance is generally granted pride of place. Nevertheless, in our view Derrida 
and Levinas are plagued by exactly the same problem, but in a reverse sequence. This time, 
substantial thinking is marginalised, in order to give way to the priority of differences. The idea 
of substance is reduced to a 'trace.' However, without this notion of the 'trace,' differences also 
become impossible to conceive of After all, without the possibility of the trace, we might ask; 
'differences between what?' 
Derrida does not completely fail to rid himself of substances or the idea of a present. Trace or not, 
this is still the notion ofsubstantiality. It is the notion ofsubstantiality (like Augustine's 
Trinitarian substratum) that is, but is not a substance. It is not there at all. It is just a 'ghost.' The 
truth of the matter is that without the trace, without the present, there cannot be any past or future. 
There cannot be any differentiation. Therefore, in their desire to deconstruct, have not Derrida 
and Levinas gone somewhat too far in their swing away from substance towards the hegemony of 
'differential' thinking" 
Levinas nevertheless, does open up some valuable insights into the value of relationality and 
sharing as constituting an authentic ontology. Here, Levinas is close to Barth's and Alan 
Torrance's idea ofintertrinitarian life as koinonia. There is also a certain similarity between what 
Levinas is saying and Augustine's and Aquinas' views, concerning the very ontological status of 
the Trinitarian persons. Their very ontological orientation is constituted by their relationality 
towards one another. They are their relatedness. We will recall that the theologians discussed in 
this thesis want to move beyond traditional language, in their discussions of the Trinity. 
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The Levinas view of ontological participation is closer to Neoplatonism, than Derrida's 
differance. In fact, we can only term a system of differentiation, 'participation,' if it invites the 
genuine sharing of being, a real giving over of one to the other. Levinas invites this possibility, 
when he says that the very 'ontological' nature of the subject is sharingness. It is clearly seen that 
if we are to uphold the possibility of ontological sharing, this has to take place between two 
entities or 'beings.' There cannot be any sharing without the possibility of substances or subjects. 
Sharing for Levinas, is not an accident. This is where Levinas' thought can be very fruitful for the 
future of the doctrine of the Trinity. It brings about the possibility of a postmodern doctrine of the 
Trinity that, although beyond Aristotelian predication, does not give in to the elimination of real 
participation between continuants, such as we find in much postmodemity. 
The concept of sharing or participation is also not accidental with Plotinus, Augustine and Barth. 
Such is also the case with Aquinas' treatise de Deo trino. Real sharing takes place between the 
Trinitarian hypostases. Derridean differentiation is based upon the prior Saussurian view of the 
arbitrariness of the process of signification. Derridean differance locates entities or words through 
'separateness' without any strong view of mutual sharing of life, 'being' etc. This undermines 
authentic differentiation, which depends upon a mutual sharing of 'substances,' 'traces,' however 
one wishes to term these continuants. In our view, there cannot be differentiation without 
continuants. Yet, because Derrida strongly identifies any possibility of a spatio-temporal 
continuant with logocentrism, he has no authentic place for such concepts in his system. It is to 
these issues that we will again tum, in our conclusion below. 
Yet, what ofLevinas' God? He states that his God is 'not a present.' He cannot be directly 
apprehended, only as a trace. Now Levinas himself states that he is not a theologian, nor is he 
engaging in theology when he talks about God. He also, at the same time, states that the 
traditional God of predications is dead. There is no God in this sense, at all. The problem with 
Levinas' kind of God is the problem of whether or not in the theological context, one can live 
with this kind of God. For Levinas we can only get in touch with him if we are open to the Other. 
This kind of touch itself, however, is nothing more than the fleeting glimpse of a 'trace.' God 
therefore, in Levinas, is theologically inadequate. This is because when it comes down to the 
bottom line, God is no more than a fleeting trace of nothingness. It is impossible to have an 
authentic communion with such a God, in the traditional theological sense. After all, how can one 
address God, think of God, without falling into the traditional categories (even biblical) of 
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'relationship' and 'subject'? In Derrida's case, when he approaches the possibility of God, this 
possibility is similar in concept to that of Levinas. This we shall see, is indeed the case, when we 
examine some of Derrida's autobiographical statements in the final chapter. 
9.5.5-LEVINAS, DERRIDA AND THE MOVEMENT 'BEYOND BEING' 
Levinas and Derrida follow the Heideggerian criticism of Western theology by suggesting that 
the Western theologians continually reduced God to Being. Yet we have shown in our chapters on 
Augustine, Aquinas and Barth, that the story is not nearly as simple as this. 168 Although each of 
these thinkers made use of the language of being, (as do Derrida, Levinas and Heidegger) they are 
continually transforming classical sapientia into a unique trinitarian reflection, surpassing the 
metaphysical language in which it is presented. Although both Aquinas and Augustine use the 
language of being when speaking about God, they are clearly wanting to go 'Beyond Being,' in 
their views of God as Trinity (this is despite the fact that these theologians' opinions in this 
regard are not without possible criticism). In fact, it is in the Trinity particularly, that the 
metaphysical language of the Western church expresses a desire to go beyond metaphysics. 
Because Derrida does not open himself to a trinitarian and theological view of being as moving 
towards a new vision, other than traditional metaphysical views of being, he does not look to the 
Trinity as presenting new possibilities and new questions. 169 
9.5.6-PRELIMINARY CRITICISM OF THE DERRIDEAN IDEA OF 'BEING AS 
PRESENCE' 
This brings us to the inherited, popular 'postmodern view' of being as 'presence.' This view 
originated with Heidegger but has been built upon by Levinas and Derrida. This insight of 
Heidegger was, to some extent, undoubtedly true. It is true particularly that the West does often 
seem to prize presence above all other possible metaphysical margins. Yet we believe, (for 
example in our exposition of Plotinus' 'Enneads ')we have shown that being is not just presence. 
The matter is more complicated than this. We can look again at Plotinus as an example. The 
West, while seeming to prize the notion of presence as primary, has incorporated it into a 
sometimes prior notion of participation (albeit it different to Derrida's view of differance). Our 
point is that Being was never just a matter of 'being as presence,' as Heidegger supposed. For 
whenever there is presence, there is always differentiation. The Trinity reminds us of this. Derrida 
believes that being is primarily 'presence,' and because of this, his philosophy became a 
reactionary philosophy of primarily differences. Derrida's view is based upon a prior, 
Heideggerian reduction of the notion of being. This is one of the weaknesses in Derrida. 
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9.5.7-THE ETHICS OF DECONSTRUCTION: A TRINITARIAN POSSIBILITY 
As we have observed, Levinasian ethics is not a traditional model of ethics. Derrida, however, 
seems to avoid ethical language entirely in his work. At one point, he was asked why this is the 
case. In response to the question, Derrida, mentioned the Heideggerian critique of traditional 
models of ethics, in his 'Letter on Humanism. ' 170 Heidegger stated that traditional ethics, is a 
product of the scientific, logocentric age of technology. It is therefore, a problematic view. Not 
that Heidegger is saying that ethical principles themselves are questionable. The point is that the 
traditional view is based upon a prior, received ontological perspective. As Critchley shows, 
Derrida has accepted that the ethical implications in Levinas' thought, circumvent the ontological 
problem. 171 This is because of the openness of reading, evident within the Levinasian model. It is, 
an openness to the Other, or the illeity of an ethical reading. 
Here, Levinas is similar to Derrida. Levinas accepts the need to read the text in a 'double-handed 
manner.' We acknowledge the prior, ontological view. Nevertheless, within the ontological 
reading, we open the possibility of an ethical saying within the text. Says Derrida: 'I believe that 
when Levinas speaks of ethics-I wouldn't say that this has nothing in common with what has 
been covered over in this word from Greece to the German philosophy of the 19'" Centnry, ethics 
is wholly other (tout au/re), and yet it is the same word.' 172 Derrida acknowledges the difficulties 
fucing Levinas in his task, of reducing the Said to the Saying. He accepts the necessary 
compromise of the Saying, when this is done. The ethical dimension (the movement towards 
'illeity,' or the 'Other') involves climbing the very ontological-ethical ladder that it wishes to 
overcome. 
Derrida has accepted that his own task of overcoming the subject as pure presence is not that 
different to Levinas' method. One is also reminded of the rough similarity between Barth and 
Levinas, with respect to the ethics of thought. Barth also regards the task of dogmatics as ethics. 
This is also an ethical openness towards the Other, in this case the Word of God. Although he is 
true man, he also expresses an 'illeity' or a 'transcendence' from man. 
Critchley has convincingly demonstrated that we can link Derrida's deconstructive program to the 
ethical imperative in Levinas. 173 lfCritchley's analysis is correct, (as we deem it to be) it has real 
implications for the way in which we read Derrida. As Derrida acknowledges the 'ethical' 
implication to his own work, it means that it no longer becomes possible to treat deconstruction 
merely as a type of nihilistic textual freeplay, that rejects all truths and questions of value. 
Furthermore, if this 'relational dimension' to deconstruction is appreciated for what it really is, 
more fruitful intercourse than has hitherto taken place, is now possible between Derrida and 
Trinitarian thinking which is relational thinking par excellence. This is the case, despite our 
criticisms of some of the elements of deconstruction. 
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9.6-CONCLUSION: DERRIDA.RELATIVISM AND IBE POLITICS OF READING 
Before deciding on the question of a specifically theological reading of Derrida, what manner of 
reading generally, must we adopt with Derrida? This is of course, fundamental to the reading of 
any author. One's basic decision concerning the value or 'veracity' of the text, reflects one's 
foundational involvement with, and reception of that text. At some point in the reading, one has 
to make a 'fundamental decision,' textually, hermeneutically and even 'morally.' 
When one is reading Derrida, unlike many other writers, one is forced to make these fundamental 
decisions about his texts, not once (as in the case of many other authors) but all of the time. This 
basic decision that one makes about Derrida, ultimately determines and colours everything one 
later says about him. We have already indicated that our attitude towards Derrida is neither that of 
a slavish follower, nor a vehement dissenter. Yet, once one has tried to familiarise oneself with 
Derrida's neologisms, the basic question that most readers will still need to deal with, is: 'Is 
Derrida a relativist?' 'Is he a sceptic?' Ifwe answer, 'yes,' with Rorty and others, this in turn 
answers the question of Derrida and theology. If read in this manner, Derrida must be seen as 
bringing about the end of any possibility for systematic theology. 
9.6.1-'REITERATING THE DIFFERENCES:' IBE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE 
This infamous debate between Searle and Derrida, forms an effective backdrop to the question of 
relativism (or scepticism) in Derrida. It also illustrates how Derrida himself approaches the 
question of the reading of his texts. 174 Our purpose is not necessarily to take either Derrida's or 
Searle' s side, or even to immerse ourselves into the debate, but to show how Derrida in this 
debate is rejecting any idea that he is a 'relativist.' 
Speech act theory is a pragmatic theory of language that attempts to describe how we use 
language to accomplish actions of various sorts."' To Derrida's mind, it is a theory of 
approaching utterances, according to preconceived notions of how such utterances should work. 
A key area where Derrida begins his discussion, is on the specific type of speech act that Austin 
has chosen to study. Austin decides to concentrate, in erecting his speech-act theory, only by 
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concentrating upon a certain type of speech or discourse. Derrida feels that for received, a priori 
reasons, Austin chooses to discuss only a certain type of speech act, to the exclusion of other 
types. Derrida believes that Austin has done this because he (Austin) feels that some of the things 
we do with words do not satisfy the requirements of real 'speech-act theory.' For example, 
utterances in the area of fiction, drama and poetry are not 'normal,' serious contexts. Searle 
chooses to (possibly temporarily) exclude these modes of discourse from his theory. 176 Of course, 
we can expect Derrida to latch onto these marginalised aspects of Austin's discourse. He does this 
in order to show that it is precisely these marginalised dimensions, that form the core of his 
problem with Austin. 
Austin believes that the meaning of a speech act finds itself in the contextual definition of the 
author of such speech-acts, as these are performed according to certain conventions that he 
himself (Austin) is attempting to point out. Austin feels that the meanings of these acts-remain 
constant, across contexts. This enables one to erect a 'theory of speech acts.' As Derrida sees it, 
Austin believes that speech act theory continues to associate meaning with the sovereign presence 
of the speaker. The possibility of knowing the authorial intention perfectly, provides for the 
possibility of the theory. 177 
'I think the speech act theorist does finally believe that meaningful language is possible because 
we stabilise and delimit the effects of our language by appealing to conventions and expected 
intentions.' 171 This is all that Derrida is merely trying to point out. It is the metaphysical 
conventionalism that enables us to make sense of what we do. 179 He is wishing to say that the 
context of language is not as certain as we might wish. These contexts can change as the language 
or speech act moves across contexts. Here we can see that Derrida is also opposing the view of 
the so-called 'everyday language' philosophies. These have often been associated with the later 
Wittgenstein. " 0 Individuals of this school believe that we can bypass metaphysical problems in 
language by emptying it of technical jargon and concentrating instead, on the everyday use of 
language. 
Derrida shows that even everyday language is fraught with metaphysical problems, including 
speech act theory. Although he concentrates on the iterability oflanguage in this discussion, and 
its ability to elude the contexts we impose on it in advance, he is not saying that therefore 
meaning is impossible. 
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Says Fish of Derrida: 'The Derrida who emerges in the preceding pages may strike some readers 
as not at all like the apostle of "free play" they have learned either to fear or admire ... While he is 
certainly not a believer in determinate meaning ... he does believe that communications between 
two or more persons regularly occur and occur with a "relative" certainty that ensures the 
continuity of everyday life. Rather than a subverter of common sense ... Derrida is very much a 
philosopher of common sense, that is, of the underlying assumptions and conventions within 
which the shape of common sense is specified and acquires its powerful force.'"' 
'What he calls into question is the right of philosophy to erect a wholesale theory of mind and 
language on the basis of common sense notions that work well enough for all practical purposes 
but take on a different, more doctrinaire aspect when applied as a matter of philosophic 
principle.' 182 'Again, Derrida is far from denying that we do require at least some presumed 
general grasp of an author's purpose in order to read any text whatsoever. Interpretation, as he 
puts it, "operates a fortiori within the hypothesis that I fully understand what the author meant to 
say, providing he said what he meant." (P 199). But this is an empirical fact about the psychology 
of reader response and not any kind of guarantee, such as speech-act theory would claim, that any 
kind of understanding must indeed have taken place.' 183 
We find another important statement to this effect in 'OfGrammatology· 'To produce this 
signifying structure (i.e. a deconstructive reading) obviously cannot consist of reproducing, by the 
effaced and respectful doubling of commentary, the conscious, voluntary, intentional relationship 
that the writer institutes in his exchanges with the history to which he belongs thanks to the 
element oflanguage. This moment of doubling commentary should no doubt have its place in a 
critical reading. To recognise and respect all its classical exigencies is not easy and requires all 
the instruments of traditional criticism. Without this recognition and this respect, critical 
production would risk developing in any direction at all and authorise itself to say almost 
anything. But this indispensable guard-rail has always only protected, it has never opened, a 
reading.' 184 
The question of Derrida and relativism is not a peripheral one, with respect to the application of 
his thinking to the Trinity or theology as a whole. Indeed, this issue is fundamental to the way in 
which deconstruction is to be applied to any theology seeking to enter the new millennium. Those 
who regard Derrida as calling for the 'death of metaphysics' might conclude that we have finally 
also come to 'the death of the Trinity,' as the dogma which is encapsulated in nothing more than 
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an anachronistic metaphysical wrapping. On the other hand if one views the value of Derrida's 
work as not comprising a call to the eradication of metaphysics, but to a re-reading of the 
logocentric past in a new way, new options for the application of Derrida to theology, open up."' 
In our final, concluding chapter we shall provide our response to Derrida's work. 
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CHAPTER TEN: GENERAL CONCLUSION 
10.1-THE AFFIRMATION OF DERRIDA 
We shall argue, in our general conclusion, as follows. We shall firstly provide a response to 
Derrida's thinking, as it pertains to the issues of substance, participation, the language of being, 
and so on. We shall provide our response to his work, via the relating of Derrida to the thought of 
the other individuals assessed in this study. Certain overlaps and divergences will be made 
manifest. ln this comparison, we will also incorporate our own positive and negative responses to 
Derrida as a philosopher and as a 'theologian.' We shall provide our reasons why we feel that 
there is a future for both substance and participational thinking in the postmodern era, and in the 
idea of the Trinity. We shall argue that this is indeed the case, not only for philosophy in general, 
but also for the future of the doctrine of the Trinity, in particular. 
Much of our own assessment of Derrida includes a somewhat negative reaction. For this, we 
make no apology. However, we need to firstly acknowledge the many positive elements of 
Derrida's work. An understanding of these, can only be arrived at, once Derrida has been 
properly read on his own terms. Interpreters of his texts need to incorporate into their 
assessments, the clear religious, autobiographical and pseudo-mystical elements that are found in 
his more recent reflections. 
Perhaps the greatest benefit that we have received from our study of Derrida as a philosopher, is 
that he has the right feel for what is really the spirit of the age. Derrida presents a challenge to 
theology at the end of the millennium, because in his many works he allows us into the mind of 
contemporary culture, turning upon itself. This (fin de siecle) turning is a deconstructive tum 
inwards. It, for a wealth of reasons, is the inward, fragmented gaze of critique. Much of this 
critique is justified. Yet, this critique is not, for the most part, a wilful and gleeful activity. 
Derrida's gaze is not the gaze of the clown, who deconstructs for the sake of nihilistic 
amusement. The situation is far more serious than that. It is the unconscious glimpse that results 
in prayers and tears. Derrida provides us with a mirror of what many of us have become. To some 
extent, we should become like this. Does not any authentic 'message,' that we give to others 
today, need a prior willingness to listen and be deconstructed? 
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Much of what Derrida says, concerning the unthought assumptions of our discourse, rings true. 
Some of Derrida· s readings are genuinely insightful and are not merely nihilistic freeplay. He 
teaches us to read our philosophical and theological texts (especially those that are dear to us) 
again and again, in a 'deconstructive mood.' Deconstruction is about the careful reading of texts. 
Theology needs to listen to its culture, if in any way, theology seeks to relate to its culture. This 
means listening to criticism. Theology needs to genuinely hear the voices in the silences, if only 
to offer an answer. If only to modify its 'old' answer. This is because theology cannot merely be 
an intellectual discipline, whose task in the university fuculties, is to reflect upon culture and 
metaphysics. This became the assumption and task of Nineteenth Century theology. Much of 
these assumptions live on in fuculties today. Derrida shows us that indeed, a theology that rests 
merely on a cultural metaphysic base alone, will ultimately self-deconstruct. 
Can we really give him an answer as to why this should not be allowed to happen? Can we 
answer Derrida, by pointing out to him that theology is more than just culture and metaphysics? 
Will we convince Derrida that theology as a discipline, still has a role to play? Many theologies 
would not be able to do this. It is our opinion that if theology as an academic discipline cannot 
help but self-deconstruct as a result of Derrida's critique, then it should be allowed to so. The loss 
will not be so great. This is because theology should be offering something more than cultural 
and metaphysical commentary. However, it is the perspective and the hope of this thesis, that 
there is more to theology than just a metaphysics of presence and of culture. 
10.2-DERRIDA AND THE DEAIB OF THE SUBSTANCE 
10.2.l-TIME, ESCHATOLOGY. AND THE NOTION OF THE END OF THINKING 
Derrida concerns himself primarily with the same question as his philosophical predecessors in 
this study. This is the question; 'What is real?' Derrida's subject, is therefore also a metaphysical 
one. One of the reasons why Derrida's work is unique, when compared to the ideas of the other 
philosophers covered in this work, is because Derrida's culture is unique. As a result of his 
intellectual and cultural background, Derrida chooses deconstruction as a 'method,' and the 
philosophy of differentiation, above substance. We have suggested that his system moves in the 
direction of 'pure becoming,' as a reaction against traditional views of being. 
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We also believe that in reality, Derrida concentrates on the here and now. Of course, he denies the 
possibility of a linear view of time, in the naive sense of the tenn. He would reject the accusation 
that we are bringing here, namely, that he concentrates on the here and now. However, the result 
of his view of being brings about the combination of actuality and potentiality. Reality, as an 
endless chain of differences, is at the same time, both actual and potential. Yet, this actuality and 
potentiality does not stretch itself over a time-scale. In practice, Derrida downplays both the past 
and the future. All he has left, is the endlessly differentiated present. Does one receive the 
impression from Derrida, that there is a real future in academic endeavour? On the other hand, do 
we find Derrida finding much philosophical confidence in the intellectual epochs that have 
preceded him? In practice, Derrida, is actually left with the present. This is despite the fact that he 
is very critical of any notion of a self-revealing 'here and now. ' 1 
Nevertheless, Derrida in practice, and in another sense, does seem to also incorporate the 
'possibility of the end,' despite his own comments on an 'apocalyptic tone.' This happens, when 
in his program of deconstruction, he effects a perpetual criticism of the past, with seemingly, a 
minimal possibility of philosophy's future. There, is therefore, a very strong 'postmodern' 
element within Derrida's work, even though Derrida is suspicious of this epithet. However, as 
readers of Derrida, we do receive the impression that constructive intellectual possibilities have 
now run their course. 
Without actuality, or the 'here and now,' can we make any affirmations or predications of 
anything? If all is pure differentiation, can predicative language be possible? Furthennore, if we 
speak of differences, we need to ask: 'Differences between what?' Practically speaking, to speak 
of differences between differences, does not suffice. There can only be a true understanding of 
differentiation, as differentiation between 'some things." To speak of differentiation between 
'traces' does not suffice either. This is because the role of the trace as the trace of a substantial 
continuant, is an entity of which nothing can be predicated. This, is the problem that haunts 
Derrida, and even Levinas (despite our positive attitude towards and outworking of his relational 
ontology for Trinitarian theology). Levinas, as an example, tries to speak of 'God' in such a way 
as to escape any metaphysical language. Derrida speaks in a similar manner. During an 
autobiographical moment, Derrida says: ' ... and this is why I am addressing myself here to God, 
the only one I take as a witness, without yet knowing what these sublime words mean, and this 
. grammar ... '3 What possible, real value can such a statement have, whether in an academic or a 
'living' context ? 
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Both Derrida and Levinas fit into this mould. Of course, both admit that we cannot avoid 
metaphysics. Yet, both continue to try avoiding metaphysics (again in practice). Despite 
Derrida's highly complex semantics, he still needs some kind of'substance' or 'presence,' in 
order to uphold a system of differences. If Derrida does indeed acknowledge the ongoing need to 
think metaphysically, then surely he needs to approach metaphysics in a slightly more positive 
manner (even if this does not entail the entire jettisoning of deconstruction)? 
10.2.2-DERRIDA AND THE AFFIRMATIVE ELEMENT IN PHILOSOPHY 
This does not detract one from admiring Derrida's great subtlety, in his many readings. Some of 
his assessments are truly penetrating in a totally new manner. He certainly rates as one of the 
most important thinkers of current times. Yet, deconstruction is a parasitic discipline by Derrida's 
own admission. It would not exist, were it not for the philosophies and metaphysics of the past 
and present. What has made philosophy and theology, disciplines worth pursuing are their 
perpetual search for new and better models. Built into any science is the need to move on. 
Admittedly, for a model to truly supersede its predecessor, some criticism is necessary. This is the 
fundamental principle that Karl Popper4 has built into his view of any advancement of human 
thought, whether political or intellectual. Without criticism of the past, there can be no 
advancement, even in societal structures. However, critique is not enough. It is only half of the 
picture. It is with this prior half, that deconstruction concerns itself. However, together with 
negation, there also needs to be affirmation. Without this second component, there would be no 
science, indeed, no meaning. Derrida's deconstruction has no offer on hand to assist in the 
advancement of any science or technology. Of course, in response to this, Derrida might 
immediately argue that in our conclusion, we are showing that we have not heard him at all. The 
very notion of the future of technology, is problematic. We might then respectfully answer 
Derrida, by pointing out to him that like millions of other Western individuals, in his everyday 
life, he perpetually affirms the intrinsic value of Western technology. We assume that Derrida 
also rides in automobiles and watches television, and so on. Derrida and Rorty, we assume, also 
stop at red robots and leave the lecture room by the elevator, not the tenth story window. If they 
indeed, do this, they must in some way be affirming the possibility of 'truth." 
Now Derrida does uphold the possibility of the notion of 'truth' as we have seen. He is not 
merely advocating a view of reality that is nothing more than endless 'misreadings.' This is where 
his interpreters sometimes go wrong. However, much of the time, Derrida often speaks as ifthere 
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is no truth. Yet, the truth that Derrida does advocate is a truth that is only possible, due to an 
imposition of a metaphysical context upon the prior differential nature of all texts. Often (he says) 
this imposition, is problematic and inconsistent within the premises of the 'text,' within which we 
are working at the time. In our own reading of Derrida, we have found that frequently here, he is 
correct. In this sense, deconstruction can be very helpful. At the same time, we cannot help but 
get the impression from Derrida that built into his philosophy, is the possibility·of a naked and 
purely differential, textual reality that is somehow 'prior' to our metaphysical impositions of 
meaning. Derrida denies this, but the impression is certainly there. This is a naive impression. In 
our view it is not so much a matter oftextuality or words 'going all the way down.' It is, instead, 
a matter of 'metaphysics going all the way down.' In this way, Derrida comes close to affirming 
that there is a pre-metaphysical and prior-metaphysical dimension, to texts. 
Derrida, however is correct when he states that often the 'interpretation' of a text, is such that it 
becomes an 'imposition,' on the text. Yet our response to this 'misreading,' must surely be 
'positive.' We need to then correct this 'misreading,' and move on. Ifwe are to move on in an 
affirmative manner, we need to then uphold a modified interpretative metaphysic, that does a 
better job of fitting the 'text,' than before. Derrida does not seem to want to move on, in this 
affirmative manner. He wishes to remain behind and concentrate on the negative rather than the 
affirmative dimension. 
Because of this one-sidedness of its approach, we deem deconstruction for all its value, to be a 
passing reality. It will not survive as a discipline, for long into the next Century even ifthe spirit 
of deconstruction will continue to surface for many years to come. 
Theology cannot survive, if it does not acknowledge its heritage. Neither will it survive, ifit 
cannot say anything about God in the predicative sense of the word. If, together with Levinas, 
God can be no more than a trace, then we can no longer have a 'science of God.' Neither can we 
have a faith in God, either. This is why the 'apophatic' in theology must include the 'kataphatic.' 
10.3-DERRIDA, NEOPLATONISM, AND ARIUS 
Let us now relate some of these above comments to some of the other figures featuring in this 
study. Our study of Aristotle and Plato reveals that while the Western understanding is not 
immune to deconstruction, deconstruction is in error, when it reduces being to 'presence,' and 
when it 'demonises' metaphysics. We criticised this earlier. This is a reductionistic notion. As we 
have shown, all our thinkers studied, particularly those in the Neoplatonic Trinitarian tradition, 
view Being as fur more than just presence. Derrida and Saussure were not the initiators of the 
concept of differences as constituting reality. As such, a Trinitarian metaphysic provides a 
response to the Heideggerian and Derridean view. 
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Furthermore, Derrida's thinking is not devoid of substantial and accidental concepts either. As 
Aristotle, downplayed differentiation (as accidental), for the sake of substance (as central), 
Derrida performs the reverse. He falls into the same trap as those whom he criticises, but in a 
manner, exactly opposite to them. As such, deconstruction would be a more balanced enterprise, 
if it upheld the impossibility of eliminating either substantial, or participational dimensions in 
philosophy. 
There are also some interesting common elements between Aristotle's substratum, Barth's time, 
and Derrida's understanding of 'textuality.' It strikes us that the underlying textual nature of all 
reality, is Derrida's substratum, or the anchor behind Derrida's differance. After all, without an 
underlying 'textuality,' can Derrida's view of differences and of the sign, stand? In his reducing 
the world to the text, Derrida has been criticised. 
He has received criticism, even from thinkers not completely antagonistic towards his project or 
'postmodern' perspective. Foucault feels that Derrida has engaged in a systematic reduction of 
discursive practices to textual traces: 'A historically well-determined little pedagogy manifests 
itself very visibly here. A pedagogy which teaches the pupil that there is nothing outside the text, 
but that in it, in its interstices, its blanks and its silences, there reigns the reserve of the origin; that 
is therefore unnecessary to search elsewhere, but that there, not in the words, of course, but in the 
words under erasure, in their grid, the "sense of being" is said. A pedagogy which, conversely 
gives to the voice of the master the limitless sovereignty which allows it to restate the text 
indefinitely. ' 6 In our view, Foucault is correct in implying that Derrida merely reinvents another 
form of authoritative reading in deconstruction: Foucault continues: 'I am not going to say that 
there is a metaphysics, the metaphysics or its closure, concealed in this "textualisation" of 
discursive practices. I am going to go much further. I am going to say that it is a minor pedagogy, 
one thoroughly historically determined, that manifests itself in a way that is highly visible ... This 
pedagogy gives the teacher's voice that unlimited sovereignty which allows it to repeat the text 
indefinitely.' 7 
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We have a suspicion that Derrida is not entirely able to escape a modification of the Third Man 
Argument criticism. This argument is one that leads to infinite regress. This argument, when 
loosely applied, is applicable to all systems of thought that rely upon differentiation between two 
realities, as a means to anchor truth. It seems that to Derrida, the criticism can be even more 
stringently applied. In actuality, Derrida's system of endless differentiation, never comes to a 
close. There can be therefore, no real reference point to one truth, without a continual reference to 
all of the system of differences, themselves. Yet, this is impossible, as these differences, in 
Derrida's system, go on indefinitely. 
In the system of Plato and Plotinus, two determining, ontological movements take place. Firstly, 
there is an inward movement. An object is constituted via an initial, inward movement (this is a 
non-relational movement). This is self-identity. This is then followed by the second operation, 
outwards towards other entities (the relational dimension). This is typical of all Greek thought. 
Something is constituted as a horse, because it is initially to be seen for 'what it is as a horse,' 
before it is seen to be 'not a donkey.' The order in classical metaphysics, is self-identity, 
preceding relational identity. Saussure and especially Derrida, go"too far the other way. 
We feel that both movements are necessary as the Trinity shows. God is equally 'God in himself,' 
(de Dea una) as well as 'God for himself' (de Dea trina). When Derrida speaks of the 
constitution of objects, he only employs the second, differentiating movement, not the first. 
Levinas, on the other hand attempts to combine both dimensions of the 'I' and the 'Other,' 
implying the possibility ofreal individuality as well as differences. Yet even in the case of 
Levinas, there is a downgrading of the subject. 'Postmodemity's' inclination to downgrade the 
subject, is not a solution. We find this strange paradox in the 'postmodern' viewpoint. It 
stringently wishes to uphold human rights and freedom politically, whilst at the same time, 
reducing the substantial reality of the subject philosophically. This threatens to bring us again, 
full-circle towards the same kind of institutional violence against the human subject, so 
characteristic of modernity. 
10.3.1-DIFFERANCE AND NEOPLATONIC PARTICIPATION 
In our view (as we have suggested), Derrida's view of difference, if farless viable for theology, 
than is the Neoplatonic notion of participation. The world of differance, is a lonely one indeed. 
All there is, (in practice) are differences between entities. There is no real sharing of being. This 
is not the case with the kind of participation between beings that we find in the Christian doctrine 
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of the Trinity, and the Neoplatonism, from which it has been adapted. Because Derrida, in his 
personal experience of life (see his many autobiographical statements), has always been a 
marginal person, in his family background and his philosophy, his view of differentiation lacks 
real sharing. Differance does not invite real sharing, or koinonia. 
This automatically results, in an encompassing vision of differences, and not real substances. The 
doctrine of the Trinity upholds the unity, of sharing and individualism, both solitude and sharing. 
The Trinity calls for a philosophy of both substance and participation. This is why there is so 
much to be gained from the study of Levinas' ontology, which is entirely relational in nature 
(ahhough one would also have to modify Levinas' view of God as 'trace'). The Biblical 
Doctrine of agape refuses to reject the importance of the subject, even in the postmodern 
environment. God loves the subject. The incarnation is the incarnation of a unique subject for the 
sake of other subjects. We feel that Heidegger did not fully appreciate this as he tried to build 
what little theology he had, exclusively on the idea of the theology of the cross. Heidegger's God, 
is the Deus Absconditus. He failed to see the importance of the self-authenticating presence of the 
Son of God, incarnate into the world. The Trinity refuses to reject the role of the subject, both the 
subject of God and the subject of man. Yet, with an application ofLevinas' ontology ofrelations 
to the Trinity, an acceptable view of the subject can survive the postmodern downgrading of its 
status in theology and philosophy. The Trinity calls for a new type of subject, one that is not only 
itself, but becomes itself in its desire forthe Other. 
There are some further points of comparison between Plotinus and Derrida. Both in a 
foundational manner seek to discover the transcendent and to escape the prison of conceptual 
language. As such, there are certain common elements between Plotinus' 'One' and Derrida's 
'Trace.' Yet, there are also disagreements. Derrida sees the trace as a necessary problematic. It is 
the necessary capitulation to the ghost of metaphysics, haunting our language. Derrida wants us to 
move away from the trace, as he does not accord it a high place in his system. Plotinus places the 
One as the foundation of his philosophy. Yet the One is like a trace in that it also resists, closure 
or normal predication language. Both Derrida and Plotinus struggle with this. Both fail to prevent 
the usage of metaphysical language as a means of describing the very realities that seek to go 
beyond metaphysics. Fascinatingly, Plotinus resists calling the initial differentiation of Nous from 
the One as a morally acceptable event. Derrida, feels that differentiation is the only acceptable 
way to see the world. 
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We have indicated that we feel problems develop when God is granted the epithet of the 'Trace,' 
or 'Beyond Being,' only. Problems develop even when we tryto speak of God 'Without Being.' 
Is there ultimately any difference between these three terms? Each seeks to place God beyond 
metaphysical language which is impossible. 
10.3.2-ARIUS 
The chapter on Arius was written for two main reasons. The first reason was to show, how 
historically, theological issues have to be discussed and debated. This truth, graphically illustrated 
in the Arian controversy, continues today. Even in the postmodern era, we need to talk about 
God. No matter how transcendent our God might be we have to be able to bring his reality into 
our world, in order to discuss who he is. 
Secondly, No matter what side one takes, whether that of Arius or Athanasius, the historical 
reality is that we have to be able to affirm some predicates of God in the real world. Technically 
speaking, Arius, in order to be consistent concerning his statements about his God, should not 
have said anything at all. His God was not much different to the God of Derrida (and to a lesser 
extent, Levinas). Arius' God was a transcendent 'trace,' from whom nothing could emanate. In 
his case, however, God was pure, undifferentiated presence. God could not reach out in 
differentiation. He was too much of a self-contained presence. Whether trace or undifferentiated 
transcendence, such a God is no God at all. Could Arius effectively argue with Athanasius? Was 
it possible for him to refute Athanasius? After all, if his God was so transcendent, how could he 
be sure that what he knew about his God, was true at all? In any 'theoretical' discussion, we must 
be able to define our terms, or speak in a cognitive manner. If God is totally transcendent, or in 
some way completely illusive, this is not possible. 
Marion, in his book 'God without Being,' realises the problem. Ifwe empty all the being from 
God, we cannot say anything about him. Caputo summarises the somewhat sad situation as 
follows in a personal remark: 'As a good friend of mine once said, "Of God I do not believe we 
can say a thing, but, on the other hand, as a theologian, I have to make a buck." 'That is the 
impossible."'' This ultimately, is the God of Arius. He is the God who (in another way) has 
returned to many of the postmodern theologies. It is also the God of Derrida, even Levinas. 
Admittedly, this problem, might not be too much of a problem to Derrida and Levinas. After all, 
they engage in a type of discourse that is not immediately 'theological.' Thus, they can afford to 
leave the problem at that. Marion realises that the problem is not that easily ignored. He is a 
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theologian_ Does Marion therefore, solve the problem? We feel, not for the following reasons. 
Firstly, it needs to be acknowledged that Marion does grapple with the problem of 'speaking in 
silence_' He realises that if theology is to survive Derrida and Heidegger, it cannot be completely 
silent about God_ Therefore, Marion wants to try to resurrect a theology that says, without saying 
in a traditional, metaphysical manner. In our view, this is not possible_• Our main criticism of 
Marion and many other figures who want to resurrect a God 'after metaphysics,' is that he 
inevitably is a non-Trinitarian God_ Can we, in order to capitulate to the demands of our 
contemporary culture, give up the idea of the Trinity? In our view, there can be no talk of God 
that is in any way, Christian, unless he is a Trinitarian God. This is the weakness of Marion's 
book. 
Although we are not implying that Marion completely rejects the Trinity, and although he does 
not obliterate the Father, Son and Spirit, he does not dedicate enough time to speaking also of a 
Trinity without being. We might be able to get away with speaking of the possibility of a 'God 
without Being.' Speaking of a 'Trinity without Being' is a far more difficult task. 
10.4-AUGUSTINE'S GOD AND DERRIDA'S TEARS 
We find, in reading Derrida through Augustinian eyes, a certain mutual concern and desire. 
Derrida's recent autobiographical reflections; 'Memoirs of the Blind,' contains much in common 
with Augustine's 'Confessions.' ' 0 The same is the case with the text, 'Circumfession.' As such, 
deconstruction must not therefore be seen as 'atheistic' in the usual 'denial' sense of the term. 
Derrida does regard himself as being an atheist. Neither does he engage in what we might term 
traditional, theological beliefs, but as we shall see, he does not close himself off to an idea of 
'God.' 
'Memoirs of the Blind,' is at first sight a commentary on an exhibition given at the Louvre, 
organised by Derrida at the invitation of the museum curators_ 11 Derrida (in a way that we might 
expect) chose to concentrate on the concept of blindness. Yet, here is more than a running 
commentary on the paintings of others. Included in the text are searching, autobiographical 
remarks_ We find in both Derrida and Augustine a 'passion forthe impossible.' 12 Derrida's work 
is also religious in that there is the same, strong 'searching element' towards the transcendent, as 
found in Augustine. 'Memoirs of the Blind' (reflecting a type of quasi-Augustinian legacy) 
commences and ends with the issue of faith. At both the beginning and end of the book there is 
the question: 'vous croyez?' 13 With Derrida, the affirmation of faith is the affirmation of 
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blindness. This breaks with the oldest paradigm of Western philosophy, which is the view of faith 
as the naked knowing of the ever-present deity. Faith and philosophy, is the ability to see the 
'naked truth,' the eidos. 'The blind do not want to know, or rather, would like not to know: that is 
to say, not to see. Idem, eidos, idea: the whole history, the whole semantics of the European Idea, 
in its Greek genealogy, as we know-as we see-relates seeing to knowing.' 14 Descartes is a true 
representative of this paradigm, says Derrida. 'What does Descartes, this thinker of the eye who 
one day analysed his own inclination to "like" "dubious characters" or "squinters" say about 
error? ... For the author of the Optics, who also dreamed of making sunglasses and ofrestoring 
sight to the blind, error is first of all a belief, or rather, an opinion: consisting in acquiescing, in 
saying yes, in opining too early, this fault of judgement and not of perception betrays the excess 
of infinite will over finite understanding. I am in error, I deceive myself, because, being able to 
exercise my will infinitely and in an instant, I can will to move myself beyond perception can will 
(vou/ior) beyond sight (voir).'" Derrida decides to identify himself with the blind, not the seeing. 
This is the 'counter-phenomenology of blindness, as a certain counter-type of phenomenology 
and its principle of all principles, the principle of pure seeing. Phenomenology is a classical 
hypothesis of sight, philosophy of seeing and intuition par excellence, which wants to be the eyes 
of philosophy.' 16 
In his self-avowed blindness, Derrida also wants to aspire towards the impossible, that which is 
beyond being. Yet Derrida's religion is without religion in the normal sense. 17 Derrida's 
deconstruction, with its dwelling on the margins, also seeks for the wholly other, tout autre. 
' ... you have spent your whole life inviting calling promising, hoping sighing dreaming, 
convoking invoking provoking constituting engendering producing, naming assigning demanding 
prescribing commanding sacrificing.' 18 'What we will not have understood about deconstruction, 
and this causes us to read it less and less well, is that deconstruction is set in motion by an 
overarching aspiration, which on a certain analysis can be called a religious or prophetic 
aspiration, what would have been called in the plodding language of the tradition (which 
deconstruction has rightly made questionable), a movement of"transcendence."' 19 
Deconstruction is the 'exceeding of the stable borders of the presently possible."0 
What does Derrida have to say about God? 'I am addressing myself here to God, the only one I 
take as a witness, without yet knowing what these sublime words mean ... '" '(T)hat's what my 
readers won't have known about me ... the changed time of my writing ... (to) be read less and less 
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well over almost twenty years, like my religion about which nobody understands anything __ ."' 
'The name of God is not the name of some "theological" being or object. "God" is given only in 
praying and weeping-"l'm mingling the name of God here with the origin of tears;" we would say 
that "God" for him is given not in theological analysis but in religious experience, in a certain 
passion for the impossible._. While Derrida is willing to associate himself with "religion" and 
"prayer" and "passion," the word 'theology" tends to have a strictly onto-theological sense for 
him, signifying something objectifying, totalising, dogmatic and awash in ominous institutional 
power, so that his is a religion without theology, a life of prayer and passion without theology's 
God ... God without being that, that institutional theological God. For Derrida, God is not an 
object but an addressee, not a matter for theological clarification, but the other end of a 
"' prayer ... 
' ... so that I rightly pass for an atheist, the omnipresence to me of what I call God in my absolved, 
absolutely private language being neither that of an eyewitness nor that of a voice doing anything 
other than talking to me without saying anything. __ ' 24 
In Derrida's recent autobiographical reflections, we find the same personal element of searching 
for the transcendent, that we find in Augustine's 'Confessions.' Derrida and Augustine, look 
Beyond Being. Augustine also acknowledges his 'blindness.' 'And now the time has come, when 
after this exercise of our understanding in a lower sphere for so long as need required (and maybe 
for longer), we would lift ourselves up to perceive the supreme Trinity which is God. Yet our 
strength fails us_"' There are also clear differences between the two figures. Derrida is not ready 
to call his faith a faith in the God of the Church and the Creed. Augustine, on the contrary, ends 
his search via secularism and scepticism, at the doors of the City of God. His God is the God of 
tradition, not the atheistic god of Derrida. Derrida is blind to even knowing the meaning of the 
name God. Augustine acknowledges in the 'De Trinitate,' that God ultimately eludes predicative, 
metaphysical language_ Faith and Reason have to give in to mystery_ Augustine does not see, 
however, that this God is incompatible with a community of believers, who affirm both his 
friendship and his transcendence. Derrida, on the other hand, is not much of a community type of 
person in his thinking. 
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10.4.1-THE 'THEOLOGICAL' VIEW OF BEING 
Derrida and Augustine, do not call for a total abandonment of reason, but a new reason. Each 
thinker begins his life's work at the twilight point of a great culture. For Augustine, classicism is 
to be supplanted by the reason of sapientia. Derrida calls for the deconstruction of reason. Both 
Derrida and Augustine, struggle to 'throw away the ladder' of the old reason of classical culture. 
Both realise that this cannot be done. Despite similarities, Augustine and Derrida differ in a 
fundamental manner. Augustine remains firstly a theologian, and as a theologian he still insists 
that we can speak about God. Derrida is not a theologian. For all the 'prayers and tears' of 
Derrida, his hope of God, or for God, is limited indeed. Augustine (and Aquinas) has a far more 
open attitude to the hope of using the language of this age, in order to speak of the next. That is to 
say, all the theologians in this study believe in a special view of being, a theological view. 
A theological possibility. A theological view of being, is not necessarily a naive view of being. It 
is not a view of being that denies the problems associated with metaphysics and classical reason, 
succinctly raised by Derrida and Heidegger. It accepts the potential weaknesses in the 
metaphysical statements about God. Yet, because of grace, a theological view of being still 
persists in speaking about God, even if such speaking is subject to continual deconstruction. 
Derrida's philosophy, is a philosophy of 'sin,' or 'hopelessness' and not 'grace' in the midst of 
hopelessness. Derrida's outlook on the hope of meaning, truth and reference, whilst not hopeless, 
is dim indeed. As a secular figure, his own view is that of the 'fallen' nature of the text and the 
world in which it lives. Derrida's textual and hermeneutic outlook is forlorn. He does not hope (at 
least, not much, despite what Caputo says in 'The Tears and Prayers of Jacques Derrida.'). There 
is no possibility of'grace,' in Derrida's outlook. 
Grace is the hope that lies behind all theological language. This is the message of the 'Church 
Dogmatics.' Barth's brilliance (even ifhe went too far) lies in this insight. Unless there is a real 
theological possibility enabling us to speak about God, all is lost. Despite our fallen existence, a 
theological view of being still states that language about God is possible. Ifwe fail to speak about 
God 'correctly,' the first time, we try again. Derrida does not incorporate this concept of 'grace' 
into the religious dimension of his work. With him, there is no possibility, beyond the trace. 
There can be nothing beyond a vague hope, a center-less centre. All there can be, is a silent 
prayer amidst the tears of the atheist. 
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The other issue that is incorporated into a theological view of being, is the perspective of 
creation. This is absent in Derrida's work. The reality of creation states, that in the beginning, the 
world and human beings were created as 'good.' Today, even after the fall of man, hope remains. 
Even today in a 'fallen world of metaphysics,' some 'good' is still possible. Even a 
'metaphysical' good. This was an important and fundamental insight of Thomas. Not all 
metaphysics is 'without hope. ' 26 The theological concept of creation places a far less negative 
outlook upon the metaphysical language of creation. Because Derrida does not reflect a 
theological view of being, deconstruction gives us little hope for the future of metaphysical 
language. 
10.4.2-SPEAKING AMIDST THE TEARS AND SILENCES 
This reflects one of the main divergences between Derrida and the other subjects of this study. 
Augustine, for example, realises that for the sake of the future of the Church, even mankind, we 
must still dare to speak about God, even if such speaking is subject to weakness and criticism. 
Not to speak about God, is not to have God at all. Augustine's Trinity is his answer to the 
tensions within which he must operate. In the Trinity, Augustine says 'Yes,' and 'No' to 
classicism. The balance must be kept. In his Trinity, Augustine says 'Yes' and 'No,' to the 
language of Being and Beyond Being, respectively. We must use both in their place, even ifthe 
two terms are mutually paradoxical. Through grace, God is accessible to our language of Being. 
Through grace he reminds us that he is not completely thus accessible. We have also observed 
that it is not possible to speak of any kind of Trinity, without using the language of Being. Valla 
attempted to go beyond the metaphysical categories of his illustrious predecessors, which resulted 
in him using a language of Being, no less. 
The Trinity calls for both differentiation and substance. Additionally, the Christian Trinity 
overcomes the binary problem in that it calls for both substance and participation, in such a way 
as to avoid the binary pitfalls of which Derrida and Nietzsche speak. 
10.5-IBOMAS 
The chapter on Thomas was written to refute the popular opinion that scholasticism, is a 
theological method that exemplifies conceptual closure, and not much else. The scholasticism of 
Thomas does not capitulate completely to hyperessentialism. Our study of Thomas has revealed 
that although there is a certain rigidity in his style, when compared to contemporary theologies, 
Thomas was engaging in the same deep task of grappling with human language, as a means to 
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speak about God. His theology, as with the theologies of Karl Barth and Augustine, also contains 
a transcendent element. Thomas also seeks to go beyond the language of closure in his search for 
God. This is clearly evident within the Neoplatonic stream in his writing. Yet, particularly when it 
comes to his Trinity, it is clear that Thomas has transformed both N eop latonism and 
Aristotelianism into something new. 
There are also various indications that Thomas has attempted to move beyond a static substance 
ontology, even ifhe did not succeed in this entirely. These efforts are clearly visible as Thomas 
based his substantial concepts upon an underlying 'existence,' not a substrate. Despite the clear 
tensions, and inconsistencies, Thomas' world of substances, is a dynamic world in which each 
entity moves towards its actual perfection, ordained for it by God. These entities achieve this 
through a continual interaction with other entities. This results in a more relational universe, than 
that of Aristotle. 
The crucial part of our chapter on Aquinas, is our exposure of his unique Trinitarian ontology. 
This is a unique, Trinitarian ontology, because of its subject matter. For Thomas, Augustine and 
Barth, speaking about the Trinity is affirmation at the limit. Thomas was forced into a new 
ontological paradigm in his talk about the Trinity, precisely because of the unique problems the 
Trinity afforded to the theologian, working in Aristotelian categories_ Yet, Thomas' Trinitarian 
relations go beyond the relations of the categories. Here, he is partly assisted by the new 'modal' 
dimension to logic that medieval philosophy afforded Trinitarianism_ 
Augustine also shows this new movement, but it reaches its zenith in Thomas. Significantly, this 
singular Trinitarian ontology does not flow over into his other work. This was shaped by the 
unique problem within which Thomas (and others) had to operate. As a unique, Trinitarian 
ontology, such thinking was revolutionary at the time in that we are not aware of any othertype 
of 'non theological' philosophy of that period, that operated with the same insight. This insight 
was the forced overcoming of an Aristotelian, substance-centred ontology, towards a more 
balanced approach, acknowledging the equal importance of both substance and relations. Thus, 
Thomas views the individual persons of the Trinity as both individuals and relations. They are 
constituted through their very openness towards the Other. The language of the Trinity is not an 
apophatic language. It is a language that describes the possibility and the impossibility of a 
language that speaks of God. It is a language that speaks in positive, onto-theological categories, 
yet does not become a 'hyperousiology,' lodging itself securely in pure presence without 
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differentiation. We can almost ascribe to Trinitarian language a similar reality to that which 
Derrida gives to differance: ' ... not only irreducible to any ontological or theological-
ontotheological-reappropriation, but as the very opening of the space in which ontotheology-
philosoph y-produces its system and its history, it includes ontotheology, inscribing it and 
exceeding it without return. " 1 Derrida on the other hand, acknowledges neither the possibility of 
God as a 'Him-himself,' or a 'Being-towards.' 
10.6-KARL BARTH 
With Barth, we have a theology that shouts yes! This is a concrete yes, not the oui, oui of Jacques 
Derrida." In some senses, we can compare the God of the early Barth of the 'Commentary on 
Epistle to the Romans' to thethinking of Derrida. At that early time, Barth's God was Wholly 
Other in a sense of being too fur away for theologians to actually ascribe theological language to 
him. However, later, when Barth was called upon to take up a lecture post in a theological faculty 
at university, he realised the unhelpful nature of this position. Barth's answer to the problem was 
not to bring God back again into immanence, but the analogia fidei. 
In Derrida's case, the 'time of the Messiah,' is never a presence. It makes itself meaningless, it 
disappears and effuces itself precisely in order to bring about the possibility of 
Tout autre the advent of the impossible, of that which is never present." Derrida does not speak 
of the 'messiah,' but rather of 'messianicity.' ' ... like this strange concept of messianism without 
content, of the messianic without messianism, that guides us here like the blind ... ' 30 
On the contrary, Barth's theology is all about what God can do, despite man's doubt thereof. We 
have already suggested some of the shortcomings of Barth's theology in a previous chapter. Our 
main criticism was to state that in safeguarding the possibility of a revelation in a sceptical age, 
Barth reduced the humanity of human beings. Indeed, we showed how Barth's theology is also 
subject to a deconstructive reading. 
Nevertheless, Barth still can provide Derrida with a new perspective of hope. Despite a culture 
that doubts that God can speak in a non-immanent manner, God can speak. Indeed, He does 
speak. Even if this is impossible. Yes, Barth acknowledges (in a sense, not too different to that of 
Derrida) that for God to break through into man's time, is impossible. Yet, it is this specifically 
theological impossibility that becomes possible in the 'presence' of Jesus Christ. This is the 
'naive belief' that makes the impossible, a reality. 
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Barth's Trinity also provides intriguing answers and possibilities for Derrida. His Trinity 
comprises the present, past and future. Barth's Trinity speaks of an eternal now of the One God, 
that is never a metaphysical 'presence' alone. God is a real 'Now' in Jesus Christ, but He is never 
a 'thing.· The Messiah is never a 'presence· alone. He is theologically, and historically a man 
who shares our own fallen 'presence,' but without being reduced to 'presence· alone. In Jesus 
Christ, and his paradoxical relationship to the Father and Spirit, we have the opening up of 
Heidegger's problem of Being and beings. God who is Beyond Being, the creator of Being, sends 
his Son who is a being. In Christ we have the combination of both the signifier and the signified 
of grace. In the Trinity, all possible notions of God come together. Barth and the other Trinitarian 
figures featuring in this study, acknowledge the necessity and the problematic nature of 
metaphysics. Yet, they will brave this danger. They will speak to the silences and in the silences 
because of the great hope, that enfolds them. This is a hope that is greater than metaphysics. 
When Derrida attempts to 'throw away the ladder,' our question to him is; 'Where shall you go?' 
God is an actuality, moving in constant 'differentiatedness.' This is not a differentiation of 
separation, but koinonia. It is the difference that brings together. He can only be called a 
'presence,' in Jesus Christ because of grace-for-us. He is at the same time 'One,' and 'Many.' 
God is a 'present,' incorporating all margins. He places under himself all synchronic and 
diachronic elements of reality. At the same time, Barth will not reduce the Word of God to a text. 
We have provided a deconstructive reading of Barth's view of time and have seen that it performs 
the anchor-function, in the 'Dogmatics.' Can Derrida, provide a deconstructive reading of Barth 
here, and not fall into inconsistency? We feel, not. Derrida, of course, also has a necessary 
'substrate' to his own thinking, and this is the textuality of all reality. 
10. 7-THE FUTURE OF THE TRINITY 
We can term the work of Derrida philosophically, as the inclination towards certain 
reductionisms. Firstly, there is a reductionistic view of being as primarily, presence. Our study 
has attempted to show that historically, this is not the full picture. Secondly, Derrida reduces the 
rational enterprise of the West to a conceptual search for 'closure.' Again, this is not a true 
reflection, particularly with respect to the doctrine of the Trinity. One of the great cornerstones of 
orthodoxy, in this connection, was the denial of closure. 
Thirdly, Derrida manifests what has been termed: semiological reductionism. 31 Philosophically, 
deconstruction relies on the 'transcendental argument' that significance presupposes idealisation. 
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Reality is already 'subject to signification,' before any perception takes place. The possibility of 
God is no more than the possibility of a transcendent signified. Yet, has Denida demonstrated 
that this is indeed the case? Philosophically, Denida disenfranchises the thought that language as 
a system of signifiers, has any possibility of origins in experience, prior to the medium of 
language. 'Since every act if idealisation, including every noesis, every intentional act of 
consciousness, presupposes the ideal of objectivity as an indeterminate latency, and since that 
ideal cannot itself be given in an intuition, it follows that the phenomenological project of 
grounding all cognition in experience cannot be realised: every present intuition presupposes a 
future which can never be made present. ' 32 
'The curious twist constituting the semiological reduction is that the meaning of the force or 
quantity ultimately responsible for genesis of signifiers is ultimately derived from the signifiers 
themselves ... If the only meaning the force or quantity can have is that which derives from 
signifiers and what they signify-which means that the question of genesis cannot be asked much 
less answered.'" In this sense deconstruction, although disavowing doctrinal content, remains 
doctrinaire. 
The greatest contributions both philosophically, and theologically, have been those contributions 
that have made real attempts to say something about the reality of which their disciplines have 
historically purported to speak. Of course, one of the 'discoveries' of particularly the Twentieth 
Century has been the fact that linguistic 'meaning,' does in a significant manner, impact reality. 
This is certainly a valuable insight. Nevertheless, linguistics and hermeneutics must never deter 
philosophers from continuing to (even if in a Critical-Realist fashion) construct models that 
approximate the reality with which their discipline concerns itself When theology and 
philosophy (as has often been the case in the last sixty years) is duped into reinterpreting its 
purpose as solely that ofhermeneutical and linguistic commentary on the terms that we use to 
describe that reality, the values of these disciplines decline. In different ways, the linguistic 
philosophers, the later Wittgenstein and Denida all fall into this trap. Philosophy becomes 
nothing more (or very little more) than involving oneself in highly intricate semiological and 
linguistic problems that ultimately have a very limited ability long term, to contribute to an 
understanding of the world. 
We can apply this issue to particularly the Western doctrine of the Trinity and indeed, theology 
itself At some point in time, it seems that the theologians of the West missed at least part of the 
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point, of what the Trinity is all about. Although the 'logical problem' will inevitably crop up in 
any systematic theology of the Trinity, this must never become the 'end in itself' of Trinitarian 
theology. A theology of the Trinity should never be primarily about solving a complex, linguistic-
logical problem. These tools are merely to be used towards a deeper end, communion with God 
himself 
This thesis has been an attempt to interpret Derrida's work critical! y. However, as such, we have 
also attempted to avoid the language of a polemic. It has tried to answer him, both philosophically 
and theologically, in an interpretation that is broadly conceived and worked out. Yet, it has 
attempted to bring a wide range ofDerridean and postmodern themes into a scheme of Trinitarian 
thought as traditionally conceived as the sustaining of both substance and participational thinking. 
We believe that Trinitarian thinking, (as indeed, all philosophical thinking) needs to continue to 
uphold these two possibilities. Derrida's failure was to effect precisely the same mistake of which 
he accused the West of committing. This is marginalisation. Derrida downgrades the substance, 
for the sake of a radical difference. 
We have suggested that the Trinity as a unique type discourse, can lead to a genuine reply to 
many of Derrida's questions, and much of the questions of postmodernity. Yet, it must not be 
assumed that the role of the Trinity is to be merely employed as an apologetic, philosophical and 
theological tool. The future of the Trinity is assured not because of, but despite the fact that it can 
be so employed. The future of the Trinity (and that of theology) lies in the fact that once we have 
sought to understand it, (and have failed) life can still go on. Faith can go on. The Trinity's future 
lies not in the hands of the logicians and the proponents of deconstruction. Its future lies in the 
grass-roots, collective life and worship of those sharing in the koinonia of the kingdom of God. 
As we attempted to understand the Trinity through the metaphysical language of being, we realise 
that we are ultimately to throw away the ladder. Conceptual language fails us. However, we 
throw away the ladder, always aware that we must return to it, time and time again. We return to 
the ladder, confident that as we do this, we learn more of both the life and hope that lies beyond 
the ladder. 
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EXPERIENCE OF THE WORLD. HOWEVER, AS WE SHALL SEE, FROM AT LEAST THE TIJVIE OF ARISTOTLE, THERE 
WAS A COMPACT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD AND THE LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD (TO USE 
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3 IF IN SO~IE SENSE WE SPEAK OF INDIVIDUALS, WE Mt;ST ALSO SPEAK OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THOSE 
INDIVIDUALS. HOW THOSE RELATIONS ARE SAID TOBE. OR HOW THEY ARE SAID TO OPERATE, HAS BEEN 
CONTESTED FROM THE START-FROM ARJSTOTLE, THROUGH TO LOCKE AND QuINE. 
4 ANSCOMBE.G.EM, GEACHP.T. 'IBREE PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CITP5. 
5 ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF SUBSTANCE IS NOT ONLY TO BE FOUND HERE. OTHER WORKS ARE ALSO IMPORTA.'JT. 
ESPECIALLY THE 'CATEGORIES,' THE 'TOPICS,' THE 'SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS' .A,\fD OTHER WORKS OF 
LOGIC. THIS IS PRIMARILY BECAUSE LOGIC IS CLOSELY ALIGNED WTIH EXISTENTS. THE QUESTIOK IS, HOW 
CAN SOMETHING BE SAID TO BE. IN A WAY THAT ANOTHER IS NOT'? .A.\fD SO ON. 
THE' METAPHYSICS' AS A TREATISE, IS NOT A UNITY OF THOUGHT IN EVERY WAY. THIS IS BECAt;SE IT IS THE 
PROBABLE COMPILATION OF A LATER EDITOR. THE ARGUMENTS COVER DIFFERENT TOPICS AND ISSUES. 
OFTEN MANY ARE REPEATED. IT IS DIVIDED INTO 14 BOOKS OF CNEQUAL LENGTH A.'JD COMPLEXITY-
BARNES.J.OP CJT.P66. ' ... THERE IS ON THE WHOLE NO DOGMATIC SYSTEM BUT A SERIES OF ESSAYS AT THE 
DISCOVERY OF TRUTH IN A REGION Wl!!CH HE (ARJSTOTLE) FEELS TO BE FULL OF OBSCURITIES.' -ROSS.D.OP 
CIT.Pl62. 
6 SEE ARISTOTLE. (TRANSLATED: TREDENNICK.H: 1989). METAPHYSICS.OP CIT. IN 
BOOK.ZETA! \VE READ:' ... THE QUESTION WHICH BOTH NOW A.\fD IN THE PAST, IS CONTINUALLY POSED 
.A.\fD CONTINUALLY PUZZLED OVER IS THIS'. WHAT rs SUBSTA.\fCE?' IBm.ZL 1028B2-4. (As QUOTED BY 
BARNES.J.OP CIT.P78). THE CLAIMS OF MANY NOTWITHSTANDING, BECAUSE OF THE SOMEWHAT 
DISJOINTED NATL'RE OF THE 'METAPHYSICS' AS A LITERARY WHOLE, ARJSTOTLE DOES NOT PROVIDE SO 
MUCH OF A STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWER TO THE QUESTION'. WHAT IS METAPHYSICS? 
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'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT.l.1.P3FF. ' ... IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT WHAT IS CALLED WISDOM IS 
CONCERNED WITH PRIMARY CAUSES AND PRINCIPLES, SO THAT, AS HAS BEEN ALREADY STATED, THE MA.'1 OF 
EXPERIENCE, THE MASTER CRAFTSMAN OTHER THA.\f THE ARTISAN; A.\fD THE SPECULATIVE SCIENCES TO BE 
MORE LEARNED THA.'I PRODUCTIVE. THUS IT IS CLEAR THAT WISDOM IS KNOWLEDGE OF CERT AlN PRINCIPLES 
AND CAUSES.' -IBID.P9. 'OF THE QUALITIES THERE DESCRIBED THE KNOWLEDGE OF EVERYTHING MUST 
NECESSARILY BELONG TO HIM WHO IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE POSSESSES KNOWLEDGE OF THE UNIVERSAL, 
BECAUSE HE KNOWS IN A SENSE ALL THE PARTICULARS WHICH IT COMPRISES ... THESE THINGS, VIZ, THE 
MOST UNIVERSAL. ARE PERHAPS THE HARDEST FOR MAN TO GRASP. BECAUSE THEY ARE FURTHEREST 
REMOVED FROM THE SENSES.' -Pl 1. 
8 BARNES.OP CIT.P70. 
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WE CONSIDER THE PROPERTY "WHITE.' .A.LL ENTITIES WITH THIS PROPERTY. EACH CONT AJN THIS QUALITY 
ONLY BY PARTICIPATION IN 'WHITENESS' AS A FORM. 
'' OWENS.I: 1951. 'TifE DOCTRINE OF BEING IN TifE ARISTOTELIAN MET APHYSICS.'OP 
CIT .P298-99. 
12 ARISTOTLE.'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT.BOOK GAMMA.1003A21-36.Pl47. 'THERE ARE THREE 
ORDERS OF ENTITY· THOSE WHICH HA VE SEPARATE SUBSTANTIAL EXISTENCE BUT ARE SUBJECT TO CHANGE, 
THOSE WHICH ARE FREE FROM CHANGE BUT EXIST ONLY AS DISTINGUISHABLE ASPECTS OF CONCRETE 
REALITIES. AND THOSE WHICH BOTH HA VE SEPARATE EXISTENCE AN'D ARE FREE FROM CHANGE. THESE ARE 
STUDIED BY THREE DISTINCT SCIENCES-PHYSICS, MATHEMATICS, AND THEOLOGY OR METAPHYSICS.'. 
ROSS.D.OP CIT.Pl63. 
13 ACKRILL.J.L.OP Crr.Pll8. SAYS ARISTOTLE: ' ... IF .THEN, SUBSTANCE IS THIS PRIMARY THING, !TIS OF 
SUBSTANCES THAT THE PHILOSOPHER MUST GRASP THE FIRST PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES.' - 'ARISTOTLE. 'Qp 
CIT.BOOK GAMMA.1003B. l 9-20.Pl48. 
"ACKRILL REMARKS: 'IN GAMMA, THEN, ARISTOTLE HAS DEFINED FIRST PHILOSOPHY AS A HIGHLY 
GENERAL STUDY OF BEING QUA BEING (A."ID OF ITS ATTRIBUTES): AND HE HAS THEN NARROWED IT DOWN BY 
SA YING THAT SINCE SUBSTANCE IS THE PRIMARY FORM OF BEING, FIRST PHILOSOPHY WILL BE PRIMARILY 
CONCERNED WITH SUBSTANTIAL BEING AND WITH ITS CAUSES AND PRINCIPLES. IN EPSILON.!, HAVING 
MENTIONED PHYSICS AND MATHEMATICS AS TWO THEORETICAL SCIENCES. ARISTOTLE INTRODUCES A 
FURTHER AND MORE FUNDAMENTAL THEORETICAL SCIENCE, THEOLOGY WHICH IS CONCERNED WITII WHAT IS 
A SUBSTANCE A.'ID EXISTS SEPARATELY (UNLIKE MATHEMATIC AL OBJECTS) AND IS CHA.'IGELESS (UNLIKE 
PHYSICAL OBJECTS).' -ACKRILL.J.L.OP CIT.Pl 18. 
"GUTHRIE. W.C.K: 1933.'THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S TifEOLOGY. 'Op CIT.Pl 71. 
"ARISTOTLE.OP CIT.BOOK GAMMA.1005A.15-20.Pl59. 
17 IBID.BOOK GAMMA.1005.A28-30. 
L8 OWENS.J.OP CIT.P257FF. SAYS ARISTOTLE: 'THE TERMS "BEING" AND "NOT BEING," ARE USED NOT 
01'"LY WITH REFERENCE TO THE TYPES OF PREDICATION, A.>'ID TO THE POTENTIALITY OR ACTUALITY, OR NON· 
POTENTIALITY AND NON-ACTUALITY. OF THESE TYPES, BUT ALSO (IN THE STRICTEST SENSE) TO DENOTE 
TRUTH AND FALSITY.'-OP CIT. BOOK EPSILON.1051A35-39.P469. I A.\! THANKFUL TO PROF. E. VAN 
NIEKERK WHO POINTED OLT TO ME TIIE DISTINCTION BET\\!EEN 'rs, AND 'OUGHT.' ST A TEMENTS AS 
DENOTING THE TWO DIMENSIONS OF 'ETHICS,' AND '01'TOLOGY.' FOR AN ANAL YS!S OF THE COGENT 
ELE!>.IENTS IN THOMAS' ~!ETAPHYSICS, SEE CLARKE.WN: 1974. 'WHAT IS MOST AND LEAST 
RELEVANT IN TifE METAPHYSICS OF ST lHOMAS TODAY?' IN INTERNATIONAL 
PIIlLOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. VOL l 4. l 974.P412. CLARKE POINTS OUT THAT THE GOODNESS OF 
CL TIMA TE REALITY, IS A.'1 INTRINSIC PART OF THAT REALITY, ACCORDING TO THOMAS. 
'
9 BECK.A OP CIT.P534. ARISTOTLE'S ANSWER TO THIS PROBLEM IS TO SEEK A MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN 
HOMONYMOCS AND NON-HOMONYMOUS TERMS. '"To EXIST'' OR "To BE," IS LIKE DISCUSSING THE WORD 
HEALTHY. THE WORD HAS A PRIMARY USE. AND ITHAS VARIOUS DERIVATIVE USES. EACH OF WHICH 
CONTAINS IN ITS ACCOUNT THE ACCOUNT OF IBE PRIMARY USE. Now METAPHYSICS CAN BE DEFENDED 
AG . .\.INST THE ACCUSATION: "BEING IS NOT A GENUS." THERE CAN BE NO ONE SINGLE SCIENCE OF KEYS; FOR 
KEYS ARE HOMONYMS. BUT EXISTING ITEMS ARE NOT HOMONYMS IN THE WAY KEYS ARE, FOR THE WORD 
"'EXIST," AS !TIS APPLIED TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF ITEM, IS NOT SIMPLY HOMONYMOUS: ITS USES, IBOUGH 
INDEED DIFFERE1'T, ARE ALL TIED TOGETHER IN AS MUCH AS THEY ARE ALL CONNECTED TO ONE CENTRAL, 
FOCAL, PRIMARY USE. JUST AS A STUDENT OF MEDICINE, INTERESTED IN HEALTH, WILL CONSIDER DIETS AND 
COMPLEXIONS AS WELL AS BODIES, AND WILL NOT THEREBY FIND THAT HIS SCIENCE FALLS APART INTO 
SEVERAL DISTINCT DISCIPLINES, SO A METAPHYSICIAN, INTERESTED IN ENTITIES, WILL CONSIDER 
EVERYTHING TO WHICH THE WORD "EXISTS" APPLIES AND WILL NOT THEREBY FIND THAT HIS SUBJECT IS 
DISSOLVED.' -BARNES.J.OP C!T.P77. 
20 ANSCOMBE.G.E.MOP C!T.P 8FF. SHE IS DOUBTLESSLY SPECIFICALLY THINKING OF THE IDEA OF 
INDIVIDUALS IN THE LocKEAN SENSE. 
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'THE TERM: BEING; IS USED IN VARIOUS SENSES. BL'T WITH REFERENCE TO ONE CENTRAL IDEA AND ONE 
DEFINITE CHARACTERJSTIC. AND NOT AS MERELY A COMMON EPITHET ... FOR SOME THINGS ARE SAID TO "BE .. 
BECAUSE THEY ARE SUBSTANCES; OTHERS BECACSE THEY ARE MODIFICATIONS OF SUBSTANCE; OTHERS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE A PROCESS TOWARDS SUBSTANCE. OR DESTRUCTIONS OR PRIVATIONS OR QUALITIES OF 
SUBSTANCE ... • -ARISTOTLE.OP CIT.BOOK GAMMA l003A31-1003B3.Pl47-8. 
"BARNES.I.OP C!T.P90. 
°' ARISTOTLE.(TRANSLATED: ACKRJLL.J.L: 1990).'CATEGORIES AND DE !NTERPRETATIONE. • 
OPC!T. CH5.211.P5. 
24 IBID.CH 5.3BIO. P9 
"SEE THE COMMENTS OF EDEL.A.OP CIT.P49. SAYS THE EARLY WITTGENSTEIN OF THE CONTINLITY 
BETWEEN LANGUAGE AND THE WORLD'. 'THE WORW IS EVERYTHING THAT IS THE CASE. THE WORLD IS THE 
TOTALITY OF FACTS. NOT OF THINGS. THE WORLD IS DETERMINED BY THE FACTS, AND BY THESE BEING ALL 
THE FACTS ... THE FACTS IN LOGICAL SPACE ARE THE WORLD.' -WITTGENSTE!N.L.(TRANSLATED: 
OGDEN.C.K: 1933). 
'TRACTATUS LOG/CO PHILOSOPHIC US.' 1-1.13.P31. SEE ALSO ANSCOMBE. G.E.M: 1967. 'AN 
INTRODUCTION TO WITTGENSTEIN'S TRACTATUS.' P29. SEE ANSCOMBE's COMMENTS ON 
WITTGENSTEIN'S: 'THE LIMITS OF MY LANGUAGE MEA.'\fTHE LJl\,llTS OF MY WORLD.' -IBID.5.6-P149. 
26 IN THE 'PoETICS,' FOR EXAMPLE. WE HA VE THE ORJGINS OF 'HEIUAENEUTICAL THEORY,' AS WELL AS AN 
EARLY APPRECIATION OF LANGUAGE AS EXPRESSING DIFFERENT ~!EDIUMS FOR TRUTH: 'JNARISTOTELES SE 
POETICA EN RHETORICA VIND ONS ALGEMENE UITSPRAKE ORR DIE TAAL, ASOOK DIE EERSTE UITGEWERKTE LEER 
VAN DIEMETAPHOOR.. '-DU TOIT.C: 1984. 'DIE k!ETAFORJESE SPREKE OOR GOD. 'P67. 
27 ARISTOTLE.'CATEGORIES'.OP CIT.CH 5.2A34FF.P6. 
"THERE ARE V ARJOUS DEFINITION OF A 'CATEGORY.' AND THEY HA VE FEATURED IN THE THOUGHT OF 
VARIOUS PHILOSOPHERS. TO NAME LEIBNIZ AND KA>'IT IS TO NA>\,!E JUST TWO OTHER EXAMPLES. DocTRINES 
OF 'CATEGORJES' AND THEORJES OF TYPES. ARE EXPLORATIONS IN THE SAl\,!E AREA. WHAT HAS 
HANDICAPPED DISCUSSIONS. HAS OFTEN BEEN THE DIFFEREl'<'T VOCABCLARIES OF DIFFERENT PHILOSOPHERS, 
AND THE QUESTION '\1iHAT TYPE OF THING, IDEA OR ENTITY 00 WE INCLUDE IN CATEGORY LISTS?' IT SEEMS 
CLEARLY FROM THE HISTORY OF IDEAS THAT WITHOUT SOME BELIEF IN OR USE OF 'CATEGORIES,' 
PHILOSOPHY AS PRACTISED IN THE ANALYTICAL TRADITION BECOMES VERY DIFFICULT. 
FOR K&'.'T's 'CATEGORIES.' SEE: KANT.I. (TRANSLATED: SMITH.N.K: 1964).'CRITIQUE OF PURE 
REASON. 'Pl05FF. IN HIS FIRST DIVISION OF THE CRJTIQUE OF PURE REASON, 10\N'T DEALS WITH \\11AT HE 
CALLS THE TRANSCENDENT AL ANALYTIC. IN THE FIRST BOOK, HE LOOKS AT WHAT HE CALLS THE 
'ANALYTIC OF CONCEPTS.' THEN IN THE FIRST CHAPTER. HE DETERl\,llNES TO EXAMINE WHAT HE TERMS: 
'THE CLUE TO DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING.' FIRSTLY, HE ARGL"ES THAT 
WHEN WE THINK SYSTEMATICALLY. THEN, ACCORDING TO CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES-VARIOUS CONCEPTS 
A>'JD IDEAS WILL BE APP ARENT-THROUGH THE USE OF SUCH REASON (Pl04 ). THEN HE MOVES ON TO DISCUSS 
WHAT HE CALLS THE CLl"E TO Tiffi DISCOVERY OF ALL PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDER ST ANDI1'G. THESE ARE 
THE 'CATEGORJES' (Pll). GENERAL LOGIC OPERATES BY ABSTRACTING FROM THE GENERALCOl'<'TENT OF 
KNOWLEDGE-WHICH IT TRANSFORMS INTO CONSTITIJENT CONCEPTS BY A>'\fAL YSIS. 'BY SYNTHESIS. IN ITS 
MOST GENERAL SENSE, I lJNDERST A.'lD THE ACT OF PL'TTING DIFFERENT REPRESENTATIONS TOGETHER, AND 
OF GRASPING WHATIS MANIFOLD IN THEM IN ONE (ACT OF) KNOWLEDGE. SUCH A SYNTHESIS IS PURE. IF THE 
MANIFOLD IS NOT EMPIRICAL BUT IS GIVEN A-PRJORJ, OR AS IS THE MA.'l!FOLD IN SPACE AND 
TIME ... SYNTHESIS OF A MANIFOLD (BE IT GIVEN EMPIRJCALLY OR A-PRJORI) IS WHAT FIRST GIVES RISE TO 
K..NOWLEDGE. THIS KNOWLEDGE MAY, INDEED, AT FIRST, BE CRUDE AND CONFUSED, A.'\fD THEREFORE IN 
NEED OF ANALYSlS. STILL THE SYNTHESIS IS THAT WHICH GATHERS THE ELEMENTS FOR KNOWLEDGE AND 
UNITES THEM TO (FORM) A CERTAIN CONTENT ... IN THIS MANNER THERE ARISES PRECISELY THE Sk~IE 
!'.-UMBER OF PURE CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH APPLY A-PRIORJ TO OBJECTS OF INTUITION IN 
GENERAL, AS, IN THE PRECEDING TABLE, THERE HA VE BEEN FOUND TO BE LOGICAL FUNCTIONS IN ALL 
POSSIBLE JUDGEMENTS. FOR THESE FUNCTIONS SPECIFY THE UNDERSTANDING COMPLETELY, AND YIELD AN 
EXHAUSTIVE INVENTORY OF ITS POWERS. THESE CONCEPTS WE SHALL, WITH ARJSTOTLE, CALL 
"CATEGORIES," FOR OUR PRJMARY PURPOSE IS THE SAME AS HIS, ALTHOUGH WIDELY DIVERGING FROM IT IN 
MANNER OF EXECUfION' (IBID.Pl 13). THEN FURTHER: 'THIS TABLE OF "CATEGORIES" SUGGESTS SOME NICE 
POINTS, WHICH MAY PERHAPS HA VE IMPORTANT CONSEQL"ENCES IN REGARD TO THE SCIENTIFIC FORM OF ALL 
MODES OF KNOWLEDGE OBTAINABLE BY REASON. FOR THAT THIS TABLE IS EXTREMELY USEFUL IN THE 
THEORETICAL PART OF PHILOSOPHY, A.'\fD INDEED IS INDISPENSIBLE AS SUPPLYING THE COMPLETE PLA>'\f OF A 
WHOLE SCIENCE. SO FAR AS THAT SCIENCE RESTS ON A-PRIORI CONCEPTS. AND AS DIVIDING IT 
SYSTEMATICALLY ACCORDING TO DETERMINATE PRINCIPLES. IS ALREADY EVIDENT FROM THE FACT THAT 
THE TABLE CONTAINS ALL THE ELEMENTARY CONCEPTS OF THE UNDERSTANDING IN THEIR 
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COMPLETENESS .. -, (Pl15-6). Ins IMPORTANT TO NOTICE THAT CATEGORICAL THEORY IS CONTEXIUAL IN 
NATURE •. 'u'ID EACH PHILOSOPHER WOULD POSIT THOSE 'CATEGORIES' THAT ARE PARTICULARLY PERTINENT 
TO HIS OWN STL"DIES AND THEORIES. THIS MEANS THAT SHOULD THE THEORY CONTINL'E TO BE USED, THERE 
WILL NEVER COME A TIME WHEN THE NUMBER OF "CATEGORIES' JS 'EXHAUSTED.' As LONG AS 
PHILOSOPHERS CONTINUE TO 'DIVIDE BEING UP' IN DIFFERENT WAYS. TllEIR 'CATEGORIES' DIFFER. PLATO 
REFLECTS HIS "OTHER-WORLDLINESS' IN HIS LACK OF THE USE OF CONCRETE 'CATEGORIES' (HE WOUW 
PROBABLY NOT HA VE GONE MUCH FURTHER THAN 'BEING' AND 'BEC01'!ING' ). 'THE "CATEGORIES" OF A 
CARTESIAN PHILOSOPHER WOULD SURELY HA VE INCLUDED LIFE OR ~!IND, BECAUSE HE WOUW WORK IN A 
DU.-illST SPIRIT. HOWEVER, ARISTOTLE DOES NOTN"EED TO SEPARATE MIND AND BODY BECAUSE HE SEES 
THE UNITY OF THE NATURAL AND THE HUMAN WORLD. HIS INITIAL CONCERN IS RATHER WITH THE CENTRAL 
PHILOSOPHIC ISSUE INHERITED FROM THE WHOLE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY ·THE RELATION AND 
RESPECTIVE "REALITY" OF THE ETERNAL TO THE CHA.'IGING.'-EDEL.A.OP CIT.P59. EVEN HEIDEGGER 
SPOKE OF (ADMITTEDLY VERY DIFFERENT) 'CATEGORIES' IN HIS 'BEING AND Tll\;IE.' NAMELY THOSE OF: 
'ZUHANDENSEJN' (READINESS-TO-HAW) AND 'VORHANDENSEJN' (PRESENCE-TO-HA'ID)-SEE 
BRANDOM.R. 'HEIDEGGER'S "CATEGORIES" IN BEING AND TIME. (IN: EDITOR: HALL.H: 
1992: HEIDEGGER.A CRITICAL READER.). 
'
9 THE HIERARCHICAL NATURE OF ARISTOTLE'S WORLD IS TO BE SEEN INTHE DIFFERENT TYPES OF SEPARATE 
ENTITIES IN THE,fSEL <"ES AND THE TYPES OF QUALITIES THAT THEY HA VE. IN HIS HIERARCHIALISM, 
ARISTOTLE DOES 'IOT POSIT A'IOTHER WORLD OF 'TRUE BEING.' THE WAY PLATO AND PLOTINUS DID. 
30 GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CIT.P46. 
" l(_'ffiALE DEFINES THE RussELLIAN TYPE AS FOLLOWS: 'ACCORDING TO ·'PRJNC/Pl4 i\4ATHEMATICA" THE 
TYPES OF SUBJECTS FORM A HIERARCHY IN WHICH EACH HIGHER TYPE IS DEFINED BY REFERENCE TO THE ONE 
BELOW IT AND SUBJECTS OF THE LOWEST TYPE .ARE THE IN"DIVIDUALS JUST lvIENTIONED I.E. SUBJECTS OF 
PROPOSITIONS AS PARTS AND CONT AlN 'IEITHER THE NOTION OF "ALL," NOR THE NOTION OF "SOME." l THINK 
THAT MR RUSSELL SAYS THAT THESE SUBJECTS ARE WllAT PHILOSOPHERS COMMONLY CALL SUBSTA'ICES 
BECAUSE HE CONSIDERS THAT HIS DISTINCTION OF TYPES JS THE SA'-!E AS THAT DISTINCTION OF LEVELS BY 
CONSIDERATION OF WHICH PHILOSOPHERS WERE FIRST LED TO SPEAK OF SUBSTANCES IN A STRICT SENSE. 
WE SEE HERE WITH RUSSELL. SOME SIMILARJTY TO THE PLOTINIAN UNIVERSE, AS COMPRISED OF THE THREE 
'TYPES' OF O!-."E. Nm:s AND SouL. 
32 RYLE.G.Op C!T.Pl89. 
33 1BID.Pl89. 
34 1BID.Pl90. 
35 ROSS. W.D. 'ARISTOTLE. 'Op C!T.P23. 
36 KNEALE.W.OP CIT.PI04. 
3
' 1BID.Pl04.Ross.0P CIT.P24. SAYS ARISTOTLE: "OF THINGS THAT ARE SAID. S01'IE INVOLVE COMBINATION 
WHILE OTHERS ARE SAID WITHOUT COMBINATION. EXAMPLES OF THOSE INVOLVING COMBINATION ARE 
"cv!.'u'I RUNS.'' .. ,IAN WINS.,, A'ID THOSE WITHOUT COMBINATION "MAN." "ox •• , "RUNS." OF THINGS THERE 
.ARE: (A) SOlv!E ARE SAID OF A SUBJECT BUT ARE NOT JN ANY SUBJECT. FOR EXA'>!PLE, MAN IS SAID OF A 
S\JBJECT. THE !!>"DJVIDUAL MAN, BUfIS NOT IN ANY SUBJECT. (B) SOME .ARE JN A SUBJECT BUT ARE NOT SAID 
OF ANY SUBJECT. (BY "JN A SUBJECT," l MEAN WHATIS IN SOlv!ETHfNG, NOT AS A PART, A.'ID CANNOT EXIST 
SEPARATELY FROM WHAT IT IS IN.) FOR EXAMPLE. THE I!>"DIVIDUAL K.'IOWLEDGE OF GRAMMAR IS IN A 
SUBJECT, THE SOUL, BUT JS NOT SAID OF A;'IY SUBJECT; AND THE INDIVIDUAL WHITE IS IN A SUBJECT, THE 
BODY (FOR A!.L COLOUR IS JN A BODY), BUT IS NOT SAID OF 1°'"'N SUBJECT. ( C) SOME ARE BOTH SAID OF A 
SUBJECT AND IN A SUBJECT. FOR EXAMPLE K,NOWLEDGE IS IN A SUBJECT, THE SOUL. AND IS ALSO SAID OF A 
SUBJECT, KNOWLEDGE OF GRAMMAR. (D) SOME ARE NEITHER IN A SUBJECT NOR SAID OF A SUBJECT, FOR 
EXAMPLE, THE INDIVIDUAL MAN OR INDIVIDUAL HORSE-FOR NOTHING OF THIS SORT!S EITHER IN A SUBJECT 
NOR SAID OF A SUBJECT. THINGS THAT ARE INDIVIDUAL AND NUMERICALLY ONE ARE, WITHOUT EXCEPTION, 
NOT SAID OF ANY SUBJECT, BUT THERE IS NOTHfNG TO PREVENT SOME OF THEM FROM BEING IN A SUBJECT· 
THE INDIVIDUAL K>NOWLEDGE OF GRA;'>IMAR IS ONE OF THE THINGS IN A SUBJECT.' -
ARISTOTLE. 'CATEGORIES'.Or CIT.CHAPIER 2.P 3-4. 
38 EDEL.A.ARISTOTLE'S 'CATEGORIES' .OP C!T.P61. 
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39 HOWEVER ANSCOMBE NOTES THAT THE CONCEPT OF ESSENCE IN THE WAY IT IS UNDERSTOOD IS NOT FROM 
ARISTOTLE HIMSELF, BUT RATHER A PRODUCT OF HIS INTERPRETERS AFTER HIM-SEE ANSCOMBE. 'TIIREE 
PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CITP! 1.43. 
40 EDEL.A OP CIT.P45, SEE ALSO THE LIST AS EXPOUNDED BY ROSS.OP CIT.P22-23. ACKRILL PLACES THE 
THEORY OF THE CATEGORIES INTO THE GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC: 'WITHIN THE 
"0RGANON" THE "CATEGORIES" AND "DEINTERPRETATIONE' COME FIRST. FOLLOWED BY THE 
"ANALYTICS." (THIS IS BECAUSE THE ''CATEGORIES" DEALS WITH TERMS, THE CONSTITUENTS OF 
PROPOSITIONS, THE "DE I1'TERPRETAT!ONE' DEALS WITH PROPOSITIONS, THE CONSTITUENTS OF SYLLOGISMS, 
AND THE "ANALYTICS" DEALS WITH SYLLOGISMS). THE "CATEGORIES" CONTAIN A THEORY OF CATEGORIES. 
WITH AN ASSOCIATED THEORY OF PREDICATION, A.'ID AN ACCOUNT OF THE CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANCE, 
QUANTITY, RELATION AND QUALITY. '-ACKRILL. 'ARISTOTLE THE PHILOSOPHER 'OP CITP79. 
41 LACEY.A 'CATEGORIES.' IN: (EDITED: HONDERICH.T: 1995).THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
PHIL0S0PHY.Pl26. VARIOUS SCHOLARS HA VE POINTED OUT PROBLEMS. 'MOVEMENT (KINESIS), FOR 
f:,'(AMPLE, FALLS INTO THE LIST OF THE LAST FOUR CATEGORIES (E.G. "EUDEMIAN ETHICS" 1217B30, 
"METAPHYSICS" VII l028B24, XII I069A23 AND B9FF.) ALso IN SPITE OF ARISTOTLE'S SCRUPULOUS 
ATIENTIONTO THE DIFFERENCES OF RESPECT IN WHICH THE APPARENTLY SAME MATERIAL CA.'l COME UNDER 
ONE CATEGORY IN ONE WAY (E.G. "CATEGORIES" 9Al6FF.), THERE IS CONSIDERABLE RAIDING BETWEEN 
CATEGORIES. QllALITY IS PARTICULARLY SWOLLEN. IT COVERS HABIT (HEXIS) AND DISPOSITION (DIATHESIS), 
NATIJRAL CAPACITIES OR INCAPACITIES, PASSIVE QUALITIES AND AFFECTIONS (PATHETIKAI POIOTETES KAI 
PATHE), AND THE FORMS AND FIGURES OR SHAPE OF THINGS (SCHE~IE AND}v/ORPHE)'-EDEL.0P CIT.P45FF. 
'THERE SEEMS TO BE WIDESPREAD OPINION THAT SITUATION (KEISTHAI) A,'ID STATE (ECHEIN) ARE 
RELATIVELY UNIMPORTANT, THAT THEY HA VE A VERY LIMITED USE, WERE ABANDONED BY ARISTOTLE, OR 
DO NOT HAVE TO BE MADE SENSE OF IN ANY GENERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE "CATEGORIES"' -IBID.P46FF. 
42 IBID.P50. 
43 ACKRILL.J.L.'ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES AND DEINTERPRETATJONE.' 0PCIT.P79, AS 
QUOTED BY EDEL.A OP CIT.P49. 
44 IBID.P61.THE MEDIEVAL CHURCH. HOWEVER, WITH THE LATE DISCOVERY OF THE FllLL '0RGA.'l0N,' 
RECTIFIED THIS IGNORANCE AND MADE MUCH USE OF THE ARISTOTEL!A,'l DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACTUALITY 
AND POTENTIALITY. 
"ANSCOMBE.G.E.M. 'TIIREE PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CIT.P7. 
46 1BID.P8. 
41 IBID.P8. 
48 FOR ~n;cH OF WHAT FOLLOWS, WE HAVE DEPENDED ON THE WORK OF COHEN: COHEN.S.M. 
'ESSENTIALISM IN ARISTOTLE' OP CIT.IN REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS. VOL 31.P387-405. 
49 ARISTOTLE.'CATEGORIES'.OPCIT.CHS. 4Al0-4A21.Pll. 
so SEE THE DEBATE IN COHEN.S.M.OP CIT, BRODY.RA 'WHY SETTLE FOR ANYTHING LESS THAN 
GOOD OW-FASHIONED ARISTOTELIAN ESSENTIALISM?'OP CIT. IN NOUS 7. l 973.P35 l-365, 
QUINE.Q.W: 1966.'TIIREE GRADES OF MODAL INVOLVEMENT.' OP CIT. Pl 73-4, 
WHITE.N. 'ORJGINS OF ARISTOTLE'S ESSENTIALISM,' OP CIT. 
51 KNEALE.OP CIT.Pl 15. 
52 IT IS IMPORTANT TO REMEMBER THAT THE CONCEPT OF 'MATIER' DID "IOT RECEIVE . .\.NY ATIENTION IN 
THE EARLIER CATEGORIES OF ARISTOTLE. WE FIND HIS TREATMENT INTHE 'METAPHYSICS,' CHAPTERS 7 
AND8. 
53 SEE, 'MET APHYSICS,'Op CIT. BOOK Vll.P315.1029A85FF: 'THE TERM "SUBSTANCE," IS USED, IF NOT 
IN MORE AT LEAST IN FOUR PRINCIPLE CAUSES; FOR BOTH THE ESSENCE AND THE UNIVERSAL AND THE GENUS 
ARE HELD TO BE THE SUBST A,'JCE OF THE PARTICULAR, AND FOURTHLY THE SUBSTRATE. THE SUBSTRATE IS 
THAT OF WHICH THE REST ARE PREDICATED, WHILE IT IS NOT ITSELF PREDICATED OF ANYTHING ELSE. HENCE 
WE MUST FIRST DETERMINE ITS NATURE. FOR TIIE PRIMARY SUBSTRATE IS CONSIDERED TO BE IN THE TRUEST 
SENSE SUBSTANCE. Now IN 01''E SENSE WE CALL THE MATIER THE SUBSTRATE; IN ANOTHER, THE SHAPE; AND 
IN A THIRD, THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO. BY MATIER] MEAN, FOR INSTANCE, BRONZ; BY SHAPE; THE 
ARRANGEMENT OF THE FORM; AND BY THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO, THE CONCRETE THING: TIIE STATUE. 
THUS IF THE FORM IS PRIOR TO THE ~!ATIER AND MORE TRULY EXISTENT, BY THE SA.\1E ARGUMENT IT WILL 
ALSO BE PRIOR TO THE COMBINATION. WE HA VE NOW STATED IN OUTLINE THE NATURE OF SUBSTANCE-THAT 
IT IS NOT THAT WHICH IS PREDICATED OF A SUBJECT, BUT THAT OF WHICH THE OTHER THINGS ARE 
PREDICATED.' 
54 COHEN.S.M.OP CIT.P397. 
., 
' IF SOCRATES CONSISTS OF 'MATTER,' IN OTHER WORDS IF HIS INDIVIDUALISM IS THAT WHICH IS 
PREDICATED OF \IATTER, (HIS FLESH AND BONES) THEN IT SEEMS THAT MATTER. NOT SUBSTANCE IS THE 
L'LTIMATE Ol'<'TOLOGICAL BUILDING BLOCK. 
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56 1BID.P398. 'GoLD. FOREXM1Pl.E, IS :\!"OT BY ITSELF A RING OR SPHERE. NOR IS EVEN A CERTAIN BIT OF 
GOLD-JUST LIKE Tttc\T- A GENUINE INDIVIDUAL. BUT THE BIT OF GOLD CAN BE SHAPED IN ONE WAY OR 
·'-'"OTHER. ·'-'"D THEC'i YOU HA VE THIS RING, FOR EXAMPLE, OR THIS SPHERE. BUT THE GOLD OF WHICH THE 
RING IS COMPOSED IS NOT THE RING ANY MORE THAN THE SHININESS OR THE YELLOWNESS THAT THE RING 
\lA.'HFESTS. IS THE RING.' -C0HEN.!BID.P398. 
57 IBID.P399. 
58 IBID.P400. 
59 IBID.P401. 
"'IBID.P405. 
61 QUINE.'THREE GRADES OF MODAL INVOLVEMENT.'OPCIT.P 174, AS QUOTED BY COHEN.OP 
C!T.P391. 
62 
FOR THIS SECTION. WE DEPENDED PRIMARILY ON THE INSIGHTS OF GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME 
PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CIT.P43FF. 
63 IBID.P72. 
64 1BID.P43. 
65 lBID.P44. 
66 
FOR OUR DISCCSSION OF FORM, SEE GILSON.E.OP CIT, LESZL. W: 1972. 'KNOWLEDGE OF TIIB 
UNIVERSAL AND KNOWLEDGE OF TIIE PARTICULAR IN ARISTOTLE.' IN REVIEW OF 
METAPHYSICS. VOL 26.P279-313, ANSCOMBE.E: 1957. 'FORMS OF PARTICULAR SUBSTANCES 
IN ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS.' IN PROCEEDINGS OF TIIB ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY OP 
CIT. VOL 54.1'699-708, COUSIN.D.R: I 993.' ARISTOTLE'S DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE.' IN 
MIND.0PCIT.VOL42. P319-37. LESHER.J.H: 1971.'ARISTOTLEONFORM. SUBSTANCE, AND 
UNI\lERSALS: A DILEMMA.' IN PHRONESIS.OP CIT. VOL I6.Pl69-78. 
67 
'A PARTICUAR \!ATERIAL SUBSTANCE NOT ONLY SHARES WITH OTHERS OF ITS SPECIES A UNIVERSAL 
FOR.'1,1. BFTIT HAS .HARTICULAR FORM OF ITS OWN, A.'l INSTANCE OF THAT UNIVERSAL FORM, WHICH IS NOT 
THE FOR:\! OF A';'Y OTHER THING.' -ALBR!TTON.R.OP CIT.P700. 'IF THEN MATTER, FORM, A.'lD THE 
COMBINATION OF THE TWO ARE DISTINCT, AND IF BOTH MATTER AND FORM AND THEIR COMBINATION ARE 
SlJBST..INCE. THERE IS ONE SENSE IN WHICH EVEN MATTER CAN BE CALLED "p ART" OF A THING ... ' -
ARISTOTLE.IBID.BOOK VII.1035A4-9. 'Now IN ONE SENSE WE CALL THE MATTER THE SUBSTRATE: IN 
.'-''lOTHER THE SHAPE: A'lD IN A THIRD, THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO, THE CONCRETE THING: THE STATUE. 
THCS !F THE FOR\! IS PRIOR TO THE MATTER AND MORE TRUI.Y EXISTEl'<"f. BY THE SAME ARGL'},,IENT IT WILL 
ALSO BE PRIOR IN THE COMBINATION.' -IBID.BOOK Vll.1029A2. 
68 LESHER.J.H.OP CIT.P169. HERE HE QUOTES 'METAPHYSICS.' 1038B8-9. 
69 ALBRITTON.R.OP CIT.P701. HERE ALBRITTON QUOTES 'METAPHYSICS' I003.A8-9. 
ALBRITTON.IBID.P700. QUOTES 'MET APHYS!CS. 'BOOKZ.1071A20-29, ILLUSTRATING ARISTOTLE'S 
CLOSE LINK ALSO BETWEEN THE FOR.\! OF AN INDIVIDUAL THING AND ITS UNIVERSAL AS \VELL: 'THE 
(PROXIMATE) PRl:>iCIPLE OF PARTICUI.ARS IS THE PARTICULAR ... h'lD (THE PROXIMATE CAUSES A.'lD 
ELE\IE:\'TS) OF THINGS IN THE S.4"'1,IE SPECIES ARE DIFFERENT, NOT FORMALLY, BUT IN THAT THOSE OF 
DISTI;>;CT PARTICl'LAR THINGS ARE DISTINCT-FOR EXAMPLE. YOUR MATTER AND FORM ANO MOVING CAUSE 
A.'lD \lL'lE-THOCGH THE SA.'1,IE IN THEIR UNIVERSAL FORMULA.' 
'O S.ws ALBRITTON.OP C!T.P708: 'IF THE SUBSTANCES OF PARTICUl.ARS ARE PARTICUI.AR. THERE IS A 
DA,-.;GER OF HAVING TO CONCLUDE THAT NO KNOWLEDGE OF THEM IS POSSIBLE, SINCE KNOWLEDGE IS OF 
THE l ":\WERSAL. THERE WOULD THEN BE NO KNOWLEDGE OF WHAT THINGS REALLY ARE, FOR A THING IS, 
REALLY, ITS SUBST..INCE.' OF COURSE. PA.RT OF THAT SUBSTANCE IS THE FORM OF THAT SUBSTANCE. 
LESZL 's SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM IS HELPFUL: 'ACCORDING TO MANY OF THE MOST AUTHORITATIVE 
INTERPRETERS A.'lD COMMENTATORS OF ARISTOTLE, THERE IS IN HIS THOUGHT A DISCREPANCY BETWEEN 
THE REAL ,4",'D THE INTELLIGIBLE, THA TIS TO SAY, A F A!LURE TO RECONCILE THE REQUIREMENTS OF HIS 
ONTOLOGY, THE INDIVIDUAL, IN EFFECT THE SUBSTANCE PROVIDED WITH THE MATTER, IS BASIC, WHILE THE 
UNIVERSAL IS DERIVATIVE, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF HIS LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY, ONLY THE "IDEAL," 
THAT IS TO SAY, WHAT IS UNIVERSAL A,'lD FORMAL, IS INTELLIGIBLE; AND THEREFORE, IF THE INTELLIGIBLE 
COINCIDED WITH THE REAL, THIS WOULD HA VE TO BE BASIC Ol'<'TOLOGICALLY. THIS CONFLICT IN HIS SYSTEM 
IS use ALL y ATIRIBUI'ED TO THE EXISTENCE OF TWO INCOMPATIBLE STRANDS OF THOUGIIT' ONE OF WHICH JS 
CLOSE TO A FORM OF EMPIRICISM AND IS TYPICALLY ARISTOTELIAN, WHILE THE OTHER IS "IDEALISTIC" 
(MEA.'JING BY THIS THAT IT TAKES WHAT IS CONCEPTUAL OR FORMAL AS THE ULTIMATE REALITY) AND 
DERIVES FROM PLATO' -LESZL,OP CIT.P278. 
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71 GILSON.E.OP CIT.1'45. 'THERE IS NO TEXT IN \HUCH ARISTOTLE SAYS THAT ACTUAL BEING IS NOT SUCH 
IN \1RTUE OF ITS 0\1/N "TO BE," BUT THAT WE HA VE PLE1'TY OF TEXTS IN WHICH HE TELLS LS THAT TO BE IS 
SOMETHING ELSE. IN FACT, EVERYTHI1'G GOES AS IF, \\1IEN HE SPEAKS OF BEING, HE NEVER THOUGHT OF 
EXISTENCE. HE DOES NOT REJECT IT. HE COMPLETELY OVERLOOKS IT. WE SHOULD THEREFORE LOOK 
ELSEWHERE FOR WHAT HE CONSIDERS ACTUAL REALITY. '·IBID.1'46. 
72 IBID.!'44. 
73 
BARNES.I.OP CIT.1'95. 'WE HA VE NOW DEALT "'1TH BEING IN THE PRIMARY SENSE, TO WHICH ALL THE 
OTHER CATEGORIES OF BEING ARE RELATED, I.E. SUBSTANCE. FOR IT IS FROM THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE 
THAT ALL THE OTHER MODES OF BEING TAKE THEIR MEANING: BOTH QUANTITY A.'ID QUALITY AND ALL 
OTHER SUCH TERMS: FOR THEY "'1LL ALL INVOLVE THE CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE, AS WE HA VE ST A TED IT IN 
THE BEGINNING OF OUR DISCUSSION. AND SINCE THE SENSES OF BEING ARE ANALYSABLE NOT ONLY INTO 
SUBSTANCE OR QUALITY OR QUA.'<TITY, BUT ALSO IN ACCORDANCE "'1TH POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY 
A"ID FUNCTION, LET US ALSO GAIN A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING ABOUT POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY; AND 
FIRST ABOUT POTE1''TIALITY IN THE SENSE WHICH IS MOST PROPER TO THE WORD ... ' -
ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT.BOOK IX.1045Bl-2.P429. 
74 !Brn.BOOKVIII.1045A4-6.P423. 
"GILSON.E.OP CIT.1'44. 
76 lBID.!'45. 
"DERRIDA.l(TRANSLATED: ALLISON.D.B: 1973). 'SPEECH AND PHENOMENON. '1'6. AS 
QUOTED BY STATEN.H: 1984. 'WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA 'Op CIT.1'6. 
"DERRIDA.l(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1982). 'MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY. '1'157-8. I AM INDEBTED 
TO STATEN.H.OP CIT.1'5, FOR POINTING OUT THIS PASSAGE OF DERRIDA. 
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SEE CLARKE.W.N: 1974.'WHAT IS MOST AND LEAST RELEVANT IN THE METAPHYSICS OF 
ST THOMAS TODAY?' OP CIT.1'412. Tms DEBATE IS WELL SUMMARISED BY DAVID TRACY, IN HIS 
PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF MARION'S 'GoD "'1THOUT BEING.'· 
MARION.J.(TRANSLATED: CARLSON.TA: 1991). 'GOD WITHOUT BEING. 'PIX-XV. ONE 
IMPORTANT CONNECTION THAT WE FIND BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND PLATO. IS THAT OF THE IDENTIFICATION 
OF BEING A.'ID TRUTH. 'TRUTH,' IN TIIIS CONNECTION IS 'HIDDEN TRl'TH,' IN NEED OF INTELLECTUAL 
RECOVERY. SEE, IN TIIIS CONNECTION: DuBOIS.I': 1991. 'TORTURE AND TRUTH. 'P75FF. Du BOIS, 
WRITING AS A CLASSICIST, FOCUSES ON THE ROLE OF TORTlJRE IN ANCIENT GREEK CULTURE, AS A ME.<\;"IS OF 
'GAINI1'G THE TRUTH.. Al THOUGH THIS IS NOT PART OF THE SCOPE OF OUR OWN EXAMINATION. THE POINT 
THAT DUBOIS MAKES OF TRUTH IS THATTRUTH FOR THE GREEKS IS NOT OPEN, IT IS NOT APPARENT, PART OF 
THE WORLD OF THE EVERYDAY. INSTEAD IT NEEDS TO UNDERGO A CERT A1N TYPE OF HERJl.lENElff!C 
"RECOVERY,' THROUGH A CERTAIN HERMENEUTIC, SCIENflFIC METHOOOLOGY. THIS MIGHT BE 1.-IYSTICAL, 
PIIILOSOPHICAL OR IN THE CASE OF CRIMINAL TRIALS. EVEN TORTlJRE. WE ALSO FND AN IMPORTANT 
DISCUSSION OF DuBOIS' THEORY IN NORRJS.C: 1993. 'THE TRUTH ABOUT POSTMODERNISM. 'CHAP 
5. 'GETTING AT TRUTH: GENEALOGY, CRJTIQUE AND POSTMODERN SCEPTICISM. P262FF. 
so 'IT IS NECESSARY THAT THERE SHOULD BE A'! ETE&NAL .<\;'ID UNCHA1'GING SUBSTANCE. FOR SUBSTANCES 
ARE THE FIRST OF EXISTING THINGS, A.'ID IF THEY WERE ALL DESTRUCTIBLE, EVERYTHING WOULD BE 
DESTRUCTIBLE. BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE THAT MOVEMENT SHOULD EITHER HA VE COME INTO BEING OR CEASE 
TOBE (FOR ITMLST HAVE ALWAYS EXISTED), OR THATTIJl.IE SHOULD. FOR THERE COULD NOT BE A BEFORE 
AND AN AFTER UNLESS THERE WERE TIME. SO MOVEMENT IS CONTINUOUS IN TIIE SAME WAY AS TIME IS· TIME 
BEING EITHER THE SAME THING AS 'vlOVEMENT OR AN ATTRIBUTE OF IT. BUT NOW IF THERE IS SO!v!ETHING 
CAP ABLE OF MOVING TIIINGS OR ACTING ON THEM, BUTIS NOT ACTUALLY DOING SO, THERE "'1LL NOT 
1''ECESSARILY BE MOVE~IENT, SINCE WHAT HAS A POWER MAY NOT EXERCISE IT. NOTHING THEREFORE, IS 
GAINED BY ASSUMING ETERNAL SUBSTANCES (LIKE PLATO'S FORMS) UNLESS THERE IS TO BE INTHEM SOME 
PRINCIPLE CAP ABLE OF CAUSING CHANGE, BlJ'T EVEN THIS IS NOT ENOUGH ... FOR IF !TIS NOT TO ACT, THERE 
MLL BE NO MOVEMENT. MOREOVER, EVEN IF IT ACTS, THIS MLL NOT BE ENOUGH, IF ITS ESSENCE IS 
POTENTIALITY. FOR THERE MLL NOT NECESSARILY BE ETERNAL MOVEMENT, SINCE THAT WIIICH IS 
POTENTIALLY MAY POSSIBLY NOT BE. THERE MUST THEREFORE BE AN ETERNAL PRINCIPLE WHOSE ESSENCE IS 
ACTUALITY' -ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS.' BOOK LAMBDA.6.107184.0P CIT, AS QUOTED BY 
ACKRILL.J.LOP CIT.1'128-9. 
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-BARNES.J.OP CIT.Pl06. 
"GUTHRIE. W.K.C: 1933. 'THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARISTOTLE'S THEOLOGY.' OP CrT.Pl62. 
83 IBID.Pl62. 
34 lBID.Pl66. 
85 lBID.Pl69. 
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86 IBID.Pl 71. AGAIN. GUTHRIE SAYS, ' .. THAT THE UNMOVED MOVER, WHEN IT DID APPEAR ON THE SCENE, 
APPEARED 01'1,Y TO PL 'T THE COPINGSTONE ON THE PREVIOUS CONSTRUCTION, NOT TO SHAKE ITS 
FOUNDATIONS. ALL CHANGE AND ~!OTION HAS TO BE REGARDED AS THE ACTUALISATION OF POTENCY. THIS 
ACTUALISATION TAKES PLACE BECAUSE THE "PHUSJS" OF THINGS IS SOMETHING DYNAMIC, AN INWARD URGE 
TOWARDS THE REALISATION OF FORM ... THAT INWARD URGE WOLl,D REMAIN DORMANT UNLESS THERE WERE 
ACTUALLY EXISTENT SOME EXTERNAL PERFECTION TO AW AKEN IT, BY INSTILLING THE DESIRE OF !MIT A TION, 
IN SO FAR AS THAT WAS POSSIBLE FOR EACH THING IN ITS OWN PARTICULAR MODE OF BEING.' -IBID.Pl 71. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTERS THREE AND FOUR 
''SOURCES ON PLATO CONSULTED ARE: TA YLOR.AE: 1960.'PLATO THE MAN AND HIS WORK,' 
CORNFORD.F.M: 1960. 'PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE,' KRAUT.R.(EDITOR: 1992).THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. THIS COMP A.'l!ON COVERS ALL THE MAIN AREAS OF PLATO 's 
THINKING, AS WELL . .\S THE MOST RECENT INTERPRETATIONS OF PROBLEMS. MORE SPECIALISED SECONDARY 
SOURCES INCLL'DE: GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS.' OP CIT, CHERNISS.H.F: 
1%2.'ARISTOTLE'S CRITICISM OF PLATO AND THE ACADEMY.'OPCIT, 
ARMSTRONG.AH.(EDITOR: 1967).'THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER GREEK AND 
EARLY MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY,' (PARTICULARLY PART III), CROSS.RC: 1954.'LOGOS 
AND FORMS IN PLATO.'INMIND.VOL63.1954.P433-451, MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.I. 
'PLATO'S PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY' IN STUDIA 
PATRISTJCA. VOLXX.1989.P 102-118. DILLON.J.'LOGOS AND TRINITY: PATTERNS OF 
PLATONIST INFLUENCE ON EARLY CHRISTIANITY ' IN THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY. 
(EDITED: VESEY.G: 1989).Pl-13, ARMSTRONG.AH: 1973. 'ELEMENTS IN THE THOUGHT OF 
PLOTINUS ATV ARIANCE WITH CLASSICAL INTELLECTUALISM' IN THE JOURNAL OF 
HELLENIC STUDIES.1973. VOL 93.Pl3-22, RIST.JM. 'BACK TO THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS: 
SOME MORE SPECIFICS.'IN JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.VOL27.1989 P 183 -
197, GERSON.L.P: 'PLOTINUS,' GERSON.L.P.'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR 
CREATION?' IN REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS. VOL 46.1992.P59-574, PERL.E.D. 'HIERARCHY AND 
PARTICIPATION IN DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE AND GREEK NEOPLATONISM.' IN 
AMERICAN CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION. VOL 68.1994.PlS-30. 
EDW ARDS.M.J.'PORPHYRY AND THE INTELLIGIBLE TRIAD.' IN JOURNAL OF HELLENIC 
STUDIES. VOL 60. l990.Pl4-25. FINDLAY.J.N. 'THE THREE HYPOSTASESOF PLATONISM.' IN 
REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS. VOL 28. l 975.P660-680, O' MEARA.D. 'BEING IN NUMENIUS AND 
PLOTINUS: SOME POINTS OF COMPARISON.' IN PHRONESIS.VOL 21.1976.Pl20-l29, 
LOYD.AC. 'NEOPLATONIC LOGIC AND ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC.' IN PHRONESISVOL 
l.l 956.P58-72. BALES.E.F. 'A HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN 
PLOTINUS.' IN THOMIST.VOL 47.1983.Pl97-208, RAPPE.A'METAPHOR IN PLOTINUS' 
ENNEADS.' IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.VOL 15. l 995.Pl55-172, ANTON.JP. 'SOME LOGICAL 
ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF HYPOSTASJSIN PLOTINUS.'IN REVIEW OF 
METAPHYSICS.VOL 31.1978.P258-271, HUNT.D.P.'CONTEMPLATION AND HYPOSTATIC 
PROCESSION IN PLOTINUS.' IN APEIRON.VOL 15.1981.P71-79, EMILSSON.E.K.'PLOTINUS' 
ONTOLOGY IN "ENNEAD" VI.5 AND 5.' IN HERMATHENA VOL157. l 994.P87-101, 
HEISER.J.H. 'PLOTINUS AND AQUINAS ON "ESSE COMMUNE'' IN MODERN SCHOOLMAN. VOL 
70.1993.?259-287. SWEENEY.L. 1988. 'PARTICIPATION IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES: PHAEDO, 
PARMENIDES, SOPHIST AND TIMAEUS' IN NEW SCHOLAS.1988.VOL 62.Pl25-149, 
MORRlS.T.F. 'HOW CAN ONE FORM BE IN MANY THINGS?' IN APEIRON. VOL19.1985.P53-56, 
MATTHEN.M. 'GREEK ONTOLOGY AND THE "IS" OF TRUTH' IN PHRONESIS.1983.VOL 28. Pl3-
135, ANNAS.J 'ARISTOTLE ON SUBSTANCE, ACCIDENT AND PLATO'S FORMS' IN 
PHRONESIS.1977. VOL 22.P146-160, RIST.J.M.'THE ONE OF PLOTINUS AND THE GOD OF 
ARISTOTLE' IN REVIEW OF METAPHYSICS.1985.VOL38.P75-87, STEAD.C.G: 1977.DIVINE 
SUBSTANCE.OP CIT. KURD.P.K: 1986.'PARMENIDES 13lc-132B: UNITY AND PARTICIPATION.' 
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IN HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY QUARTERL Y.1986. VOL 3.Pl25-l36, KAHN.C.H .. 'WHY 
EXISTENCE DOES NOT EMERGE AS A DISTINCT CONCEPT IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY' IN 
(EDITED: MOREWEDGE.P: 1982).PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE ANCIENT AND MEDIEV AL.P 
7-17, DESJARDINS.R: 1990 'THE RATIONAL ENTERPRISE.LOGOS IN PLATO'S THEAETETUS.' 
VLASTOS.G 'THE THIRD MAN ARGUMENT IN THE PARMENIDES' IN PHILOSOPHICAL 
REVIEW.1954.VOL 63.P319-349, COHEN.S.M 'THE LOGIC OF THE THIRD MAN' IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.1971. VOL 80.P448475, GEACH.P. T 'THE THIRD MAN AGAIN.' IN 
PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.1956.VOL 65.P72-82, PLATO.(TRANSLATED: FOWLER.RN: 1977). 
"'CRATYLUS," "PARMENIDES," "GREATER HIPPIAS," 
"LESSER HIPPIAS'" (LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY VOL IV), PLATO (TRANSLATED: LEE.D: 
1971) '"TIMAEUS" AND "CRITIAS,"' PLATO (TRANSLATED: CORNFORD F.D: 1955) 'THE 
REPUBLIC OF PLATO,' PLATO. (TRANSLATED: COBB.W.S: 1990).'SOPHIST,' 
PLATO.(TRANSLATED: ROWE.C.J: 1988).'PHAEDRUS,' PLATO. (TRANSLATED: BLUCK.R.S: 
1955), 'PHAEDO,' PLOTINUS. (TRANSLATED: ARMSTRONG.AH: 1966) 'ENNEADS' 6 
VOLS.(LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY). 
88 MATTHEN.M.'GREEK ONTOLOGY AND THE "IS" OF TRUTH.' IN PHRONESIS.1983.VOL 
28.Pll3-35. 
89 THE WORK OF GILSON IS: GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS. 'OP CIT. 
HEIDEGGER.M. 'WHAT IS METAPHYSICS?' IN BASIC WRITINGS. (EDITED: KRELL.D.F: 1993). 
ALTHOUGH HEIDEGGER, CAN HARDLY BE CALLED A MYSTIC, HE TOGETHER WITH THE MYSTICS, TRIED, IN 
DIFFERENT WAYS, TO ESCAPE THE NEED TO CONCEPTUALISE EITHER THE HUMANITY IN MAN, OR THE 
GODNESS OF Goo, USING THE LANGUAGE OF 'BEING.' As DERRIDA (SEE HIS: 'OF SPIRIT.HEIDEGGER AND 
THE QL'ESTION,' AND OTHER WORKS) HAS SHOWN, TO ACHIEVE THIS INTENTION IS "!OT AS EASY AS IT MIGHT 
INITIALLY APPEAR. ONE OF THE WAYS THAT DERRIDA HAS ILLUSTRATED THIS, IS IN THE DANGER OF JUST 
SWITCHING TO TERMS LIKE 'NOTHING,' (AS HEIDEGGER DID IN HIS 'WHAT Is METAPHYSICS?'). USING A 
TER.>,,t LIKE, 'NOTHING.' STILL PROCEEDS FROM THE SAME LINGlJ1STIC, CONCEPTUAL AND LOGOCEN1RIC 
FRAMEWORK AS THE WORD'S OPPOSITE: 'BEING.' THE SAME CRITICISM APPLIES TO OTHER THEOLOGIANS 
SUCH AS TILLICH WHO CHOSE TO USE THE TERM: 'GROUND OF ALL BEING.' THIS, IN OUR OPINION, 
ACTUALLY DEFEATS HIS CORRELATION THEORY. IF GoD IS REALLY 'THE GROUND OF ALL BEING,, (WHICH 
WE INTERPRET AS MAKING SO~IE INDICATION TO THE EFFECT THAT Goo IS OTHER TH.<\N BEING) THEN WE 
HA VE NOTHING TO SAY ABOUT HIM. WE SUSPECT, THAT WITH ALL HIS 'POSTMODERN CREDENTIALS,' 
MARION N'EVERTHELESS EXHIBITS THE SAME PROBLEM. IN HIS TEXT 'GoD WITHOUT BEING.' 
ClJPITr, ON THE OTHER HAND, HAS RECENTLY REVIVED THE APOPHATIC ROAD OF 'NEGATIVE THEOLOGY.' 
SEE THE INTERPRETATION OF CUP ITT' S THEOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT IN 
THISTLETON.A: 1995. 'INTERPRETING GOD AND THE POSTMODERN SELF,' ALSO CUPITT.D: 
1971.'CHRIST AND THE HIDDENESS OF GOD'P28. CONCERNING NEGATIVE THEOLOGY, HERE THE 
PROBLEM IS THE SAME, AS DERRIDA HAS PO!NfED our WITH RESPECT TO MEISTER ECKHART'S 
THEOLOGICAL ~IETHOD, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF THE PsEUDO DIONYSIUS. 'THE NEGATIVE MOVE~IENT OF 
THE DISCOURSE ON Goo IS ONLY A PHASE OF POSITIVE ONTOTHEOLOGY.'-SEE 
DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1978).'WRITING AND DIFFERENCE' P337, 398, WARD.G: 
1995. 'BARTH, DERRIDA AND THE LANGUAGE OF THEOLOGY' P205. THE OTHER !MPORT.<\NT 
ESSAY OF DERRIDA, DEALING WITH THIS SUBJECT IS 'CO/'vf.MENT NE PAS PARLER: DENEGRAT!ONS,' 
DELIVERED IN JERUSALEM IN 1986. SEE ALSO THE COMMENTS IN WARD.G.0PC!T.P253FF. WARD. 
READING DERRIDA'S ESSAY, OUTLINES HOW HE ASSOCIATES THE ST ART OF THIS PROBLEM WITH THE GocD 
OF PLATO IN THE 'REPUBLIC' AND THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE KHORA IN THE 'TIMAEUS.' DERRIDA, 
COMMENTING ON THE SPECIFICALLY MYSTICAL TRADITION IN THEOLOGY-IDENTIFIES THE TENSION POINT 
THAT LIES BETWEEN THE IDEA OF THE 'ANALOG IA ENT IS, ' AND THE 'ANALOG IA FIDE!.' 0N THE ONE HA.'lD WE 
N'EED TO SAY SOMETHING ABOUT GoD, AND IN DOING SO, WE NEED TO USE ACCEPTED CONCEPTUAL 
LANGUAGE TO SAY WHAT WE NEED TO SAY ABOUT HIM. THIS IS THE LANGUAGE OF BEING.YET BECAUSE 
Goo, IN THE TRADITION OF THE CHURCH, IS SOMEHOW 'MORE THAN,' 'BEYOND,' 'THE GROUND OF,' BEING, 
WE CANNOT IDENTIFY GoD WITH WHAT WE ARE SAYING ABOUT HIM. As WE SHALL SEE WITH OUR STUDY OF 
BARTH-THIS PROBLEM IS TYPICALLY REVEALED IN THE 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' VAN NIEKERK PO!N"J'S OL"f 
THAT THE WAY BARTH TRIES TO SAFEGUARD THE PROBLEM, IS TO AFFIRM DIALECTICALLY THAT THE 
LANGUAGE Goo USES TO SPEAK ABOUT HIMSELF, ALTHOUGH USED BY HUMANS, IS BEYOND HUMA.'l (BEING). 
THIS IS THE LANGUAGE OF THE 'GoD-FOR-US,' THE Goo AS 'OBJECT.' Goo MIRACULOUSLY MAKES HIMSELF 
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BECOME PART OF BEING, (NORDER THAT WE MIGHT UNDERSTAND HIM. WE THEREFORE CANNOT 
UNDERSTAND THE Goo WHO IS AT THE 'BACK OF BEING.' AFTER ESTABLISHING THIS POINT. VAN NIEKERK 
SHOWS THAT BARTH THEN GOES ONTO DO PRECISELY THAT: TO SPEAK ABOUT GoD AS HE IS 'BEYOND 
BEING,' OR AT THE 'BACK OF BEING.' -VAN NIEKERK.E: 1988. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF 
KARL BARTH'S DOGMATICS.' SEE, FOR EXAMPLE Pl21-22. 
90 GILSON.E.OP err.PS. 
91 IBID.P9. 
92 IBID.P9. 
93 IBID.PIO. 
94 IBID.PIO 
95 IBID.P !OFF. 
% IBID.Pl 7FF. 
97 IBID.P20-21. 
98 
.... THIS, THEN, WHICH GIVES TO THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE THEIR TRUTH AND TO HIM WHO KNOWS 
THEM HIS POWER OF K.'IOWING, IS THE FORM OR ESSENTIAL NATURE OF GoODNESS. IT IS THE CAUSE OF 
K.'iOWLEDGE AND TRUTH; AND SO, WHILE YOU MAY THINK OF IT AS AN OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE, YOU WILL 
DO WELL TO REGARD IT AS SOMETHING BEYOND TRUTH AND KNOWLEDGE AND, PRECIOUS AS THESE BOTH 
ARE, OF STILL HIGHER WORTH. AND, JUST AS IN OUR ANALOGY OF LIGHT AND \llSION WERE THOt:GHT TO BE 
OF AS LIKE THE SUN, BUT NOT IDENTICAL WITH IT, SO HERE BOTH K.'IOWLEDGE AND TRUTH ARE TO BE 
REGARDED AS LIKE THE Goon. BUT TO IDENTIFY EITHER WITH THE Goon IS WRONG. THE Goon MUST HOLD 
A YET HIGHER PLACE OF HONOUR ... THE OBJECTS OF KNOWLEDGE: THESE DERIVE FROM THE GooD NOT ONLY 
THEIR POWER OF BEING KNOWN, BUT THEIR VERY BEING AND REALITY; AND GoODNESS IS NOT THE SAME 
THING AS BEING, BUT EVEN BEYOND BEING, SURPASSING IT IN DIGNITY AND POWER.' -PLATO. 'THE 
REPUBLIC.' (TRANSLATED: CORNFORD.F.D: 1941) CHAP XXIII. THE GOOD AND THE SUN. 
P215. 
99 GILSON.OP C!T.P20. 
lOO IBID.P23. PLOTINUS. HOWEVER CANNOT BE ADVOCATING MONISM AS ALTHOVGH ALL BEING DERIVES ITS 
BEING FROM THE ONE, THE ONE IS NOT AS BEING IS, IT IS BEYOND BEING. 
101 G!LSON'S QVOTE, SEE IBID.P40. SEE ALSO KEARNEYR: 1986. 'MODERN MOVEMENTS IN 
EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY. 'Op Crr.Pl24. HERE KEARNEY IS SUMMARISING DERRIDA'S CRITICISMS OF 
PL •. \To's lVIETAPHYSICS. SEE ALSO: VAN NIEKERK.E: 1995 'THE RESURGENCE OFF AILED MACRO-
AND MICROSCALE IMPERIALISMS IN LOCAL TWENTIETH CENTURY FUNDAMENTALISMS.' 
IN NEW MODES OF THINKING (EDITOR: DU TOIT.C: 1995) P78FF. HERE. VAN NIEKERK 
ILLUSTRATES IN A CONSIDERABLY WIDE MANNER HOW VARIOUS STRATA OF SOCIAL AND INTELLECUAL 
MODES ARE PREDETERMINED BY A CERTAIN 'CONSCIOUSNESS.' FOR EXAMPLE; 'NATIONALISM: I 
BELONG TO A VOLK, THEREFORE I AM.' 'COLONIALISM: I AM CIVILISED: THEREFORE I 
AM,' .'-''ID SO ON. HERE WE QUOTE FROM THE UNPUBLISHED OUTLINE TO V.AN NIEKERK'S PAPER WITH THE 
ABOVE TITLE. 
102 UNLIKE M,'1,,'0Y OTHER AUTHORS OF CLASSICAL ANT!Ql:ITY, THE WRITTEN WORK OF PLATO SEEMS TO 
HA VE COME DOWN TO us F AIRL y COMPLETE-SEE TA YLORAE: 1960. 'PLATO THE MAN AND ms 
WORK' OP CIT.PIO. [NOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PLATONIC DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPATION, WE SHALL REPLY 
PRIMARILY UPON THE 'P ARMENIDES,' THEN 'PHAEDO,' THE 'SOPHIST,' ru'ID THEN THE TIMAEUS .. THE 
STLUY OF THESE DIALOGUES, PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROBLEMS OF ll-.'TERPRETATION, ru'ID 
THE DATING OF EACH ONE IS .AN EXTREMELY COMPLEX ISSUE. EVEN TODAY, THERE IS NOT MUCH CONSENSUS 
ON MANY AREAS. NEVERTHELESS, THE CHRONOLOGICAL PLACING OF THESE DIALOGUES DOES HA VE SOME 
BEARING ON OUR INTERPRETATION OF THE PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION IN PLATO. GENERALLY, HOWEVER, 
STUDE1''TS OF PLATO DIVIDE HIS THINKu-.G INTO THREE MAIN PERIODS-SEE KRAUT.R. 'INTRODUCTION 
TO THE STUDY OF PLATO' IN (EDITED: KRAUT.R: 19%). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO 
PLATO.OP CIT.PIFF. BOSTOCK.D. 'PLATO' IN THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
(EDITOR: HONDERICH.T: 1995).0PCIT. P683FF, TAYLOR.AE.0PCIT.Pl6FF. ARISTOTLE TELLS us IN 
THE 'PoLITICS, THAT PLATO, s 'LA ws,' IS LATER THAN THE , REPUBLIC.' YET THE 'REPUBLIC, MUST BE 
EARLIER THAN THE 'TIMAEUS,' WHERE IT IS REFERRED TO AND WHERE MUCH m· ITS ARGUMENTS ARE 
REPEATED. TAYLOR, REFLECTING AN EARLIER PERIOD OF RESEARCH, BELIEVED THAT PLATO WROTE DURING 
TWO MAIN PERIODS OF HIS LIFE. 'IF WE ST ART WITH TWO WORKS WHICH ;\RE K.'IOWN TO BE SEPARATED BY A 
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CONSIDER.IBLE NrERV AL A,'ID EXHIBIT A MARKED DIFFERENCE IN STYLE. IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO TRACE THE 
TR.'-<'ISITION FROM THE WRITER 's EARLIER TO HIS LATER MANNER IN DETAIL. TO SEE THE LATE MM.JNER 
STEADILY MORE A,'ID MORE REPLACING THE EARLIER, !u'ID THIS SHOULD ENABLE US TO ARRIVE AT SOME 
DEFINITE CONCLUSIONS .\BOUT THE ORDER OF WORKS THAT OCCUPY THE INTERVAL.'-IBID.Pi8. TAYLOR'S 
CONCLUSION IS: 'THCS WE MAY SAY \\1TH EVERY APPEARA,'ICE OF PROBABILITY THAT THERE ARE TWO 
lllSTINCT PERIODS OF LITERARY ACT!v1TY TO BE DISTINGL1SHED IN PLATO 's LIFE. THE FIRST CA,'INOT HA VE 
BEGUN BEFORE THE DEATH OF SOCRATES; APART FROM THE ABSURDITY OF THE CONCEPTION OF PLATO AS 
'"DRAMATISING" THE SAYINGS A,'ID DOINGS OF THE LIVING MA,'l WHOM HE REVERED ABOVE ALL OTHERS. ' -
IBJD.P2 L TAYLOR THEN ARGUES THAT AFTER HA YING SET UP TllE ACADEMY, FOR AT LEAST 20 YEARS, 
PLATO COMMENCED ON THE SECOND LITERARY PERIOD OF HIS LIFE, WRITING THE "THEAETETVS," AND 
"PARMENIDES," WHICH IN HIS OPINION, REFLECT HIS MATURE THOUGH1. 'IT SEEMS TO BE FAIRLY WIDELY 
ESTABLISHED THAT THE "LAWS" WAS HIS FINAL WORK. IN THE EARLIER DIALOGUES (ALL PLATO'S WORKS 
EXTANT TO US ARE IN DIALOGL'E FORM) PLATO IS OBVIOUSLY UNDER THE SPELL OF HIS MENTOR, SOCRATES, 
AND THUS MUCH OF THE OPIMON EXPRESSED BY THIS INTERLOCUTOR, IS GENUINELY SOCRATES' OPINION. 
As THINGS PROCEED, HOWEVER, SOCRATES SEEMS TO ST ART CONTRADICTING SOME OF IIIS POSITION, 
EXPRESSED IN THE EARLIER DIALOGUES. ACCORDING TO THE VOICE OF SOCRATES IN THE EARLIER 
DIALOGUES, TRUE VIRTUE IS NOT TO BE KNOWN BY MAN, ONLY THE GODS, HA VE TRUE VIRTUE. THIS 
PROFESSION OF IGNORANCE IS SEEN IN MA,'IY OF THE EARLIER PLATONIC DIALOGUES: ''LACHES," "H.!PPIAS 
MVOR," AND THE "EuTHYPHRO." IN THESE DIALOGUES. SOCRATES OPENLY DE1'1ES THAT HE CAN KNOW 
THESE THINGS FULLY. BY THE TIME WE COME TO THE "REPUBLIC." HOWEVER, WE MEET UP WITH SOCRATES 
MAKING ELABORATE DEFINITIONS OF VIRTUE, JUSTICE A,'ID so ON. How DO WE EXPLAIN TIIIS 
CONTRADICTION? BY ACCEPTING THAT NOW THE VOICE OF PLATO HAS BEEN PLACED INTO SOC RA TES' 
MOUTH' -KRAUT.R. 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF PLATO' OP CIT.PJ. ARISTOTLE HIMSELF 
ALSO PROVIDES EXTERNAL EVIDENCE FOR TIIIS AS HE READS THE 'REPUBLIC' AS REFLECTING THE 
PIIILOSOPHY OF PLATO, NOT SOCRATES. Oh'E OTHER WAY OF DETERMINING THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE 
GENUINE PLATO .'-<'JD THE GENUINE SocRATES IS THAT PLATO WRITES ON A MUCH BROADER FRONT THAT DID 
IIIS PREDECESSOR, WHO SEEMS TO HA VE CONFINED IIIMSELF MOSTLY TO ETIIICAL MATTERS-KRAUT.OP 
CIT.P6. 
SAYS KRAUT.OP CIT.P4: 'THIS WAY OF DISTINGllISHINGTHE PHILOSOPHIES OF SOCRATES AND PLATO HAS 
BEEN GIVEN FURTHER SUPPORT BY STUDIES OF PLATO'S STYLE OF COMPOSITION THAT HAVE BEEN 
UNDERTAKEN SINCE THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. THERE HAS NOW EMERGED A BROAD CONSENSUS THAT WE 
CAN SAY .u LEAST IN MANY CASES, WIIICH OF PL.uo's WORKS V.'ERE WRITTEN AT WHICH PERIODS IN IIIS 
LIFE.' THE 'MENO,' AND THE 'PIIAEDO,' REPRESENT THE EARLIER PERIOD IN HIS LIFE. BUT REFLECT THE 
BEGINNING OF THE DOCTRJ1''E OF TIIE FOR),IS. PLATO'S GREATNESS, HO\\'EVER. LIES IN THE MIDDLE PERIOD, 
WHERE WE ENCOUNTER 'SYMPOSIUM.' 'REPL1lLIC. 'PARMENIDES.' 'THEAETETUS,' .'\c'ID 'Pl!AEDRUS'. THE 
LATER DIALOGL'ES ARE EQUALLY FA,\IOUS: 'TIMAEUS,' A,'\'D ITS SEQL'EL: 'CRIT!AS,' 'SOPHIST,' 'PHILEBCS.' 
.'-<'lD 'LAWS.' -IBID.P9. THE 'PHAEDO,' THE FIRST STUDY OF PLATO THAT PRESENTED A DEVELOPED PICTL1IB 
OF THE FORMS, ALSO PLACED ITS FINGER UPON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS OF PLATO'S CONSEQUENT THEORY 
OF PARTICIPATION. THE 'TIMAEUS,' REPRESENTING A LATER PERIOD SHOWS PLATO TRYING TO DEAL WITH 
THE PROBLEMS IMPLIED IN THE EARLIER 'PIIAEDRUS. '-SEE CORNFORD.OP CIT.P6. IF WE ASSU),!E THAT 
THE 'PARMENIDES,' REPRESENTS THE LATER PERIOD, THEN WE CAN POSIT THAT PLATO DID NOT ABANDON 
THE THEORY OF THE FOR.;Wi, OR PARTICIPATION. HAVING FELT THAT HE HAD SUCCESSFULLY DEALT WITH 
THE OBJECTIONS TO THESE THEORIES. INDEED, THE 'PAR1'!E1'1DES,' OPENS ITS DISCUSSION WITH CERTAIN 
OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE EARLY THEORY OF THE FORMS, BUT ACCORDING TO ARISTOTLE AND OTHERS, 
PLATO NEVER CONVINCINGLY DEFEATED THESE ARGUl.!ENTS TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL. FOR OUR 
PURPOSES, HOWEVER, WET fuKE IT THAT THE CRITICAL DIALOGCE, THE 'P.<\.RMENIDES,' IS A LATE DIALOGUE 
.'-''ID THAT PLATO DID NOT ABANDON HIS THEORY OF THE FORMS, NOR OF PARTICIPATION. 
103 SWEENEY.L: 1988.0P CIT. 'PARTICIPATION IN PLATO'S DIALOGUES: PHAEDO, 
PARMENIDES, SOPHIST AND TIMAEUS.' Pl25. 
l04 lBID.PJ25. SWEENEY, WRITING IN 1988, CONSULTED ONE BIBLIOGRAPIIIC SOURCE THAT REVEALED 81 
ENTRIES, INCLUDING THE USE OF THE TERM IN INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS PLATO, ARISTOTLE, PL0TJNUS, 
AUGUSTINE, PROCLUS, PsEUD0-0IONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE, BoETIITUS, BoNA VENTURE, THOMAS 
AQllINAS, HENRY OF GHENT, MALEBRM'CHE, BLONDEL, LOUIS LAVELLE, HUSSERL, AND OTHERS. HE 
NfuMES ONE OF HIS SOURCES AS FOLLOWS: CARROL. W.J: 1981.'PARTICIPATION IN SELECTED 
TEXTS 
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OF PSEUOO DIONYSIUS TIIE AREOPAGITE'S THE DIVINE NAMES. 'WASHINGTON DCPIS~-
195. 
lUS ]BID.Pl26. 
106 ]BID. P 126. THE INTERPRETATIONS OFFERED BY COl\IMENTATORS, OF THE TERMS PLATO USES TO SPEAK 
OF 'PARTICIPATION.' ARE OF IMPORT . .\..'\fCE, AS THEY TO SOME EXENT WILL DETERMI'.'IE THE ENTIRE 
UNDERST . .\..'\fDING OF THE USE AND THE ROLE OF PARTICIPATION. IN THE DIALOGUES. 'THE VERB, 
".l!ETALAMBANEIN" IS SOMETIMES USED AS A SYNONYM FOR ''METECHEllv"' AND DIFFERS MAINLY BY 
SUGGESTING . .\..'\f ONGOING PROCESS: TO COME TO HAVE ALONG WITH. ETC .... ' -[BID.PJ26. FOR AN HISTORIC 
OVERVIEW OF THE THEORY OF PARTICIPATION, SEE'. ANNICE.M. 'IDSTORICAL SKETCH OF 
PARTICIPATION.' OPCIT. 
SWEENEY ALSO OBSERVES THE I~IPORTANCE OF THE TERMS: 'HEAITIA.' AND 'TOAIT!ON,' AS ALSO USED BY 
PLATO IN THE DIALOGUES. HE DISCUSSES AND PROVIDES A St.'MMARY OF THE VIEWS OF THE GREAT PLATO 
SCHOLAR, GREGORY VLASTOS, (SEE VLASTOS.G: 1973. 'REASONS AND CAUSES IN TIIE PHAEOO,' 
IN PLATONIC STUDIES.P76-l !0) WHO VIEWED THESE WORDS AS NOT DENOTING NECESSARILY A 'CAUSE,' 
'WHICH IN ORDINARY SPEECH POINTS TO THE TEMPORAL ANTECEDENT THAT IS THE SUFFICIENT CONDITION 
OF AN EVENT AND THUS ALLOWS TIIE EVENT TO BE PREDICATED AND WHICH IS RESTRICTED TO AGENCY OR 
EFFICACY. '-SWEENEY.IBID.Pl27, QUOTING VLASTOS, OP CIT.P 79. 
To VLASTOS, AN 'AITL4.' HAS BOTH LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS. LOGICALLY, THE TERM 
WOL'LD SHOW W11Y S01"!ETHING IS LOGICALLY THE WAY THAT IT IS. [NOTHER WORDS. IF WE SAY THAT A 
SQUARE IS A SQUARE, BECAUSE IT HAS FOUR EQUAL SIDES A"JD FOUR EQUAL ,\,'IGLES. THE PHRASE IN THE 
SENTENCE BEGINNING WITH 'BECACSE,' DOES NOT TELL !JS SOl\!ETHING ABOUT THE ACTUAL OCCLl<RENCE 
OF THE SQUARE ITSELF, BUTTHE REASONS WHY WE SAY !TIS A SQUARE, THE LOGICAL REASONS. THE 
REASONS W11Y WE CAN MAKE SUCH LOGICAL INFERENCES. IS BECACSE OF THE FACT THAT THERE IS A 
~!ETAPHYSICAL, PREDETERMINThiG IDEA OF SQUARENESS, TO START OFF WITH. THUS, AN '.4ITIAN' IS THE 
LOGICAL FUNCTION OF A METAPHYSICAL ENTITY-VLASTOS. G.OP C!T.P92. VLASTOS, ADMITS THE CAUSAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF 'AITIA.' WHEN 'SOCRATES ;>,,IAINTAINS THAT THE FOR~!, SNOW, IS THE "AITL4," OF COLD, 
W11AT HE ASSERTS IS ·'FIRMLY TIED TO THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORD."' - SWEENEY.LOP 
C1T.PJ28 (AGAIN SUMMARISING VLASTOS' ARGUMENT). SWEENEY. DEMONSTRATES THAT THE LOGICAL 
'.'<cCESSITY BETWEEN A FORM A'ID ITS INSTANCE. HAS ITS ROOT, NOT IN THE TElV!PORAL ENVIRONl>!E1'T, BUT 
THAT THIS LOGICAL RELATIONSHIP IS ~!ERELY A ll.flRROR OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FORMS. HE 
DISAGREES WITH VLASTOS ON THIS POINT. A'-D ARGUES THAT 'PLATO IS MUCH MORE LIKELY TO HAVE 
CONCEIVED OF EFFICIENT CAUSE AS TEMPORALLY SIMULT McOUS AND SPATIALLY CONTIGUOUS TO THE 
EVE1'T IT CA\.:SED., -IBID.Pl29. THE 'TIMAEcs' \1AKES CLEAR THAT WE NEED TO INCLUDE PLATO·s BELIEF IN 
A'l '11'TELLIGENT AGENT,' TI1AT ASSISTS IN THE 'CREATION' PROCESS. 'FORMS SERVING AS GOALS AND 
"'10DELS, PLUS THE INTELLIGENT AGENT THEY INFLUENCE ARE ''AUTHENTIC" CAUSES. WI1ERAS FIRE, AIR, 
WATER . .\..'ID EARTH AS ELEl.IENTS AND IN THEIR VARIOUS COMPOUNDS ALSO, ARE "ACCESSORY CAUSES," 
(SrNAITIA) USED BY THE CRAFTSMAN IN FASHI01'1NG INDIVIDUAL THINGS . .\.."JD THE PHYSICAL t.rl!'cRSE (SEE 
'PHAEDO' 99B: PHYSICAL STiffFS ARE "THAT WITHOUT WHICH AN AUTHENTIC CAUSE WOULD NOT BE A 
CAUSE"). THE RECEPTACLE ITSELF, WI1EREIN THAT FASHIONlNG TAKES PLACE, IS AN "ERRANT CAUSE" ( 48A: 
'TES PLANO MENES AITIAS) IN THAT lJNIVERSE ... Bur, MORE GENERALL y, ONE MA y v ALIDL y INFER FROM 
PL.HO'S TEXTS A"JD FROM OUR ( A.<"JD HIS) EXPERIENCES IN EVERYDAY LIFE, THAT "CAUSE" (AITIA. TO AITION) 
ME . .\,'lS "THAT WHICH PRODUCES SOMETHING IN S01vIE SORT OF DIRECT WAY."' -SWEENEY.L.OP CIT .Pl29. 
lO? THE NARRATOR IS CEPHALUS OF CLAZOl\IENAE. AS IT WAS REPEATED TO HIM BY ANTIPHON. WHO 
APPARENTLY HEARD IT FROM PYTHODORUS, PRESENT AS THE DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE BETWEEN THE MAIN 
INTERLOCLTORS, PAR1'!ENIDES, SOCRATES . .\.."JD OTHERS -SEE FOWLER '!NfRODUCTION TO TIIE 
PARMENIDES,' IN LOEB CLASSICAL LIBRARY EDITION.OP CIT.Pl95-97. THE INTRODUCTION SETS 
THE SCENE . .\,"JD COMMENCES WITH THE YOUTHFL'L SOCRATES, CRITICISING THE PARADOX OF ZENO. FROM, 
HERE THERE IS SOME TALK (TO 137B) BETWEEN SOCRATES AND PAR.\IENIDES, OF THE DIFFICULTIES THAT 
ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE THEORY OF THE IDEAS. THESE OBJECTIONS ARE NOT FULLY ANSWERED IN THE 
E\CS OF MANY OF PLATO'S CRITICS. SEE HOWEVER: MEINW ALD.C 'GOODBYE TO TIIE TIIlRD MAN.' 
IN TIIE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. OP CIT.P365FF. INTHE 'PARMENIDEs.' THE 
YOUTHFUL SOCRATES IS ATTEMPTING TO DEFEND THE IDEA OF THE FOR!v!S AGAINST THE OLDER, VE1'cRABLE 
SOCRATES. IT HAS BEEN GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT THE ARGUMENTS OF SocRATES REPRESENT PLATO 's 
OWN POSITION. NEITHER IS THERE ANY INDICATION, THAT LATER, HE ABANDONED THE THEORY OF THE 
FORMS. THE PROBLEM IN THE 'PARMENIDES.' HOWEVER, IS TI1AT IN THE FIRST PART OF THE DIALOGUE IN 
324 
PARTICULAR, IT SEEMS THAT AT EVERY TURN, PARMENIDES HAS THE BEITER OF THE YOUTHFUL SOCRATES, 
RAISING VARIOUS CRITICISMS AGAINST HIS ARGUMENTS. FURTHERMORE, IT SEEMS THAT SOCRATES DOES 
NOT MANAGE TO PROVIDE A COHERENT RESPONSE TO PARMEMDES. YET HIS ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE 
FORMS ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE WE FIND IN THE 'REPUBLIC,' AND THE 'PHAEDO. '-MEINW ALD. C.IBID.P366. 
DoES THIS THEREFORE MEAN THAT PLATO ACCEPTED THAT HIS OWN THEORY WAS FATALLY FLA WED'/ 
MANY SCHOLARS SUCH AS CHERNISS, ARGUE IN THE NEGATIVE, BUT ACCEPT THAT THE SECOND PART OF THE 
'PARMENIDES' DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY REAL ANSWER. MANY OF THESE INTERPRETERS THEN TRY TO SOLVE 
THE PROBLEM BY SEEING PLATO AS PROVIDING A RESPONSE TO THE CRITICISMS OF PARME1'1DES, IN A 
GENERAL F ASH!ON, AS SCA TIERED ALL OVER HIS DIALOGUES-IBID.P366. ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THIS 
APPROACH IS THAT OF SWEENEY.LOP CIT, ESPECIALLY P!46FF. DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES INVOLVED 
WITH HER ALTERNATIVE, MEINWALD FEELS THAT PLATO DID NOT PROVIDE ANY INDICATION THAT HIS 
ARGUMENTS IN THE SAME AREA, AS FOUND IN HIS OTHER DIALOGl!'ES, HA VE ANY REAL BEARING ON THE 
PROBLEMS RAISED IN 'PARMENIDES.' SHE, IN THE LIGHT OF THIS, CHOOSES TO VIEW PLATO'S ANSWER TO 
THE CRITICISMS OF THE FORMS, IN THE SECOND PART OF THE 'PARMENIDES.' FOR OUR PURPOSES, AND IN 
OUR INTERPRETATION, WE INCLINE OURSELVES TOWARDS HER ARGUMENTS. 
108 CURD.P.K.'PARMENIDES 131C-132B: UNITY AND PARTICIPATION. 'OP CIT.Pl25FF. 
109 IBID.Pl26. WE TAKE UP THE DEBATE WITH SOCRATES: 'SOCRATES LISTE1''ED TO THE END, AND THEN 
ASKED THAT THE FIRST THESIS OF THE FIRST TREATISE BE READ AGAIN. WHEN THIS HAD BEEN DONE, HE 
SAID: "ZENO, WHAT DO YOU MEAN BY THIS? THAT IF EXISTENCES ARE MANY, THEY MUST BOTH BE LIKE M'D 
UNLIKE, WHICH IS IMPOSSIBLE, FOR THE UNLIKE CANNOT BE LIKE, NOR THE LIKE, UNLIKE? JS NOT THAT 
YOUR MEANING?" 
"'YES." SAID ZENO. 
·'THEN IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE UNLIKE TO BE LIKE A."ID THE LIKE UNLIKE, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR 
EXISTENCES TO BE MANY; FOR IF THEY ARE TO BE MANY, THEY WOULD EXPERIENCE THE IMPOSSIBLE."' -
PLATO 'PARMENIDES' (TRANSLATED: FOWLERH.N: 1977) OP CIT.127.D-E.P203. 
11
° CURD. OP CIT. P 126. CuRD TRAC Es ZENO' s ARGUMENTS AG A INST THE POSSIBILITY oF PLu"RALITIEs AS 
FOLLOWS: 'CONSIDER THE PLURALITY FORMED OF SJMMIAS ,\,"ID PHAEDO. THEY ARE LIKE IN THAT BOTH 
ARE MEN, BUTPHAEDOIS TALLER THAN SIMMIAS, AND SO THEY ARE UNLIKE ONE A.'IOTHERINTHAT 
RESPECT. SO SIMMIAS AND PHAEDO ARE BOTH LIKE .A.."ID UNLIKE, AND THIS, ACCORDING TO ZENO, IS A 
CONTRADICTION THAT RULES OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF NUMERICAL PLURALITY. IN ADDITION, ZENO'S 
ARGUMENTS ALSO RULE OUT A Fu"RTHER, "PREDICATIONAL" PLURALITY: A PLURALITY OF PREDICATES, OR 
"NAMES ATTACHING TO A SINGLE ENTITY." CONSIDER SIM!VIIAS ALONE, FOR INSTANCE. WE MAY SAY THAT 
HE IS LIKE INSOFAR AS HE IS SELF-IDENTICAL, BUT HE IS ALSO UNLIKE, IN THAT HIS RIGHT SIDE IS DIFFERENT 
FROM THE LEFT, OR SO FAR AS HE IS BEAUTIFUL A.SWELL AS HE IS JUST.' -IBID.Pl27. 
111 PLATO.OP CIT.129A.P207. 
m FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCRATES AND PLATO'S POSITION, SEE: 
PENNER. T. 'SOCRATES AND THE EARLY DIALOGUES.' IN (EDITOR: KRAUT.R: 1992). THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO.Pl21FF. 
iu CURD.OP C1T.Pl29, PLATO.OP CIT.131DFF.P214. 
114 1BID.Pl30. 
115 lBID.Pl30. 
116 MORRIS. T.F. 'HOW CAN ONE FOR.Iv! BE IN MANY THINGS?'OP CIT.IN APEIRON. VOL 
19.1985.P53-6. 
117 PLATO 'REPUBLIC' OP CIT.CH.AP XXXV.596.P3 l8. ' ... BUT, PARMENIDES, I THINK THE ~OST 
LIKELY VIEW IS, THAT TIIESE IDEAS EXIST IN NATURE AS PATIERNS, AND THE OTHER THINGS RESEMBLE 
THEM AND ARE IMITATIONS OF THEM; THEIR PARTICIPATION IS ASSIMILATION TO THEM, THAT AND NOTHING 
ELSE. '-PLATO 'PARMENIDES' OP CIT.132E.P221. 
118 MORRIS.OP CIT.P53. 
119 GREGORY VLASTOS, W.KC. GUTHRIE AND FRANCIS COR.'lFORD ALL AGREE CONCERNING THIS 
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF PARTICIPATION. THE DISCUSSION IS ABOUT FORM, NOT MATIER-IBID.P55. 
120 IBID.PSS. 
121 SWEENEY.L.OP CIT.Pl33. 
122 iBID.Pl34-5. SWEENEY'S SUMMARY OF PLATO'S POSITION COMES FROM 'SOPHIST' 246A-248E. 
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·"MOREOVER. THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME SORT OF GIGANTIC BATf!E AMONG THEM BECAUSE OF THE DISPUTE 
BETWEEK THE~i .--\.BOUT BEING." 
"How so"" 
.. SO!v!E DRAG EVERYTHING FROM THE SKY AND THE INvlSIBLE REALM DOWN TO EARTH. ARTLESSLY 
GRABBING ROCKS AND TREES Wf!H THEIR HANDS. FOR THEY HA.\IG ONTO ALL SUCH THINGS A.'ID 
CONFIDEN'TLY AFFIRM TO BE ONLY WHAT CAN BE HANDLED AND TOUCHED. THEY DEFINE PHYSICAL BODY 
MID BEING AS THE SAME, AND IF A."NONE SAYS THAT SOMETHING ELSE IS THAT DOES NOT HAVE PHYSICAL 
BODY. THEY DESPISE HIM ALTOGETHER AND ARE u°l'<l.vJLLING TO LISTEN ANY FURTHER." 
"You SPEAK OF TERRIBLE MEN. I TOO HAVE MET MMY OF THEM BEFORE NOW." 
"FOR THIS REASON THOSE WHO DISPUTE WITH THEM DEFEND THEMSELVES VERY CAREFULLY FROM AN 
INVlSIBLE PLACE UP ON HIGH AND FORCEFULLY MAINlAIN TRUE BEING TO BE SOME SORT OF INTELLIGIBLE. 
NONPHYSICAL FORMS. IN THEIR ARGUMENTS, THEY SMASH TO BITS THE FORMER 's PHYSICAL BODIES AND 
\\!HAT THEY SAY IS TRUE, A.'ID REFER TO THAT AS A SORT OF BECOMING THAT IS SWEPl ALONG RATHER TH&\! 
AS BEING. THESE TWO HA VE BEEN CONTINUOUSLY ENGAGED IN A TRE!v!ENOOUS BATf!E ABOUT THIS, 
THEAETETUS." 
"TRUE." 
··THEN LET'S GET A STATEMENT FROM BOTH FACTIONS IN TURN AS TO WHAT THEY PUT BEING DOWN AS." 
"How "'lLL WE GET IT?" 
"EASILY. FROM THOSE WHO PUT DOWN THAT IF IT CONSISTS OF FORMS, FOR THEY'RE MORE CIVILISED. IT 
"'lLL BE '.!ORE DIFFICULT, AlvU PERHAPS EVEN JUST ABOu'T IMPOSSIBLE, WITH THOSE WHO VIOLENTLY DRAG 
EVERYTIIING DOWN INTO PHYSICAL BODY. HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THIS IS HOW WE NEED TO DEAL 
Wf!H TIIE LATIER."' -PLATO 'SOPHIST'OP C!T.246A-246D.P80-81. 
123 SWEENEY.OP CIT.Pl46. 
1°' '"! F.-1 .. 'ICY THAT YOUR REASONS FOR BELIEVING THAT EACH IDEA IS ONE IS SO!v!ETHING LIKE THIS: WHEN 
THERE IS ANU'-IBER OF THINGS WHICH SEEM TO YOU TO BE GREAT, YOU MAY THINK, AS YOU LOOK ATTHEM 
. .\LL. THAT THERE IS ONE ,'\,,'ID THE SAME IDEA IN THEM, A."ID HENCE YOU THINK THE GREAT IS ONE. " 
"THAT IS TRL"E." HE SAID. 
"Bn· IF WITH YOUR "!IND'S EYE YOU REGARD THE .-UlSOLu'TE GREAT .<\,'ID THESE M."''IY GREAT THINGS IN THE 
SA.VIE WAY. WILL NOT ANOTHER GREAT APPEAR BEYOND, BY WHICH ALL THESE MCCH APPEAR TO BE 
GREAT?" 
"So IT SEE'-1S." 
"THAT IS .. '1,,'IOTHER IDEA OF GREAThcSS WIILL APPEAR, IN ADDITION TO ABSOLUTE GREATNESS AND THE 
OBJECTS WHICH PARTAKE OF IT, A.'ID ANOTHER AGAIN IN ADDITION TO THESE, BY REASON OF WHICH THEY 
ARE ALL GREAT: .~U EACH OF YOUR IDEAS WILL NOT LONGER BE ONE. BUT THEIR NUMBER WILL BE 
INFINITE."'-PLATO 'PARMENIDES' OPCIT.132A~.P217-8. 
1
"EV ANS.J.D.G. 'THIRD MAN ARGUMENT' IN THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
OP CIT. P873. 
1
" SWEENEY.OP CIT.Pl48. 
127 IBID.Pl48. 
1
°"VLASTOS.G: 1954.'THETHIRDMAN ARGUMENT IN THE PARMENIDES' 0PCIT.P320FF. 
129 IBID.P347. 
130 THE BREAKDOWN THAT VLASTOS SPEAKS OF HERE IS THAT OF THE FIRST VERSION OF THE ARGUMENT IN 
THE 'PARMEMDES,'132Al-B2. lBID.P320. 
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131 IBID.P32L 
132 ME!NW ALD.C.OP CIT.P365. MEINWALD BELIEVES THAT THE CRITICISMS OF P.~RMENIDES, LEVELLED 
AT THE YOUTHFUL SOCTRATES' DOCTRINE OF THE FORMS. IS INTENDED TO REFLECT PLATO'S O\\iN 
ADMISSION OF THE SOMEWHAT UNDEVELOPED NATURE OF HIS OWN 'J\;!JDDLE·PERIOD,' THEORY OF THE 
FORMS. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY THAT IT IS P AR.'1ENIDES' PURPOSE TO TOTALLY DESTROY THE POSSIBILITY OF 
THERE BEING ANY SUCH THING AS A FORM. HOWEVER. PARMENIDES, ON THE CONTRARY. WISHES TO SHOW 
SoCRATES THAT HE WILL NOT SUCCEED IN HIS ARGUMENT UNTIL HE CHANGES THE SHAPE OF HIS ARGUMENT 
FIRST (SOMETHING WHICH SOCRATES IS GOING TO SHOW PARMENIDES IN THE SECOND PART OF THE 
DIALOGUE). AGAIN, THIS CHANGES ONE'S INTERPRETATIVE APPROACH TO THE DIALOGUE-AS NOW ONE Cfu"J 
APPROACH IT AS VIEWING PLATO, WANTING TO PROVIDE A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEMS. 
133 MEINW ALD.!BID.P374. 
134 1BID.P374. 
135 IBID.P378. 
136 IBID.PP378. MEINWALD ILLUSTRATES THIS CONCEPT USING WHAT SHE CALLS THE 'TREE PREDICATION.' 
WE CAN, FOR EXAMPLE, PICTURE A TREE SHOWING THE ANlMALS. WE THEN DIVIDE THE TYPES OF fu'IIMALS 
INTO VERTEBRATE AND INVERTEBRATE. WE THEN PROCEED TO DIVIDE THE VERTEBRATE INTO THE 
MAMMALS AND so ON. WE CONTINUE OUR DIVISION, UNTIL AT LAST WE REACH THE ANIMAL, CAT. Now AN 
ANIMAL IS AN ANIMAL, AND AN ANIMAL IS ALSO A CAT, BUTTHE TWO INSTANCES OF PREDICATION. MEAN 
DIFFERENT THINGS. DESPITE nus, HO'W"EVER, THERE IS A CERTAIN fuY!OUNT OF OVERLAP, OR 
'PARTICIPATION.' AS BOTH CAN (ACCORDING TO THEIR RESPECTIVE NATURES, WHICH DIFFER) BE CALLED 
'ANIMALS.' 
137 BOETHIUS' ARGUMENT HERE IS REPRODUCED BY: TE VELDE.R.A: 1995. 'PARTICIPATION AND 
SUBSTANTIALITY IN THOMAS AQUINAS' P87. 
138 SECONDARY SOURCES CONSUL TED IN THIS SECTION INCLUDE: STEAD.C.G.'DIVINE SUBSTANCE., OP 
CIT. P253FF, AND DRISCOLL, J. 'THE PLATONIC ANCESTRY OF PRIMARY SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT, 
KAHN. C.H. 'WHY EXISTENCE DOES NOT EMERGE AS A DISTINCT CONCEPT IN GREEK 
PHILOSOPHY. 'OP CIT, MATTHEN.M. 'GREEK ONTOLOGY AND THE "IS" OF TRUTH. 'OP CIT. 
139 SEE PLATO. 'SOPHIST' 252 A-C.OP CIT.P89FF. IN THIS SECTION. PLATO INSISTS THAT THERE HAS TO 
BE SOME COMMONALITY BETWEEN ALL THAT EXISTS (25 lD). IF THERE WAS NO COMMONALITY BETWEEN 
THE THINGS THAT ARE, THERE COULD BE NO METAPHYSICAL AND LINGUISTIC UNITY. THAT WOULD MAKE 
ALL DISCOURSE IMPOSSIBLE. RATHER. SPEECH IS THE WEAVING TOGETHER OF THE FORMS (259E): 
'FURTHER. WHOEVER SAYS THAT EVERYTHING IS COMBINED AT ONE TIME AND SEPARATED AT ANOTHER, 
WHETHER THERE ARE AN INFINITE OR A FINITE NUMBER OF ELEMENTS FROM WHICH THEY ARE COMBINED 
INTO A UNITY fu'ID SEPARATED OliT OF UNITY. AND REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THEY PLT DOWN THAT THIS 
HAPPENS IN STAGES OR CONTINUALLY, IN ALL THESE CASES THEY WOULD BE UITERING NONSENSE IF THERE 
JS NO INTERJ\;fiXING AT ALL.' -PLATO.!BID.252B.P90. THE QL"ESTION ABOUT SPEECH IS FOUND IN 259E-262D. 
SEE ALSO WHITE.N. 'PLATO'S METAPHYSICAL EPISTEMOLOGY.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO PLATO.OP CIT.P277. 
140 IBID.P278. 
141 lBID.P279. 
142 PLATO.'REPUBL!C' OP CIT.CHAP Vll.534.P249. THE GREEK TE;<.T IS FOUND IN WHITE. OP CIT.P278. 
THE FULL PASSAGE IS AS FOLLOWS: ' "WE SHALL BE SATISFIED THEN, WITH THE NA~IES WE GA~"E EARLIER 
TO OUR FOL'R DI\1SIONS: FIRST, KNOWLEDGE, SECOND, TIUNKING, THIRD. BELIEF. AND FOURTH. IMAGINING. 
THE LAST TWO TAKEN TOGETHER CONSTITLTE THE APPREHENSION OF APPEARANCES IN THE WORLD OF 
BECOMING. THE FIRST TWO, INTELLIGENCE CONCE~"ED WITH TRUE BEING. FINALLY AS BEING IS TO 
BECOMING, SO IS INTELLIGENCE TO THE APPREHENSION OF APPEARANCES, AND IN THE SAME RELATION 
AGAIN ST ANDS fu'IOWLEDGE TO BELIEF, AND THINKING TO IMAGINING ... A>'ID BY A MASTER OF DIALECT DO 
YOU ALSO MEAN ONE WHO DEMANDS AN ACCOUNT OF THE ESSENCE OF EACH THING? AND WOULD YOU NOT 
SAY THAT, IN SO FAR AS HE COULD RENDER NO SUCH ACCOUNT TO HIMSELF OR TO OTHERS, HIS 
INTELLIGENCE IS AT FAULT?" 
"I SHOULD?" 
"AND DOES NOT THIS APPL y TO THE Goon? HE MUST BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF 
GooDNESS, ISOLATING IT FROM ALL OTHER FORMS, HE MUST FIGHT HIS WAY THROUGH ALL CRITICISMS, 
DETERJ\;fiNED TO EXA>~!INE EVERY STEP BY THE STANDARD, NOT OF APPEARANCES AND OPINIONS, Blff OF 
REALITY AND TRUTH .. -U'ID WIN THROUGH TO THE END. WITHOUT SUSTAINING A FALL ... "'-
PLAT0.lBID.P2~8-9. 
143 
·"so IF THE REAL IS THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE. THE OBJECT OF BELIEF MUST BE SOMETHING OTHER 
THAN THE REAL ... " 
"YES. A.'IY SUCH THING WILL ALWAYS HA VE A CLAIM TO BOTH OPPOSITE DESIGNATIONS." 
''THEN. WHATEVER .-U'<YONEOFTHESE MANY THINGS MAY BE SAID TO BE. CAN YOU SAY THAT IT 
ABSOLlJfELY IS THAT. ANY MORE THANTHAT !TIS NOT THAT?" 
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" ... THESE THINGS HA VE THE SAME A.\1BIGUOUS CHARACTER, AND ONE CANNOT FORM ANY STABLE 
CONCEPTION OF THEM EITHER AS BEING OR AS NOT BEING. OR AS BOTH BEING AND NOT BEING, OR AS 
EITHER."' -PLATO. 'REPUBLIC' OP CIT. CHAP V. 4 791834. THE IMPLICATION IN THIS PASSAGE IS THAT 
THE SO-CALLED fu'IOWLEDGE THAT PEOPLE HA VE OF, SAY, BEAUTY, IS NOT TRULY 'REAL' (BEING), UNLESS 
IT SUBSISTS IN THE FORM OF BEAUTY, WHICH THE TRUE PHILOSOPHER REVEALS IN HIS TEACHING, TO THE 
COMMON INDIVIDUAL. SOMETHING CANNOT BE SEEN TO BE 'REALLY THAT.' WITHOUT APPEAL TO THE FORM. 
PLATO ALSO DEALS \;ITH THE PROBLEM OF \\!HAT IS, OR WHAT IS NOT, IN THE 'SOPHIST.' ESPECIALLY FROM 
236D-257 A NORMAL. PHYSICAL OBJECTS ARE REJECTED AS BEING TRUE INSTANCES OF REALITY (OUSIA). 
THIS IS BECAUSE; PHYSICAL THINGS ARE AL WAYS CHANGING. THE FORMS (EIDOS), ON THE OTHER HAND ARE 
THE MOST IMPORTANT INST A,'ICE OF THE 'THINGS THAT ARE.' 
H
4 PLATO. 'SOPHIST. 'Op CIT.219B.P40: 'THERE IS AGRICULTURE AND EVERY OTHER SORT OF CARE OF 
~IORTAL THINGS AND. FURTHER, OF THINGS THAT ARE CONSTRUCTED OR SHAPED-TO WHICH WE HA VE GIVEN 
THE NA.\1E EQl1P1'!E1'T, .'\ND THERE IS ALSO THE IMITATIVE ART. ALL OF THESE TOGETHER COULD MOST 
Jl'.STL Y BE REFERRED TO BY ONE NA,'.!E.,.' 
145 FOR A STLTIY OF THE DIFFERENT USES OF THE CONCEPT OF 'BEING.' IN ARISTOTLE, SEE: BRENT ANO.F. 
(TRANSLATED: GEORGE.R: 1975). 'ON 1HE SEVERAL SENSES OF BEING IN ARISTOTLE.' 
146 SEE KAHN.OP CIT.P9. IN BOTH PLATO AND ARISTOTLE. THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE IS NOT 
COMPLETELY . .\BSENT. ARISTOTLE COMES CLOSE TO SEEING EXISTENCE AS IMPLIED IN CERT AJN INSTANCES 
OF PREDICATION. 
14
' IBID.P7.HOWEVER. WE ARE NOT ENTIRELY IN AGREEMENT WITH KAHN. WHEN IT COMES TO THE 
AUGUSTINIAN DOCTRINE OF GoD. SEE BELOW. 
148 WITTGENSTEIN.OP CIT. I, l. I. P3 I. 
l'9 WE CA.'i LOOK AT ARISTOTLE HERE AS W'ELL. WE ~!IGHT CALL THE 'CATEGORJES' OF ARISTOTLE, A 
STL'DY OF DIFFERE1'T TYPES OF EXISTENCE. YET THE EMPHASIS IS NOT ON 'F' EXISTS, BUT ON 'WHAT KIND 
OF ATTRIBUTES MUST FHA VE, IN ORDER TO BE F''' FOR SOCRATES TO EXIST IS FOR HIM TO BE A LIVING MAN, 
WITH CERTAIN ATTRIBUTES. IT IS THEREFORE THE LOGICAL FORM OF A THING THAT MAKES IT REALLY REAL. 
l50 MATTHE:>l.OP CIT.Pl 15. SAYS PARMENIDES: 'COME NOW, AND I WILL TELL THEE-AND DO NOT HEARKEN 
.-U'IDCARRY ~IY WORD AWAY-THE ONLY WAYS OF ENQUIRY THAT EXIST FOR THINKING: THE ONE WAY, THAT 
!TIS . .\.,'\l) C.4-'\~0T'.'IOT·BE, IS THE PATH OF PERSUASION, FOR IT ATTENDS UPON TRUTH; THE OTHER, THATIT 
IS-NOT .-U'ID N'EEDS ~ll.'.ST NOT-BE, THAT I TELL THEE JS A PATH ALTOGETHER UNTHINKABLE. FOR TIIOU 
COULDST 'lOT K<'IOW THAT WHICH IS-NOT (THAT IS IMPOSSIBLE) NOR UTTER IT; FOR THE SAME THING EXISTS 
FOR THI'lKING . .\.,'ID FOR BEING.' -'PARMENIDES. 'FRAGMENT 2. IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY: THALES 
TO PLATO.(EDITED: ALLEN.R: l 966).P45. 
151 BARTH IS DEALING WITH A SIMILAR PROBLEM TO PLATO: How CAN THE PARTICULAR SINNER, SAVED BY 
GRACE, 'PARTICIPATE.' IN THE WORD, WITHOUT THE WORD (FORM) LOSING ITS TRANSCENDENCE'/ As WE 
SHALL SEE, BARTH'S SOLUflON IS 'lOT ENTIRELY DISSIMILAR TO THAT OF PLATO. 
152 STEAD.CG. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT.P25. 
153 PLATO.'REPUBLIC.. OP en.CHAP VI.508.P215. 
l>4 STEAD.OP CIT.P26, POINTS OUT THAT PLATO NEVER ACCEPTED THE EXTREME VIEW THAT 'JS' CAN ONLY 
CONNECT IDE'lTICAL THINGS. WE HA VE ALSO ILLUSTRATED THIS IN PLATO'S CONCEPTION OF THE FORMS, 
AN INDIVIDUAL ENTITY CAN PARTICIPATE IN A FORM, MEA.\fING WE CAN SAY: 'A' IS' A,' WITHOUT LOSING 
THE FACT THAT THERE ARE IMPORT ANT DISCONTINL1TIES BETWEEN THE PARTICULAR QUALITY 'A' IN A 
CONTI'lGENT THING. AND Tiffi FORM 'A' FROM WHICH IT DERIVES. 
155 IBID.27. 
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156 PLATO., SOPHIST. 'OP CIT.246C.P8 l. IT IS WORTH QUOTING THIS p AS SAGE AGAIN: 'FOR THIS REASON 
THOSE WHO DISPUTE WITH THEM DEFEND THEMSELVES VERY CAREFULLY FROM AN INVISIBLE PLACE UP ON 
HIGH AND FORCEFULLY MAINTAIN TRUE BEING TO BE SOME SORT OF INTELLIGIBLE. NONPHYSICAL FORMS. IN 
THEIR ARGUMENTS, THEY SMASH TO BITS THE FORMER'S PHYSICAL BODIES AND WHAT THEY SAY IS TRUE. 
AND REFER TO THAT AS A SORT OF BECOMING THAT IS SWEPT ALONG RATHER THAN AS BEING.' IN THESE 
KIND OF PASSAGES, BEING (OR OUSIA), IS OPPOSED TO THE CONTINGENT STATE (PATHOS). 
157 IBID.P29. 
158 IBID.P33.WEARE NOW MOVING AWAY FROM THE TYPE OF STATEMENT THAT SAYS. 'XIS JUST.' 
TOWARDS. 'JUSTICE IS ... ' 
159 IBID.P35, HERE STEAD IS QUOTING FROM THE 'PROTAGORAS.' 330c-E. 
160 IBID.P37. 
161 PLATO. 'REPUBLIC. 'OP CIT.CHAP VI.508B.P215. 
162 IBID.P41. SEE ALSO PLATO. 'TIMAEUS. 'Op CIT.30B.P42: 'LET US THEREFORE STATE THE REASON WHY 
THE FRAMER OF THIS UNIVERSE OF CHANGE FRAMED IT AT ALL. HE WAS GOOD, AND WHATIS GOOD HAS NO 
PARTICLE OF ENVY IN IT; BEING THEREFORE WITHOUT ENVY HE WISHED ALL THINGS TO BE AS LIKE HIMSELF 
AS POSSIBLE. THIS IS AS VALID A PRINCIPLE FOR THE ORIGIN OF Tiffi WORLD OF CHANGE AS WE SHALL 
DISCOVER FROM THE WISDOM OF MEN, AND WE SHOULD ACCEPT IT. GOD, THEREFORE, WISHING THAT ALL 
THINGS SHOULD BE GOOD, AND SO FAR AS POSSIBLE NOTHING BE IMPERFECT, AND FINDING THE VISIBLE 
UNIVERSE IN A STATE NOT OF REST BUT OF INHARMONIUS AND DISORDERLY MOTION, REDUCED IT TO ORDER 
FROM DISORDER, AS HE JUDGED THAT ORDER WAS IN EVERY WAY BETTER.' 
163 SEE HERE, HOWEVER THE DISCUSSION BELOW, WHERE IT IS CLAIMED BY SOME THAT MORE DETAlLS 
CONCERNING THE IDENTITY OF 'GOD.' CAN BE GLEANED FROM THE 'NON-DIALOGUE,' DISCOURSES OF PLATO, 
FOR EXAMPLE IN THE SUMMARY OF PLATONIC BELIEFS FOUND IN ARISTOTLE. 
164 DRISCOLL.J. 'THE PLATONIC ANCESTRY OF PRIMARY SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT.P253. 
165 PLATO. 'TIMAEUS. 'OP CIT.49A.P66. 
LOOKh'-IG DOWN UPON THE MATERIAL WORLD AS CONCEIVED BY THE ATOMISTS. PLATO SEES A SENSE OF 
DISORDERLINESS. EACH BODY HAS A SHAPE FILLED WITH SOLID STUFF WHICH THE ATOMISTS CALLED 
'BEING.' OR 'SUBSTA,'-ICE.' THE THEORY OF THE RECEPTACLE JN THE 'TIMAEUS' IS PLATO'S REFUTATION OF 
THAT THEORY. THE RECEPTACLE-OR THE 'NURSE,' OF BECOMING COMPRISES THE CONTENTS OF SPACE 
BEFORE THE CREATOR IN THE TIMAEUS IMPOSES FORM AND NUMBER IN THESE BODIES-
CORNFORD.F.M. 'PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.' OP CIT.P247. IN OTHER WORDS, BOTH 
ARISTOTLE AND PLATO BELIEVED, IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO THE ATOMISTS, THAT WHAT IS TRULY 
'SUBSTANCE,' MUST, JN SOME WAY, INCLUDE SOME INTELLIGIBLE FORM, IT CANNOT JUST BE 'STUFF.' IN THE 
CASE OF TAYLOR, THE RECEPTACLE JS A 'MATRIX.' IN WHICH 'BECOMING GOES ON.' THIS MATRIX IS NOT 
FIRE OR WATER OR ANY OF THE OTHER POSSIBLE THINGS THAT THE EARLIER PHILOSOPHERS HAD SELECTED 
AS THE PRIMARY. BOCNDlESS 'MATTER,' OlJTOF WHICH ALL . .\RISE. EXPERIENCE SAYS THAT THESE 'BASIC. 
THINGS A.RE NEVER ALWAYS OO"MINANf INDIVIDliALLY: L"NDER CERTAJN CIRCUMSTA.i'\ICES, FIRE BEC01'1ES 
WATER. WHAT HOWEVER. DOES REMAIN CONSTANT IS THE BASIC 'SPACE,' lJNDERWHICH THEY ALL APPEAR. 
THIS BASIC UNDERLYING ENTm' STAYS THE SAME DESPITE THE CHANGES OF THINGS THAT TAKE PLACE 'IN' 
IT-TA YLOR.AE.'PLATO THE MAN AND HIS WORK.' OP CIT.P456. 
166 PLATO. 'TIMAEUS. 'OP CIT.P67. 
161 IBID.P68. 
168 STEAD.OP CIT.P48. 
169 DRISCOLL.OP CIT.P253FF. 
170 WOLFSON.H.A: 1956 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS.'P350FF. 
111 IBID.P296. 
172 MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.I. 'PLATO AND TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY.' OP CIT.P!06. 
TORRENTS POINTS OUT TWO POSSIBLE DYADIC INTEPRETATIONS IN THE DIALOGUES. FIRSTLY, THE DY AD: 
GOOD-IDEAS ('SYMPOSIUM,' 'REPUBLIC' VI). SECONDLY, THE DY AD: IDEAS-MATHEMATICAL FORMS. 
('REPUBLIC 'VI, 'TIMAEUS'). 
173 MUCH OF TR!NIT . .\RIAN THOUGHT, WllEN NOT CORRECTLY WORKED OUT, BECOMES MORE DYADIC, THAN 
TRIADIC, AND BECOMES SUBJECT TO MUCH OF DERRIDA'S CRITICISMS OF BINARY OR OPPOSITIONAL 
THINKING. IN OUR OPINION, TO OVERCOME THIS CRITICISM, TRINIT . .\RIAN THEOLOGY NEEDS TO STRESS THE 
ROLE OF THE INCARNATION AS WELL AS THE IMMANENCE OF GoD, AS FOUNDATIONAL TO ALL THINKJNG ON 
THE TRINITY. SEE OUR DISCUSSION IN THE FINAL CHAPTER. 
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114 
WE Fll\U A DISCl"SSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN: KRAUT.R. 'INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
PLATO. 'IN THE CAl1vffiRIDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. OP CIT.P20FF. HE ACKNOWLEDGES THAT WE 
HAVE REPORTS FRmI ARISTOTLE . .\ND OTHER THINKERS IN LATER ANTIQUITY, CONCERNING \VHAT PLATO 
TAUGHT .UTHE ACADEMY. TOBE SURE, WE CAN BE FAIRLY CERTAIN THAT PLATO DID TEACH MUCHMORE 
~!A TERIAL THAT WE DO NOT FIND IN THE EXT ANT DIALOGUES. DoES NOT PLATO HIMSELF, ACKNOWLEDGE 
Tl!E Ll~IITATIONS OF THE WRITTEN WORD (AS DERRIDA HAS SO RECOGNISED IN HIS ESSAY ON PLATO IN 
·DISSENUNATION') N, FOR EXAMPLE THE 'PHAEDRUS. '274B-287B? FoRPLATO, IT IS PHILOSOPHICAL 
DIALOGUE THAT IS FOUJDATIONAL TO THE WRITTEN TEXT. BECAUSE OF THE POSITION PLATO TOOK. SOME 
SCHOLARS HA VE CONTROVERSIALLY ASSERTED THAT PLATO THEREFORE PURPOSEFULLY REFRAINED FROM 
PLACNG SOME OF HIS MOST IMPORT ANT CONVICTIONS, INTO WRITTEN FORM. 'WE FIND THIS POSITION EVEN 
'.!ORE SUPPORT ALE. \VHEN WE LOOK AT THE SEVENTH OF PLATO'S LETTERS, WHICH SEEMS TO SHOW AN 
EVE1' GREATER RESERVATION ABOUT THE VALIDITY OF WRJTING, IN COMPARISON TO THE "I'HAEDRUS."' -
KRAUT.R.IBID.P22. ARISTOTLE INTHE 'PHYSICS. 'IV.2.209Bl4-15, MAKES A DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT 
PLATO SAID AT A CERT.'ill'< POINT IN THE 0 T!MAEUS' AND HIS SO-CALLED UNWRITTEN OPINJONS. YET AS 
KRALT ARGUES, IBID.P23, THISDIDNOTCAUSEARISTOTLE TO PLACELESS WEIGHT ON THE 'TIMAEUS,' IN 
FAVOUR OF THESE OTHER OPINIONS. AL THOUGH ARISTOTLE DOES REFER TO SOME THINGS THAT PLATO 
TAUGHT. THINGS THAT ARE NOT CLEARLY WRITTEN IN THE DIALOGL'ES, THIS IS UNDERSTANDABLE, TAKING 
INTO ACCOL'NT ARISTOTLE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS MASTER. ANY STUDENT, WORKING UNDER A MASTER, 
WILL TEND TO Ql:OTE HIM LATER, WITHOUT SPECIFIC REFERENCE ALL THE TIME TO HIS WRITTEN WORK. THE 
INIPORTAJ•IT POI1'T THAT KRAUT MAKES IS THAT ARISTOTLE DOES NOT QUOTE PLATO'S UNWRITTEN VIEWS IN 
A WAY THAT SUBST.\l'<TIALLY CONTRADICTED WHAT PLATO SAID IN THE WRITTEN DIALOGUES. WE FIND THIS 
TO BE A SOUND HER~IENE\JTICAL PRINCIPLE. 
1
"MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.J.OPCIT,FINDLAY.J.N.'THETHREEHYPOSTASESOF 
PLATONISM. 'Op C!T 
1
,
6 IN THE SUMMARY OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE PLATONIC TRIAD THAT FOLLOWS, WE SHALL RELY 
PRIMARILY ON THE READING OF MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.OP CIT.Pl04FF. 
177 
SEE 'REPUBLIC' OP C!T.510-5 l IA. 'TIMAEUS' .OP CIT.53C-55C.P72-77.IN THIS SECTION OF THE 
0 T!H.\EUS,' PLATO ARGL'ES THAT THE FOUR ELEMENTS A.'ID THE FOUR REGULAR SOLIDS-GENERALLY TAKE 
l"P ·"-GEOMETRICAL FORM A.ND SHAPE. 'IN THE FIRST PLACE IT rs CLEAR TO EVERYONE THAT FIRE. EARTH. 
W.~TER . \ND AIR ARE BODIES, AND ALL BODIES ARE SOLIDS. ALL SOLIDS AGAIN ARE BOUNDED BY SURFACES, 
·'-''-TI ALL RECTILINEAR St.:RF ACES ARE COMPOSED OF TRIANGLES.' -IBID.P72. 
l 'S • A.'ID WI!EN THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF THE SOUL HAD BEEN FINISHED TO THE LIKING OF ITSFRAMER, HE 
PROCEEDED TO FASHION THE WHOLE CORPOREAL WORLD WITHIN IT. FITTING THE TWO TOGETHER CENTRE TO 
CENTRE: A'-TI THE SOU. WAS WOVEN RIGHT THROUGH FROM THE CENTRE TO THE OUTERMOST HEAVEN, 
\HUCH IT ENVELOPED FROM THE OUTSIDE AND, REVOLVING ON ITSELF, PROVIDED A DIVINE SOURCE OF 
L-;>.'ENDING .'-''ID RATI01'.~ LIFE FOR ALL TIME. THE BODY OF THE HEAVEN IS VISIBLE, BUT THE SOUL 
f}i\1SIBLE .'-''ID ENDO\H'.D WITH REASON AND HARMONY. BEING THE BEST CREATION OF THE BEST OF THE 
INTELLIGIBLE ,.\,'ID ETER'.'J.~ THINGS. A'ID BECAUSE IT IS COMPOUNDED OF SAME, DIFFERENT .. .\J»U 
EXISTENCE .\S COMTffi!EYI' PARTS, . \l'D DIVIDED UP .~D BOUND TOGETHER IN PROPORTION, ,\1'1) IS 
REVOLVING Ll'ON ITSELF, WHE1''E\'ER THE SOUL COMES INTO CONT ACT WITH ANYTHING ELSE WHOSE BEING 
IS EITHER DISPERSED OR INDIVISIBLE ... ' -·TIMAEUS. 'Op CIT.37.P49-50. PLATO THEN GOES ONTO SPEAK OF 
THE WORLD CREATED IN TIME-AS A COPY OF ETERNITY. HE ASSERTS THAT THE CREATION AND ITS ORDER IS 
\IATHEMAT!C~ Bl TIS YET PART OF THAT CREATION. 
"'MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.OP CIT.Pl04. 
ISO IBID.Pl04-5. SEE .~so ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS. 'Op CIT.XIIl.1076A33-35. Pl 1-2.SEE AGAIN 
ALSO 'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT.III.997B: 'fuRTHER, ARE \\'E TO SAY THAT ONLY SENSIBLE SUBSTANCES 
EXIST, OR THAT OTHERS DO AS WELL? MU IS THEREREALLYONLY ONE Kl1'UOF SUBSTANCE, OR MORE 
TIL'-''101''£ (AS THEY HOLD WHO SPEAK OF THE FORMS ANDTHE Il\'TERMEDIATES, WHICH THEY MAINTAIN TO 
BE THE OBJECTS OF THE MATHEMATICAL SC!ENCES)? IN WHAT SENSE PLATONISTS HOLD THE FORMS TO BE 
BOTH CAUSES AND !NUEPENDENT SUBSTANCES HAS BEEN STATED IN OUR ORIGINAL DISCUSSION ON THIS 
SUBJECT. BL'T WHILE THEY INVOLVE DIFFICULTY IN MANY RESPECTS, NOT THE LEAST ABSURDITY IS THE 
DOCTRINE THAT THERE ARE CERT A1N E1'TITIES AP ART FROM THOSE IN THE SENSIBLE UNIVERSE, AND THAT 
THESE ARE THE SA.\IE AS SENSIBLE THINGS EXCEPT IN THATTHE FORMER ARE ETERNAL AND THE LATTER 
PERISHABLE ... AGAIN. IF ANY01'c POSITS INTERMEDIATES FROM FORMS AND SENSIBLE THINGS, HE WILL 
HAVE MANY DIFFICl'LTIES; BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY NOT ONLY WILL THERE BE LINES APART FROM BOTH IDEAL 
.'-''ID SENSIBLE Lll\'ES. BUT IT WILL BE THE SAME WITH EACH OF THE OTHER CLASSES.' 
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181 MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.IBID.Pl81. 
ISC [T SEEMS THATTHE ACTUAL TERM 'll'\DEFINITE DYAD." DOES NOTITSELF GO BACK TO PLATO. ARISTOTLE 
ON PLATO AGAIN: 'FURTHER. HE STATES THAT BESIDES SEJ'\SIBLE THINGS AND THE FORMS THERE EXISTS . .\'.'/ 
INTER.\IEDIATE CLASS, THE OBJECTS OF MATHEMATICS, WHICH DIFfER FROM SENSIBLE THINGS IN BEING 
ETERNAL AND IMMUTABLE, AND FROM THE FORMS IN THAT THERE ARE MANY SIMILAR OBJECTS OF 
~IA THEMATICS. WHEREAS EACH FORM IS ITSELF UNIQL"E. Now, SINCE THE FORMS ARE THE CAUSES OF 
EVERYTHING ELSE, HE SUPPOSED THAT THEIRELE1"1ENTS ARE THE ELE1'JENTS OF ALL THINGS. ACCORDINGLY. 
THE MATERIAL PRJNCIPLE IS THE "GREAT AND SMALL," AND THE ESSENCE (OR FORMAL PRINCIPLE) IS THE 
Ol--c, SINCE THE NU1"ffiERS ARE DERJVED FROM THE "GREAT AND SMALL," BY PARTICIPATION IN THE ONE. IN 
TREATING THE ONE AS A SUBSTA.'ICE INSTEAD OF A PREDICATE OF S01'!E OTHER ENTITY, HIS TEACHING 
RESEMBLES THAT OF THE PYTHAGOREANS, AND ALSO AGREES WITH IT JN STATING THAT THE NUMBERS ARE 
THE CAUSES OF BEING IN EVERYTHING ELSE; BUT IT IS PECULIAR TO HI~ITO POSIT A DUALITY INSTEAD OF 
THE SINGLE UNLIMlTED, AND TO MAKE THE UNLIMlTED CONSIST OF THE "GREAT AND SMALL."' -
ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS.'0PCrr.l.VI.5-6.P45. 
183 STEAD.C.G.OP CJT.P50. ' ... IT REPRESENTS UNDEF!NcD QUA.'ITITY, WHICH IS QUA.'IT!f!ED OR 
CALIBRATED BY THE IMPOSITION OF A UNIT. IT MUST! THIN1C BE ASSUMED THAT THIS ARITHMETICAL 
THEORY DID NOT SPRJNG FROM A 1"IERE SHIFT OR CONTRACTION OF PLATO'S INTERESTS TO THE PROBLEM OF 
THE ORJGIN OF NUMBER. BUT FROM SOME SORT OF PROPHETIC GLIMPSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE 
DERJVATION OF THE MATHEMATICAL IDEAS FROM IDEAL UNITY ;-,,IIGHT BE THE FORMAL PATTERN \VHICH 
WOULD EXPLAIN THE INTERRELATION BETWEEN ALL FOR1"!S OF PERFECTION. ARJSTOTI.E TELLS US THAT IN 
CONSTRUCTING HIS CHAIN OF DERJVATION, PLATO ASSIGNED A SPECIAL ROLE TO THE IDEAL '<UMBERS, THAT 
HE DISTINGUISHED THESE FROM THE MA THEMA TI CAL NU~IBERS. A.ND THAT HE ASSIG1''ED TO THE LATTER ·"'" 
INTERMEDIATE PLACE BETWEEN THE IDEAS A.'ID PERCEPTIBLE THINGS. WE ARE ALSO INFOR1'1ED, THOUGH 
Mt;CH LESS CLEARLY. THAT PLATO SOUGHT TO DERIVE THE IDEAL NUMBERS FROM THE Ol<c AND INDEFINITE 
DY AD; AND AGAIN, TO ~L.\KE THEM THE SOURCE OF THE OTHER !DEAS.' 
184 FIND LA Y.J. N. OP CJT.P668-9. 
185 MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.OP err.Pl 05. 
186 PLATO.'REPUBLIC.'OP err. VI.5 IO.P220: , ... You ALSO KNOW HOW THEY MAKE USE OF VISIBLE 
FIGURES AND DISCOURSE ABOUT THE1'L THOUGH WHAT THEY REALLY HA VE IN MlND ARE THE ORIGINALS OF 
WHICH THESE FIGURES ARE IMAGES: THEY ARE NOT REASONING, FOR INSTANCE, ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR 
SQUARE AND DIAGONAL WHICH THEY HA VE ORA WN, Blff ABOUT THE SQUARE AND THE DIAGONAL; A.ND SO 
IN ALL CASES. THE DIAGRAMS THEY DRAW A.'ID THE MODELS THEY ~!AKE ARE ACTUAL THINGS, WHICH MAY 
HAVE THEIR SHADOWS OF IMAGES IN WATER; BUT NOW THEY SERVE IN THEIR TURN AS IMAGES, WHILE THE 
STUDENT !S SEEKING TO BEHOLD THESE REALITIES WHICH ONLY THOLGHT CAN APPREHEND.' 
187 MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS. 0PCrr.Pl05. 
188 IBID.P!05. 
189 PLAT0.'REPUBLIC.'0PCJT.509B. 
190 MONTSERRAT-TORRENTS.OP CJT.Pl08. 
191 THE FATHER IS Goo, THE SoN IS GoD.'"'ID THE HOLY SPIRJT IS Goo, YET ALL ARE ~I\llDliAL PERSONS 
WITHIN THE GoDHEAD. 
192 IBID.Pl08. 
193 SEE ARMSTRONG.AH. 'LIFE: PLOTINUS AND THE RELIGION AND SUPERSTffiON OF HIS 
TIME.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER GREEK AND EARLY MEDIEVAL 
PHILOSOPHY. OP.CIT.Pl 95FF. 
194 IB!D.P204, SEE ALSO: 'THE SliPREME AUTHORITY FOR PLoTJNUS, AND THE ONLY PHILOSOPHER WHOM 
HE REGARDS AS BEYOND CRITICISM, IS OF COURSE, PLATO. BUT HIS WAY OF USING THE WORKS OF HIS 
MASTER JS SOMEWHAT DISCONCERTING TO THE MODERN PLATONIC SCHOLAR. As THEILER PLTS IT, THE 
PLATO OF PLOTJN1JS JS A VERY RESTRJCTEDPLATO, A "PLATODIMJDIATUS," A PLATO WITHOUT POLITICS.' -
!BID.P213. 
195 JACKSON.B.D.'PLOTINUS AND THE PARMENIDES. 'OP CIT.P315FF. JACKSON, IN THIS ARTICLE, 
IS WORKING ON THE FOUNDATION OF THE FAMOUS PLOTINUS SCHOLAR. E.R DoDDS WHO ARGUED FOR THE 
. P AR~IENJDES,' BEING THE MAIN SOURCE OF AT LEAST TWO OF THE THREE HYPOSTASES OF PLoTINUS. 
JACKSON ALSO ACKNOWLEDGES THE ARGUMENTS OF OTHER SCHOLARS, SUCH AS ARMSTRONG, WHO 
FOLLOW SIMILAR LINES OF THOUGHT. HE ALSO MENTIONS THE IDEAS OF E.O'BRJEN AND OTHERS WHO 
SUGGEST DIFFERENT SOURCES, SUCH AS THAT OF PLoTINUS' PREDECESSOR. NUMENIUS, AS AN IMPORTANT 
SOURCE. !N ADDITION TO THIS, H.A. WOLFSON, ARGUES FOR THE STRONG INFLL'ENCE OF PHILO. FINDLAY !N 
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HIS .\RT!CLE ·THE THREE HYPOSTASESOF PLATONISM. 'OP C!T.P660FF, SUGGESTS THAT WE ALSO 
)iEED TO TAKE TI\TO .\CCOL1'T THE ARISTOTELIAN CORPUS .AS A SOURCE. IN THAT ARISTOTLE QLOTED FROM 
PL.-\TONIC SOURCES (POSSIBLY HIS OWN K,'IOWLEDGE OF PL.Ho's LECTURES) THAT ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO 
CS. HE Sl'GGESTS THAT READING PLATO. AS WELL AS Tl-IE ARISTOTEL!&'I CRITICISMS OF THE 
'MET.-\PHYSICS,. PROVIDES CS WTTH A FAIRLY CLEAR PICTLRE OF THE TRIADIC STRUCTURE OF PLATO'S 
OPP.'<lONS. 
196 JACKS0N.IBID.P3!6. SEE ALSO PLOTINUS' TESTIMONY IN 'Ei\\VE4D' V.l.8. 'ON THE THREE 
PRIMARY HYPOSTA.SES.' OP C!T.P39FF: 'THIS IS Tl-IE REASON WHY PLATO SAYS THAT ALL THINGS ARE 
THREEFOLD -HE '.>.IE&'IS THE PRIMARY REALITIES-AND "Tl-IE SECOND ABOUT THE SECOND AND THE THIRD 
ABOUT Tl-IE THIRD." BUT HE ALSO SAYS THAT THERE IS A "FATHER OF THE CACSE," MEANING INTELLECT BY 
''THE CALSE," OR INTELLECT IS HIS CRAFTSMAN; AND HE SAYS THAT IT MAKES SOUL IN THAT 
·':>.IIXINGBOWL" HE SPEAKS OF. AND THE FATHER OF INTELLECT, WHICH IS THE CAUSE, HE CALLS THE Goon 
,-1,,'\U THAT WHICH IS BEYOND 11'TELLECT A1'U "BEYOND BEING." AND HE ALSO OFTEN CALLS BEING MU 
l1'TELLECT, IDEA: SO PLATO KNEW THAT 11'TELLECT COMES FROM THE Goon AND SOUL FROM INTELLECT. 
AW (IT FOLLOWS) THAT THESE ST A TEMENTS OF OURS ARE NOT NEW; THEY DO NOT BEW NG TO Tl-IE PRESE1' T 
TI'.>.IE, Bl'T WERE l.IADE WNG AGO, NOT EXPL!Cffi Y AND WHAT WE HAVE SAID IN THIS DISCUSSION HAS BEEN 
A.'\i INTERPRETATION OF THEM. RELYING ON PLATO'S OWN WRITINGS FOR EVIDENCE THAT Tl-IESE VIEWS ARE 
_.\..>;CJENT.·-P39-ll. 
PLOTINL'S .-\LSO QL'OTES OTHER SOURCES IN PLATO FOR HIS DOCTRINE SUCH AS: 'EPISTLE.' !I.3!2E. VI 
3230 AND THE I~IPORT.-\,'IT SOURCE: 'REPUBLIC' 509B. 
Ir JACKSON.Qr CIT.P3 l 7. INTHE 'PARME1'1DES,' 137c-142A, PARl.IEN!DES DISCUSSES THREE HYPOTHESES 
CORRESPONDING FIRSTLY TO 'THE ONE.' JACKSON.OP Crr.P318FF, DEl.IONSTRATES CERTAIN IMPORT.-1,,'IT 
P.\R.-\LLELS BETWEEN THE 'ONE.' OF Tl-IE 'P.ARMENIDES,' &'<UTHE 'ONE' IN PLOTINUS. THE FACT THAT IT 
CA.'-i liEITHER BE.-\ WHOLE, NOR HA VE PARTS, ('PARMENIDES' 137 E) THAT IT HAS NO BEGINNING (137D 4-8), 
'-"ORE= . .\..'<U IT HAS NO SHAPE ( 137D 8-!38A). !T NEITHER l.IOVES, NOR RESTS (138B 7-J39B 3). THE ONE IS 
'JOT IN TL\IE (l 40E 1-141 D 6). PwTINUS THEN CONCLUDES. ON THE BASIS OF PL.-\TO' S THINKING THAT THE 
0'iE '.Il.'ST HAVE BEING EXCLUDED FROM IT. l1'IPORTA.c'ITLY. PLOTINUS HERE SYSTEMATISES PLATO'S 
THOCGHT IN A WAY THAT PLATO DID NOT: HE IDENTIFIES THE Goon OF THE 'REPUBLIC,, WITH THE 'ONE' OF 
THE 'P.\R'.IE'>lDES.' 
'A'\U P.\R'.IENIDES SAID: " ... W11AT SHALL BE OUR FIRST HYPOTl-!ESIS'?" ... "WELL Tl-!EN," SAID HE. "IF THE 
O"-'E EXISTS. THE ONE C.-\,'JNOT BE MA.c'IY. CAN IT?"' -PLATO. 'PARMENIDES.' OP C!T.137C.P237. 
P.\R'.IENIDES BEGINS BY D!SCCSSING THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE ONE. WHICH IS SELF-IDENTICAL. THE ONE IS 
'ON'E.' NOT '.!ANY. THE SECONU HYPOTHESIS OF P.\RMENIDES, IS THAT OF UNITY THAT IS SPREAD OVER 
BENO (142B-!55E). THE 01''E, CA.c'<'NOT P.ARTAKE OF BEING, BECAUSE IT IS TRL'L y ONE-lBID.P253: "'Now 
CONSIDER Tl-IE FIRST POI'JT. lF ON'E IS. C.-\1' IT BE AND NOT PARTA..KE OF BEING?" "No. IT CANNOT." "THEN 
THE BE!1'G OF 0"-'E WILL EXIST, BLT WILL NOT BE IDENTICAL WITH 01''E; FOR IF IT WERE IDENTICAL WITH 01"£, 
IT WOULD NOT BE TI-IE BEING OF ONE, NOR WOULD 01''E P.\RTAKE OF IT ... "' THIS LEADS THE PARl.IENIDES IN 
THE OI.-\LOGl'E TO POSIT A<'<OTHER HYPOTHESIS: THAT OF THE 'SECOND.' THE SECOND IS NOT Tl-IE ON'E, .AS 
.-\LTHOCGH IT IS .-\LSO A L'NITY, IT IS A UNITY OF 
''.L.\..'<Y. '('PARMENIDES' 142B-!55E). THIS SECOND HYPOTl-!ESIS IS WHAT PAR1'1ENIDES CALLS 'BEING.' 
THIS IS Tl-IE PwTINI.'\.,'I "Yous,' WHICH CORRESP01'DS TO Tl-IE FOR,-..JS OF PLATO. JACKSON (Or Crr.P3 l 7), 
Ql'OTING THE WORK OF BREHIER AND SCHWYZER, CLAIMS THAT PLATO (USING THE MOUTH OF 
P.AR'.IENlDES) POSTULATED A THIRD HYPOTl-!ESIS AS WELL. THIS IS TO BE FOUND IN 'PARMENIDES' !55E-
157B. THERE. PL.-\TO ATTEMPTS TO COMBI1''E THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST TWO HYPOTHESES. THE ONE W11ICH 
HAS BEE1' SHOW)! TO BE BOTH ONE .'\.,'ID ).IA_c:--,y, AND NEITHER ONE NOR MANY, MAY BE ONE AT ONE TIME A.c'ID 
l.IA:--,y AT . .\..'IOTl-!ER Tll\;IE. THIS IS CLOSE TO PwTINUS' DESCRIPTION OF THE THIRDHYPOSTASJS. IN OUR OWN 
READING OF Tl-IE 'PARMENIDES,' WE FI1'U THAT Tl-!ERE IS NO DIRECT LNK BETWEEN THE HYPOTHESES OF 
P .-\Rl\IENIDES AS EXPRESSED IN THE DIALOGL'E. FAIRLY RE~IOVED FROM THE RESULT ANT VIEW OF PwTINUS, 
MU W'E WOL'LD :--!OT ARGUE FOR SUCH A CWSE CORRELATION BETWEEN THE 'PARMENIDES,' ANDPLOTINUS. 
HOWEVER THE ROOTS ARE L'NDOL'BTEDLY THERE. 
198 GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS.' Or CIT.P3FF. 
199 WE ).l]GHT ACCEPTPLOTINUS' ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE ONE, FROM PURELY A 
'RELIGIOCS,' GROUND ALONE. PwTl1''\JS, HOWEVER, WAS NOT PRIMARL YA THEOLOGL'l'l k'ID DESPITE HIS 
THEOLOGJC.-\L 'OVERTONES,' HIS .\RGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF Tl-IE FIRST PRINCIPLE, WERE 
PHIWSOPHICAL, NOT TI-!EOLOG!CAL. 
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:<JOGERS0N.0PCIT.P4. IN ADDITION, TO CALL THIS PRI1'CIPLE 'GOD,' WAS IN ITSELF, NOT REALLY A'i 
IN>IOVATION EITHER, ALTHOUGH \VHEN THE ATIRIBUIB 'DIVINE,' WAS GIVEN IN GREEK PHILOSOPHY, MORE 
OITEN THAN NOT THIS ATTRIBUIB REFERRED TO A QUALITY IN />/!EN WHO SHARE THE NATURE OF THE GODS. 
'
01 GERSON SUGGESTS THAT THE USE OF THE WORD 'HYPOSTAS!S,' IN f>LOTI1'1.IS, IS NOT ONLY RESTRICTED TO 
THE THREE: ONE, Nous AND SOUL. RATHER, HE USES THE TERM TO SPEAK OF MANY SELF-SUBSISTING 
H;TITIES SUCH AS WISDOM, LOVE ETC. WHEN HE RAISES THE QL'ESTION OF THE 'HYPOSTAS!S OF X,' f>LOTINl.:S 
IS NOT WISHING TO DISCUSS WHETHER X EXISTS, BUT INSTEAD THE ATIRIBUIB S OF X-IBID.P4. 
'
0
' IBID.Pol. 
00
3 ARGUMENTS EXPLAINING THE EXISTENCE OF THINGS, ESPECIALLY THE THREE HYPOSTASES AS THEY 
'PROCEED,' FROM THE ONE, ARE PRIMARILY CAUSALLY ORIENTED. ALTHOUGH WE DO 1'0T FIND IN THE 
'E/>INEADS' THE SAME KIND OF 'coSMOLOGICAL-TELEOLOGICAL' ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A 'FIRST 
CAUSE,' AS WE DO IN ARISTOTLE AND AQUINAS. 
204 PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS'. OP CIT. V.4. l-30.Pl42-3. 
°'
5 GERSON.IBID.P4FF. 
'
06 IBID.P6. FOR A COMPARATIVE DISCUSSION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE USAGE OF THESE TER.\!S: 
BEING, ONE, EXISTENCE ETC, SEE: HEISERJ.H. 'PLOTINUS AND AQUINAS ON ESSE COMMUNE. 'Op 
CIT.P259FF. 
om GERSEN.OP CIT.PIO. WE CAN JUST U..L~GINE WHAT HT.Th.IE WOULD HA VE TO SAY TO THIS KIND OF LOGIC! 
208 ARMSTRONG.AH.OP CIT.P236. 'BLT THESE (ETYMOLOGIES) ARE TO BE TAKEN AS ANYONE WISHES. 
SINCE THE SUBSTANCE WHICH IS GENERATED (FROM THE ONE) IS FORl<l-ONE COULD NOT SAY THAT WllAT IS 
GENERATED FROM THAT SOURCE IS ANYTHING ELSE-A'iD 1'0T THE FOR'.\.! OF SO~lE ONE THING Bl.ff OF 
ANYTHING SO THAT NO OTHER FORM IS LEFT Ol.HSIDE IT, THE ONE MUST BE WITHOUT FOR.\!. BUT IF IT IS 
WITHOUT FORM IT IS NOT A SLBSTANCE, FOR A SUBSTA'iCE MUST BE SOME ONE PARTICULAR THING, 
SO~!ETHING, THAT IS, DEFINED AND LIMITED: BUT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO APPREHEND THE ONE AS A 
PARTICULAR THING: FOR THEN IT WOULD NOT BE THE PRINCIPLE, BUT ONLY THAT PARTICULAR THING WHICH 
YOli SAID IT WAS. BLT IF ALL THINGS ARE IN THAT WHICH IS GE1''ERATED (FROM THE ONE), WHICH OF THE 
THINGS IN IT ARE YOU GOING TO SAY THAT THE ONE rs? SINCE IT IS NONE OF THE'.\.!, IT CAN ONLY BE SAID TO 
BE BEYOND THEM. BUT THESE THINGS ARE BEINGS, .>IND BEING: SO IT IS "BEYOND BEING." THIS PHRASE 
"BEYOND BEING" DOES NOT MEAN THATIT IS AP ARTICLLAR THING-FOR IT MAKES NO POSITIVE STATEME:-.T 
ABOUT IT-AND IT DOES NOT SAY ITS NAME, BUT ALL IT IMPLIES IS THAT IT IS "NOT THIS".' -PL0T!NUS.0P 
CIT.V.56-13. 
209 IBID.P237. f>LOTINLS DISAGREED WITH THE VIEW OF ARISTOTLE, CONCERNING THE 'UNMOVED MOv'ER.' 
OR THE SUPRE\,IE BEING. ARISTOTLE'S BEING WAS A THIN'KING BEING, MEANING THAT IT WAS A 'GOD,' 
WHOSE COGN1TIVE MAKE-UP BROUGHT ABOUT THE DUALITY OF SUBJECT-OBJECT. THE MIND OF GOD IS NOT A 
SIMPLE ENTITY. IN ARISTOTLE, MA'I AND GOD (AND HERE WE HA v'E A SIMILARITY WITH '.\.IUCH OF GREEK 
\,IYTHOLOGY) ARE ONLY QUMTITATiv'ELY DIFFERENT. THIS IS A DIFFERENCE OF DEGREE, NOT KIND-SEE 
RlST.J. 'THE ONE OF PLOTINUS AND THE GOD OF ARJSTOTLE.' OP CIT.P75. FoR ARISTOTLE, 
THINKING IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF BEING. PL0T!Nl'S GOES BEYOND THE CONCEPTION OF THINKING WITH 
HIS THEORY OF THE 'ONE.' AGAIN, PLATO A'ID ARISTOTLE AS Tu'E HA VE SEEN, ARE CONCER1''ED WITH THE 
GMNG OF 'FORM.' TO A MATERIAL SUBSTRATE. PlDTINliS IS ADDRESSING HIMSELF TO THE MATIER OF THE 
ONE, BRINGING ABOUT ALL EXISTENCE. 
210 ARMSTRONG.OP CIT.P238. 
211 lBID.P239. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT PLOTINUS IS ATTE'.\.IPTINGTO DENIGRATE PHILOSOPHY OR REASON. 
01' THE CONTRARY, REASON OR PHILOSOPHY IS THE ONLY WAY IN WHICH WE CAN REACH THIS POINT WHERE 
W'E NEED TO GO 'BEYOND REASON,' COMPARE THIS VIEW TO THAT OF DERRIDA. 
m WITTGENSTEIN.L. 'TRACT ATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS. 'OP CIT.6.54.Pl89. 
213 RJST.J. 'THE ONE OF PLOTINUS AND THE GOD OF AR1STOTLE. 'OP CIT.P82. 
214 IBID.P82. 
'
15 SEE HERE: RJST.J.M. 'BACK TO THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS SOME SPECIFICS.' OP 
C!T.Pl84FF. 
'
16 01''E Q!J'ESTION THAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE PLOTINIAN INTERPRETERS IS WHETHER PLOT!NUS 
ACTUALLY BELIEVED IN THREE HYPOSTASES (AS HYPOSTASES), ALTHOUGH THIS IS THE GENERAL POSITION TO 
WHICH WE INCLINE. ARMSTRONG IN HIS INTRODUCTION TO THE LoEB EDITION OF THE 'ENNEADS' SUGGESTS 
THAT PL0TINUS BELIEVED IN A FOURTHHYJ'OSTASIS, BUT WAS RELUCTA'IT TO ADMIT IT-SEE THE DISCUSSION 
ON THIS SUBJECT IN ANTON.J. 'SOME LOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE CONCEPT OF HYPOSTAS!SIN 
PLOTINUS. 'OP CIT.P258. ANTON POINTS OUT FOUR MAIN CHARACTERISTICS THAT ARE TRUE FOR A 
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PLOTINTI.'< HYPOSTASJS: I-AS POWER. AHYPOSTASISIS INFINITE AND NON-SPATIAL. 2-A HYPOSTAS!S RE:\JAINS 
l>IAFFECTED BY lliHATIT PRODCCES. 3-AHYPOS7:4S/SCREATES WITHOUT INCLINATION. WILL OR 
:\JO\"E:\!E:\T 4-A HYPOSTAS!S HAS 'JO REAL KNOWLEDGE (CONSCIOUS IGiOWLEDGE) OF WHAT IT PRODCCES-
ANT0NJBID.P258-9. SEE HERE ALSO: GERSON.L.P. 'PLOTINUS. ·op Crr.P3FF. GERSON SAYS THAT WE 
"<"EED XOT INSIST ON CALLING THE oi-.i:. Nous .\hTI SOUL. 'HYPOSTASES.' ANOTHER LABEL MIGHT BE 
'SATl"RES.' OR 'PRINCIPLES.' THEY ARE PRIMARY EXPLANATORY, PARADIGMATIC STARTING-POINTS FOR 
l1'TIERST.\.'<TIING PHILOSOPHICAL PROBLEMS. MULLER. DRAWING ON GENERAL SCHOLASTIC TERMINOLOGY. 
DEFI:\"ES 'HYPOST.4SIS' AS FOLLOWS: ·sussJSTENTIA: SUBSISTENCE OR SUBSISTENT. INDICATING A 
PA.RTICU.AR BElNG OR EXISTENT, AN INDivlDUAL SUBSTANCE OR A GIVEN ESSENCE. IN THIS LATTIR SENSE, 
THE L.ATlN EQmVALENT OF HYPOSTAS!S, HAD A MORE TECHNICAL AND PHILOSOPHICALLY ADEQUATE TERM 
TH.-\." PERSONAE FOR INDICATING THE FATHER. SON MTI SPIRIT IN THE TRINITY.' -MULLER.R: 
1986. 'DICTIONARY OF LATIN AND GREEK THEOLOGICAL TERMS. 'P29L 
217 ANTON.J.P.OP Crr.P259FF DEALS WITH THIS IMPORT ANT PROBLE:\f. 
'
18 HERE \\"E ARE QUOTING FROM ANTON.IBID.P260. 
219 fu'<TOX IBID.P265, PROVIDES FURTHER QUOTES FROM THE 'ENNEADS' THAT HELP TO THROW LIGHT ON 
THIS PROBLEM: 
'E.\"IE..JD' Vl.8.14A2: THE ()r..i: IS FROM ITSELF AND THROUGH ITSELF. 
'E.YNE.~D' Vl.8.17.26: IT IS TOWARDS ITSELF. 
'ES.VE~D' Vl.8.13.38-10: IT WILLS ITSELF. 
'E.\:VE~D' Vl.8.14A2: IT MAKES OR CONSTITUTES ITSELF AS THE CAUSE OF ITSELF. 
E.\:VE4D' Vl.8.16.30: IT MADE ITSELF TO SUBSIST. 
'E.\'.VE4D '1.8.2.4-5: IT IS SELF-SUFFIC!ENT. 
'E.Y'.fE4D' Vl.8.10.37: THE ()r..i: JS BEFORE SL'BSISTE'JCE. 
'E.\:VE4D 'Vl.8.10.35-8: THE ONE DOES NOT SL13SIST. 
220 GERSON.L.P. 'PLOTINUS. 'OP Crr.P84FF. 
221 [BID.P85. 
'"ARMSTRONG.AH. OP Crr.P240. 
'°
3 
'IF THERE IS A''YTHlNG AFTER THE FIRST, IT YIUST NECESSARILY COME FROM THE FIRST; IT ~!UST EITHER 
CO:\!E FROM IT DIRECTLY OR HAVE ITS ASCENT BACK TO IT THROUGH THE BEING IN BETWEEN, .\hTI THERE 
:\!CST Bf..-\.'-' ORDER OF SECO!<ms AND THIRDS. THE SECOND GOING BACK TO THE FIRST AND THE THIRD TO 
THE SECO:\TI. FOR THERE MUST BE SOMETHING SIMPLE BEFORE ALL THINGS, AND THIS MUST BE OTHER THA'I 
.\LL THE THINGS WHICH COME .\ITER IT. EXISTING BY ITSELF. NOT MIXED WITH THE THINGS WHICH DERlv"E 
FRO:\! IT .. -1.'<TI .\LL THE S.-'"\!E ABLE TO BE PRESENT IN A DIFFERENT WAY TO THESE OTHER THINGS. BEING 
RE.\LLY O'<"E .. 'c'<TI NOT .A DIFFERE1'ff BEING AND THEN Ol'<"E ... IF THEN THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE .\ITER THE 
FIRST. IT C.>..'<NOT STILL BE SIMPLE: IT WILL THEREFORE BE A ()r..'E-MA 'IY. WHENCE THEN. DOES THIS COME? 
FRO:\! THE FIRST: FOR IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT COME ABOUT BY CHA'ICE. AND IF IT DID THE FIRST WOULD 
NO LOXGER BE THE PRThiCIPLE OF ALL THINGS. How THEN DOES IT CO!.;!E FROM THE FIRST? IF THE FIRST IS 
PERFECT. THE MOST PERFECT OF .ALL. A"ll THE PRI:\!AL KNOWER. IT MUST BE THE MOST POWERFL'L OF ALL 
BEl'OGS . .\.,TI THE OTHER POWERS MUST IMITATE IT AS FAR AS THEY ARE ABLE. Now WHEN ANYTHING ELSE 
CO:\!ES TO PERFECTION \\t SEE THAT IT PRODUCES, .-\.'<TI DOES NOT E'JDURE TO REMAIN BY ITSELF, BUT 
\4.AKES SO:\!ETHlNG ELSE ... How THEN COULD THE MOST PERFECT. THE FIRST Goon, REMAIN IN ITSELF AS IF 
IT GRL lJGED TO GIVE OF ITSELF OR WAS IMPOTENT. WHEN IT IS THE PRODUCTIVE POWER OF ALL THINGS? 
How THE:-< WOULD IT STILL BE THE PRJNCIPLE?'-PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS'.Op err. V.4.1-38. 
"' RIST.J.M. 'BACK TO THE MYSTICISM OF PLOTINUS: SOME MORE SPECIFICS.' OP CIT.Pl84. 
·so. IF THERE IS ASECO"<TI AFTER THE ONE IT MUST HAVE COME TO BE WITHOUT THE ONE MOVING AT ALL, 
WITHOLT ANY INCLINATION OR ACT OF WILL OR A..'IY SORT OF ACTl\/lTY ON ITS PART. How DID IT COME TO 
BE THEN, .AND WHAT ARE WE TO THINK OF AS SCRROUNDING THE ONE IN ITS REPOSE? !T MUST BE A 
RADIATIO'J FROM IT WHILE IT REMAINS UNCHANGED, LIKE THE BRJGHT LIGHT OF THE SUN WHICH, SO TO 
SPEAK. RLNS AROUND IT. SPRINGING FROM IT CONTINUAL!. Y WHILE IT REMAINS UNCHANGED. ALL THINGS 
WHICH EXIST. AS LONG .AS THEY REMAIN IN BEING, ~CESSARJLY PRODUCE FROM THEIR OWN SUBSTANCES, 
IN DEPE1'TIENCE ON THEIR PRESENT POWER, A SURROUNDING REALITY DIRECTED TO WHAT IS OUTSIDE THEM, 
. .\ M';TI OF IMAGE OF THE .ARCHETYPES FROM WHICH IT WAS PRODUCED: FIRE PRODUCES THE HEAT WHICH 
CO:\!ES FROM IT ... ' -PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS' .OP Crr.V. l.25-35.P31. FOR THE COMMENTS ON IAMBLICHUS, 
SEE WILLIAMS.R: 1987. 'ARnJS' Pl 94. 
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THERE IS MUCH SCHOLARLY DEBATE AMONG l'LoTINUS' INTERPRETERS, CONCERMNG WHETHER WE ARE TO 
SEE THE CREATIVE. PROCESS OF THE ONE AS BEING 'PER SE,' OR 'PERACCIDEHS.'-SEE 
GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?' OP CIT. CREATION 'PER 
ACCIDENS.' IS THE SYSTEM WHERBY 'A' SAY, CREATES 'C,' USING THE AGENCY OF 'B.' CREATION 'PER SE,' 
REPRESENTS 'A,' CREATING BOTH 'C,' AND 'B.' THERE ARE PASSAGES IN THE 'ENNEADS.' THAT SUGGEST 
EITHER ALTERNATIVE. WE. HO\VEVER, GO ALONG WITH GERSON, IN HIS CHOICE OF CREATION 'PER SE,' IN 
PLOTINUS. IN ONE SENSE CREATION 'PER ACCJDENS,' IS A LEGITIMATE INTERPRET ATJON. IN THAT THE WAY 
THE ONE, BRINGS ABOLTT THE HYPOSTASIS OF INTELLECT, IS NOT PRECISELY THE SAME WAY THAT THE ONE 
BRINGS ABOLTT SOUL. 0NTHE OTHER HAND, THERE ARE PLENTY OF PASSAGES THAT STATE THAT ALL 
'BEING,' FINDS ITS 'BEING' THROUGH PARTICIPATION IN THE ONE. THIS FAVOURS THE 'PER SE,' THEORY. 
225 FINDLAY.J.N. 'THE THREE HYPOSTASESOF PLATONISM.'OP CIT.P663. 
22
' IBID.P675. 
227 ARMSTRONG.A.H.OPCIT.P251. 
228 GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS. 'OP CIT.P58. 
229 
' ... INTHE SAME WAY SOUL, MAKING THE WORLD OF SENSE INIMITATIONOFTHATOTHER WORLD, 
"40VING WITH A MOTION WHICH IS NOT THAT WHICH EXISTS.' -PLOT!NUS.OP CIT. I I. 7.26-8.P339. 
"
0 EMILSSON.E.K. 'PLOTINUS' ONTOLOGY IN "ENNEAD" VI.4 AND 5.' OP CIT. P87FF. 
231 l'LoTINUS ADDRESSES HIMSELF TO THIS PROBLEM IN 'ElvNEAD 'Vl.4 A!>iD 5. 
232 WE OBVIOUSLY, REEER HERE TO THINKERS SUCH AS DERRIDA. DERRIDA, H0\1iEVER, CONCENTRATES 
RATHER ON THE TENDENCY OF THE GREEKS TO DISCOVER CLOSURE. TO HOLD ON TO CLOSURE. INSTEAD OF 
CONSCIOUSLY RESISTING IT. IF THERE IS THE RESISTANCE TO CLOSURE IN INHERITED METAPHYSICS, DERRIDA 
AND HEIDEGGER REGARD THIS AS AN UNTHOUGHT PROBLEM. HOWEVER PLOTINUS IS AN EXAMPLE OF A 
THINKER, WHO RESISTS CLOSURE IN A CONSCIOUS SENSE OF THE WORD. 
233 SECONDARY SOURCES FOR THE PLOTINIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE PL\T01'~C 'THIRD MAN ARGUMENT,' 
INCLUDE: STRANGE.S.K. 'PLOTINUS' ACCOUNT OF PARTICIPATION IN "ENNE4D" Vl.4-5.' OP 
CIT, EMILSSON.E.K. 'PLOTINUS' ONTOLOGY IN "ENNEAD .. Vl.4 AND 5.' OP CIT. 
234 
' ... IN THIS SENSE IT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE TO SPEAK OF "p ART" WHEN DISCUSSING SOUL: FOR IT IS NOT 
QUMTITATIVE IN A SENSE IN WHICH THE WHOLE COULD BE THE TEN .'-''ID TIIE INDIVIDUAL SOUL THE UNIT; 
MANY OTHER ABSURD CONSEQUENCES WILL FOLLOW (FROM THIS SUPPOSITION) AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE 
TEN ARE NOT ONE THING, A,'ID EITHER EACH OF THE ACTUAL UNITS WILL BE A SOUL, OR THE SOUL WILL BE 
ENTIRELY COMPOSED OF SOULLESS THINGS, AND, BESIDES, IT HAS BEEN AGREED THAT THE PART OF THE 
TOTAL SOUL HAS THE SAME FORM AS IT .... , -PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS'.IV.3.29-34.P39. 'BLTT sorn .. IS 
OBVIOUSLY NOT DIVIDED INTHE WAY fl' WHICH SIZES ARE ... , -IBID.IV.3.39. ' ... THIS WE MUST CONSIDER 
(LATER); BLTT NOW WE "4UST ENQL1RE IN WHAT SENSE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SPEAK OF "PART." 
ACCORDING TO THIS ANALOGY. FOR THE SOUL OF ALL GIVES ITSELF TO ALL THE PARTIAL LIVING THINGS, 
. .\ND EACH INDI\.1DUAL SOUL IS A PART IN THIS SENSE, THEN IF IT WAS DIVlDED IT WOlJLD NOT GIVE ITSELF TO 
EACH, BLTT IT WILL BE ITSELF EVERYWHERE, THE COMPLETE SOUL EXISTING SIMULTANEOUSLY IN MANY 
THINGS AS ONE AND IDENTICAL. BUT HIS WOULD NO LONGER ALLOW ONio SOUL TO BE THE V.'HOLE A,"JD THE 
OTHER A PART, ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE OF THI"iGS \\IHICH HA VE TllE SAME AMOUNT OF POWER: FOR ALL 
THE POWERS ARE PRESENT IN BOTH SOULS .. '·IB!D.IV.3.6-l6.P43. 
235 STRANGE.S.K.OP CIT.P486. 
236 lBID.P490. 
237 [BID.P493 
138 PLOTINUS. 'ENNEADS.' OP CIT.Il.8.'I. I .. 8.P369. 
239 PLOTINUS, IN DEALING WITH THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOUL AND THE SENSIBLES, ONLY DISCUSSES 
THE PROBLEMS THAT PERTAIN TO THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LAST AND LEAST HYPOSTASIS A,'ill THE 
WORLD. 
240 ARMSTRONG.AH.OP CIT.P240. 
241 IBID.P241. 
242 IllID.P24 l. 
243 PLOTINUS.OP CIT.IIL8.9.30-34.P392-3. 
°'4 ' ..• THE ONE, IS PEREECT BECAUSE IT SEEKS NOTIIING. HAS NOTHING, A.'JD NEEDS NOTHING, OVERFLOWS 
AS IT WERE, AND ITS SUPERABUNDA,NCE MAKES SOMETHING OTHER THAN ITSELF. THIS, WHEN IT HAS COME 
INTO BEING, TURNS BACK UPON THE ONE AND IS FILLED, AND BECOMES INTELLECT BY LOOKING TOW ARDS 
IT. IT HALTED AND TURNING TOW ARDS THE 0N£ CONSITUTES BEING, ITS GAZE UPON THE ONE, INTELLECT. 
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SJ:'<CE IT HALTS .'u'>D TIJR'IS TOWARDS THE ONE THAT IT MAY SEE, IT BECOMES AT ONCE INTELLECT .A.'>D 
BEING. RESEMBLING THE ONE THUS, INTELLECT PRODUCES fN THE SAME WAY, POURING FORTH A MULTIPLE 
POWER. THIS IS A LIKENESS OF IT-JUST AS THAT WHICH WAS BEFORE IT POURED IT FORTH. THIS ACTI\1TY 
SPRINGING FRO~! THE SIJBST.A.'ICE OF INTELLECT IS SOIJL, WHICH COMES TO BE THIS WHILE INTELLECT 
ABIDES l'NCHA.'>GED: FOR INTELLECT TOO COMES INTO BEING WHILE THAT WHICH IS BEFORE ABIDES 
L'NCHANGED. BLT SoL:L OOES NOT ABIDE UNCHANGED WHEN IT PRODUCES: IT !S MOVED AND SO BRINGS 
FORTH AS IMAGE. IT LOOKS TO ITS SOURCE A.."ID IS FILLED, AND GOING FORTH TO A.'IOTHER OPPOSED 
\10VEME:-.T CREATES ITS OWN IMAGE ... NOTHING IS SEPARATED OR CUT OFF FROM THAT WHICH IS BEFORE 
IT., -PLOTINUSJBID.V.2. L8-23.P59-{;L 'So IT GOES ON FROM THE BEGINNING TO THE LAST AND LOWEST. 
EACH (GENERATOR) REMAINING BEHIND IN ITS OWN PLACE, AND THAT WHICH IS GE1'cRATED TAKING 
A.'>OTHER LOWcR, Rh'IK; AND YET EACH BECOMES THE SAME AS THAT UPON WHICH IT FOLLOWS, AS LONG 
AS IT OOES CONTINUE TO FOLLOW uPON IT.' -IBID. V.2.2-5.P6 L 
'WHAT WAS IT, THEN, W1!ICH HAS MADE THE SOULS FORGET THEIR FATHER, Goo, AND BE !GNORA.'IT OF 
THEMSEL <cs A'ID HIM, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE PARTS WHICH COME FROM THIS HIGHER WORLD A'ID 
ALTOGETHER BELONG TO IT? THE BEGINNING OF EVIL FOR THEM WAS AUDACITY (TOIMA) AND COMING TO 
BIRTH A>'ID THE FIRST OTHERNESS ru'ID THE WISHING TO BELONG TO THEMSELVES. SINCE THEY WERE 
CLEARLY DELIGHTED IN THEIR OWN Il\'DEPENDENCE, .<\,,'ID MADE GREAT CSE OF SELF-MOVEMENT, RUNNING 
THE OPPOSITE COURSE AND GETTING AS FAR AWAY AS POSSIBLE, THEY WERE IGNORANT EVEN THAT THEY 
THEMSEL\cS Cru\IE FROM THAT WORLD. '-IBID. V.1.1-9.Pl L 
°'' IBID.Il.8.830-37.P387. 
-... 
- ARMSTRONG.AH.0PCITP243. 
:r HUNT.D.P. 'CONTEMPLATION AND HYPOSTATIC PROCESSION IN PLOTINUS.' OP CIT.P71FF 
°'
8 IBID.P71. 
°'
9 PLOTI:-.uS OOES NOT HA VE TOO MCCH DIFFICULTY IN ASSERTING THAT Nous CAN PERCEIVE INTELLECT 
'.-IS OBJECT.' THE PROBLEM LIES IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE ONE, BY INTELLECT 
'"' IBID .P72. 
"
1 Imo.P73. 
'" IBID.P7~. 
:;; PLOTINUS. 'ENN&ID'. VLl2. (HERE WE ARE QUOTING THE TEXT .-IS IT APPEARS IN HL"NT0P CIT.P74). 
'" HUNTJBID.P74. 
:;; THE QLCSTION OF WHY THREE, IS ·"-'" NfRIGUING ONE AND NOT FUNDA>MENT AL TO THE THEME DISCUSSED 
HERE. FOR FURTHER INFOR'vlATION ON THIS QUESTION, SEE COAKLEY.S. 'WHY THREE?' IN THE 
IVIAKING AND REIVIAKING OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE. (EDITED: COAKLEY.S, PALIN.D: 
1993).P29FF. SEE ALSO: WILES.M. 'SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE 
OF THE TRINITY. ' IN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STIJDIES. VOL 8. l 957.P92-!06. WHY TIIE 
PROCESS OF 'HYPOS'I'ATISATION.' OF JUST THREE? IN OUR OPl"IION, THE CRITICISM JUST LEVELLED AT 
PLOTINCS C.<1,,'-'NOT BE AS PRECISELY APPLIED TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY. BECAIJSE OF THE SELF-AVOWcD 
ROLE OF REVELATION IN THEOLOGICAL FORMULA. THE EARLIEST CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS CHOSE TO 
'HYPOSTAT!SE,' JUST THREE: FATHER, SoN ru'ID SPIRIT THIS WAS NOT ON THE BASIS OF JUST 'PHILOSOPHY,, 
OR 'MEL\PHYSICS,' (AS MLCH AS BOTH PHILOSOPHY AND METAPHYSICS PLAYED A MAJOR PART IN THE 
G.A.'-IE) BLT BECAUSE OF THE BELIEF IN REVELATION, THE INTERPRETATION OF HOLY SCRIPTURE AND THE 
CHRISTIA'I TRADITION. To THEREFORE CRITICISE THE CHRISTIAN DECISION OF OPTING FOR JUST THREE 
PERSONS IN THEIR TRl1'TIY, WOULD REQUIRE CRITICISM FROM AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE, TO 
THAT OF CRITICISM OF PLOTINus's USE OF THREE. SUCH CRITICISM (BEYOND THE BOUNDS OF THIS THESIS) 
WOLLD HA VE TO BE PRl~IARILY 'THEOLOGICAL.' INCLLUING EXEGETICAL, HISTORICAL-DOGMATIC, AS WELL 
AS METAPHYSICAL PERSPECTIVES. 
"
6 I ru\1 GRATEFL"L TO PROF.VA'I NIEKERK FOR POmTING THIS OUT TO ME. DURING OUR ~lru'IY 
CO!\ V'ERSATIONS 
15
' SEE GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS.' OP CIT.P 84FF, FOR A CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE'S VIEW OF THE 
'CATEGORIES.' 
158 GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?' OP CIT.P564. 
159 PLOTINUS. 'ENNE4DS.' OP CIT. 4.8.6.8. THE TEXT HERE TAKEN FROM GERSON.OP CIT.P565. 
""'PLOT!NUS.IBID.2.6.914FF, AGAIN REPRODUCED IN GERSON.OP CIT.P566. 
261 GERSON.LP. 'PLOTINUS' METAPHYSICS: EMANATION OR CREATION?' Op Cit.P568. 
262 PLOT!NUS.OP CIT. 'ENNE4D'.6.8.20.9-16, AGAIN REPRODUCED BY GERSON.L.P.IBID.P569. 
263 GERSON.OP C!T.P569 
264 PLOTINUS.0P CIT.6.6.13.49-53. 
265 INTHIS CONNECTION, SEE: RAPPE.S.'METAPHOR IN PLOTINUS' ENNEADS.' OP CIT.Pl55-l 72. 
266 GERSON. 'PLOTINUS'S METAPHYSICS: CREATION OR EMANATION?' OP CIT.P572. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE 
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ARIUS' PHILOSOPHY?' IN THEOLOGJSCHE ZEJTSCHRIFT. VOL 28.1972.PI 11-I 17, 
VAGGIONE.R.P. 'SOME ASPECTS OF DOGMATIC FORMULAE IN THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY.' 
IN SI'UDL4 PATRISTICA. VOL XVII.PART I.1982, STEAD.C.G.'THE "THALIA" OF ARIUS AND THE 
TESTIMONY OF ATHANASIUS.' IN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES.VOL 29.1978.P20-52, 
W ALLACE-HADRILL.D.S: 1982. 'CHRISTIAN ANTIOCH,' WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS AND TIIE 
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HA Y.C.E: 1977). 'TIIE HlSTORY OF DOCTRINES. 'OP CIT, 'TIIE ECCLESIASTICAL HlSTORIES OF 
SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUS AND SOZOMEN' (TRANSLATED: SCHAFF.P, WACE.H: 1989). IN 
TIIE NICENE AND POST NICENE FATIIERS OF TIIE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (SECOND SERIES). 
VOL IT, 'SELECT WRITINGS AND LETTERS OF ATHANASIUS.' (EDITED: SCHAFF.P, WACE.H: 
1987). INTIIE NICENE AND POST-NICENE FATIIERS.OPCIT.VOL IV, GAYBBAB: 
1988. 'ASPECTS OF TIIE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF TIIEOLOGY,' GAYBBA.B: 1984. 'STUDY 
GUIDE l FOR STH403-T. SYSTEMATIC TIIEOLOGY. 'UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA,' 
CROUZEL.H.(TRANSLATED: WORRALL.AS: 1989).'0RIGEN.' 
'WILLIAMS.R: 1987.'ARIUS'OPCIT. P29FF, HANSON.RP.C: 1988.'TIIESEARCHFOR TIIE 
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD. 'Op err. P3, GRILLMEIERA. 'CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN 
TRADITION. 'OP CIT.P219. ARIUS WAS BORN AROUND 256-260 AD. 
3 ONE OF TIIESE LETIERS WAS FROM Aruus TO THE EMPEROR CONSTANTINE (WllICH HAS NOT SURVIVED) 
CLAIMING THAT THE PEOPLE OF LIBYA WERE SUPPORTIVE OF HIM. ANOTHER IS A REFERENCE TO THE BISHOPS 
OF LJBY A, ESPECIALLY SECl.J'NDUS OF PTOLEMAIS. WHO SUPPORTED HIS CAUSE. 
4 FREND. W.H.C: •1984.0P CIT. 'TIIE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY. 'P493. 
5 LIETZMANN.H. 'FROM CONSTANTINE TO JULIAN.' OP CIT.PIO?. 
6 WILLIAMS.OP Crr.P178. W!LUAMS, IN HIS CAREFULLY ARGUED STUDY, SUCCESSFULLY SHOWS THAT 
ARIUS WAS NOT A 'CONSENSUS THINKER,' BUT A,'I INDIVIDUAL INTELLECT. THIS PROBABLY MEANS THAT HE 
DISPLAYED STRENGTH OF CHARACTER WITH RESPECT TO HIS PERSONAL BELIEFS AND ECCLESIASTICAL 
DEALINGS WITH OTIIERS. 
'SEEBERG.R(TRANSLATED: HAY.CE: 1977).'TIIE HISTORY OF DOCTRINES.' OPCrr. P 205. 
THE PRIMARY SOURCE HERE IS THE 'PANARION' OF EPIPHANIUS. 69 .5. l-2.Pl56, QUOTED IN HANSON.OP 
CIT.PS. NEVERTIIELESS, Tiffi ACTUAL INFLUENCES OF SPECIFIC TRADITIONS UPON ARIUS, A,'ID WHAT THOSE 
OTHER TRADITIONS WERE, HOW THEY MET IN AR!us· THEOLOGY, AND TO WHAT EXTEITT, JS AN ISSlJE OF 
CONTENTION _c\..,IONGST SCHOLARS. LIETZMANN SUGGESTS THAT Aruus w AS INFLUENCED PARTICULARL y BY 
THE SCHOOL AT ANTIOCH, (WHICH WAS OPPOSED TO ALEXANDRLc\.. THEOWGICALLY) PARTICULARLY, 
LucrA'I OF AvrrocH. SEE ALSO: GONZALEZ.J.L. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' VOL 
LOP CIT.P269. GoNZALEZ ALSO .'\ROVES FOR A STRONG M'TIOCHENE INFLUENCE. ROWAN WILLIAMS, 
HOWEVER, SCGGESTS THAT WE MUST 'JOT PLACE ARIUS TOO Mt:CH UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF LUCIAN. 
8 FREND.W.H.C.OP CIT.P493. IN TERMS OF POLITICAL ISSUES, SEE THE COM!v!ENTS OF TILLICH IN 
TILLICH.P: 1967. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' P69. 
9 IBID.P493 
10 FREND.0PCrT.P493. 
11 HANSON.0PCIT.P3. 
10 THE CHIEF PRIMARY SOURCE HERE IS THAT OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF SOZOME'l, 1.25.2, AS 
DRA'W'N UPOK BY HANSON.!BID.P4. THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT ARICS WAS INVOLVED IN THE MELETIAN 
PROBLEM JUST BEFORE 318, BUT TO WHAT EXTENT HE WAS INVOLVED PRIOR TO THATIS STILL UNCERTAIN. 
SEE THE DETAILED, BALA,'ICED STUDY OF THE SOURCES (ESPECIALLY SOZO!v!EN AS AN HISTORIAN) BY 
WILLIA"IS: WILLIAMS.R' ARIUS AND TIIE MELETIAN SCHISM.' OP CIT.P35FF. 
13 THE SOURCE HERE rs EPIPHANIUS' 'PANARION '68.4.1-3. 
14 HANSON.OP CIT.P4. 
15 FREND.0PCrr.P495 
16 SEE KOPECEK.T.'HlSTORY OF NEO ARIANISM.' VOL l.P4. SEE ALso: 'THE ECCLESIASTICAL 
HISTORY OF SOCRATES SCHOLASTICUS' (1RANSLA TED: SCHAFF.P, W ACE.H: 1989). IN TIIE 
NICENE AND POST NICENE FATHERS OF TIIE CHRISTIAN CHURCH (SECOND SERIES).OP 
Crr.P3. SAYS SOCRATES: 'A CERTAIN ONE OF THE PRESBYTERS UNDER HIS JURISDICTION, WHOSE NAME WAS 
ARIUS, POSSESSED OF NO INCONSIDERABLE LOGICAL ACUMEN, IMAG!1'1NG THE BISHOP WAS SUBTLY 
TEACHING THE SAME VIEW OF THIS SUBJECT AS SABELLIUS THE LIBY A,'I, FROM I.JOVE OF CONTROVERSY TOOK 
THE OPPOSITE OPINION TO THAT OF THE LIBYAN, AND AS HE TAUGHT VIGOROUSLY RESPONDED TO WHAT 
WAS SAID BYTIIE BISHOP. "IF," SAID HE, "THE FATHER BEGATTHESoN, HE THAT WAS BEGOTIENHAD A 
BEGINNING OF EXISTENCE: AND FROM THIS IT IS EVIDENT, THAT THERE WAS A TIME WHEN THE SON WAS NOT. 
IT THEREFORE 'IBCESSARJLY FOLLOWS, THAT HE HAD HIS SUBSISTENCE FROM NOTHING."' 
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17 NOT ALL SCHOLARS ARGUE THAT, AT THAT TIME. THE REAL ISSUE BETWEEN MILETIUS AND ARIUS WAS 
ACTUALLY THEOLOGICAL. GROH, GREGG AND KOPECECK SUGGEST THAT THE CONTENTION WAS MORE 
SOTERIOLOGICALLY ORIENTED. SEE KOPECECK.OP CIT.P4. FOR THE REST OF OUR HISTORICAL SUMMARY, 
WE HAVE RELIED PRINCIPALLY UPONKOPECEK'S ACCOUNT, OP C!T.Pl4-59. 
18 SEE WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS. 'Op CIT.PlFF. WILLIAMS OUTLINES HOW, BY THE MEDIEVAL PERIOD, ARIUS 
IS DEPICTED ALONGSIDE JUDAS, AS TllE ULTIMATE HERETIC. 
19 HANSON.OP Crr.PXVII. 
'° IBID.PS-6. 
:I BOTH SCHNEEMELCHER AND ESPECIALLY H. G.0PITZ HA VE INVESTIGATED THIS POINT OF CHRONOLOGY IN 
THE ARIAN CORPUS VERY CAREFULLY. THE CONTRIBU'TIONS OF STEAD, HANSON AND WILLIAMS ALL !NONE 
WAY OR ANOTHER ARE INDEBTED TO BOTH OF THESE SCHOLARS, SPECIFICALLY 0PTIZ. SEE OPITZ.H-G. 
'DIE ZEITFOLGE DES ARIANSCHEN STREJTES VON DEN ANFANGEN BIS ZUM JAHRE 328.' OP err. 
'
2 WILLIAMS.R 'ARIUS.' OP Crr.P95. 
"WE SHALL HERE BE USING THE TRANSLATION OF NEWMAN: SEE 'SELECT WRITINGS AND LETTERS 
OF ATHANASIUS.' (EDITED: SCHAFF.P, WACE.H: 1987). IN THE NICENE AND POST-NICENE 
FATHERS. VOL IV.OP C!T.P303FF. THERE IS ALSO THE TEXT AS FOUND IN THE BOOK OF WILLIAMS.R.OP 
CIT. 
24 STEAD.CG. 'THE "THALIA" OF ARIUS AND THE TESTIMONY OF ATHANASillS.' OP C!T.P20. 
25 WILLIAMS.R. OP CIT.P98. 
26 STEAD.OP C!T.P20 
"IBID.P20-21. 
"WILLIAMS.R.OP CIT.P 96. 
29 STEAD.CG.OP CIT.P21. 
30 STEAD AND WILLIAMS (AMONGST OTHERS) HA VE SUBJECTED THESE SOURCES TO MLCH ANALYSIS AND 
EVALUATION. FOR OUR PLRPOSES WE SHALL BE FOLLOWING THEIR CONCLUSIONS. 
WE HERE PRODUCE FIRSTLY, THAT PORTION OF THE 'THALJA,' AS FOUND !NTHE '0RATJONESCONTRA 
ARIANOS' 1.5. THE TEXT AND NUMBERING (WHICH IS THE NOTATION OF WILL!&VIS IN TllE INTEREST OF 
CLARITY) IS TAKEN FROM WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP C!T.P!00-10 I: 
1-GoD WAS NOT ETERNALLY FATHER. THERE WAS (A TIME) WHEN GoD WAS ALL-ALONE, AND WAS NOT YET 
A FATHER, ONLY LATER DID HE BECOME AFATIIER. 
2-THE SON DID NOT AL WAYS EXIST. EVERYTHING CREATED IS OUT OF NOTHING, ALL EXISTING CREATulIBS, 
ALL THINGS THAT ARE MADE, SO THE WORD OF GoD HIMSELF CA"1E INTO EXISTENCE OUfOF NOTHING. 
THERE WAS (A TIME) WHEN HE DID NOT EXIST, BEFORE HE WAS BROUGHT !::-ITO BEING, HE DID NOT EXIST. HE 
TOO HAD A BEGINNING TO HIS CREA TED EXISTENCE. 
3-FOR-SO HE SAYS-GoD USED TO BE ON HIS OWN (MONOS), AND HIS WORD AND WISDOM DID NOT YET EXIST. 
Bu'T THEN Goo w ANTED TO MAKE US, AND ONLY THEN DID HE MAKE SOME KIND OF BEING THAT HE DUBBED 
WORD, WISDOM MID SON, SO THAT THROUGH HIM HE MIGHT MAKE LS. 
4-So: THERE ARE TWO 'WISDOMS,' HE SAYS, ONE THATIS PROPER TO GoD AND EXISTS TOGETHER WITH HIM, 
&'ID (THE OTIIER) TllE SON WHO HAS BEEN BROUGHT INTO BEING IN Tl!IS 'WISDOM' ONLY BY PARTICIPATING 
IN THIS WISDOM IS TllE SON CALLED WISDOM A'ID WORD. 'WISDOM,' HE SAYS, CAME INTO EXISTENCE 
THROUGH 'WISDOM,' BY TllE WILL OF THE GoD WHO IS WISE. LIKEWISE, HE SAYS THAT THERE IS ANOTIIER 
WORD JN GoD BESIDES TllE SoN, AND TllE SON, PARTICIPATING INTHIS WORD, IS ONCE AGAIN, CALLED 
WORD AND SON BY GRACE-AND-FAVOUR ... 
5-L!KE ALL OTHERS, TllE WORD HIMSELF ALSO IS SUBJECT TO CHA'IGE, HE GOES ON BEING GOOD AS LONG AS 
HE WANTS TO, BY HIS OWN FREE WILL AND, THEN, WHEN HEW ANTS TO, HE TOO, JUST LIKE US, JS ABLE TO 
CHANGE HIS WAYS, BECAUSE HE IS CHANGEABLE BY NATURE. FOR IT IS BECAUSE OF THIS, HE SAYS, THAT 
GoD, KNOWING IN ADVANCE THAT HE WOULD BE GOOD, GA VE HIM THIS GLORY OF HIS IN ANTICIPATION, THE 
GLORY HE AFTERWARDS HAD AS A HUMAN BEING ON ACCOUNT OF HIS VIRTUE. So IT WAS BECAUSE OF HIS 
ACTIONS, WHICH WERE KNOWN IN ADVANCE TO Goo, THAT Goo MADE HIM BECOME THE KIND OF BEING HE 
INF ACTIS. 
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6-AGAIN. HE HAS PRESUMED TO SAY THAT THE WORD IS "lOT TRUE GoD. HE MAY BE CALLED 'GoD' BUT HE 
IS l'OT TRH Goo. [TIS ONLY BY PARTICIPATING IN GRACE. LIKE ALL OTHERS, THAT HE TOO IS CALLED BY 
THE 'iAME OF "GoD.' ALL THINGS ARE. IN RESPECT OF THEIR SUBSTANCE, ALIEN TO Goo AND UNLIKE HIM; 
A ';1) SO TOO THE WORD IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM AND UNLIKE THE FATHER'S SUBSTANCE AND 
PROPERTY. HE IS PROPER TO (THE CLASS OF) MADE ..I.ND CREATED THINGS AND IT IS TO THIS THAT HE 
BELO~GS. 
7-0-.; TOP OF ..I.LL THIS, AS IF HE HAD BECO~IE A PUPIL OF THE DEVIL HIMSELF IN RECKLESS1'cSS, HE STATED 
IN THE 'THALIA' THAT THE FATHER IS THUS INVISIBLE TO THE SoN, AND THAT THE WORD CA'I NEITHER SEE 
NOR KNOW HIS OWN FATHER CLEARLY AND EXACTLY, BU'T WHAT HE KNOWS AND WHAT HE SEES HE KNOWS 
.'\<';1) SEES IN PROPORTION TO (ANALOGOS) THE MEASURE OF HIS OWN CAPACITIES-nJST AS WE KNOW 
smIETHING ACCORDING TO OUR OWN PROPER CAPACITY. FOR NOT ONL y (HE SAYS) DOES THE SON NOT 
KNOW THE FATHER CLEARLY A'ID EXACTLY, SINCE HE LACKS COMPREHENSION, BUT ALSO THE SON HIMSELF 
DOES NOT fu'iOW HIS OWN SUBSTANCE. 
8-(A';U HE SAYS THAT) THE SUBST A.'ICES OF FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE SEPARATE IN NATURE, 
ALIE'.'<ATED AND CUT OFF FROM EACH OTHER, FOREIGN TO EACH OTHER AND HAVING NO PARTICIPATION 
WlTH EACH OTHER. As HE HIMSELF PUT IT, THEY ARE IN SUBSTA.'iCE A.'iD IN SPLENDOUR WHOLLY UNLIKE 
EACH OTHER. INFINITELY UNLIKE. So, AS REGARDS LIKENESS OF GLORY AND OF SUBSTANCE, THE WORD, HE 
SAYS. IS QLlTE OTHER THAN THE FATHER AND THE HOLY SPIRIT. lN WORDS SUCH AS THESE DID THAT 
GODLESS '>!AN EXPRESS HIMSELF. HE CLAIMED THAT THE SON IS A DISTINCT BEING IN HIMSELF AND HAS NO 
KIXU OF PARTICIPATION IN THE FATHER. 
WE 'IOVE ON TO 'iOW REPRODUCE THAT PART OF THE 'THALIA.' AS IT OCCURS IN THE 'DE SYNODIS' OF 
ATH,\.'iASIUS .. .\GAIN FOLLOWING THE TEXT IN WILLIAMS.OP C1T.Pl01-103: 
1- ... So Goo Hl'.1.!SELF IS INEXPRESSIBLE TO ALL BEINGS. 
HE . .\L01'c HAS ><ONE EQUAL TO HIM OR LIKE HIM, NONE OF LIKE GLORY. 
WE CALL HIM L").13EGOTTEN ON ACCOUNT OF THE ONE WHO BY NATURE IS BEGOTTEN; 
WE SING HIS PRAISES AS W1THOUT BEGINNING BECAUSE OF THE ONE WHO HAS A BEGINNING. 
5-WE WORSHIP HIM AS ETERNAL BECAUSE OF HIM WHO WAS BORN IN THE ORDER OF TIME 
THE ONE WITHOL 'T BEGINNING ESTABLISHED THE SON AS THE BEGIN1'1NG OF ALL CREATURES, 
A';D. HA\lNGFATHERED SUCH A ONE, HE BORE HIM 
AS A SON FOR HL'.!SELF. 
HE (THE So1') POSSESSES NOTHING PROPER TO Goo. IN THE REAL SENSE OF PROPRIETY. 
FOR HE IS 'iOT EQUAL TO Goo. NOR YET IS HE OF THE SAME SUBSTANCE (HOMOOUSJOS). 
10-GoD IS WlSE IN THE SENSE THAT HE IS THE TEACHER OF WISDOM. 
A FL"LL Dn!ONSTRATION THAT Goo IS INVISIBLE TO ALL, 
11'"\lSIBLE TO WHAT IS MADE THROUGH THE SON. INVISIBLE TO THE SON HIMSELF: 
l SHALL SAY IN PLAIN WORDS HOW THE [N'VlSIBLE IS SEEN BY THE SoN-
lT IS IN (OR BY) THE POWER BY WHICH GoD HIMSELF CAN SEE, 
(BL'T) IN ms O\VN DEGREE, 
15-THAT THE SON ENDURES THE VISION OF THE F A'l1lER. AS FAR AS IS LAWFUL. .. 
OR AGAIN: THERE EXISTS ..\.TRINITY (TRIAS) IN UNEQUAL GLORIES, FOR THEIR SUBSISTENCES (HYPOSTASIS) 
ARE XOT ~IIXED WITH EACH OTHER. 
IN THEIR GLORIES, ONE IS MORE GLORIOUS THAN ANOTHER IN INFINITE DEGREE. 
THE FATHER IS OTHER THA'i THE SON IN SUBSTANCE 
BECAUSE HE IS WITHOUT BEGINNING. 
You SHOULD U1'UERST AND THAT THE MONAD (ALWAYS) w AS, 
BL'T THE DY AD WAS NOT BEFORE IT CAME TO BE. 
20-AT 01'CE, THEN, (YOU SEE THAT) THE FATHER IS GoD (EVEN) WHEN THE SON DOES NOT EXIST. 
So THE SoN. NOT EXISTING (ETERNALLY) (SINCE HE CAME INTO BEING BY THE FATHER'S WILL), 
Is Goo THE 01'"LY-BEGOTT.EN, AND HE (LIT: THIS ONE-THE HOLY SPIRIT) IS DIFFERENT FROM BOTH. 
WISDOM CA.l\!E INTO EXISTENCE THROUGH WISDOM, BY THE WILL OF THE Goo WHO IS WISE, 
A';l) SO IT IS THOUGHT OF IN COUNT.LESS MANIFESTATIONS, 
SPIRIT, POWER AND WISDOM, 
25-GoD's GLORY, TRUTH. IMAGE, WORD. 
You SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT HE IS THOUGHT OF TOO AS RADIANCE AND AS LIGHT 
THE HIGHER ONE IS ABLE TO BEGET A.'ID EQUAL TO THE 
SON, 
BUT NOT ONE MORE RENOWNED, HIGHER OR GREATER THA.\l HE. 
BY Goo's V.1LL THE SON IS SUCH AS HE IS, BY Goo's 
WILL HE IS AS GREAT AS HE IS. 
30-FROM (THE TIME) WHEN. SINCE THE VERY MOME1'< WHEN. HE TOOK HIS SUBSISTENCE FROM Goo. 
MIGHTY Goo AS HE IS, HE SINGS THE PRAISES OF THE HIGHER ONE 
WITH ONLY PARTIAL ADEQUACY. 
To PUT IT BRIEFLY: Goo IS INEXPRESSIBLE TO THE SON, 
FOR HE IS V.l!AT HE IS FOR (OR TO, OR IN) HIMSELF, AND THAT IS UNUTTERABLE, 
So THAT THE SON DOES NOT HA VE THE UNDERSTANDING 
THAT WOULD ENABLE HIM TO GIVE VOlCE TO ANY WORDS EXPRESSING COMPREHENSION. 
35-FOR HIM IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO SEARCH OUT THE MYSTERIES OF THE FATHER, WHO EXISTS IN HIMSELF: 
FOR THE SON DOES NOT (EVEN) KNOW HIS OWN SUBSTANCE, 
SINCE, BEING A SON, HE CAME INTO ACTUAL SUBSISTENCE 
BY A FATHER'S WILL. 
WHAT SCHEME OF THOUGHT (LOGOS), THEN, COULD AD!vllT THE IDEA THAT HE WHO HAS HIS BEING FROM 
THE FATHER 
SHOULD K..'JOW BY COMPREHENSION THE ONE WHO GA VE HIM BIRTH'! 
40-FOR CLEARLY THE ONE WHO HAS A BEGINNING IS IN 
'JO WAY (IN A POS!TION) TO ENCOMPASS IN THOUGHT OR LAY HOLD 
UPON THE ONE WITHOUT BEGINNING AS HE IS (IN IIlMSELF). 
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31 FOR EXA.\!PLE. IT HAS BEEN POPULAR FOR SCHOLARS OF ARIAJ'<lSM TO SPEJ'.iD MUCH TIME REMARKING ON 
THEFACTTBAT ARIUS' CONCE&'IS .'\RE HARDLY SOTERIOLOG!CAL, INSTEAD HIS MATERIAL IS MOSTLY 
DEALING WITH COSMOLOGY. FOR THIS KIND OF OPINION, SEE POLLARD. T.E. 'LOGOS AND SON IN 
ORIGEN, ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS. 'OP CIT.P287. WILES HOWEVER, POINTS OUT THE OBVIOUS WHEN 
HE DRAWS ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT ALL WE HAVE PRESERVED OF ARrns' WRJTINGS, FOR y ARJOUS 
OBVIOUS REASONS, ONLY REFLECT HIS COSMOLOGICAL-METAPHYSICAL CONCERNS. THEREFORE, IT IS 
SPEClJLAT!VE OF POLLARD TO ARGUE THAT ARIUS WAS NOT CONCERNED WITH SOTERJOLOGY. SEE IN THIS 
CONNECTION: W!LES.M.T.'IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' OP CIT.P346. IN FACT, TWO AMERICAJ'J SCHOLARS. 
GROH AND GREGG, HA VE SUGGESTED THAT THE ST ARTING-PO!l'ff INTO ARIANISM, IS HIS vlEW OF 
SALVATION. NOT THE USUAL COSMOLOGICAL CONCERNS. SEE GREGG.R GROH.D: 1981. 'EARLY 
ARIANISM. A VIEW OF SALVATION.' THIS WAS DRAWN TO OUR ATTENTION BY STEAD IN HIS ARTICLE: 
STEAD.CG. 'ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH. 'Op CIT.P25. 
32 STEAD.CG.' ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH.' OP CIT.P24. 
33 STEAD REFERS TO THIS ARTICLE AND ITS MAIN ARGUME1'<S IN: 'ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH.. OP 
CIT. 
P26-7. 
34 IN 1833. NEWMAN PUBLISHED 'THE ARIANS OF THE FOURTH CENTURY.' UP TO THAT TIME. IT HAD BEEN 
CUSTOMARY TO SPEAK OF THE EVILS OF NEOPLATONISM AS BEING THE CAUSE OF THE THEOLOGY OF ARIUS. 
NEWMA'I SUGGESTED THAT THE EVIL HAD STRONG ROOTS IN THE ANTIOCHENE SCHOOL. NEWMAN 
PRESENTS HIS PICTURE WITH AN EXTREME A.'JTI-ARlAN RHETORIC HIMSELF. HARNACK IN THE SECOND 
VOLUME OF HIS 'HISTORY OF DOGMA' IS SLIGHlLY MORE CIRCUMSPECT THAN IS NEWMAN-BUT ALSO 
PRESENTS A STRONG ANT!·ARJA.'I FLAVOUR TO HIS WORK. GWATKIN, IS ALSO EXTREMELY NEGATIVE, GOING 
AS FAR AS TO SAY THAT ARIANISM rs: .... A MASS OF PRESUMPTUOUS THEORISING ... A LIFELESS SYSTEM OF 
UNSPIRITUAL PRJDE AND HARD UNLOVINGNESS.' -THIS QUOTE IS IN WILES.M.T.0PCIT.P339, ANDIS TAKEN 
FROM GWATKIN's 'STUDIES IN ARIANISM.' P274. 
35 THE QUOTE IS AGAIN FROM 'STUDIES IN ARIANISM.'P2, AS FOUND INWILES.M.T.OP CIT.P339. 
36 WILES.OP CIT.P343,345. ETC 
31 SEE W!LL!AMS.R 'ARIUS.' OP CIT.PllS: 'A GREAT MANY ATTEMPTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO LOCATE HIM 
IN ONE SORT OF TRADITION OR ANOTHER, BUT IT IS PERHAPS A MISTAKE TO LOOK FOR ONE SELF-CONTAINED 
OR EXCLUSIVE "THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL" TO WHICH TO ASSIGN HIM, EVEN THE ELUSIVE SCHOOL OF LUCIAN 
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OF A>'ITIOCH. IT IS MORE HELPFUL TO LOOK AT ARIUS' !NfELLECTUAL CONTEXT GE"'ERALLY. WITHOUT 
SPECIFICALLY ATTEMPTING TO DISCOVER A SET OF EXACT SOURCES FOR HIS IDEAS. INSTEAD, IT WOULD BE 
\!ORE PROFITABLE TO UNDERSTAND HIS TIIEOLOOICAL AGENDA, ASKING: WHAT MADE TIIESE PARTICULAR 
QlcSTIONS, TERMS OR TEXTS IMPORT.-\NT FOR SUCH A MA.<'l AT THAT PARTICULAR TIME?' 
38 THIS WAS THE WAY EUSElllUS OF NICOMEDIA DESCR!llED TIIE CONFLICT. WIIEN TIIE PROBLEM FINALLY 
REACHED THE EARS OF CONSTANTINE, WHO WANTED AN EXPLANATION. 
39 WILLIAMS.R.OP CIT.Pl 75. 
4-0 IF TIIERE IS ONE POINT WIIERE ALL OF ARrus' INTERPRETERS AGREE, IT IS HERE: SEE GRILLMEIER.A.OP 
CJT.P224. THIS ST AR TING-POINT CAN BE SEEN NOT ONLY IN THE 'THALIA,' BUT ALSO IN THE ARIAN 
CORRESPONDENCE, SUCH AS THE LETTER TO ALEXANDER, WHOM GRILLMEIER QCOTES AS SUBSTANTIATING 
THIS POINT. 
4l COPLESTON.F: 1946., A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.' OP err.VOL I.P453. WIWAMS SUGGESTS 
THAT THE Goo OF PHILO IS 'PURE HEINO ITSELF,' NOT 'BEYOND BEING,' AS IS THE ONE OF TIIE 
'P.'-RMENIDES.' IN OUR VIEW, PHILO REFLECTS BOTH ASPECTS IN Goo. 
42 PHILO. 'DE OPIFICJO MUND!. '.2.8, QUOTED IN COPLESTON.F.!Brn.P459. 
"COPLESTON.F.OP CIT.P459. 
44 WILLIAMS.R, ARIUS., OP err.Pl 18. 
45 !BID.Pl21. 
'° IBID.Pl22. 
47 GONZALEZ.J.L. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' VOL I. OP CIT.Pl 97. SAYS CLEMENT: 
'IN REFERENCE TO THESE COMMENT ARIES, WHICH CONTAIN AS THE EXIGENCIES OF TIIE CASE DEMAND, TIIE 
HELLENIC OPINIONS, l SAY THIS ~IUCH TO THOSE WHO . .\RE FOND OF FINDING FAULT. FIRST, EVEN IF 
PHILOSOPHY WERE USELESS, IF TIIE DEMONSTRATION OF ITS CSELESSNESS DOES GOOD, IT IS YET USEFUL.' -
CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. 'THE S1ROMATA OF MISCELLANIES.' IN THE ANTI-NICENE 
FATHERS. (EDITED: ROBERTS.A, ET AL: 1885).P303. 
"'PELIKAN.I: 1971. 'THE EMERGENCE OF THE CATHOLIC TRADillON.' P54. 
49 HARNACK.A.(TRANSLATED: BUCHANAN.N). 'HISTORY OF DOGMA' VOL ll.P326. 
50 W!LL!AMS.R.OP Crr.Pl24. SAYS CLEMENT: 'FOR BOTH IT IS A DIFFICULT TASK TO DISCOVER THE 
FATHER .-\ .. 'ID MAKER OF THIS VNIVERSE; A.\JD HAVING FOL1'iD HIM, IT IS !MPOSS!llLE TO DECLARE HIM TO 
.\LL. FOR THIS IS BY NO MEANS CAPABLE OF EXPRESSIOI', LIKE THE OTHER SUBJECTS OF INSTRlJCT!ON, SAYS 
TIIE TRlJTH-L0\1NG PLATO ... AND WHEN TIIE SCRIPTURE SAYS, "MOSES ENTERED INTO THE THICK 
DARK"'ESS WIIERE Goo WAS," THIS SHOWS TO THOSE CAPABLE OF UNDERSTANDING, THAT GOD IS INVISI!lLE 
A'<D BEYOND EXPRESSION BY WORDS. AND ''THE DARfu'IESS" -WHICH IS, IN TRUTH, THE UNBELIEF A.'ID 
IG'iORANCE OF THE MVLT!TUDE-OBSTRUCTING THE GLEAM OF TRUTH ... AND JOHN THE APOSTLE SAYS: "No 
~!AN HATH SEEN Goo AT ANY TIME. THE ONLY-BEGOTTEN Goo, WHO IS IN THE BOSOM OF THE FATHER, HE 
HATH DECL.\RED HIM." CALLING IN\~SlllILITY AND !NEFF ABILITY THE BOSOM OF Goo. HENCE SOME HA VE 
CALLED IT THE DEPTH. AS CONTAINING A\JD nrnosOM!NG ALL THINGS, INACCESSI!lLE A'ID BOUNDLESS., -
CLEMENT. 'THE STROMATA.' OP CIT. BOOK V.CHAP XII.P463. 
;i WE REFER HERE TO LILLA.S.R.C: 1971. 'CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. 'OXFORD: OXFORD 
UNIVERSITY PRESS. AS REFERRED TO BY GR!LLMEIER.A.OP C!T.P!35. 
;'LILLA.OP CIT.P201. 
'
3 CLEMENT. 'DE STROAlATEIS.' VI.18, 517.22-23, AS QCOTEDIN WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP 
CIT.Pl25. 
54 WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT.Pl25. 
s; GRILLMEIER.A. 'CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION.' VOL I.OP CIT. P!36. 
56 IBID.Pl36. 
57 ALTHOUGH THIS IS U1'DOUBTEDLY THE CASE, WILES POINTS OlJT THAT TIIE ALEXANDRIAN TRADITION, 
WAS NOT COMPLETELY UNIFORM: THE FACT IS THAT PETER TIIE MARTYR, WITH WHOM ARIUS HAD CONT ACT, 
REPlJDIATED MCCH OF THE THEOLOOY OF 0RJGEN-SEE W!LES.M.T. 'IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' OP CIT. 
P3~0. ALso, Aruus' BISHOP ALEXANDER AND HIS YOUNGER PROTEGE, ATHANASIUS, REPRESENT A FAA 
'.10RE 'WESTER,'/ PERSPECTIVE' ON THE CONSUBSTA1''TIALITY BETWEEN FA TIIER AND SON, THAN DOES THE 
0RJGENIST TRADITION. 
58 GRILLMEIER.A.OP C!T.Pl40. 
59 SEEBERG.R.OP CIT.Pl48. 
60 
'TO THIS WE REPLY, THAT IF CELSUS HAD KNOWN THAT SAYING,"! AND MY FATHER ARE ONE," ANDTHE 
WORDS USEDINPRAYERBYTHE SoNOF Goo, "As THOU A'ID [ AATONE," HE WOULD NOT HAVE SUPPOSED 
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THAT WE WORSHIP ANY OTHER BESIDES HIM WHO IS THE SUPRE!NlE Goo. "FOR," SAYS HE. "MY FATHER IS IN 
),IE .-IJ"D I IN HIM." AND IF ANY SHOULD FROM THESE WORDS BE AFRAID OF OUR GOING OVER TO THE SIDE OF 
THOSE WHO DENY THAT THE FATHER Al\TI THE SON ARE TWO PERSONS, LET HIM WEIGH THAT PASSAGE, 
"AND THE MULTITUDE OF THEM THAT BELIEVED WERE OF ONE HEART AND OF ONE SOUL." THAT HE MAY 
UNDERSTAND THE /..-lEANING OF THE SAYING, ''I k'ID MY FATHER ARE ONE." WE WORSHIP ONE Goo. THE 
FATHER .'\NTITHE SON, THEREFORE, AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED, AI® OUR ARGUMENT AGAINST THE WORSHIP 
OF OTHER GODS STILL CONTINUES VALID. AND WE DO NOT "REVERENCE BEYOND MEASURE ONE WHO HAS 
BUT LATELY APPEARED." AS THOUGH HE DID NOT EXIST BEFORE; FOR WE BELIEVE HIMSELF WHEN HE SAYS, 
"[ AM THE TRUTH," AND SURELY NONE OF US IS SO SIMPLE AS TO SUPPOSE THAT TRUTH DID NOT EXIST 
BEFORE THE TIME WHEN CHRIST APPEARED. WE WORSHIP THEREFORE, THE FATHER OF TRUTH, AND THE 
SON. WHO IS THE TRUTH; MTI THESE, WHILE THEY ARE YET TWO, CONSIDERED AS PERSONS OR 
SUBSISTENCES, ARE ONE IN UNITY OF THOUGHT, IN HARMONY MID IN IDENTITY OF WILL. SO ENTIRELY ARE 
THEY ONE, THAT HE WHO HAS SEEN THE SON, "WHO IS THE BRIGHTNESS OF Goo's GLORY, AND THE EXPRESS 
IMAGE OF HIS PERSON," HAS SEEN IN HIM WHO IS THE IMAGE OF Goo, Goo HIMSELF., -ORIGEN. 'CONTRA 
CELSUS.' BOOK VII.CHAP XII. IN THE ANTI-NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. 
OP err. BOOK VII.CHAP XII.P643. 
61 CROUZEL.H. (TRANSLATED: WORRALL.AS: 1989).'0RIGEN'. P\87. SEE ALSO: 'WHEREFORE WE 
HA VE AL WAYS HELD THAT Goo IS THE FATHER OF HIS ONLY ·BEGO'ITEN SON, WHO WAS BORN INDEED OF 
HIM, ANDDERJVES FROMH!M WHAT HE IS, BUT WITHOUT ANY BEGINNING, NOT ONLY SUCH AS MAY BE 
\.lEASLlIBD BY ANY DIVISIONS OF TIME, BUT EVEN THAT WHICH THE MIND ALONE CANNOT CONTEMPLATE 
WITH!!' ITSELF ... fu'ID THEREFORE WE MUST BELIEVE THAT WISDOM WAS GENERATED BEFORE ANY 
BEGINNING THAT CAN BE EITHER COMPREHENDED OR EXPRESSED. JOHN, HOWEVER ... SAYS IN THE 
BEGINNING OF HIS GOSPEL. WHEN DEFINlNG Goo BY A SPECIAL DEFINITION TO BE THE WORD, "AND Goo 
WAS THE WORD, A<'ID THIS WAS IN THE BEG!Nl\lNG WITH Gon." LET HIM, THEN, WHO ASSIGNS A BEGINNING 
TO THE WISDOM OR THE WORD OF Goo. TAKE CARE THAT HE BE NOT GlJILTY OF !),!PIETY AGAINST THE 
UNBEGOTIENFATHER HIMSELF. SEEING HE DENIES THAT HE HAD AI.WAYS BEEN A FATHER, AI-ID HAD 
GENERATED THE WORD. AND HAD POSSESSED WISDOM IN ALL PRECEDING PERIODS, WHETHER THEY BE 
CALLED TI/..-IES, OR AGES, OR ANYTHING ELSE THAT CAN BE SO ENTITLED. '-OR!GEN. 'DE PRJNC!P!!S .. 
BOOK 1.3. (TRANSLATED: CROMBIE.F: 1885).IN THE ANTI-NICENE FATHERS OF THE 
CHRISTIAN CHURCH. OP err. VOL IV. P246. 
6
' GONZALEZ. J. L. OP CIT. P223. HERE, GoNZALEZ IS QUOTINGOR!GEN ON PsALM.135.2 (THE MIONE 
EDITI01'), SUPPORTING HIS CASE. 
63 POLLARD. TE.' LOGOS AND SON IN ORIGEN. ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS .• OP CIT.P282. 
64 WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP Crr.P\32. 
65 [BID.Pl32. THERE IS 01'E PARTICULAR 0R1GEN FRAGMENT THAT MIGHT CONTRADICT THIS STATEMENT. 
66 CROUZELH.OP Crr.Pl87. 
67 WILLl&VIS.R.OP CIT.P\33 
68 [BID.Pl34. WILLIAMS QUOTES. AS NOEXAMPLE, 0RIGEN IN HIS 'COMMENTARY ON JOHN'.XX.18, 
WHERE THE IDEA OF THE SON BEING GENERATED OUT OF THE FATHER'S OUSIA IS SHARPLY REPUDIATED. 
69 IBID.P134-5. 
'0 lBID.PIJ5. 
'l THERE IS SOME INCONSISTENCY HERE: IN HIS 'COMMENTARY ON THE GOSPEL OF JOHN.' 0RIGEN 
CLEARLY STATES THAT THIS IS THE CASE, BUT IN HIS 'SELECTA ON THE PSALMS,' HE SEEMS TOBE 
STATil'G THE OPPOSITE. SEE THE DISCUSSION IN W!LLIAMS.R.OP CIT.P\42. 
72 POLLARD.TE. 'THE ORIGINS OF ARIANISM.' OP CITPI03. 
73 SEE POLLARD. IBID.Pl03. THIS OPINlON OF ALEXANDER IS SOURCED IN HIS: 'LETTER TO 
ALEXANDER OF THESSALONICA,' SEE OPITZ.H.G. 'URKUNDEN ZUR GESCHJCHTE DES 
ARIANJSCHEN STREJTES.' OP CIT. (ATHANASIUS WERKE.B.D.Ill.TEIL 2). URK XIV.P25, LINES 
8FF, AS REFERRED TO BY PoLLARD. 
74 K!DD.B.J. 'IDSTORY OF THE CHURCH. 'VOL I, REFFERED TO BY POLLARD.TE. OP CIT.PI03. 
75 WE HA VE ALREADY HAD CAUSE TO MENTION BRIEFLY NEWMAN'S 'ARIANS OF THE FOURTH 
CENTURY.' 
76 LOOFS.F. 'LEITFADEN ZUM STUDIUM DER DOGMENGESCHICHTE.' 
77 POLLARD.T.E.'THE ORIGINS OF ARIANISM.' OP CIT. SEE ALSO HIS 'JOHANNINE 
CHRISTOLOGY AND THE EARLY CHURCH.' OP CIT. PoLLARD TENDS TO SEE THREE TRADillONS 
THAT WERE PROMINENT AT THE TIME OF ARius: FIRSTLY, THERE IS THE ANTIOCH TRAD!TlON, REPRESENTED 
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BY ECSTATHICS OF ANTIOCH. THEN, THE 0RIGENIST TRADITION. REPRESENTED BY EUSEB!US OF CAESEREA. 
THEN THERE IS FINALLY, THE 'NEO-ALEXANDRlAN TRADITION.' REPRESENTED BY THE MORE 'WESTER.."I' 
IDEAS OF PETER OF ALEXANDRIA AND ATHANASllJS OF ALEXANDRIA-SEE: POLLARD. T.E. 'THE 
TRADITIONS AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE ARIAN CONTROVERSY. 'Or CIT.Pl l 7FF. HOWEVER. 
THE ARTICLE OF WILES HAS QUESTIONED THIS SOMEWHAT SIMPLISTIC ANALYSIS: WILES.MT 'IN 
DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' Or CIT. 
-, A'O EXCELLENT SUMMARY OF POLLARD'S POSITION CA." BE FOt:ND IN: BARNARD.L.W. ·THE 
ANTECEDENTS OF ARIUS.' Or CIT. P I 72. 
"W ALLACE-HADRILL: 1982. 'CHRISTIAN ANTIOCH.' Or CIT.P68-9. 
'
0 STEAD.CG. 'THE PLATONISM OF ARIUS.' OP CIT, AND 'ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH.' Or 
CIT. 
81 WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT.ESPECIALLY Pl15. 
82 WILES.M.T. 'THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY. ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS.' Or CIT, AND 
'IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' Or CIT. 
83 THIS IS THE POSITION OF WILLIAMS, OP CIT, AND IN A DIFFERENT WAY, 
!TIS .-U.SOTHATOF BARNARD.L.W. OP CIT. 
84 ALT ANER.B.(TR.ANSLATED: GRAEF.H: 1960). 'PATROLOGY.'P24 l. 
85 FREND. W.H.C. 'THE RISE OF CHRISTIANITY.' OP CIT.P385. 
86 EUSEBIUS. (TRANSLATED: BOYLE.I: 1989)_ 'THE ECCLESIASTICAL HISTORY OF EUSEBIUS 
PAMPHILIUS' BOOK VII.CHAP XX.-X. 'THE EPISTLE OF THE COUNCIL AGAINST PAUL.'P304. 
87 FREND. OP CIT.P385. THE FACT THAT HE SERVED AS A SENIOR FINANCIAL OFFICIAL OF THE QuEEN OF 
P.-\L~!YRA. ~!ADE THE PRO-ROMAN BISHOPS OF ALEXA."IDRlA A."D As!A MINOR READY TO CONDEMN HIM .-\S 
THE WORST OF HERETICS-IBID.P385. 
88 FOR _-\N .-\SSESSMENT OF SOURCES, SEE NORRIS.F. W.'PAUL OF SAMOST A: PROCUR.A TOR 
DUCENARIUS .. OP CIT.P50FF. OUR COMMENTS HERE ARE DRAWN FROM THIS AFOREMENTIONED 
ARTICLE. 
F. LOOFS. GUSTA VE BARDY A.ND HENRI DE RlEDMATTENHAVE EACH ATTEMPTED TO ARGUE FOR THE 
GENUNEN'ESS OF CERTAIN FIFTH AND SIXTH CENTURY FRAGMENTS. YET THERE IS NO UNI'll'ERSAL 
AGREE:,,!E:-.T ON THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESTIM01'Y OF THESE FRAGMENTS. NORRIS, AFTER CAREFUL 
IN\ 'ESTIG.\ TION OF THE FRAGJ\,!ENTS, COJ\,!ES DOWN ON THE SIDE OF THE RECORDS OF EcsEBllJS IN HIS 
'ECCLESL-\STIC.-U. CH CR CH HISTORY' (DESPITE BEING FULLY A WARE OF EUSEBIUS' 0RJGENIST BIASES). 'IN 
.-\.'OY CASE HIS O\VN COMMENTS 01' PAUL'S TEACHINGS ARE THE BEST-INFORJ\,!ED WHICH WE POSSESS 
BECACSE W'E C.-\." BE CERTAIN THAT HE HAD SEEN THE FULL TEXT OF THE SYNODICAL LETTER, WHICH ITSELF 
IL\D SECTIONS DE.-U.ING SPECIFICALLY WITH THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ISSUES_' -IBID.P55. 
89 W ALLACE-HADR!LL.OP CIT.P72. EUSEB!US W.-\S UNABLE TO .-\TTE1'U THE FIRST SYNOD IN264 THAT 
CONDEM'>'ED PAL'L. LATER. AT THE SECOND SYNOD IN 268. THE BISHOPS OPPOSING PAUL WERE 
REPRESENTED BY MALCHION, A LEARNED RllETORlCI.a,," AND THEOLOGIAN, WHO ALSO SEEMED TO SHOW ·""" 
ORlGENlST SLA.'-T. 
90 W ALLACE-HADRILL.IBID.P74. 
91 IBID.P75 
90 STUDER.B.(TR.ANSLATED: WESTERHOFF.M: 1993).'TRINITY AND INCARNATION. ·or 
CIT.P92. 
93 1BID.P92-3. 
94 GONZALEZ.J.L. OP CIT.P255. 
95 W ALLACE-HADRILL.Or C!T.P72. 
% STEAD.C. G .. ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH.' Or CIT.P34, WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS_' Or 
CIT.Pl62FF. 
90 W ALLACE-HADRILL.OP CIT.P83 
98 1BID.P83. ON THE OTHER HA."D, SEE: HANSON.R.PC. 'THE SEARCH FOR THE CHRISTIAN 
DOCTRINE OF GOD.'OP CIT.P83. SAYS HANSON: 'THERE IS ONE FACT, AND ONE FACT ONLY, WHICH WE 
C_-\., WITH ANY CONFIDENCE ACCEPT AS AUTHENTIC ABOUT LUCIAN'S DOCTRINE. THE STATEMENTS OF 
EPIPHA.'HCS THAT LUCIAN TAUGHT THAT THE SAVIOUR AT THE INCARNATION ASSUMED A BODY WITHOUT A 
son ("SOMAAPSYCHON") IS CONFIRMED BY THE FACT THAT THIS DOCTRINE BECOMES AN INV ARlABLE 
FEATURE OF ARlAN TEACHING AFTER ARIUS, A.ND THAT EUSTATHllJS OF ANTIOCH, A CONTEMPORARY OF 
ARllJs. ATTRlBuTES IT TO HIS FOLLOWERS., 
99 SOZO_HENUS. OP CIT.BOOK Ill.CHAP 5, AS REFERRED TO BY W ALLACE-HADRILL.IBID.P82. 
too W ALLACE-HADRILL.OP Crr.P82. 
toi [BID.PSI. 
'
02 HENRY.P. 'WHY IS CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP SO ENAMOURED OF ANCIENT 
HERETICS?' OP CIT.Pl23FF. 
'
0
' lsm.Pl24. 
104 IBID.Pl24. 
105 lll!D.Pl24. 
106 lsm.Pl24. 
10
' IBID.Pl24. 
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JOB SEE FOR EXAMPLE TilE WORKS OF NIETZSCHE, AS THE FORERUNNER TO POSTRUCTURALISM AND 
POSTMODERNITY. ()/.,ll HELPFUL TEXT IS: SCHRIFT.A.D. 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY.' OP CIT. 
THE WORKS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT ARE ALSO IMPORT ANT. 
'
09 S™ONETTI.M: 1%5. 'LE ORIGIN! DELL ARJANESJMO. 'JN RJVISTA DJ STORM E LETTERATURA 
REUGJOSA. VOL 7.P5 l, AS QUOTED BY WILLIAMS.R.OP CIT.Pl08. 
110 WILLIAMS.R.lsm.P!09. 
111 SIMONETII.M. 'BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION IN THE EARLY CHURCH.'OP CIT.Pl21. 
lll IBID.Pl22. As AN EXAMPLE, SIMONETTI MENTIONS JOHN 4:24: 'GoD IS SPIRIT.' IN THE ORIGINAL 
SETTING, NAMELY JESUS' CONVERSATION WITH THE SAMARITAN WOMAN, JESUS JS WISHING TO TEACH HER 
OF A NEW OF WORSHIP. IN NO WAY IS HE ATTEMPTING TO PROVIDE A PHILOSOPHICAL-METAPHYSICAL 
DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. COMPARED TO THE OLD WAY OF WORSHIP, BEING DECIDEDLY DEPENDA.NT LPON 
CERTAIN LOCATIONS, TilE NllW MESSIANIC AGE ANNOUNCED A TYPE OF WORSHIP DIVORCED FROM TIIESE 
PROBLEMS, YET TilE TERM: 'PNEUMA,' HAD AN ENTIRE, LOADED (STOIC) PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION BEHIND 
IT TO THE PATRISTIC THINKER. THlis OFTEN, nus TEXT IN JOHN WOULD BET AKEN TO BE SPEAKING OF THE 
DIVINE 'SUBSTANCE,' OF TilE FATHER ,.\<'lD THE DIVINll ELEtvlENT IN THE SON-illlD.Pl22. 
113 S™0NETII.M.IBID.Pl23. WILLIAMS ENGAGES IN A SIMILAR ANALYSIS, AND WITH SIMONETTI, CO!>!ES 
TO SIMILAR CONCLUSIONS-SEE WILLIAMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT.P108-l I. 
l l4 WILES.M.T.'THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY: ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS. 'OP CIT.P4 l. 
WILES IS HERE REFERRING TO SozotvIEN'S 'ECCLESIASTICAL CHURCH HISTORY. 'OP CIT. 4.5. 
115 FOR THE DEBATE BETWEEN ABELARD AND CLAIRVEAUX, SEE GA YBBA.B.'STUDY GUIDE 1 FOR 
STH403-T. SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 'OP CIT.Pl l 7FF,123FF, ALSO: GA YBBA.B. 'ASPECTS OF 
THE MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF THEOLOGY. 'Op CIT.P7FF. GAYBBA OBSERVES THAT MARTIN 
GRABM . .\<'lN IDEN'TIFIED A SPECIFIC SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY DURING THE EARLIER MEDIEVAL PERIOD. THIS IS 
THE SCHOOL OF 'MONASTIC THEOLOGY.' THIS SCHOOL WAS OPPOSED TO THE 'DIALECTICAL,' EARLY 
'SCHOLASTIC METHOD' IN THEOLOGY AND PREFERRED THE MORE CONSERVATIVE 'GRAMMARIAN.' 
HERMENEL'TICAL STYLE. To SOME EXTENT, LATER CRITICS OF ARiliS SEE IN HIM A TYPE OF ABELARDIAN 
'OBSESSION.' WITH LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY, AS BEING THE CAUSE OF HIS OOWNF ALL. HO\Vll\llR, THERE IS 
NO EVIDENCE TO SUGGEST THAT ARIUS WAS LIKE THIS. HE IS NOT PRIMARILY A SELF-CONSCIOUS 
PHILOSOPHICAL SPECULATOR. 
116 WILLIAMS.R., ARIUS., OP err.Pl 12FF. 
117 Ism.Pl12 
1 
'
8 STEAD.C.G. 'ARIUS IN MODERN RESEARCH.' OP CIT.P25. 
119 
' ... So GoD HIMSELF (KATHO ESTIN) IS INEXPRESSIBLE (ARRETOS) TO ALL BEINGS, 
HE ALONE HAS NONE EQUAL TO HIM OR LIKE, NONE OF LIKE GLORY. 
WE CALL HIM UNBEGOTTEN (AGENNETON) ON ACCOUNT OF THE ONll WHO BY NATURE IS BEGOTTEN ... ' -
ARIUS.' Tfl4LL4 .' LINES 1-5. IN OUR QUOTATIONS OF THE 'THALIA', \Vll ARE USING THE TEXT AS IT 
OCCURS IN WILLIA.\!S.R. OP CIT.PIOl-3 (SEE NOTE 308, ABOVE). THE PORTION ABOVE IS WHAT WILLIAMS 
CALLS THE 'S' SEGMENT, MEA.'lINGTHAT PART OF THE 'THALIA', ASIT OCCURS INTHE 'DE SYNODJS' OF 
ATHANASlliS. THEPORTIONTHATIS REPRODUCED IN THE 'CONTRAARW{OS,' OF ATHANASIUS, IS 
DISTINGlJISHED BY WILLIAMS AS THE 'A' TEXT, OR PORTION. 
lZO ATHANASIUS PARAPHRASES: 'AGAIN, HE HAS PRESUMED TO SAY THAT THE WORD JS NOT TRUE GoD 
("THEOS ALETHJNOs'"). HE MAY BE CALLED "Goo" BUT HE IS NOT "TRUE GoD." !TIS ONLY BY 
PARTICIPATING IN GRACE, LIKE ALL OTHERS, THAT HE TOO IS CALLED THE NAME ''Goo."' -ARIUS. 'Tfl4LL4.' 
FRAGMENT 'A 'LINE VI. 
121 WILL!AMS.R.OP CIT.Pi43. 'OR AGAIN: THERE EXISTS A TRINITY (TRIAS) IN UNEQUAL GLORIES, FOR 
THEIR SUBSISTENCES (HYPOSTASES) ARE NOT MIXED WITH EACH OTHER. IN THEIR GLORIES, ONE JS MORE 
GLORIOUS THAN A.'lOTHER IN INFINITE DEGREE.' -ARIUS.IBID. FRAGMENT 'S '.LINE 18. 
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122 HANSON.RP C. 'THE SEARCH FOR THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF GOD.' OP CIT.PB. 
I '3 CONFESSlON OFF AITH BY ARIUS AND HIS COLLEAGUES TO ALEXANDER OF ALEXANDRIA (ACCORDlNG TO 
0P"rlZ WRITTEN BEFORE THE SDJOD lN BtTHYNlA, ABOL 'T 320)-AS REPRODUCED BY 
GRILLMEIER.A. 'CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION .. OP CIT.P226. 
1
°' ARIUS. 'Tli4LL4'. OP CIT. FRAGMENT 'A.' LINE I. As USUAL. WE ARE USl1'G THE NOTATlON AND 
'.1J~IBERl1'GOF WILLIAMS.OP CIT. STEAD, HOWEVER WAR<'IS HERE THAT ARIUS. ALTHOUGH NOT PLACING 
THE SON OI\ THE !EVEL OF THE FATHER, DID NOT PRESENT HIS TEACHING IN SUCH A PROVOCATIVE MANNER, 
AS ATHA'IASIUS RECORDS-SEE: STEAD.C.G. 'THE "THALL4 "OF ARIUS AND THE TESTIMONY OF 
ATHANASIUS.' 0PC!T.P29. 
1
" IBID. LINE 19. 
126 IBID. LINE 24. 
12
' IBID. LINE 30. 
1
"' IBID. FRAGMENT 'S.' LINE 8. 
1
'° IBID. FRAGMENT'S' LINE 30. 
130 STEAD.C.G.'THE "Tll4LL4" OF ARIUS AND THE TESTIMONY OF ATHANASIUS.' OPCIT.P28. 
131 IBID.P29. 
132 !BID.P29 
133 WILES.MT. 'IN DEFENCE OF ARIUS.' OP CIT.P345. 
134 1BID.P345. 
135 IBID.P345. 
136 WILLIAMS.R 'ARIUS.' OP C!T.Pl04. 
137 ARIUS.'Tfi4LL4' OP CIT. FRAG!\.-!ENT. 'S' LINE 37. 
138 WILLIAMS.R.OP CIT.Pl06. 
139 WILES.M.T. 'THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY: ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS.' OP CIT.P4!. 
FOR WOLFSON's VIEWS SEE WOLFSON.HA 'PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF ARIANISM AND 
APOLLINARIA.i'IISM.' IN DUMBARTON OAKS PAPERS.NO 12. L958.P5-9. ALSO DE GHELLINK.J. 
L--; REVlE D 'HJSTORIE ECCLESIASTJQUE. VOL XXVL 1930.P29, WHO MAKES A SIMILAR ARGU~IENT 
COI\CE~'\T\G THE LATER ARlk'I, ElJNOMIUS. IT SEEMS, INTHE CASE OF EUNOMICS, THE DlALECTlCAL 
INFLl!"E:-iCE \,l!GHT WELL HAVE BEEN THERE TO A GREATER EXTENT. THAN IN ARIUS HIMSELF. 
140 IBID.P4!. OF COURSE INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS CLEl><IENT OF ALEXANDRIA, WOULD BE k'I EXCEP"rION TO 
THISRCLE. 
w BARNARD.L.W.'WHAT WAS ARIUS' PHILOSOPHY?' OPCIT.PllO. 
142 MARROU.H.I.(EDITED: MOl'vl!GLIANO.A: 1963). 'THE CONFLICT BETWEEN PAGANISM AND 
CHRISTIA.i'IITY IN THE FOURTH CENTURY.' AS REFERRED TO BY BARNARD.OP C!TP! 10 
1
" BARNARD.IBID.Pl 10. 
1
" STEAD.C.G. 'THE PLATONISM OF ARIUS.' OP CITP16. 
1
" !BID.P!7. 
116 STEAD.!BID.Pl7. 
He WILES.MT '''THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY:'' ARIUS AND ATHANASIUS.' OP CIT.P42. 
THE SA\,IE POSITION IS T AICEN BY STEAD.C. G.'THE PLATONISM OF ARIUS .. OP C!T.P 17-18, A'<TI 
BARNARD. OP CIT.Pl 11. 
'"" 1BID.P44. 
'"'FOR THIS SECTION ON THE BACKGROUND TO THE TERYI 'SUBST A'ICE.' IN ARlus' DAY, A.'>!ONGST OTHER 
SOl 1lCES. I HAVE PRINClPALLY RELIED ON THE IMPORTA'IT RESEARCH OF STEAD: STEAD. G.C: 'THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOMOOUSIOS.' OP CIT. STEAD.G.C. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OP CIT, 
STEAD.G.C.'THE CONCEPT OF DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' 
"
0 SEE, FOREXA'-IP!E: STEAD.C.G: 1977.'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.'OPCIT.Pl64FF. 
151 BETHUNE-BAKER.OP CIT.Pl67,169. P286,375. 
152 PRESTIGE.G.L. OP CIT.P223. 
153 STEAD.G. C. 'THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE HOMOOUSIOS.' OP Cn.P40 I. 
154 IBID.P 403. 
155 IBID.P407. 
156 STEAD.G.C. 'DIVINE SUBSTANCE.' OPC1T.P96. 
151 WILL!AMS.R. 'ARIUS.' OP CIT. P 197. ARIUS A'ID HIS CONTEMPORARIES HAD TO SEE A WILL IN THE 
FATHER, BECAUSE OF THE STRONG BINDING NATURE OF BIBLICAL TRADITION. 
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158 FOR INSIGIITS HERE INTO THE MEANING OF A PHILOSOPHY OF DIFFERENTIATION. I AM GRATEFUL TO PROF. 
E.V AN NIEKERK. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER SIX 
1 SOURCES CONSUL TED INCLUDE: BARNES.M.R. 'AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY 
TRlNIT ARIAN THEOLOGY.' IN THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. VOL 56. I 995.P237-250, 
COFFEYD. 'THE HOLY SP!RlT AS THE MUTUAL LOVE OF THE FATHER AND THE SON.' IN 
THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. VOL 51.1990.Pl 93-229, BARNES.MR 'THE ARIANS OF BOOK V, AND 
THE GENRE OF "DE IRJNITATE. '" IN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES.VOL 44.1993. 
Pl85-l 95, CLA YTON.J. W.'COLERIDGE AND THE LOGOS: THE TRINITARIAN UNITY OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND CULTURE.' IN THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION. VOL70. l 990.P 213-240, 
MEYNELL.H. 'TWO DIRECTIONS FOR PNEUMATOLOGY.' IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES 
BULLETIN.VOL 2.1982.P.101-116, GUNTON.C.' AUGUSTINE. THE TRINITY AND THE 
THEOLOGICAL CRISIS OF THE WEST.' IN SCOITISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY VOL 43.1990. 
P33-58, KELL YL. G. 'LINGUISTICS AND TRANSLATION IN SAINT AUGUSTINE.' IN THE BIBLE 
TRANSLATOR. VOL 24.1973.Pl34-139, LOUTH.A.'AUGUSTINE ON LANGUAGE.' IN JOURNAL 
OF LITERATURE AND THEOLOGY VOL 3.1989.Pl51-158, DOULL.J.A.'AUGUSTINIAN 
TRINITARlANISM AND EXISTENTIAL THEOLOGY.' INDIONYSIUS.VOL 3.1979P 111-!59. 
STOBB.H. 'NOTES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST AUGUSTINE.' IN CAL VIN THEOLOGICAL 
JOURNAL. VOL 8.1973.P 117-130, CLARKE.M.T.'AUGUSTINE'S THEOLOGY OF THE TRINITY: 
ITS RELEVANCE.' IN DIONYSIUS. VOL 13. l 989.P7 l-84, HENRY.P. 'THE ADvERSUSARJUMOF 
MARIUS VICTORINUS, THE FIRST SYSTEMATIC EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
TRINITY.' IN JOURNAL OF THEOLOGICAL STUDIES. VOL V.1950.P42-55, 
AUGUSTINE.(1RANSLATED: MC CRACKEN.G.E: 1981).'THE CITY OF GOD.' BOOKS HI!. 
AUGUSTINE (1RANSLATED :BURLEIGH.J.H.S: 1953).'EARLIER WORKS.' VOL VI. 
AUGUSTINE.(1RANSLATED :BURNABY.J: 1955). 'DE TRINITATE.' IN LATER WORKS.VOL VIII, 
MCGRATH.AE: 1994. 'CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AN INTRODUCTION.' 
HARNACK.A.(TRANSLATED :SPE!RS.E.B, MILLARJ: 1898). 'HISTORY OF DOGMA., OP err.VOL 
IV. GAYBBA.B. "LOVE AND KNOW WHAT YOU WILL: THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ROLE OF 
LOVE IN AUGUSTINE.' IN WINDOWS ON ORIGINS. (EDITED :LANDM.AN.C, WHITELAW.D.P: 
1985), BROWN.P: 1967. 'AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO,' CHADWICK.H: 1987. 'AUGUSTINE,' 
BURNABY.J: 1960. 'AMOR DEL' DANIELOU.J. 'PATRISTIC LITERATURE.' IN (EDITOR: 
HANSON.R.P.C: 1969). THE PELICAN GUIDE TO MODERN THEOLOGY, VON 
CAMPENHAUSEN.H.(TRANSLATED: GARRARD.LA: 1963). 'THE FATHERS OF THE GREEK 
CHURCH.' HEICK.O: 1973. 'A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT. 'VOL I, GONZALEZ.J.L: 
1971.' A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' VOL II. OP CIT, Mc GINN.B: 1991. 'THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF MYSTICISM' KNOWLES.D: 1963. 'THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL 
THOUGHT.' LACUGNA.C.M: 1973. 'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.' 
ALLERS.R 'THE NOTIONS OF TRIAD AND OF MEDIATION IN THE THOUGHT OF ST 
AUGUSTINE .. IN NEW SCHOLAS. VOL 3 l.1957.P449-525, ARENDT.H.(EDITED: VECCHIARELLI 
SCOTT.J, ET AL: 1996). 'LOVE AND SAINT AUGUSTINE.' AUGUSTINE.A(TRANSLATED: 
CHADWICK.H: 1991. 'THE CONFESSIONS,' AUGUSTINE.A. (1RANSLATED :TESKE.R.J: 
1991) 'TWO BOOKS ON GENESIS AGAINST THE MANICHEES AND ON THE LITERAL 
INTERPRETATION OF GENESIS,' EV ANS.G.R: 1980. 'OLD ARTS AND NEW THEOLOGY.THE 
BEGINNINGS OF THEOLOGY AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE,' GILSON.E.(TRANSLATED: 
L YNCH.L.E.M: 1961 ). 'THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE,' AUGUSTINE.A. 
(TRANSLATED: ROBERTSON.D.W: 1958).'0N CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE,' AUGUSTINE.A 'DE 
TRJNITATE'. IN BASIC WRITINGS OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. VOL II.(EDITED :OATES.W.J: 1948), 
AUGUSTINE.A' AL YPIUS AND AUGUSTINE TO MAXIMUS.' C.415 AD. IN SAINT 
AUGUSTINE.LETTERS VOL IV.THE FATHERS OF THE CHURCH.VOL 12. (1RANSLATED: 
PARSONS.W: 1955), SANCTI AUREUJ AUGUSTINI 'ENARRATJONESIN PSALVOS. 'VOL 2.U-C. JN: 
CORPUS CHRISTIANORU!vI.SERJES LATINA. VOL XXXLX AURELII A UGUSTINI OPERA, LOUTH.A: 
1981. 'THE ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL TRADillON,' COCHRANE.C.N: 
1974. 'CHRISTIANITY AND CLASSICAL CULTURE. A STUDY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION 
FROM AUGUSTUS TO AUGUSTINE.' DODDS.ER :1951.'THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL,' 
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LOBKOWICZ.N: 1967.'THEORY AND PRACTICE: HISTORY OF A CONCEPT FROM ARISTOTLE 
TO MARX.. lv!ILES.M. 'VISION: THE EYE OF THE BODY AND THE EYE OF THE MIND IN SAINT 
AUGUSTINE'S CONFESSIONS.· IN THE JOURNAL OF RELIGION.VOL 63.1983.P125-142. 
ATHERTON P 'THE NEOPLATONIC .. ONE" AND THE TRJNIT ARIAN "ARCHE." THE CONFLICT 
OVER THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS RELATION TO THE "IDENTITY'' OF THE 
ABSOLUTE IN SCHELLING AND HEGEL.' IN (EDITED :HARRIS.R.B: 1976) THE SIGNIFICANCE 
OF NEOPLATONISM, GAYBBAB: 1987.'THE SPIRJT OF LOVE,' BROWN.D:!985 'THE DIVINE 
TRINITY.' MACKEY.J.P: 1983'THE CHRJSTIAN EXPERJENCE OF GOD AS TRJNITY.' LOSSKY.V: 
1957. 'THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH.' 
' GONZALEZ.J.L., A HISTORY OF CHRJSTIAN THOUGHT.' OP err. VOL II.P 15. 
3 KNOWLES.D. 'THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT. 'OP err. P32. . 
' 1BID.P33. SEE ALSO BROWN.P. 'AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO.' OP err. P432FF. FOR A FULIER ACCOUNT OF 
AUGUSTINE'S PERSO:-IAL BACKGROlmD SEE NORMAN.M. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRJNITY. 
POINTERS ON A LINE OF DEVELOPMENT. WITH ATTENTION TO AUGUSTINE, BARTH AND 
THE CURRENT PROBLEM. '(UNPUBLISHED ARTICLE. UNISA: l 995).P7-26. 
3 STUDER.B. "TRJNITY AND INCARNATION.' Or Crr.Pl68. 
6 SEE TIIE DISCUSSI0:-1 OF BROWN IN: BROWN.P: 1967. 'AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO.'Or CIT.P90FF. 
IBID.P35. 
'STOBBH. 'NOTES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST AUGUSTINE.Or CIT.Pl 18. 'AUGUSTINE'S 
PHILOSOPHY IS NOT ONLY SCATTERED, IT IS INCO!MPIETE, U:-IFIN1SHED. IT DOES NOT COME FULL CIRCLE. 
SOMEOC-."E HAS CORRECTLY OBSERVED THAT AUGUSTINE'S PHILOSOPHY 'THOUGH NOT A MERE AGGREGATE 
OF DISCRETE .~ND Ic-."COMPATIBIE INSIGH1S, IS NEVERTHE!ESS MORE A TE!MPER, APPROACH, AND SPIRIT. 
TH • .\,'< A Fl'<1SHED SYSTEM.' -IBID.Pl 18. AQUINAS, AS AN EXAMPIE, WHEN STARTING OUT ON HIS 'SUMMA.' 
EXPRESSES HIS BELIEF THAT DOCTRINE IS A BODY OF TRUTH, WITH CERTAIN BOUNDARIES A.ND STRUCTURES: 
. To PL\CE OCR Pl'RPOSE WITHIN PROPER LIMITS. WE FIRST ENDEAVOUR TO INVESTIGATE TIIE NATURE AND 
EXTE:-01 OF THIS SACRED DOCTRI1'E. CONCERNING THIS, THERE ARE TEN POINTS OF ENQUIRY: 1- WHETHER IT 
IS C-."ECESS.-<RY" 2-WHETHER IT IS A SCIENCE? 3-WHETHER IT IS ONE OR MANY? 4-WHETHER IT IS 
SPECLL.,11\"E OR PR.\CTICAL? 5-How !TIS COMPARED WITH OTHER SCIENCES? 6-WHETHER !TIS TIIE SA.VIE 
. .\S \l/lSDO\.t? 
7- WHETHER Goo IS ITS SUBJECT-\l.~TTER? 8-WHETHER !TIS A MATTER OF ARGUl>IENT? 9-WHETHER IT 
RIGH1LY E\IPLOYS \IET..\PHORS .\.'-U SIMILIES? 10-WHETIIER THE SACRED SCRIPTURE OF THIS DOCTRINE 
\IX! BE EXPOl'l'<UED IN DlFFEREl•ff SENSES?' -AQUINAS.T.(TRANSLATED: THE FATHERS OF THE 
ENGLISH DOMINICAN PROVINCE: 1948). 'SU\1MA THEOLOGJCA .. OP CIT. VOL I.FIRST 
PART.QUESTION I.Pl. 
9 IBID.Pl18. HERE CALVIN. AQUDiAS, ARENDT, ANSELM AND PASCAL CAN BE NAMED AS EXAMPLES. 
10 GILSON.E. 'THE CHRJSTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.P235. 
11 REARDON.B.M.G. "THE RELATION OF PHILOSOPHY TO FAITH IN THE TEACHING OF ST 
AUGUSTIJ'<'E. "P288. AGAIN 'N"E '-"EED TO REMEMBER THAT AT 1'0 POINT IN HIS THINKING. DOES AUGUSTINE 
SEE TIIE INCO\IPATIBILITY OF REASON TO FAITH. OR THE NEED TO SEPARATE THE TWO CONCEPTS. 
'''"FOR SEElNG THAT IN THE 'NlSDOM OF Goo THE WORLD, BY WISDOM, KNEW NOT Goo, IT PLEASED Goo. 
BY THE FOOLISHC-."ESS OF PREACHDiG TO SA VE THEM THAT BELIEVE." ... THUS IN TIIE WISDOM OF Goo THE 
WORLD couo 'OOT mow Goo THROUGH WISDOM ... , -AUGUSTINE. 'ON CHRJSTIAN DOCTRJNE., OP 
C!T.P 14 ..... SlTH A SON ASCENDS TO WISDOM. WHICH IS THE SE'"ENTH AND LAST STEP, WHERE HE ENJOYS 
PEACE . .\.,°'D TR.-1.,'<QllLLITY. "FOR TIIE FEAR OF TIIE loRD IS TIIE BEGINNING OF WISDOM." FROM FEAR TO 
MSDO~ITHE WAY E:>,TENDS THROt.:GH THESE STEPS.'-!BID.P40. ' ... SINCE CORRECT INFERENCES MAY BE 
\<IADE CONCERNING FALSE AS 'N"ELL AS TRUE PROPOSITIONS, IT IS EASY TO !EARN THE NATURE OF V AL!D 
IN"FERENCE E\ "EN N SCHOOLS WHICH ARE OU1SIDE OF THE CHt.:RCH. Bur THE TRUTH OF PROPOSITIONS IS A 
MATTER TO BE DISCOVERED IN TIIE SACRED BOOKS OF TIIE CHURCH. '-1BID.P68. ;THus IT SEEMS TO ME THAT 
STUD!Ol"S A'-U INTELLIGE1''T YOU1HS WHO FEAR Goo AND SEEK THE BIESSED LIFE MIGHT BE HELPFULLY 
.illMONISHED THAT THEY SHOULD NOT PURSUE THOSE STUDIES WHICH ARE TAUGHT OUTSIDE THE CHURCH 
OF CHRIST AS THOl"GH THEY MIGHT SEEM TO LEAD TO THE B!ESSED LIFE. RATHER THEY SHOULD SOBERLY 
AND DILIGENTLY WEIGH THEM.' -1BID.P72. 'AT THAT TIME, AFTER READING THE BOOKS OF TIIE 
PLATONISTS AND !EARNING FROM THEM TO SEEK FOR IMMATERIAL TRUTH, I TURNED MY ATTENTION TO 
YOL"R "INVISIB!E "ATURE UNDERSTOOD THROUGH THE THINGS WHICH ARE MADE" ... WHERE WAS THE 
CHARITY WHICH BllLDS ON THE FOlmDATION OF HUMILITY WHICH IS IN JESUS CHRIST? WHEN WOULD THE 
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PLATONIST BOOKS HAVE TAUGHT ME THAT?' ·AUGUSTINE. "THE CONFESSIONS.• OP CIT.Pl30. 'THERE 
IS SOME CONNECTION HERE BET\VEEN AUGcSTINE'S \/1EW OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH. AND THE PLATONIC 
DOCTRI1'E OF REMINISCENCES. PLATO WAS RIGHT IN ASSU"UNG IN THE "'MEr-;o." THAT THE MIND DISCOVERS 
TRUTH. RATHER THAN CREATES IT. PLATO WAS CORRECT!N STATING THAT THE SOUL FINDS THE TRUTH 
\\TIHIN ITSELF. BUT INCORRECT IN BELIEVING THAT THIS IS A REMEMBERING AS OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE 
PAST. THE FACT IS THAT TRUTH IS ALWAYS WITHIN OUR GRASP THANKS TO THE INNER MASTER WHO 
TEACHES IT TO US. THIS IS THE LORD. IN AUGUSTINIAN THINKING, THOUGHT (COGJTO) IS MERELY THE 
MOVEMENT BY WHICH THE SOUL GATHERS. ASSEMBLES AND COLLECTS ALL THE HIDDEN KNOWLEDGE IT 
ALREADY POSSESSES.' -G!LSON.E. 'THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.' OP 
CIT.P75. / 
tl REARDON HERE QUOTING AUGUSTINE (NO REFERENCE GIVEN). SEE REARDON.IBID.P290. 
14 SEESANCTI AUREUI A UGUSTINI. 'ENARRATJONES IN PSAL'v!OS CJ-CL. 'Pl270-1271. THE 
DISCUSSION OF AUGUSTINE ON THIS SUBJECT, FOR EXAMPLE, IN HIS SERMON XVIIl.3, ON PsALM CXVIII. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE ANSELMIAN POS!TION, SEE SOUTHERN.R : 1990. 'SAINT ANSELM.A PORTRAIT 
IN A LANDSCAPE.' Pl25FF. COMMENTING ON THE 'PROSLOGION,' AND 'MONOLOGION,' SOUTHERN 
TRACES OUT THE MEANING OF ANSELM'S VERSION OF THE AUGUSTINIAN 'FJDESQUAEREVS INTELLECTUM.' 
FOR . .\NY KIND OF ARTICULATION OF FAITH, BOTH COMPONENTS ARE NECESSARY. WHAT FAITH 
GUARANTEES. REASON CLARIFIES. EQUALLY FAITH IN THE CONCEPTS OF THE MIND IS AN EXPRESSION OF 
CONFIDENCE IN THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND-Pl26. HENCE THOSE WHO DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE THE 
EXISTENCE OF THE UNIVERSALS FAIL BEFORE THEY THINK. 'INDEED IT IS CLEAR THAT, IF THE OBJECTS OF 
REASON. ARE INCORPOREAL ESSENCES OF WHICH THE EXISTENCE IS FIRST KNOWN THROUGH SENSE 
IMPRESSIONS, SOME SORT OF ACT OF FAITH IS NECESSARY BEFORE THE PROCESSES OF REASON CAN BEGIN AT 
ALL. IF ANYONE DOES NOT ADMIT THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH ESSENCES, HE LACKS THE POWER OF 
UNDERSTANDING NOT ONLY THE TRUTHS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH, BUT ALSO THE TRUTH THAT SENSE-
IMPRESSIONS HAVE THEIR OR1GINS IN REAL ESSENCES., -IBm.Pl26. THE ARGUMENT OF THE ?vfONOLOGIUM:, 
BROt:GHT ANSELM TO THIS CONCLUSION. REASON DOES NOT MAKE FAITH UNNECESSARY. 'JN COvERINGTHE 
SA},IE GROUND AND HOLDING THE SAME CONCLUSION, F A!TH AND REASON EACH ADD SOMETHING TO THE 
OTHER.' -IBID.Pl27. 'FAITH ADDS THE GLORY OF SELF-ABANDONMENT TO THE STATEMENTS OF REASON, 
REASON ADDS THE GLORY OF SYSTEMATIC UNDERSTANDING TO THE STATEMENTS OF FAITH. NEITHER THE 
NATURE NOR THE CONCLUSIONS OFF AITH ARE CHANGED BY REASON, BUT THE CONCEPTS OFF AITH. IN 
BECOMING CLEARER IN THE UNDERSTANDING, BECO/.IE ACTIVE IN THE SOUL, MORE SYSTEMATICALLY 
INTERRELATED IN THE MIND. MORE JOYFULLY EMBRACED. THIS IS THE WHOLE AIM OF MEDITATI01': TO LEAD 
THE ENQV1RER FORWARD ALONG THE ROAD TOW ARDS THE FINAL BEATITUDE OF THE IMMEDIATE 
EXPERIENCE OF THE OBJECT OFF AITH. UNTIL THIS FINAL BEATITUDE IS ENJOYED, REASON WILL CONTINUE 
TO HA VE A CONTRIBUTION TO MAKE TO FAITH. '-IBID.Pl27. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY AUGUSTINIAN. 
15 STOB.H. 'NOTES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.Pl 17FF ..... THIS ATIITUDE 
WAS CHARACTERISTIC OF THE AUGUSTINI."-''< TRADITION. ST ANSELvr'S AIM IS EXPRESSED IN HIS WORDS 
"CREDO UT !NTELUGAM," WHILE ST BONA VENTURE, IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, EXPLICITLY 
REJECTED THE SHARP DELIMITATION OF THE SPHERES OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY. THE THO~llST 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE SCIENCES OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY, WITH THE 
ACCOMPANYING DISTINCTION OF THE MODES OF PROCEDURE TO BE EMPLOYED IN THE TWO SCIENCES NO 
DOIJBT EVOLVED INEVITABLY OL'T OF THE EARLIER ATIITUDE, THOUGH, QUITE APART FROM THAT 
CONSIDERATION, IT OB\/10USLY ENJOYS THIS VERY GREAT ADV A.'ITAGE THAT IT CORRESPONDS TO AN 
ACTUAL AND REAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVELATION AND THE DATA OF THE "lJNAIDED" REASON, 
BETWEEN THE SUPERNATURAL AND THE NATURAL SPHERES ... YET THE AUGt:STINIA.'I ATTITliDE ON THE 
OTHER HA.'ID ENJOYS THIS ADV ANT AGE, THAT IT CONTEMPLATES ALWAYS MAN AS HE IS, MAN IN THE 
C01'CRETE, FORDE FACTO MAN HAS ONLY ONE FINAL END, A SUPERNATURAL END ... ' -COPLESTON.F. 'A 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 'VOL I.OP CIT.P49. 
16 IBID.P 118. 'SA11''T AUGUSTINE' s INTERESTIN THE PHILOSOPHICAL LIFE w AS Aw AKENED BY ms READING 
OF THE "HORTENSIUS," A DIALOGUE OF CICERO WHICH HAS SINCE BEEN LOST. FROM THAT DAY ON, HE WAS 
CONSUMED WITH THE LOVE OF WISDOM, AND AS TIME WENT ON HE THOUGHT OF THIS DISCOVERY AS HIS 
FIRST STEP ON THE WAY OF SORROWS WHICH WAS TO LEAD HIM TO Goo.' -G!LSON.E.OP CIT.P3. 'THAT 
BOOK OF HIS CONTAINS AN EXHORTATION TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY AND IS ENTITLED "HORTENSIUS.,. THE 
BOOK CHANGED MY FEELINGS. IT ALTERED MY PRAYERS, LoRD, TO BE TOWARDS YOU YOURSELF. IT GAVE 
ME DIFFERENT V ALL'ES AND PRIORITIES. SUDDENLY EVERY VAIN HOPE BECAME EMPTY TO ME, AND I 
LONGED FOR THE IMMORTALITY OF WISDOM WITH AN INCREDIBLE ARDOliR IN MY HEART. I BEGA.'! TO RISE 
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UP TO RETUR.'1 TO YOU .. _' -AUGUSTINE. 'CONFESSIONS.' OP CIT.BOOK III.IV. 7.P39. IN HIS CLASSIC 
STL'DY. BUR."ABY PCTS IT"fHUS: 'WE HAVE REACHED THE CENTRE OF OCR SUBJECT-THE LOVE OF Goo TO 
WHICH THE C:-l!VERSAL DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS IS AN UNCONSCIOUS POINrER, AND WHICH HAS PROVED TO BE 
THE "-"ECESSARY C01'DITION OF ALL TRUE LOVE OF SELF OR NEIGHBOUR ... To BE JOINED TO Goo IS THE 
St:PRE~!E GOOD FOR MAN. BECAUSE THERE IS NO HUMAN GOODNESS THAT IS NOT FRUIT OF THE MARRIAGE 
BET\v"EEN TI!E HUMA:-1 SPIRIT AND THE DIVI1'"E ... THE QUESTION IS NOT SO l\!UCH WHETHER, OR HOW, BUT 
WHAT OR WHOM \\/E LO'>"E ... AND WHY HA VE WE NOT K.'IOWLEOOE ENOUGH OF WHAT PLEASES, BUT 
BECAl"SE WE HA VE TOO LITTLE KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF? ... THE KNOWLEDGE OF Goo IS THE REW ARD OF 
THE PERFECT. NOT THE ~!EANS OF ACHIEVING PERFECTION, AND THAT REASON MUST WAIT UPON AUTHORITY, 
WE MUST FIRST LO\"E HIM WHO WE DESIRE TO KNOW?'-BURNABY.J. 'AMOR DEi. A STUDY OF ST 
AUGUSTINE'S TEACHING ON THE LOVE OF GOD AS THE MOTIVE OF THE CHRISTIAN LIFE.' 
OP CIT.Pl41-143. 
17 IBID.Pl43: 'THE STRVCTURE OF THE "DE TRIN!TATE' CONFORMS TO THE RULE THAT AUTHORITY TAKES 
PRECEDENCE OF REASON. THE TREATMENT OF THE SOUL, WHICH Goo's PROVIDENCE AND !NEFF ABLE 
LOVIXG-KIND1'"ESS ADMINISTERS, IS MOST BEAUTIFUL IN ITS STEPS AND STAGES. THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT 
METHODS, AliTHOR!lY A.'ID REASON. AUTHORITY DEMANDS BELIEF AND PREPARES MAN FOR REASON. 
REASON LEADS TO VNDERSTANDING, AND KNOWLEOOE. BUT REASON IS NOT ENTIRELY A.BSENT FROM 
AUTHORITY. FOR WE HA v"E GOT TO CONSIDER WHOM WE HA VE TO BELIEVE, AND THE HIGHEST AUTHORITY 
BELOSGS TO TRUTH WHEN IT IS CLEARLY KNOWN.' -AUGUSTINE. (TRANSLATED: BURLEIGH.J.H.S: 
1953). 'DE f ERA REUGJONE.' XXIV.45. IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS.VOL 
VI.AUGUSTINE.EARLIER WRITINGS. OP CIT.P249. 
l8 ST08.IBID.Pl20. IT WAS ONLY BY THE TWELFTH CE1''TURY THAT THEOLOGY IN THE TRADITIONAL SENSE, 
CAME TO BE SEEN AS .'u'I ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE-GA YBBA.B. 'STII 403-T. THE HISTORY OF 
THEOLOGY.' OP.CIT. PVllJ. 'IF WE ARE TO ARGUE THAT TWELFTH CENTURY SCHOLARS PERCEIVED FOR 
THE FIRST TI~!E THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO TREAT THEOLOGY AS AN ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE (FOR LIMITED 
PL'RPOSES) WE SHOU.D EXPECT TO FIND A FIRST INDICATION IN THEIR DISCUSSION OF THE NAME BY WHICH 
THEY ARE TO CALL IT. THE TERM .. THEO LOGIA" ONLY GRADUALLY CA1'!E TO HA VE THE UNIVERSALITY AS A 
Tl'TlE FOR A'I ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE WHICH ''GRAMMATICA" OR "RHETOR!CA" HAD ENJOYED AT LEAST SINCE 
ROMAN TIMES. E\c:-1 FOR AQUINAS THE EXPRESSION SACRA DOCTRINA STILL COMES NATURALLY TO MIND.' -
EV A.i\IS. G.R. 'OLD ARTS AND NEW THEOLOGY.' OP CIT.P29. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT AUGUSTINE 
"-'E\"ER 'DID THEOLOGY.' IT JUST c\IEANT THAT HE LACKED THE SYSTEMATIC APPROACH OF HIS SUCCESSORS. 
L'l THE 'CITY OF GOD,' AUGUSTINE SPEAKS 'OF THE THREE KINDS OF THEOLOGY ... FIRST THE 
MYTHICAL. SECOND THE NATURAL. AND THIRD THE CIVIL.' -SEE AUGUSTINE.A. 'THE CITY 
OF GOD., OP CIT. VOL II.BOOK V.P307FF. AUGUST!1'c's !NfERPRETATION IS FAR BROADER THA'I THE 
~lEA'lNG OF THE TERM TODAY. THE FIRST TYPE DEALS WITH 'FABLES,' THE SECOND KIND IS 'NATURAL.' 
.'u'<TI THE THIRD IS 'Cl\1L.' THE SEC01'TI KIND IS NOT THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF TODAY, BUT A THEOLOGY 
TH.1.T SETS OL'T THE :>IATURE OF THE Goos (UNDOUBTEDLY THE SAME KIND OF DEFINITION AS WE FIND INTHE 
"REPCBLIC' OF PLATO). THE THIRD TYPE IS 'CIVIL,' IN THATIT TELLS US HOW THE GODS ARE TO BE 
WORSHIPPED BY THE STATE, .AND WHAT RITES AND SACRIFICES INDIVIDUALS SHOULD PERFORM.-[BID.P3 J3. 
[TIS NI'ERESTING TO SEE THAT AUGUSTINE STILL INSPIRED THOSE SUCH AS ABELARD IN THEIR 
FORMt.:L1.TIO:>I OF THE CONCEPT 'THEOLOGIA.' BUT EV ANS POINTS OUT THAT AUGUSTINE. ALTHOUGH 
HAVl-"G .'u'I l'NDERST.'u'ID!NG OF 'THEOLOGY,' OR 'DOCTRINE,' EMPLOYED IT IN A MANNER THAT WAS TO BE 
TOO BROAD FOR THE LATER TWELFTH CE1''TURY. 'ACGUSTINE GREW UP IN THE LATE CLASSICAL WORLD. HE 
K.''EW THAT THE PAGA.'! IDEA OF THEOLOGY INCLUDED THE STUDY OF MYTHS, THE STUFF OF THE ."-''ICIENT 
POETS. THE PAGANS RECOGNISED A POLITICAL ROLE FOR THEOLOGY-THE PROPER CONDUCT OF PUBLIC 
WORSHIP WAS REGARDED AS AN IMPORT A'IT CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IN MAINTAINING THE STRENGTH AND 
ST ABILITY OF THE ST A IB. MOREOVER, SINCE SOME THINKERS HA VE REGARDED THE WORLD ITSELF AS 
DIVJ1'"E, THE STUDY OF THE NATURAL WORLD ITSELF MAY CONSTITUTE A FORM OF THEOLOGY. TERTULLIAN 
DESCRIBES THE THREE BRANCHES OF THEOLOGY LIKE THIS (AFTER VARRO): "ONE BRANCH IS PHYSICS, WITH 
WHICH THE PHIWSOPHERS DEAL, ANOTHER MYTH, WHICH IS THE CONCERN OF THE POETS, THE THIRD 
RATIONAL WHICH PEOPLE CHOOSES FOR ITSELF." SOME OF THESE NOTIONS HAD A PLACE IN THE PAGAN 
WORLD FOR WHICH THERE WAS NO EXACT PARALLEL INTHE TWELFTH CENTURY, IT WAS NOT PERHAPS 
DIFFICULT FOR 1'-!ED!EVAL THINKERS TO SET ASIDE WHAT AUGUSTINE HAD TO SAY ABOL'T "POETIC AND 
"CIVIL" THEOLOGY.' 
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19 STOB.OP CIT.Pl21. •J HAVE DESCRIBED "'THE OLD OR EXTERIOR OR EARTHLY MAN." HE MAY BE A 
MODERATE MAN. '-AUGUSTINE. (TRANSLATED :BURLE!GH.J.H.S: 1953). 'DE VERA REUG!ONE .. 
IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS. VOL VI.AUGUSTINE.EARLIER WRITINGS. OP 
CIT.P249. To KNOW WITH CERTAIN l(,'IOWLEDGE MEANS TO KNOW THROUGH REASON, THE SENSES CANJ<OT 
RISE TO THE LEVEL OF Kl'OWLEDGE, AND EVEN THOUGH WE PERCEIVE COLOURS BY SIGHT AND SOUNDS BY 
HEARThiG, IT IS NEITHER BY SIGHT NOR BY HEARING, NORE VEN BY THAT INNER SENSE COMrvlON TO NIAN ;\.i'\JD 
BEAST, THAT WE KNOW SOUNDS ARE NOT PERCEIVED BY SIGHT NOR COLOURS BY HEARING. NOTHING IS 
MORE OBVIOUS ... K..'10\VLEDGE THEN, IS PLACED AS.~ THIRDTERM ABOVE EXISTENCE AND LIFE AND IS, IN 
TlJRN, DISTINGUISHED AFTER HIS KIND, OR HE MAY TRANSGRESS THE MEASURE OF SERVILE JUSTICE. SOME 
LIVE THUS FROM THE BEGINNINGTOTHEENDOFTHEIRDAYS. BUT SOMEBEINGINTHATWAY, AS THEY 
NECESSARILY MUST, BUT THEY ARE REBORN !NW ARD LY, AND WITH THEIR SPIRITUAL STRENGTH AND 
INCREASE OF WISDOM THEY OVERCOME "THE OLD MAN" AND PUT HIM TO DEATH ... THIS IS CALLED "THE 
NEW MAN," THE "INWARD AND HEAVENLY MAN", .. ' 'THESE THREE TERMS, WHICH FORM A HIERARCHY, 
NAMELY THE EXTERNAL SENSE, THE INTERNAL SENSE AND REASON ... THIS THEN IS THE ANSWER: THE 
INTERNAL SENSE DIRECTS AND JUDGES THE EXTERNAL SENSE.' -GILSON.OP CIT.Pl4-15. 
20 McGINN.B.OP CIT.P 228-230. 
"AUGUSTINE. IBID. BOOK l.I.l.P3: 'You STIR MA'I TO TAKE PLEASURE IN PRAISING YOU. BECAUSE YOU 
HA VE MADE US FOR YOURSELF. AND OliR HEARTIS RESTLESS UNTIL IT RESTS IN YOU.' Of COURSE HIS 
BIBLICAL THEOLOGY DOES NOT ALLOW HIM TO INCLINE TO MONISM: THE SOUL IS ALWAYS SEPARATE FROM 
GOD, THE SOUL DOES NOT BECOME 'GoD.' THE FINAL UNION BETWEEN MAN AND GoD IS NOT ONTOLOGICAL. 
'I HAVE DESCRIBED "THE OLD OR EXTERIOR OR EARTHLY MAN" ... THIS IS CALLED ·'THE NEW MA..'I." THE 
"!NW ARD AND HEAVENLY MAN," WHOSE SPIRITUAL AGES ARE MARKED, NOT ACCORDING TO YEARS, BUT 
ACCORDING TO HIS SPIRITUAL ADVANCE. INTHE FIRST STAGE HE IS TAUGHT BY THE RICH STORES OF HISTORY 
WHICH NOURISH BY EXA\;!PLES, !N THE SECOND STAGE HE FORGETS HUMAN AFFAIRS A.."ID TENDS TOW ARDS 
DI\1NE THINGS ... IN THE THIRD ST AGE HE CONFJDENTL Y MARRIES CARNAL APPETITE TO STRONG REASON, 
AND !NW ARDLY REJOICES IN THE SWEETNESS OF THE l.jNIQN. Sorn, AND MIND ARE JOINED TOGETHER IN 
CHASTE UNION. THERE IS AS YET, NO COMPULSION TO DO RIGHT, BUT, EVEN THOlJGH NO ONE FORBIDS SIN. 
HE HAS NO PLEASlJRE IN SINNING. THE FOURTH STAGE IS SIMILAR, ONLY NOW HE ACTS MUCH MORE FIRMLY, 
AND SPRINGS FORTH AS THE PERFECT MAN, READY TO ENDURE AND OVERCOME ALL THE PERSECUTIONS. 
TEMPESTS A..'ID BILLOWS OF THIS WORLD. !N THE FIFTH STAGE HE HAS PEACE A'ID TRANQUILLITY ON ALL 
SIDES. HE LIVES A..\,!ONG THE ABUNDM'T RESOURCES OF THE UNCHANGEABLE REALM OF SUPREME 
!NEFF ABLE WISDOM. THE SIXTH ST AGE IS COMPLETE TRANSFORMATION INTO LIFE ETERNAL, A TOT AL 
FORGETFUL'IESS OF TEMPORAL LIFE PASSING INTO THE PERFECT FORM WHICH IS MADE ACCORDING TO THE 
IMAGE AND LIKENESS OF GoD. THE SEVENTH IS ETERNAL REST AND PERPETUAL BEATITUDE WITH NO 
DISTINGUISHABLE AGES. As THE END OF THE "OLD MAN" IS DEATH. SO THE END OF THE 'NEW MAN" IS 
ETERNAL LIFE. THE "OLDMAN" IS THE MAN OF SIN, BUT THE "NEW MAN" IS THE "MAN OF 
RIGHTEOlJSNESs."' -AUGUSTINE. (TRANSLATED :BURLEIGH.J.H.S: 1953). 'DE VERA REUG!ONE.' 
XXVI.49.IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS.VOL VI.AUGUSTINE.EARLIER 
WRITINGS. OP CIT.P249. Mc GINN POINTS OUT THE THERE ARE CERTAIN ELEMENTS IN AUGUSTINIA'l!SM 
THAT ARE ATV ARIANCE WITH MORE TRADITIONAL FORMS OF MYSTICISM. ' ... MANY OF THE KEYNOTES OF 
TRAD!T!ONAL UNDERST A.,'ID!NGS OF MYSTICISM, SUCH AS A PERSONAL UNION WITH GoD, ARE NOT 
PROMINENT IN AL"GUST!NE. IN THE CASE OF THE BISHOP OF HIPPO, UNION LANGUAGE SEEMS TO BE 
DELIBERATELY EXCLUDED AS A TOOL FOR THE DESCRIPTION OF THE UNCONSCIOUSNESS OF THE DIVINE 
PRESENCE IN THIS LIFE, SO THAT IF MYSTICISM IS TO BE DEF!l'iED ON THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF CNION 
'NTTH GoD IN THIS LIFE &'ID A CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN ACQUIRED AND INFUSED CONTEMPLATION. 
THEN AUGUSTINE IS CERTAINLY NOT A MYSTIC NOR DO HIS WRITINGS CONTAIN MYSTICAL THEOLOGY l1' THE 
PROPER SENSE.' -MCGINN.B: 1991. 'THE FOUNDATIONS OF MYSTICISM. 'OP CIT.P230-3 l. 
22 STOB. OP CIT.Pl22: 'HE NEVER SUCCEEDS IN EFFECTING A FINAL SYNTHESIS BETWEEN THE AGAPE-MOTIF 
OF PAUL AND THE EROS-MOTIF OF PLATO, BETWEEN THE GOD-CENTRED PHILOSOPHY OF REVELATION A..'ID 
THE MAN-CENTRED PHILOSOPHY OF THE GREEKS. His PHILOSOPHY NEVER FINDS A SINGLE CENTRE OF 
GRAVITY. !TIS THEREFORE NOT QUITE CORRECT TO SAY THAT HIS PHILOSOPHY IS COMPLETELY 
THEOCENTRIC. !TS THEOCENTRISM IS COMPROMISED BY AN UNRESOLVED EGOCENTRISM INHERITED FROM 
THE NEOPLAT01'1STS.' THIS IS CERTAINLY AN INTRIGUING ANAL YS!S, AND IT CONTAINS A MEASURE OF 
TR!ITH. HOWEVER, AT THE SAME TIME, IT CAN BE SAID THAT IN THE SYSTEM OF PLOT!NIJS (AS A..'IEXAMPLE) 
MAN IS NOT ACTUALLY AT THE CENTRE, IT IS THE 'ONE,' FROM WHICH ALL MEANING FLOWS. 
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23 LOUTH.A. 'THE ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL TRADITION.' OP CITPl36. HERE IT rs 
WORTH Ql'OTING Lotrrn, HIMSELF AS WELL AS THE QUOTE OF LADNER, WHICH HE INCLUDES: 'FIRST. THE 
NATURE OF THE ACCOUNT.. IT IS AT ONCE AN ACCOUNT. OF A PERSONAL EXPERIENCE. AND YET NOT A PURELY 
SOLITARY ONE .•. BUT THERE IS A STRAND-AND .'\.,'l IMPORT~< STRAND- IN AUGUSTINE'S THOUGHT THAT 
STRESSES THE SOCIAL NATURE OF THE FINAL BEATITUDE. IN THE 'CITY OF GOD' (XIX.5) HE SAYS: .. FOR 
HOW CO!:LD THE CITY OF Goo, ABOUT lliHICH WE ARE ALREADY ENGAGED IN WRITING THE NINETEENTH 
BOOK, BEG!c-1 AT THE START OR PROGRESS IN ITS COURSE OR REACH ITS APPOINTED GOAL, IFTHE LIFE OF THE 
SAil-HS WERE NOT SOCIAL (SINON ESSET SOCJAIJS !7TA SANCTORUM)T' LADNER IN HIS LITT.LE-KNOWN BUT 
lM:l,;lENSELY IMPORTANT BOOK, THE IDEA OF REFORM, REMARKS: "WOULD AUGUSTINE FIND ON EARTH 
THOSE PERFECT!, THOSE SANCTI, OF WHOSE LIFE IN A VITA SOCIALJS, IN COMl\lUNJON WITH THE SAINTS AND 
ANGELS OF HEAVEN HE SPEAKS IN "DE C!VITATE DEf?" IF THERE HAD NEVER BEEN SUCH A SOCIETY, HOW 
COULD IT BE RESTORED'/ THROUGH SAINT AUGUSTINE'S WHOLE LIFE THERE RUNS THE SEARCH FOR PERFECT 
COMMUNAL AND SOCIETAL WAY OF CHRISTIAN LIFE. IN THE DAYS OF HIS CONVERSION HE BELIEVED TO 
HAVE FOUND IT IN THE GROUP OF INT.ElLECTUALL Y AND RELIGIOUSLY INCLINED FRIENDS WHO LIVED 
TOGETHER ... "' THE QUOTE OF LADNER IS FROM LADNER.G.B: 1959.'THE IDEA OF REFORM: ITS 
IMPACT ON CHRISTIAN THOUGHT AND ACTION IN THE AGE OF THE FATHERS.' 
(CAMBRIDGE.MASS.HARV ARD UNIVERSITY PRESS).P282FF. 
'4 0' MEARA. OP CIT. P36: 'BUT IF AUGUSTINE WAS ROMAN IN HIS ECLECTIC ATIITUDE TO THE TRUTHS OF 
PHYSICS A.'ID LOGIC, HEW AS ALSO ROMAN IN HIS PASSIONATE ATI ACHMENT TO ETHICS ... I HAVE ALWAYS 
BEEN IMPRESSED BY HIS STRONG PASSION FOR SOCIAL A.'lD MORAL ISSUES.' SAYS MCGINN: ' ... THE THREE 
MAIN BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE BISHOP'S MYSTICAL THOUGHT AND HIS CONTRIBUTION TO LATER WESTER.'l 
~!YSTICISM: FIRST, HIS ACCOUNT. OF THE SOUL'S ASCENSION TO CONTEMPLATIVE AND ECSTATIC EXPERIENCE 
OF THE DIVINE PRESENCE, SECOND, THE GROUND FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF THIS EXPERIENCE IN THE NATURE 
OF THE HUMAN PERSON AS THE IMAGE OF THE TRIUNE Goo, AND THIRD, THE NECESSARY ROLE OF CHRIST 
AND THE CHURCH IN ATIAINING THIS EXPERIENCE.' -MCGINN.B. OP CIT.P23 l. 
05 LOUTH.A. 'THE ORIGINS OF THE CHRISTIAN MYSTICAL TRADITION.' OP CITPl46. 
16 IBID.Pl47: 'BEHIND AUGUSTINE'S USE OF THE IDEA OF THE IMAGE LIES THE INFLUENCE OF PLoTINUS. FOR 
I'LOTINUS THE :-iOTION OF Tiffi IMAGE IS IMPORT ANT IN HIS UNDERSTANDING OF THE ~!OVE~!Etff OF 
PROCESSION AND RETURN: WHAT PROCEEDS IS AN IMAGE OF THAT FROM WHICH IT PROCEEDS. INTELLIGENCE 
IS . .\,'l IMAGE OF THE ONE, AND SOUL AN IMAGE OF INTELLIGENCE. AN !~!AGE IS LIKE THAT OF WHICH IT IS 
THE IMAGE. BUT LESS THAN IT; . .\,'ill MORE IMPORT ANT.LY, THE IMAGE DERIVES IMMEDIATELY-WITHOUT ANY 
11'-<ER!\IEDIARY-FROMTHAT OF WHICH IT IS THE IMAGE. FURTHER, THE IMAGE SEEKS TO RETURN TO THAT OF 
WHICH IT IS THE IMAGE-IT LONGS FOR ITS .. ARCHETYPE." IT HAS LONG BEEN RECOGNISED THAT AUGUSTINE 
.~TICIPATES CERTAIN CENTR.~L FEATURES OF DESCARTES' PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT, SPECIFICALLY WITH 
RESPECT TO THE FAMOUS "COGITO." AUGUSTINE'S VERSION rs: "SJ FALWR SUM," "IF I AM DECEIVED. I 
A.',r."' SEE: MATTHEWS.G.B: 1992.'THOUGHT'S EGO IN AUGUSTINE AND DESCARTES.' 
ITHACA:CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS. CHARLES TAYLOR IN HIS ·SOURCES OF THE SELF,' 
ARGUED THAT THE ADOPTION OF THE FIRST-PERSONAL STANCE WA.~ At:GIISTINE'S GREAT LEGACY TO 
WESTER.'l THOUGHT. 'As DESCARTES PUTS IT IN THE THIRD MEDITATION, RECAPITULATING IN IMPORTANT 
RESPECTS THE TRAIN OF THOUGHT IN AUGUSTINE'S "DE TRINITATE." "How COULD I UNDERSTAND THAT I 
DOUBTED OR DESIRED, THAT IS, LACKED SOMETHING, UNLESS THERE WERE IN ME, SOME IDEA OF A MORE 
PERFECT BEING WHICH ENABLED ME TO RECOGNISE MY OWN DEFECTS BY COMPARISON."' -
COTTINGHAM.J. 'REVIEW OF GARETH.B. MATTHEWS.THOUGHTS EGO IN AUGUSTINE AND 
DESCARTES.' IN RELIGIOUS STUDIES.VOL .1993 .P404-406. 
21 CAL VIN.J. 'INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION.' VOL !.(TRANSLATED: 
BATTLES.FL: 1960).P35.IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS.VOL XX. 
18 LOUTH.A. OP CJT.Pl5 I. IN BOOK XII, AUGUSTINE DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN ~'lOWLEDGE AND WISDOM, 
'SCIENTIA' ·'"'ID 'SAPIENTIA.' KNOWLEDGE CONCERNS ITSELF WITH THE EXTERNAL WORLD-THE THINGS OF 
THE SENSES, WlffiREAS 'SAPIENTIA,' IS THE TRUE WISDOM, DEALING WITH !NW ARD, SPIRITUAL REALITIES. IN 
ORDER TO liNDERST AND THE IMAGE OF Goo IN MAN. THE SOUL NEEDS TO MOVE FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 
'SCIENTIA,' TOWARDS 'SAPJENTIA.' THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT 'SC!ENTIA,' IS EVIL. '!TIS ONLY THROUGH 
TEMPORAL THINGS THAT WE CAN BE PlJRIFIED SO THAT WE BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO ETERNAL REALITIES, 
THROUGH TEMPORAL THINGS TO WHICH WE ARE NOT ACCUSTOMED AND TO WHICH WE CLING ... JUST AS THE 
RATIONAL ~IIND, WHEN PURIFIED, OUGHT TO CONTEMPLATE ETERNAL REALITY, SO THAT MIND, WHEN BEING 
PlJRIFIED, OliGHT TO HA VE FAITH IN TEMPORAL THINGS.' -LOUTH. OP CIT.Pl54. HERE LOUTH IS QUOTING 
'DE TRINIT4TE.' !V.XllI.24. 
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29 McG!NN.B.OP CIT.P233. 'WHAT PREVENTED AUGUSTINE FROM GIVING HIS MIND TO THE PRESUMPTION 
OF THE PLATONISTS. ACCORDING TO WHICH A MAN IMAGINES THAT BECAUSE HE KNOWS THE TRUTH HE ALSO 
K.'JOWS ALL OTHER THINGS AS WELL AND IS THEREFORE THE MEDIATOR OF THE TRUTH TO THE WORLO-
JUSTIFYING GoD TO THE WORLD-WHAT PREVENTED AUGUSTINE FROM THIS PRESUMPTION IS THE 
ALTOGETIIBR ACCIDENT AL CIRCUMSTANCE, AS SEEN FROM A PURELY FINITE POINT OF VIEW. THAT HE HAD 
HEARD OF ANOTHER MEDIATOR ... ' -ST ARNES.C.J. 'SAINT AUGUSTINE AND THE VISION OF THE 
TRUTH.' OP CIT.Pl24. 
30 DODDS.E.R :1951.'THE GREEKS AND THE IRRATIONAL.' 0PCIT.Pl80-181. 
31 IBID.P236. 
32 IBID.P208FF. 
33 IBID.P209. 
34 IBID.P209. 
35 IBID.P212. 
36 IBID.P212-215. 
37 IBID.P2 l 7. 
38 THE INFORMATION THAT FOLLOWS HERE PARTLY REFLECTS THE FINDINGS OF LAURENT DEVEZE'S PAPER 
DELIVERED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA IN THE EARLY PART OF 1997. 
39 DEVEZE.L.OP CIT. 
40 THIS IS A NOTION THAT WE WILL BRING OUT FREQUENTLY IN THIS TIIBSIS. IT IS ONE WHICH WITTGENSTEIN 
BRINGS OUT IN HIS 'TRACTATUS,' WHEN HE SPEAKS ABOlFfTHE NEED TO 'THROW AWAY THE LADDER.' 
41 A HELPFUL ARTICLE HERE IS: SAUNDERS.T.J. 'PLATO'S LATER POLITICAL THOUGHT.' IN 
(EDITOR: 
KRAUT.R: 1992). THE CAMBRJDGE COMPANION TO PLATO. OP CIT.P464FF. 
42 DoDDS.E.R.OP CIT.P22 l. 
43 AUGUSTINE.A.'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT.IN BooK Il.Il.P 147FF. AUGUSTINE SUMMARISES HIS 
Pl:RPOSE: 'JN THE PRECEDING BOOK, ACCORDINGLY, SINCE IT WAS MY INTENT TO TREAT OF THE CITY OF 
GoD. AND THIS LED TO MY TAKING IN HAND WITH HIS HELP THE WHOLE PROJECT, I FELT THAT I MUST FIRST 
WITHSTAND THOSE WHO ATTRIBUTE THESE WARS NOW AFFLICTING THE WORLD, &'ID P ARTICCLARLY THE 
RECENT SACK OF THE CITY OF ROME BY THE BARBARIANS, TO THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, BY REASON OF 
WHICH THEY ARE RESTRAINED FROM DOING SERVICE BY ABOMINABLE RITES TO DEMONS.' 
14 COCHRANE.OP CIT.P400. SEE ALSO THE 'CONFESSIONS': 'ALL MUTABLE THINGS HAVE IN YOU THEIR 
IMMUTABLE ORIGINS. IN YOU ALL IRRATIONAL AND TEMPORAL THINGS HA VE THE EVERLASTING CAUSES OF 
THEIR LIFE.' - 'CONFESSIONS. 'I. VI. 9. THE DIONYSIA.'J AND APOLLONl.'u'I ELEMENTS DESCRIBED HERE. 
REFLECT NIETZSCHE'S DESIGNATION OF TWO CLASSICAL ELEMENTS IN GREEK ART AND CULTIJRAL FORMS. 
HE ASSOCIATED APOLLO WITH ORDER. LAWFULNESS, CLARITY, FORM. REASON ETC AND DIONYSIUS WITH 
THE IRRATIONAL, CHANGE, MOVEMENT RHYTHM AND ECSTASY. SEE NIETZSCHE'S 'THE BIRTH OF 
TRAGEDY.' SECTIONS 1-5, 'THE WILL TO POWER. 'SEE ALSO: SCHACHT.R. 'DIONYSIAN AND 
APOLLONIAN.' IN THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY.(EDITED :HONDERJCH.T: 
1996).P202. 
45 COCHRANE. OP CIT.P402. 
"'IBID.P416. 
47 AGAIN WE ARE REFERRING TO THE DISCUSSION IN COCHRANE. P4 l 7FF. 
48 COCHRANE.IBID.P427. 
49 AUGUSTINE.'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT.BOOK X.XXIII-IV.P35!-3. 
so TO SOME EXTEl'<-r THIS CONVICTION IS EVIDENT IN THE VERY TRINITARIAN STRUCTURE OF THE 
AUGUSTINIAN MIND ITSELF. 
51 AUGUSTINE. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT.BOOK X.XXIV.P355. 
52 O'MEARAJ.J. 'THE NEOPLATONISM OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.P35. SAYS O'MEARA; 
'W. THEILER ... WAS BREAST HIGH FOR PoRPHYRY; P.HENRY FOR PLOTINUS. IN MY OW'.'< INTRODUCTION TO 
THE "CONTRAACADEA1ICOS' I HAD ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT IN MY VIEW "BOTH PLOTINUS AND 
PORPHYRY ARE WELL REPRESEl'ffED," IN THAT WORK. To THAT POINT, CLAIMS FOR THE DOMINATING 
INFLUENCE OF PLOTINUS WERE ST AND ARD. SINCE THEN AND, I AM HAPPY TO SAY, SINCE MY OWN 
"PoRPHYRY'S PHILOSOPHY FROM THE ORACLES IN AUGUSTINE" ... P.HADoT'S VERY LONELY REVIEW OF IT 
IN THE "REVUE DES ETUDESAUGUSTINIENNES' . .. AND HIS OWN SUBSEQUENT WORK, "PORPHYRE ET 
VICTORINUS." ... PoRPHYRY HAS GAINED ENORMOUSLY IN HIS REPUTATION AS A PHILOSOPHER AND IS 
ALLOWED A.'J IMPORTANT ROLE, ALONGSIDE HIS MASTER PLOTINUS, IN INFLUENCING AUGUSTINE.'-IB!D.P37. 
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53 lBID.P39. 
54 SPEAKl'>G OF PLOTDllJS. AR.\!STRONG SAID: 'WHEN WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR UNDERSTANDING OF 
RE . .\LITY. WE HAVE TO LEAVE IT ALL BEHIND IN ORDER TOFl'-'D WHAT TURNS OUT TOBE THE ONLY THING. 
THE sorncE OF ALL V . .\LUES .·\ND THE GOAL OF ALL DESIRE. WHICH ALONE MAKES IT WORTH THE EFFORT TO 
ATTAJNTONOL'SON THE WAY. AS !TIS THE ONLY REASON WHY Nous IS THERE AT ALL. .. '-
ARMSTRONG.AH. 'ELEMENTS IN THE THOUGHT OF PLOTINUS AT VARIANCE WITH 
CLASSICAL INTELLECTUALISM. 'Op Cn.Pi3. 
"SEE: O'MEARA.J.'THE NEOPLATONISM OF SAINT AUGUSTINE. 'Op C!T.P36FF. 
56 THIS IS .-\N 11'"TERESTING POINT, IMPORTANT FOR OUR LATER ASSESSMENT OF AUGUSTINE'S VIEW OF 
BEING. As WE SHALL SEE, PROMINENT INTERPRETERS, DO NOT ACCEPT THAT AUGUST!l'<"E INHERITED THE 
PLOTINl.-1.,N VIEW THAT GoD IS: BEYOND BEING. INSTEAD THEY SUGGEST THAT CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIANS, 
TEND TO DOWNGRADE THE IDEA OF THE PLOTINIAN 'ONE,' INSTEAD CHOOSING TO USE THE CONCEPT OF 
'Nous .• AS APPROXIMATING THE PERSON OF Goo. THIS MIGHT BE TRUE: AUGUSTINE MIGHT NOT HAVE USED 
THE EXACT TER.\l: 'BEYOND BEING,' FOR Goo, BUT HE COMES CLOSE TO IT IN HIS DESCRIPTION OF Goo. A," 
EXAMPLE IS SO~!E OF HIS COMMENTS IN HIS WORK 'ON THE NATURE OF THE GOOD AGAINST THE 
MANICHEES." LL IN AUGUSTINE:EARLIER WRITINGS. OP CIT.P326FF: 'THE SUPREME Goon 
BEYOND ALL OTHERS JS GoD. IT IS THEREBY L"NCHANGEABLE GOOD, TRULY ETERNAL, TRULY IMMORTAL. 
ALL OTHER GOOD THINGS DERIVE THEIR ORIGIN FROM HIM BUT ARE NOT PART OF HI~!... THEREFORE. ALL 
GOOD THINGS THROUGHOUT ALL RANKS OF BEING, WHETHER GREAT OR SMALL, CAN DERIVE THEIR BEING 
OXLY FROM Goo ... ALL ARE NOT SUPREMELY GOOD. BUT THEY APPROXIMATE TO THE SUPREME GOOD, AND 
EWN THE VERY LOWEST GOODS, WHICH ARE FAR DIST ANT FROM THE SUPREME GOOD, CAN ONLY DERIVE 
THEIR EXISTENCE FROM THE SUPREME GOOD ... GoD TRANSCENDS ALL ~,fEASURE, FORM AND ORDER IN HIS 
CREATl"RES .. 
50 STOB.H. OP C!T.Pl27. HERE STOBB IS QUOTING 'ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.' OP CIT.I. 11. 18. SEE 
ALSO 'ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.' IBID.BOOK II.CHAP XL.P75: 'IF THOSE WHO ARE CALLED 
PHILOSOPHERS. ESPECL.\LLY THE PLATONISTS, HA VE SAID THINGS WHICH ARE INDEED TRUE AND ARE WELL 
ACCOM~IODATED TO OliR FAITH, THEY SHOULD NOT BE FEARED; RATHER. WHAT THEY HA VE SAID SHOULD 
BE TAKEN FRO~! THEM AS FROM UNJUST POSSESSORS A"° CONVERTED TO OUR USE.' 
58 BRUNNERE. (TRANSLATED: WYON.O: 1939).'MANINREVOLT.' P241-2. 
59 FOR WHAT FOLLOWS IN THIS SECTION. \1-"E ARE INDEBTED PRIMARILY TOW ASSMER T.A. "THE 
TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF AUGUSTINE AND HIS DEBT TO PLOTINUS.' OP CIT.P248FF. 
60 1BID.P248. 
61 AUGUSTINE. "CONFESSIONS." OP CIT.BOOK VII.CHAP 9. !3.Pl2L 
62 !BID.Pl21-22. 
63 AUGUSTINE. 'SER HON CONTR4 ARIANOS. '3, AS QUOTED BY W ASSMER T. OP Cn.P249. 
64 W ASSMER TA OP CIT.P249. 
65 
'DE TRINITATE.' Vl.9.8: XV.8. AGAIN QUOTED BY WASSMERT.A. OP CIT.P249. 
66 RUDEBUSCH. G.' ARISTOTELIAN PREDICATION. AUGUSTINE. AND THE TRINITY. 'OP 
CIT.P589FF. 
"AUGUSTINE. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT.BOOK XI.X.P464. 'ON THE SIMPLE AND 
UNCHfu'lGEABLE TRINITY OF GOD THE FATHER GOD THE SON AND GOD THE HOLY 
SPIRIT. ONE GOD, IN WHOM QUALITY AND SUBSTANCE ARE NOT TWO DIFFERENT 
THINGS.' 
68 BROWN.P .. AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO.' OP CJT.P93. ' ... BUT WHEN I HAD ME:-ITIONED THAT I HAD READ 
SOME OF THE BOOKS OF THE PLATONISTS, WHICH HAD BEEN TRA'ISLATED Il'<TO LATIN BY VICTORINUS, AT 
01'."E Tl~!E RIIETOR IN THE CITY OF ROME WHO HAD, l HAD HEARD, DIED A CHRISTIAN ... VICTORINUS WAS AN 
D.TRE~!ELY LEARNED AND MOST EXPERT IN ALL THE LIBERAL DISCIPLINES. HE HAD READ AND ASSESSED 
'o.L-\.NY PHILOSOPHERS• IDEAS,-""° WAS TuTOR TO NUMEROUS NOBLE SENATORS. TO MARK THE 
DISTINGL1SHED QUALITY OF HIS TEACHINGS HE WAS OFFERED AND ACCEPTED A STATUE IN THE ROMAN 
FORUM ... U1'TIL HEW AS OF ADVANCED YEARS HEW AS A WORSHIPPER OF IDOLS ANO TOOK PART IN 
SACRILEGIOUS RITES ... ' -AUGUSTINE. 'CONFESSIONS.' OP CIT. BOOK Vlll.II.3. Pi35. SAYS 
CHADWICK OF SIMPLICJANUS .-\ND AUGUST!l'<"E: 'THEY MUCH ADMIRED MARIUS VICTORINUS WHOSE LAST 
YEARS HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEOPLATONIC LOGIC IN DEFENCE OF ORTHODOX 
TRINITARIAN BELIEF. AUGUSTINE WAS NEVER GREATLY INFLUENCED BY THE OBSCURE THEOLOGICAL 
WRITINGS OF VICTORINUS ... '-CHADWICK.H. 'AUGUSTINE.' OP C1T.Pl6. SPEAKING OF THE 
"TRANSL-\.TIONS' OF VICTORINUS, USED BY AUGUSTINE, SAYS GILSON: 'LATER AUGUSTINE SPECIFIES THAT 
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THE TRANSLATOR OF THESE PLATONIC BOOKS WAS MARIUS VICTORINUS. CF "CONFESSIONS" VIII. 2, 3, 
PATROLOGIA LATINA.32, 750. UNFORTUNATELY, VICTORINUS' TRANSLATIONS \VHICH WERE PROBABLY 
MADE BEFORE HIS CONVERSION TO CHRISTIANITY, ARE NOW LOST. SO WE DO NOT ACTUALLY KNOW WHICH 
PLATONIC WRITINGS ARE MEANT. THE WORD ''PLATONICORUM" SUGGESTS SEVERAL AL'THORS. SINCE 
AUGUSTINE QUOTED IAMBLICHUS, PORPHYRY, HERMES TRISMEGISTUS AND APULEIS IN ADDITION TO 
l'LOTINUS WE MAY WELL HESITATE AJvlONG THESE NAMES ... BUT !'LOTINUS WAS VERY LIKELY HIS MAIN 
sol;RcE .... '-GILSON.E.'THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.NOTE 
39.P362. 
69 MARKUS.RA. 'MARIUS VICTORINUS AND AUGUSTINE .• IN THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF 
LATER GREEK AND EARLY MEDIAEVAL PHILOSOPHY. OP CIT.CHAP 20. P33 l. THE WORK OF 
JEROME REFERRED TO, IS IN THE MIONE SERIES, (PL.23.739). THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE EDITION OF HIS 
WORKS, HAS BEEN COMPILED BY FATHER PAUL HENRY: MARIUS VICTORINUS. 'CANDID! ARR!AN! AD 
.lv!ARIUM VICTORINUM RHETORE'vfDE GENERATION£ DIVINA. ADVERSUSARJUM DE 
HOMOOUSJO RECJP!ENDO. HYAfNUS. JI. III' SOURCES CHRETIENNES. PARIS. LES EDITIONS DU 
CERF. I %0. AUGUSTINE ALSO PROVIDES SOME INFORMATION ABDI.ff VICTORINUS IN THE 'CONFESSIONS.' 
HIS FAME AS A RHETORICIAN WAS KNOWN BY AUGUSTINE, PA.RTL Y DUE TO A ST A TUE RAISED IN HIS HONOUR 
IN THE FORUM BY THE EMPEROR. TRAJAN. 'HE HAD WRITTEN GRAMMATICAL, RHETORICAL A.'ID LOGICAL 
TREATISES, COMMENTARIES ON CICERO AND ARlSTOTLE.'-IBID.P33 l. IN HIS EXTREME OLD AGE HE BECAME 
A CHRISTIAN, 'AVGUSTINE HAD AlREADY READ VICTORINUS' TRANSLATIONS OF NEOPLATONIC LITERATURE 
WHEN HIS MILANESE FRIEND, SIMPLICIANUS, WHO HAD KNOWN VICTORINUS WELL, TOLD HIM TIIE STORY OF 
HIS CONVERSION.' -!BID.P33 l. V!CTORINUS IS IMPORT ANT AS A LINK BETWEEN THE EARLY LATIN .>.ND THE 
GREEK WORLDS OF THOUGHT, BEING IN FA.CT, THE FIRST WRITER OF A METAPHYSICAL TREATISE IN LATIN. 
VICTORINVS, IS ONE OF THE MOST (IF NOT THE MOST) llv!PORT ANT LINES OF DIRECT INFLUENCE FROM 
PLOTINVS TO AUGUSTINE. 
70 SEE ALSO THE DISCUSSION IN RIST.J.M. 'AUGUSTINE. 'P258.0P CIT. 
11 
'IF, THEREFORE, GoD IS NOT THE NON-EXISTENT, HE IS, HOWEVER, WHAT IS ABOVE THAT WHICH EXlSTS, 
WHICH IS TRULY "O!/' (EXISTENT), THE POTENTIALITY OF TIIE ''Git' (EXISTEN'T) ITSELF, POTENTIALLY 
WHICH, WHEN TIIE BEGETTING ACT IS AWAKENED IN IT, WILL BEGET IN A.'l !NEFF ABLE MOTION TIIE Fl;LL Y 
PERFECT "Oli' (EXISTENT) ... IT FOLLOWS THAT GoD IS Tiffi TOTAL "PRO ON" (PRE-EXISTENT), AND JESUS IS 
Tiffi TOTAL "Oii' (EXISTENT).'-VICTORINUS.M. 'LETTER TO CANDIDAS.' OP CIT.P62. 'INDEED, WHAT 
00 WE THINK Goo IS? EVEN IF WE THINK THAT Goo IS ABOVE EVERYTHING, BOTH EXISTENTS AND 
N01'"EXISTENTS, NEVERTHELESS WE BELIEVE THAT GoD IS EXISTENT AND NOT NON-EXISTENT.' -[BID.P62. 
' ... IF Goo IS THE CAUSE OF EVERYTHING, Goo IS THE CAUSE OF BEING (ESSE) AND NONBEING.'-IBID.P63. 
'GoD IS ABOVE ALL EXISTENCE, ABOVE ALL LIFE, ABOVE AlL KNOWLEDGE, ABOVE EVERY ''OI/' (EXISTENT) 
AND THE ''ONTOS ONTON" (EXISTENTS); INDEED HE IS UNKNOWABLE, INFINITE, INVISIBLE, WITHOL'T IDEA, 
INSUBSTANTIAL, INCONCEIVABLE, fu'JD BECAUSE TRANSCENDENT, HE HAS NOTHING OF EXISTENTS, A.'ID 
BECAUSE HE IS ABOVE EXISTENTS. HE HAS NOTHING FROM EX1STE1''TS. GoD IS THEREFORE "ME ON" 
(NONEXISTENT).' -IBID. P70. 
SAYS MARIUS: 'GoD IS ... ABOVE ALL BEING, ABOVE ''WHATIS REALLY BEING," ABOVE ALL LIFE AND 
KNOWLEDGE, HE IS TllEREFORE NON-BEING. THIS NON-BEING ABOVE BEING IS ~'JOWN ONLY BY IGNORANCE. 
VICTORINUS REFERS TO IT AS "PRE-BEING." (PRO ON).'-IBID.P335. 
12 CLARK.M.T.'THE NEOPLATONISM OF MARIUS VICTORINUS THE CHRISTIAN.' IN 
NEOPLATONISM AND EARLY CHRISTIANITY. (EDITED :BLllvlENTHAL.H.J: !98!).Pl55FF. 
73 IBID.Pl56. 
14 THE QUOTE IS FROM TIIE 'ADVERSUSAR!ANUM.' l.30.20-6, AS QUOTED BY CLARK.M.T.'THE 
NEOPLATONISM OF MARIUS VICTORINUS THE CHRISTIAN.' OP CIT. Pl57. 
'
5 SEE CLARK.M.T.'VICTORINUS, PORPHYRY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.' OP 
CIT .P27 l. THIS WAS ORIGINALLY A COMBINATION OF STOICISM WlTH NEOPLATONISM. STOIC SUBSTANCE, 
PER DEFINITION, INCLUDED A DYNAMIC ELEMENT, "BEING,' RENDERED AS AN INFINITIVE IS SEEN TO BE SELF· 
M0~1NG-[BID.P270. THIS IS WHAT DIFFERENTIATES THE NEOPLATONIC INTELLIGIBLE WORLD FROM THE 
PLATONIC OR ARISTOTELIAN ONE, THE DYNA.\llSM OF MIND.-[BID.P270. 'ACTION WHICH FOR THE STOICS 
WAS THE ACCIDENT OF BODIES BECAME WITH PoRPHYRY A SUBSISTENT PRINCIPLE.' -IBID.P270. 
76 SEEHENRY.P.'THEADVERSUSAR!UMOF MARIUS VICTORINUS, THE FIRST SYSTEMATIC 
EXPOSITION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 'Or CIT.P43FF. 
17 1BID.P44. 
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.
8 MARKUS.OP Cn.P334 . 
. , CLARK.MT. 'MARIUS VICTORINUS AFER. PORPHYRY AND THE HISTORY OF 
PHILOSOPHY. 'OP Crr.P266. 'THE FATHER IS ESSE. THE SoN IS MOVEMENT OR THE ACT WHICH DEFNES 
TIIIS ESSE. THIS ;>.,IOYEMENT IS A DOUBLE ONE: A MOVEME1''T OF 'LIFE.' AND A MOVEMEN'T OF 'KNOWLEDGE.' 
LIFE IS THAT \!OVE~IENT BY WHICH ESSE OR "TO-BE .. COMMlNICATES ITSELF; KNOWLEDGE IS THAT 
\!OVE\IENT BY WHICH IT RETURNS TO ITSELF. FATHER. SON AND SPIRIT ARE CONSl 'BST A'ITIAL BECAUSE AS 
ESSE. LIFE .\SD KNOWLEDGE THEY ARE MUTUALLY IMPLIED.' -!BID.P265-6. 
80 STEAD.C.G. ·AUGUSTINE AND BEING.· OP CIT.P74. AUGUSTINE.A. 'THE CITYOF GOD.' OP 
CIT.BOOK \1111. VI: 'ON THE VIEW OF THE PLATONISTS IN THE BRANCH OF PHILOSOPHY 
THAT IS CALLED PHYSICAL.' 'So THESE PHILOSOPHERS WHO, AS WE SEE. HA VE NOT UNDESERVEDLY 
ACHIEVED A GLORIOUS REPUTATION BEYOND ALL OTHERS, PERCEIVED THAT NON MATERIAL BODY IS Goo; 
AND THEREFORE IN SEEKL'JG GoD THEY HA VE GONE ABOVE AND BEYOND ALL MATERIAL BODIES ... BECAUSE 
HE IS CHANGING A."JD UNIFORM, THEY HA VE REASONED BOTII THAT HE CREATED ALL THESE THINGS AND 
THAT HE HI!v!SELF COULD HA VE BEEN CREATED FROM NONE OF THEM. THEY HA VE REFLECTED THAT, 
WHATEVER IS. IS EITHER BODILY MATTER OR LIFE. THAT LIFE IS SOMETHING BETTER THA'l BODILY MATTER • 
. \ND THAT THE FOR\! OF BODILY MATTER IS APPARE:-IT TO THE SENSES WHILE THAT OF LIFE IS TO BE GRASPED 
BY THE INTELLIGENCE. SO THEY HA VE PROCEEDED TO GIVE A HIGHER PLACE TO THE FORM WHICH IS 
11''TELLIGIBLE THAN THAT WHICH IS SENSIBLE .. .'-P 32-33. SEE ALSO 'THE CITY OF GOD.' [BID. BOOK 
XI.XVI. 'THE GRADES AND DISTINCTIONS AMONG CREATED BEINGS WHICH ARE WEIGHED 
IN ONE WAY BY THE SCALES OF UTILITY. IN ANITTHER BY THE SCALES OF RATIONAL 
ORDER.' P489FF. 
81 STEAD.CG. OP CIT.P74. 
80 ANDERSON.J.F 'ST AUGUSTINE AND BEING .• OP CIT. PlO. '[TIS A PUZZLING PHENOMENON 
BECAL'.SE. AL TIIOUGH THE CHRISTIA.'l MET ..\PHYSICS OF THOMAS AQLTNAS IS NOT THE CHRISTIA.'l 
yffiT..\PHYSICS OF Al' GUSTINE, THESE METAPHYSICS COULD NOT SIMPLY BE OPPOSED TO EACH OTHER, ELSE 
THE TIIEOLOGIES WHEREIN THEY EXERCISE THE INDISPENSABLE FUNCTION OF VlT AL RATIONAL ORGANS 
WOLL!) THE\ISELVES BE DISCORDA.,'JT. BL'T WHAT RESPECTABLE "SCHOLASTIC .. WOULD DENY THAT. IN 
THEIR ESSEN'TIAL TEACHING ABOUT Goo AND THE THINGS OF GoD. THE THOUGHT OF THESE TWO MASTERS IS 
REMARKABLY CONGRUEN'T?'-IBID.Pl. 
83 ANDERSON.J.F.!Bm.P3FF. 
"STEAD.CG.' AUGUSTINE AND BEING.' OP CIT.P73. ACCORDING TO STEAD, AUGUSTINE DREW 
L'.P01' THE E . .\RLIER . DEMIURGIC •. PLA T0"1C THEORY OF Goo. AS THE CREATOR, RATHER THAN THE L<\. TER 
TRADITI01' OF PLOTDJLS. PoRPHYRY .'-''JD VICTORINUS. WHERE GoD IS IN SO!vlE SENSE, CONCEIVED OF AS'. 
'BEYO"'D BEING.' OR 'PRIOR TO BEING.' SAYS AUGUSTINE: 'WHAT IS PAST HAS CEASED TO BE, AND WHAT 
IS Fl'Tl'R.E H.~S NOT YET BEGl'N TO BE. ETERNlTY IS EVER THE SAME. [T NEVER ''WAS .. INTHE SENSE THAT IT 
IS NOT 1'0W. AND IT "1'VER "WILL BE ... IN THE SENSE THAT IT IS NOT YET. WHEREFORE ETERNITY ALONE 
COUD HA \c SAID TO THE HUM.\,'< MIND•'[·"'"' WHAT I MA ... AND OF ETERNITY ALONc COULD IT BE TRULY 
SAID: "HE WllO IS HATH SENT ME'" (EX. 3: 14).-AUGUSTINE.A. 'OF TRUE RELIGION.' OP CIT. %.P275. 
SEE ALSO: ·THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT.BOOK XII.II. P 9-11. 'THAT NO KIND OF BEING IS 
CONTRARY TO GOD, BECAUSE NOT-BEING IS CLEARLY THE DIRECT OPPOSITE OF HIM 
WHO SUPREMELY AND FOR EVER IS. (NULLAAI ESSENTL4M DEO ESSE CONTRARJAA,f, QUIA AB 
EO QUI SO/ME ET SEHPER EST HOC IN TOTUM VIDETUR DIVERSUM ESSE QUOD NON ES1).' 
.... FOR. SIN'CE Goo IS THE SUMMIT OF BEING. THAT IS TO SAY, HE lS SUPREMELY ANDIS THEREFORE 
UNCHkNGE . .\BLE, HE GRA'lTED BEING TO THE OBJECTS THAT HE CREATED OUT OF NOTHING, BUT NOT THE 
SUPRE~IE ~U OF BEI1'G THAT BELONGS TO HIM. HE ALSO GRANTED A LARGER MEASURE OF BEING TO SO!\!E 
BL'T LESS OF IT TO OTHERS AND SO ORDERED NATURAL ENTITIES ACCORDING TO A SYSTEM OF DEGREES OF 
BEl1'G. THE WORD "BEING .. (ESSENTIA) BEARS THE SA.\1£ RELATION TO THE VERB "TO BE" (ESSE) AS THE 
NOL'N "WISDOM" (SAPIENT/A) TO THE VERB "TO BE WISE" (SAPERE). THE WORD "ESSENTIA .. IS ADMITTEDLY A 
NEW COINAGE NOT USED BY THE EARLIER LA TIN WRITERS, BUT IT HAS BECOME GOOD USAGE IN OUR ERA. 
ELSE OUR L..\NGUAGE WOULD STILL LACK A WORD FOR WHAT TIIE GREEKS CALL "OUSIA;" FOR THE LATIN 
"ESSE.VTJA" IS OBTAINED BY A LITERAL TRANSLATION OF THE GREEK TERM.' 
SAYS GILSON: 'THERE IS AGREAT DEAL OF NEOPLATONJSM IN AUGUSTINE, BUT THERE IS A POINT, .\,"ID IT IS 
A DECISIVE ONE, AT WHICH HE PARTS COMPANY WITH PLOTINUS: THERE IS NOTHING ABOVE Goo IN THE 
CHRISTIA'< WORLD OF AUGUSTINE, AND, SINCE Goo IS BEING, THERE IS NOTHING ABOVE BEING. TRUE 
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ENOUGH, THE GoD OF AUGUSTINE IS ALSO THE ONE AND THE GOOD, BUT HE IS, NOT BECAUSE HE IS BOTH 
GOOD AND THE ONE: RATHER HE IS BOTH GOOD AND ONE BECAUSE HE IS HE WHO ls. '-G!LSON.E. 'BEING 
AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS.' OP CIT.P3 L GILSON IS PARTICULARLY POSITIVE ABOUT AUGUSTINE 's 
DEPARTURE FROM NEOPLATONISM HERE. SPECIFICALLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACT THAT HE READ 
VICTORINUS, WHO DID NOT REJECT THE NEOPLATONIC TRADITION IN THIS MANNER. 
85 ANDERSON. OP CIT.PS. THE PROBLEM, OF COURSE, IN THE USAGE BY AUGUSTINE, OF THIS BIBLICAL 
PASSAGE, (ON WHICH, IT SEEMS, HIS ENTIRE EDIFICE OR THEORY OF THE EQUATION OF GoD AND BEING. 
STANDS) IS THAT THE THEOLOGICAL AND LITERAL GENRE, FROM WHICH IT ARISES. CANNOT BE FURTHER 
DIVORCED FROM AUGUSTINE'S NEOPLATONIC ONTOLOGY. THIS PASSAGE IS NOT TRYING TO EQUATE GoD 
WITH ANY KIND OF METAPHYSICAL CONCEPT, IN THE WAY AUGUSTINE WOULD SEE METAPHYSICS. 
86 IBID.P7. 
87 THIS, ESSENTIALLY, IS PRECISELY THE SAME PROBLEM THAT VAN NIEKERK, POINTS TO IN TIIE THEOLOGY 
OF KARL BARTH, AND INDEED, TO THE THEOLOGIES OF MANY. How CAN WE TALK AT ALL THEN ABOUT THE 
ONE, IF NOTHING OF HIM CAN BE SAID? ONE CAN MAKE AN INTERESTING COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ONE OF 
ANSELM AND THE ONE OF PLOTINUS. ANSELM'S ONE SEEMS SIMILAR SUPERFICIALLY TO THAT OF 
AUGUSTINE: !IE OF WHOM NO GREATER CAN BE THOUGHT. THIS IS BEING ITSELF. THE PLOTINIAN ONE, (AND 
WE SUSPECT THE BARTHIAN ONE) HOWEVER IS: HE OF WHOM NOTHING CAN BE THOUGHT OF, AT ALL! [F 
THIS IS THE CA.SE, WHOM ARE WE THEN SPEAKING ABOUT'? 
88 ANDERSON. OP CIT.P 15. SEE ALSO: AUGUSTINE. 'THE CITY OF GOD.' OP CIT. BOOK VIII.VI. 
P3 l: 'THEY PERCEIVED THAT ANYTHING SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHANGE IS NOT THE MOST HIGH Goo: AND THAT 
IS WHY IN SEEKING THE MOST HIGH GOD, THEY HA VE GONE ABOVE .'-''ID BEYOND EVERY LIVING SOUL A.'ID 
ALL DISEMBODIED SPIRITS THAT ARE SUSCEPTIBLE TO CHA.'IGE .... NOR, CONSEQUENTLY, CAN THE MATTER 
OF THE WHOLE UNIVERSE WITH ITS SHAPES, QUALITIES AND REGULATED MOVEMENT ... HA VE A..'IY EXISTENCE 
EXCEPT AS IT COMES FROM HIM WHO IS ABSOLL'TE BEING FOR HIS BEING AND LIVING ARE NOT SEPARATE, AS 
IF HE COULD EXIST WITHOUT LIVING; NOR AS HIS LIVING AND EXERCISE OF REASON SEPARATE, AS IF HE 
COULD LIVE WITHOUT EXERCISE OF REASON ... BUT FOR HIM TO BE ~!EANS TO LIVE, TO REASON AND TO BE 
HAPPY.' FAIR, ENOUGH, AUGUSTINE DIDRESISTTHENEOPLATONICTEMPTATION, NA.'-IELY, TO IDENTIFY 
Goo's BEING WITH His IMMUTABILITY. PLATO HELD THAT PERMANENCY IN SELF-IDENTITY CONSTffiJTES 
THE VERY ESSENCE OF BEING. TO 'BE,' IS TO BE CHA.'IGELESSLY THE SA.'-lE. INSTEAD, AUGUST1"'E CHOSE TO 
IDENTIFY IN GOD THE PRIMACY OF ESSE, ABOVE THE OTHER ATTRIBL'TES. YET THE FACT THAT THE 'ESSE' OF 
GoD IS SO 'WHOLLY OTHER FROM OTHER TYPES OF ESSE,' THE RESULT IS THE SAME. GoD IS BEYOND OTHER 
BEINGS. IN FACT FOR THE CREATED BEING, THERE ARE TWO POSSIBILITIES ONLY: ITCAN SHARE IN BEING, OR 
MOVE TOWARDS NOT BEING (WHICH IS EVIL). CREATURES HAVE BEING AS A POSSESSION BY GRACE, THEY 
ARE NOT BEING ITSELF, AS GOD IS. THEY HAVE IT ONLY IN A LIMITED MEASURE OR PARTICIPATIVELY· 
ANDERSON. OP Crr.P23. IN ms DOCTRINE OF CREATION THEN, AuGUST!1'"E ARGL"ES FOR THE 
CO~l~fu1'1CATIONOR THE GIVING OF BEING, TO THE CREATURE. ON THE CONTRARY, WITH PLoTINUs' VIEW 
OF 'EMA.'IATION,' WE HA VE RATHER THE COMMUNICATION OF AN IDENTICAL ESSENCE (OUSL4), TO ALL 
THINGS INV ARYING DEGREES.-!BID.P35. GOD ."8 THE 'IMMUTABLE FORM,' NOT ONLY IN CREATION, 
BESTOWS EXISTENCE UPON THE CREATL'RE, BUT ALSO THE INTELLIGIBLE FORM OF THAT CREATION. 
HOWEVER, 'THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT FOR At:GUSTINE THE PRIMARY TERMINUS OF Goo's CREATIVE ACT IS 
ESSE IN THE SENSE OF EXISTENTIAL ACT, A.'ID NOT "ESSENCE" IN THE SENSE OF QUIDDITY OR WHAT!'<"ESS. ' -
IBID.P39. IT IS ALSO INTERESTING TO NOTE HOW TILLICH VIEWS THE AUGUSTINIAN UNDERST A.'IDING OF 
GoD's BEf.'.iG: 'GoD IS SUA1MA ESSENTL4, ULTIMATE BEING, BEYOND ALL CATEGORIES, BEYOND ALL 
TEMPORAL A.'ID SPATIAL THINGS. EVEN THE C\TEGORIES OF SUBSTANCE CANNOT BE USED. ESSENCE AND 
EXISTENCE, BEING AND QU A.LITY, FUNCTIONS AND ACTS, THESE CA.'INOT BE DISTINGUISHED IN THIS SIDE OF 
GoD. THE ~"EGATIVE THEOLOGY WHICH V.'E FOUND IN 0IONYSIUS IS ALSO FOUND HERE, BOTH WERE 
DEPENDENT ONNEOPLATONISM ... INSOFAR ."8 GOD IS BEYOND ANY DIFFERENCE, HE IS BEYOND SUBJECT 
AND OBJECT.' -T!LL!CH.P' A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT.' OP CIT.Pl 16. AGAIN, IN OUR 
VIEW, THIS COMES VERY CLOSE TO ATTRIBUTING TO AUGUSTINE'S GoD, THE SAME ATTRIBUTES OF THE 
PLOTINIA.'I ONE. 
89 ANDERSON. OP CIT.Pl9. 
90 IBID.P20. 
91 ATHERTON.P.'THE NEOPLATONIC "ONE" ANDTHE TRINITARIAN "ARCHE." THE 
CONFLICT OVER THE UNITY OF THE PRINCIPLE AND ITS RELATION TO THE "IDENTITY" OF 
THE ABSOLUTE IN SCHELLING AND HEGEL.' OP CIT.Pl 73. 
92 IBID.Pl 74. 
93 IBID.Pl74. 
94 SCHWOBEL.C. 'INTRODUCTION. TIIE RENAISSANCE OF TRINITARIAN 
THEOLOGY:REASONS. PROBLEMS AND TASKS.' IN TRINITARIAN TIIEOLOGY TODAY. 
(EDITED :SCHWOBEL.C: l995).P5. 
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95 GUNTON.C. 'AUGUSTINE. THE TRINITY AND THE THEOLOGICAL CRISIS OF THE WEST. 'OP 
CIT. 
96 
'WE LIVE IN A CULTURE MARKED. AS FEW OTHERS HA VE BEEN, BY A PERSISTENT AND DEEP-SEATED 
SCEPTICISM ABOUT THE EXISTENCE AND KNOW ABILITY OF GoD. '-[BID.P33. 
91 IBID.P36FF. GUNTON SEES THIS ANTI-MATERIALISM. IN AUGUSTINE'S FAILURE TO PLACE THE 
INCARNATION, AS WELL AS THE HUMANITY OF CHRIST !NfO HIS TRThTIARIAN THOUGHT. IN FACT, (AS 
GUNTON SEES IT) AUGUSTINE CLEARLY DENIES THE IMPORT ANT ROLE OF THE ECONOMY OF SALVATION, IN 
HIS WORKING OUT OF THE ROLES OF THE SON AND THE SPIRIT. FOR EJ(AMPLE. IN REFLECTING ON THE 
THEOPHANIES OF THE OW TEST A.\,IENT, AUGUSTINE INSISTS THAT THESE ARE THEOPHANIES OF THE WHOLE 
TRINITY, NOT JUST THE SON, THUS, IN GU!<"TON'S OPINION, THIS IS A DETRACTION FROM THE ROLE OF THE 
INCARNATION. 'IN THAT CONNECTION, IT MUST BE SAID TIIAT THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST IS 
MORE IMPORTANT FOR AUGUSTINE THAT THAT OF THE HUMANITY.'-IBID.P37. THUS 'GoD IS NOT 
SVBSTANT!ALL Y INVOLVED IN CREATION.' -IBID.P37. 
98 IBID.P38. 
99 IBID.P40. 
lOO 'WHAT IS THE REAL SOURCE OF AUGUSTINE'S UNDERSTANDING OF THE T.RINITY'? THE TEXTBOOKS 
ASSURE US THATITIS ScRIPTURE AND THE DOGMATIC TRADITION OF THE CHURCH ... THE FACT IS THAT 
DURING THE PROCESS OF REFLECTION-THE TRADITION IS CHANGED UNSUBTLY AND RADICALLY.' -IBID.P4 l. 
101 1BID.P42. 
102 IBID.P43. 
103 IBID.P44. 
104 IBID.P45. SAYS GAYBBA:' .. Blrr AUGUSTINE STRESSES THE MATIER TO THE POil<"T WHERE NONE OF THE 
PERSONS APPEAR TO HA VE A DISTINCTIVE ROLE IN OUR SALVATION (APART FROM THE SON'S OWN LIFE. 
DEATH. AND RESURRECTION. SINCE HE .ALONE BECAME INCAR-'IATE). ANY SUCH DISTINCTION IS REDUCED TO 
THE LEVEL OF .. APPROPRIATION" -THE ATTRIBUTION, FOR REASONS OF FITTINGNESS, OF A CHARACTERISTIC 
OR ACTIVITY TO ONE PERSON RATHER THAN ANOTHER. EVEN THOUGH .ALL THREE POSSESS THAT 
CHARACTERISTIC OR PERFORM THE ACTIVITY EQUALLY. THE UPSHOT OF THIS IS THAT WE DO NOT REALLY 
HA VE A DISTINCT RELATIONSHIP TO EACH OF THE PERSONS, BlJ"T ONLY WITH DIVINITY AS SUCH.' -
GA YBBAB. 'THE SPIRIT OF LOVE. 'OP CIT.P60. 
105 WOLFSON COMPARES THE VIEW OF TERTIJLLIA.'I AND AUGUSTINE ONTHIS MATIER: ' THE CNITY OF THE 
"MATERIAL MATRIX" ~!EA.NS THE SAME AS THE UNITY OF "SUBSTRATUM." THE COMMON SUBSTRATUM, 
ACCORDING TO TERTULLIAN, HOWEVER. IS TIIE FATHER AND NOT SOMETHING UNDERLYING BOTH THE 
FATHER AND THE SON, IN WHICH RESPECT HE DEPARTS FR0"1 ARISTOTLE'S USE OF UNITY OF SUBSTRA TL""1, 
FOR IN ARISTOTLE THE COMMON SUBSTRATUM OF OIL AND WINE IS NEITHER THE OIL NOR THE WINE BUT 
WATER, WHICH IS SOMETHING UNDERLYING BOTH THE OIL A.'ID THE WINE. LATER AS WE SHALL SEE, 
AUGUSTINE DEFINITELY SAYS THAT HE PREFERS THE ANALOGY OF ''SG'BSTRATW.1"To THAT OF "SPECIES" OR 
"GENUS' AS THE COMMON UNITY OF THE TRINITY AND IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE THAT HE WAS INFLUENCED 
THEREIN BY TERTULLIAN. \1'1lOSE UNITY OF SUBSTANCE HE UNDERSTOOD TO ;.JEA.'1 UNITY OF SUBSTRATUM. 
UNLIKE TERTULLIA.\I AND LIKE ARISTOTLE, HOWEVER, AS WE SHALL AGAIN SEE, HE lDENfIFIES THE 
SUBSTRATUM NOT WITH THE FATHER BUT WITH SO~IETHING UNDERLYING BOTH THE FATHER AND THE SON. 
THUS THE THREE ~!EMBERS OF THE TRINITY ARE TAKEN BY TERTULLIAN, AS THEY ARE ALSO BY ORIGEN, TO 
;JEAN THREE REAL INDIVIDUALS. OR RATHER INDIVIDUAL SPECIES. FOR THE DESIGNATION OF WHICH HE 
USES, AMONG OTHER TERMS. ALSO THE TERM PERSONS.' -WOLFSON.H.A 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
CHURCH FATHERS. 'OP CJT.P326-7. 
106 GUNTON.C. OP CIT.P45. 
101 IBID.P53. 
108 BARNES.M.R. 'AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY TRINITARIAN TIIEOLOGY.'OP CIT. 
l09 WE FEEL THAT EDMUND HILL IS AN EXCEPTION. ALTHOUGH HE IS A CATHOLIC, AND AN E!<"THUSIASTIC 
SUPPORTER OF AUGUSTINE, HIS SCHOLARSHIP IS FIRST RATE, AND NOT COLOURED IN THIS MANNER. 
110 BARNES.M.R,OP CIT.P237. 
111 IBID.P239. 
112 IBID.P239-40. 
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113 THIS PARADIGM, BARNES ASCRIBES PARTICULARLY TO JOHN HENRY NEWMAc'I. [N SPEAKING FURTHER OF 
THESE SYSTEMATIC INTERPRETATIONS OF AUGUST!1'c, BARNES SAYS: 'THIS CONFIDENCE SPRINGS, ! TIIINK, 
FROM TWO ATTITUDES. FIRST, THE CONFIDENCE REFLECTS A POSITIVE SENSE OF ALL THE NEW THINGS THAT 
\l<c HAVE LEARNED AS MODERNS TIIROUGH TIIE MECHANISM OF ·'PARADIGM SHIFTS," NOT THE LEAST OF 
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED IS THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PARADIGMS THEMSELVES. SECONDLY, THE 
CONFIDENCE TO SPEAK IN ARCHITECTONIC NARRATI<c FORMS REFLECTS A GENERAL SENSE THAT DETAILS 
MATTER LESS THAN PERSPECTIVE, THAT HISTORICAL FACTS ARE ONLY EPIPHENOMENA OF Ac'I 
ARCHITECTONIC PARADIGM OR HERMENEUTIC, SO THAT A St.:FFICIE1'T KNOWLEDGE OF "FACTS" CAN BE 
ACQUIRED SOLELY THROUGH THE PRACTICE OF A HER/.IE1'cUT!CAL OR AN IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQLC IN ITSELF, 
SINCE ANY "FACT" CAN ITSELF BE REDUCED TO AN EXPRESSION OR T!IE SYMPTOM OF A HERMENEUTIC OR 
IDEOLOGY. '·IBID.P241. 
114 1Bm.P240. 
115 
BARNES.M.R.' AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY TRINITARIAN TIIEOLOOY.' OP CIT.P240. 
ANOTHER EXAMPLE THAT BARNES GIVES OF THIS, IS THE COMPARISON BETWEEN Ev AGRIUS' Ac'ID 
AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENTS FOR THE UNITY OF Goo. ' ... IN THE "DE SYl>fBOLO AD C4TECHUMENOS" 
AUGUSTINE'S ARGUMENT FOR THE UNITY OF THE TRINITY IS INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THAT OF HIS GREEK 
CONTEMPORARY EVAGRIUS. '-lBID.P245. 
116 Y ANNARAS.C: 1986. 'PHILOSOPHIE SANS RUPTURE.' GENEVA: L4BOR ET FIDES. 
111 
BARNES.MOPCIT.P243. 
118 IBID.P243. 
119 IBID.P244. SEE ALSO: BARNES.M.R. 'TIIE ARIANS OF BOOK V. AND 1HE GENRE OF "DE 
TRJNJTATE."' Qp CIT. Pl85FF. IN THIS ARTICLE, BARNES DEFENDS THE lDEAOF THE APOLOGETIC NATURE 
AND GENRE OF THE 'DE TRJNITATE.' HOWEVER, HE SUGGESTS THAT THE PREV ALE1'T lDEAOF THE ARIANS IN 
BOOK V, ARE THOSE OF THE EUNOMIANPARTY, IS ~llSTAKEN. INSTEAD, HE SUGGESTS TIIATTIIE ANTI· 
NICENE DOCTRI1'1l THAT AUGUSTINE IS REFLTING IN BOOK V, IS THAT OF LATIN, HOMOIAN ORIGIN. BARNES 
STATES THAT AUGUSTINE, IN HIS 'DE TRINITATE,' IS ACTUALLY DEALING WITH TWO SCHOOLS OF ARIAN 
THOUGHT: ONE IN BOOK V, AND ANOTHER IN BOOK VI. AFTER CAREFUL ANALYSIS, B='IES CONCLUDES 
THAT ALTHOUGH AUGUSTINE DOES MENTION Et:NOMIUS IN BOOK XV, (AND THUS SHOWING THAT 
AUGUST11'c, DID INDEED KNOW OF HIM) THE DOCTRINE THAT HE ATTRIBUTES TO EUN01"IIUS, IS NOT THE 
SAME AS THE HERESIES HE DESCRIBES IN BOOK V. BARNES GOES ON TO SUGGEST THAT THE ARIAN HERESY 
OF EUN01"IlUS, WAS NOT SUCH A MAJOR PROBLEM L'I THE WEST, DURING AUGUSTINE'S TIME·lBID.P 189. 
INSTEAD, IT IS BAR.'IES' CONTENTION THAT DURING HIS TIME IN MILAN, AUGUSTINE ENCOUNTERED A 
STRONG LATIN HOMOIAN PARTY. BECAUSE THE ARIAN ARGUMENTS, REPRODUCED IN AUGUSTINE ARE IN 
SYLLOGISTIC FORM, THIS DOES NOT MEAN (CONTRARY TO OTHER AUGUSTIN!Ac'l INTERPRETERS) TIIAT 
EUNOl«ITUS WAS THE SOURCE OF THE HERESY. NEITHER DID EUNOMIUS ALONE USE SUBST ANCE·ESSENCE 
LANGUAGE·IBID.Pl90. BAR.'IES' SUGGESTS THAT THE ARIANS OF BOOK V, ARE NOT EUNOMIAN IN OIATURE. 
THE CHM.JCES ARE THAT, CONTRARY TO MOST AUGUSTINIAN SCHOLARS, AUGUSTINE r,.nGHT HA VE BEEN 
MUCH CLOSER INTELLECTUALLY .~'-TI EMOTIONALLY TO THE HERESY'S ORIGIN, THA-N MOST MIGHT THINK. IF 
THIS IS TRUE (AND WE FEEL THAT BARNES' CASE IS CREDIBLE), THEN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE GENRE OF 
THE 'DE TRINITATE,' IS PERCEIVED, MIGHT HA vll TO CHAc'iGE. THE "DE TRJNJTATE,' IS POLEMIC, Ac'ID THUS 
NOT . .\LL OF AUGUSTINE'S STORY ON THE TRINITY. PossIBLY THEN, \l<c WOULD HAVE TO REASSESS THE 
COMMON CRITICISM, THAT THE ECONOMY IS NOT NPORT . .\1'T IN AUGUSTI1''E'S THOUGHT. 
120 IBID.P245. 
121 THERE ARE SIMPLY TOO MANY WELL-SUBSTANTIATED READINGS OF AUGUSTINE AND T!IE C.~PADOCIANS 
(EVEN IF SOME OF THEM ARE 'BIASED'), FOR US TO COMPLETELY DISMISS A_'.fY DISTINCTION IN THEOLOGICAL 
METHOD BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES. Al.THOUGH BARNES' ARGUMENT CONCERNING THE PERVASIVE 
INFLUENCE OF DE REGNON, IS WEIGHTY, THE CASE FOR THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN AUGUSTINE AND THE 
CAPPADOCIANS, CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITHOUT DE REGNON'S INFLUENCE. BARNES ALSO DOES NOT 
ATTEMPT TO DEFEND AUGUSTINE'S PROBLEMATIC !1''TERPRETATION OF T!IE ROLE OF THE SPIRIT, EITHER. 
HOWEVER, SEE T!IE ARGUMENT OF EDMUND HILL IN THIS MATTER. HILL ALSO INSISTS THAT THE 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN LATIN/GREEK TRINITARIANISM, IS PREMATURE-HILLE. 'TIIE MYSTERY OF 1HE 
TRINITY.' 0PC!T.Pl48. HILL TAKES ISSUE WITHRAHNER'S CRITICISM THAT IN THE WEST, T!IE MATTER OF 
'DE DEO UNO,' ALWAYS TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE TREATISE ON THE PLURALITY IN Goo. HILL USES THE 
'SENTENCES' OF PETER LOMBARD AS AN EXAMPLE, SUBSTANTIATING HIS ARGUMENT. HILL SHOWS THAT 
LOMBARD'S 'SENTENCES,' A STA<'IDARD THEOLOGICAL SOURCEBOOK OF THE CHURCH FOR MANY 
GENERATIONS, DEALS WITH THE PLURALITY OF Goo, BEFORE THE UNITY. RAHNER'S ARTICLE: 'REMARKS 
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ON THE DOGMATIC TREATISE "DETRINIH.TE"'OPCIT. HAS HADANENORMOl'SEFFECTINTHE 
PROPAGATION OF THE ARGUMENT THAT AUGUSTINE IS PRlMAR!LY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE WESTERN 
TENDENCY TO PLACE THE UNITY OF THE GoDHEAD BEFORE THE PLURALITY. HILL HAS EFFECTIVELY 
RESPONDED TO RAHNER'S Sl'GGEST!ONS-SEE H!LL.E. 'KARL RAHNER'S 'REMARKS ON THE 
DOGMATIC TREATISE "DE TRINITATF' AND ST AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.P67FF. HILL 
ACK'IOWLEDGES THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH IS GUILTY OF THE TRADITIONAL CHARGE AGAINST IT. BUT 
DISAVOWS (CONTRARY TO RAHNER) THAT THE BLAME MUST BE PLACED SQUARELY AT THE FEET OF THE 
BISHOP OF HIPPO. ON THE CONTRARY. HILL STATES THAT IT IS PARTIALLY ON AQUINAS, THAT THE BLAME 
l.nJST BE PLACED-IBID. HILL ACCUSES RilHNER OF NOT READING THE 'DE TRINITATE' CAREFULLY ENOUGH. 
HILL Ql'OTES 'DE TRINITATE' X:V.IIl.4, TO THIS EFFECT. HERE AUGUSTINE HIMSELF CLAIMS THAT IN THE 
NEED TO DEMONSTRATE THE EQUALITY OF THE THREE PERSONS, ONE MUST BEGIN WITH THE PLURALITY, NOT 
THE UNITY. 'IN PRIMO LJBRO SECUNDUM SCRJPTURAS SACRAS UNITAS ET AEQUALJTAS SUMMAE ILLIUS TRINITATIS 
OSTENDITUR. LV SECUNDO ET TERTIO ET QUARTO EADEM.' 
1 °' BARNES.M. 'AUGUSTINE IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY.' OP CIT.P248. 
123 CLARK.M.T. 'AUGUSTINE'S THEOLOGY OF THE TRINITY: ITS RELEVANCE. 'OP CIT.P71FF. 
1°' [BID.P72. 
1
°' 'HE WHO KNOWS THE TRUTH KNOWS THE LIGHT, MID HE THAT KNOWS THE LIGHT, KNOWS ETERNITY. 
CHARlTY KNOWS IT. 0 ETERNAL TRUTH AND TRUE LOVE AND BELOVED ETERNITY.' -
AUGUSTINE. 'CONFESSIONS.' OP CIT.BOOK VII. lO, AS QUOTED BY CLARK.M.T. OP CIT.P73. 
'HERE IN AN ENIGMATIC IMAGE (I CoR 13:12) I DISCERN THE TRINITY, WHICH YOU ARE, MY Goo. FOR IN 
THE BEGIN1'1NG OF OUR WISDOM WHICH IS YOUR V.~SDOM, FATHER, BEGOTTEN OF YOURSELF, EQUAL TO YOl. 
AND CO-ETERNAL, THAT IS IN YOUR SoN, YOU "MADE HEAVEN . \ND EARTH" (GEN 1: l) ... AND NOW WHERE 
THE NAME OF Goo OCCURS, J HAVE COME TO SEE THE FATHER WHO MADE THESE THINGS, WHERE THE 
"BEGINNING" IS MENTIONED, I SEE THE SON BY WHOM HE MADE THESE THINGS. BELIEVING THAT MY Goo IS 
TRJN!TY, IN ACCORDANCE WITH \IY BELIEF I SE.ARCHED IN Goo's HOLY ORACLES ."-"'ID FOUND YOUR SPIRIT 
TO BE BORNE ABOVE THE WATERS. THERE IS THE TRJNITY, \!YGoD-FATHER AND SON AND HOLY SPIRIT, 
CREATOR OF THE ENflRE CREATION.' -AUGUSTINE. IBID.BOOK XIII .. FINDING THE CHURCH IN 
GENESIS ONE. 'CHAP V.6.P276. 
1°' CLARK.M.T.IBID.P73. 
"' lBID.P 74. SEE: AUGUSTINE.A.(TRANSLATED: TESKE.RI: 1991). 'SAINT AUGUSTINE. ON THE 
LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF GENESIS: AN UNFINISHED BOOK.' COMMENT ARY ON 
GENESIS CHAPTER ONE.VS 2.Pl45-146: 'HERE IS THAT FAITH: GOD THE FATHER ALMIGHTY MADE 
.-1..'-TI EST ABL!SHED ALL OF CREATION THROUGH HIS ONLY-BEGOTTEN SON, THAT IS, THROliGH THE WISDOM 
.'-.'m PoWER CONSL'BSTANTIAL ·"-""D COETER'iAL TO HIMSELF, INTHE UNITY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT, WHO IS 
ALSO CONSUBST A.'ITL'\L AND COETERN.'\L. THEREFORE, THE CATHOLIC DISCIPLINE COMMANDS THAT WE 
BELIEVE THAT THIS TRJNITY IS CALLED ONE Goo AND THAT HE HAS MADE AND CREATED ALL THE THINGS 
THAT THERE ARE INSOFAR AS THEY ARE.'-
1°' CLARK.M.T. OP CIT.P7~. 'THE ORDER OF NATLRE. '-AUGUSTINE.A. 'OF TRUE RELIGION.' 
VJI.13. OP CIT .P23 2. 'WHEN THIS TRlNITY IS KNOWN AS FAR AS IT CAN BE IN THIS LIFE, IT IS PERCEIYED 
\VITHOlJT THE SLIGHTEST DOUBT THAT EVERY CREAITRE, INTELLECTUAL. A . 1."l'lllllAL AND CORPOREAL, 
DERJVES SUCH EXISTENCE AS IT HAS FROM THAT SAME CREATIVE TRlNITY, HAS ITS OWN FORM, A.'ID IS 
SUBJECT TO THE ~!OST PERFECT ORDER ... FOR EVERY THING, SL1lSTANCE, ESSENCE OR NATURE, OR 
WHATEVER BETTER WORD THERE MAY BE, POSSESSES AT ONCE THESE THREE QlJALITIES: !TIS A PARTICULAR 
THING, IT IS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER THINGS BY ITS OWN PROPER FORM, AND IT DOES NOT TR"-''ISGRESS. 
129 CLARK.M.T.' AUGUSTINE'S THEOLOGY OF THE TRINITY.ITS RELEVANCE.' OP CIT.P75. 
130 1BID.P76. 
131 THIS IS NOTTO SUGGEST THAT THE 'DE TRINJTATE' IS ENTIRELY DEVOID OF A.'IY ECONOMIC REFERENCES, 
(AS SOME CRlTICS OF AUGUSTINE MAKE OUT) SEE BOOK XII, AS AN EXPOSITION OF THE ROLE OF THE DEATH 
OF CHRlST AS PART OF THE TRINIT.ARIANECONOMY. 
132 IN HIS EARLIER WORK, AUGUSTINE HAD NOT PAID THIS QUESTION TOO MUCH ATTENTION. 
133 SOME HA VE UNDERPLAYED THE CLEAR APOLOGETIC NATURE OF THE 'DE TRINITATE,' BY ARGUING THAT 
BECAUSE IT TOOK 20 YEA.RS FOR AUGUSTINE TO WRJTE IT, A.ND BECAUSE HE TUR1'°ED TO IT ATV ARJOUS 
TIMES OVER A LONG COMPOSillON PERlOD, AN APOLOGETIC MOTIVE MUST BE AUTOMATIC.'\LLY EXCLLTIED. 
WE FIND THIS .ARGUMENl' UNCONVINCING. YES, THE 'DE TRINITATE,' MIGHT NOT CONl'AIN SOME OF THE 
\!ORE 'HEATED EXCHANGE,' CUSTOMARY IN MUCH OF THE APOLOGETIC TEXTS OF THE EARLY CHURCH. THE 
.U'PROACH IS F.-\R ~!ORE SOBER AND "LOGICAL.' NEVERTHELESS. THIS JUST POINTS TO A DIFFERENT 
APOLOGETIC STYLE. KOT TO KO APOLOGY AT ALL. 
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134 HILLE."ST AUGUSTINE'S "DE TRHvTIATE." THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS 
STRUCTURE .. P277. SEE ALSO HILLE. 'THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY.' P75FF. HILL POINTS OUT 
TH.U THIS P ARTICLL\R PSAL~! IS Ql"OTED AT THREE PO!NfS IN THE WORK. SEE AUGUSTINE.A." DE 
TRINIT.-!TE' IN PATROLOGL4E CURSUS COMPLETUS.SERJES LATINA. (EDITED :M!GNE.J.P: 1844-
55). VOL 42. LI BER PRLHG"S. VOL CAP GT 111.5: 'QUID A SUIS LECTORIBUS EXPOSATA UGUSTINUS. 
lECTORUfTARD/ORUI ERRORESAL"CTORJ NON TRIBUENDI. PRO!NDE QUISQUIS HAEC LEGIT, UBI PARITER 
CERTUS EST, PERGA L>!ECUM, UBI PARITERHAESITAT, QUAERAT MECUM: UBI ERROREM SUUM COGNOSC!T, 
REDEATADME: lrJHfEUM, REVOCET.'IE. !TA INGREDIAJiJUR SL>!UL CHAR/TATIS VIAM, TENDENTES AD EU,v!DE 
QL"O DICTUM EST, QU.-!ERITE FACIEM EIUS SEMPER (PsALM CIV.4 ). ' MANY SCHOLARS REGARD THIS TREATISE 
OF AUGl'ST!NE AS BEING ONE OF THE MOST INFLUENTIAL IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN THEOLOGY, 
MICHAEL ScH~L.\.US GOES AS FAR AS TO SAY THAT IT IS THE MOST IMPORT ANT LITERARY DOCUMENT OF 
SPECUL\ TION, THAT THE CHURCH HAS PRODUCED. SEE SCHMAUS.M: 1927. 'DE PSYCHOLOG!SCHE 
TRINIT.4TSLEHRE DES HL. AUGUST/NUS.' (MUNSTER: ASCHENDORFF).P 2: 'DIE I 5 BUCHER "DE 
TRINITATE" UBERRAGEN AN TIEFE DER GEDANKEN UND AN REJCHTUM DER !DUN ALIE UBRIGEN WERKE DES 
KfRCHESVATERS. SIE SJND DAS GEWALTIGSTE LITERARISCHE MONUMENT, DAS SICH DIE THEOLOGJSCHE 
TRINITATSSPEKL"UT!O.V SETZTE. ' 
135 MERRIELL.D.J. "TO THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY. A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AQUINAS'S TEACHING.' Pl6.AUGUSTINE AGAIN: 'DEUS INCOMPREHENSJB!LIS SEIP ER QUAERENDUS.' 
(UNLESS YOU BELIEVE. YOU V.1LL NOTUNDERSTAND.)-AUGUSTINE.IBID. BOOK 15.2.2.Pl058. 
u
6 BURNABY.I. 'INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF AUGUSTINE'S "DE 
TRINIT..JTE'" IN THE LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS. VOL VIII. (EDITED :BURNABY.I: 
1955).0P Crr.Pl9. 
1
" AUGUSTINE. "DE TRINITATE.' OP Crr.BOOK l5.XXVII.50.Pl096. "[NALL THIS LONG DISCOURSE. I 
D . .\.RE NOT CLAIM TO HA VE SAID ANYTHING WORTHY OF THE UNSPEAKABLE GREATNESS OF THE SUPREME 
TRP..1TY. I C01'"FESS RATHER THAT "FOR MYSELF HIS KNOWLEDGE HAS BECOME WONDERFUL: ITS STRENGTH 
IS SHOW'i A.'ID I CANNOT ATTAIN \j)JTO IT." AND YOU, SOUL OF MINE, WHERE IN ALL THIS DO YOU mm 
YOl llSELF. WHERE LIEST THOU, WHERE ST ANDEST THOU, WAITING FOR HIM WHO HAS SHOWN MERCY UPON 
ALL THI"<T 1:-JIQLTIIES TO HEAL ALL THY SICKNESSES?' 
138 HILLE.' AIJGUSTINE'S "DE TRINIT.-ITE" THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS 
STRUCTURE. OP CIT.P279. 
139 L.~CUGNA.C.M. "THE TRINITY AND CHRISTLA.N LIFE. 'OP Crr.P82. HILL SUGGESTS THAT THE 
FACT TH.U AcGGSTl'<T WAS -'-''\fGRY WHEN SOME WELL-wlEANING FRIENDS STOLE ELEVEN BOOKS OF TIIE 
l---Fl"<1SHED TRE.HISE. IN ORDER TO PUBLISH THEM AGAINST HIS WILL. INDICATES HIS CONCERN FOR THE 
STRl"CTl"RE OF THE E'iTIRE WORK. TOWARDS THE END OF THE WORK, IN BOOK 15, HE SUMMJ\RISES THE 
.-\RGCv!E'iTATION OF THE El\ TIRE TREATISE. HILL Q!iOTES AUGUSTINT'S EPISTLE 174: ']HAD DECIDED TO 
PLBLISH ALL THE BOOKS TOGETHER BECALSE THE ONES THAT FOLLOW ARE TIED TO THE ONES THAT PRECEDE 
TflE~!BY THE PROGRESS OF THE SEARCH.'-HILL.E. 'AUGUSTINE"S "DE TRINIT.4TE"' THE DOCTRINAL 
SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS STRUCTURE.' OP CIT.P279. HILL ACK,'\fOWLEDGES THAT THERE IS A 
STRVCTllIB, . .\.LTHOl'GH HE DOES SAY THAT EVEN AUGUST!l'm's OWN SUMMARY OF THE BOOK (BOOK 15) 
DOES NOT FVLLY EXPLAIN THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT ARGUMENTS DEVELOPED. 
! .._,HILLE.OP CIT .P280. HE ST A TES THAT IS NOT ENTIRELY CLEAR AS TO WHERE PRECISELY TO ORA W THE 
Dl'<lDfNG-Lll\T, EITHER BOOK VIII. OR IX. 
141 HILL.!Bm.P280-281. 
140 HILL. IBID.P280-281. 
'"AUGUSTINE.A. "DE TRJNJTATE.' OP err.BOOK VIII.LI.P947. 
144 HILL.E.0P Crr.P281. HILL SVMMARISES THE CONTENTS OF THE TREATISE AS FOLLOWS: BOOK I: THE 
ABSOLFTE EQUALITY OF THE DIVIJ\T PERSONS, PROVED FROM SCR!PTIJRE. BOOKS II-JV: THE MISSIONS OF 
THE DIVINE PERSONS, EXAMINED IN SCRIPTIJRE. BOOKS V-Vll: RATIONAL DEFENCE OF FAITH SO FAR 
ESTABLISHED. L'-''IGL"AGE OF RELATIONSHIPS ETC. BOOK VIII: THIS IS THE CENTRE BOOK. THERE IS AN 
AITEM!'TTO 'STOR..'-1' Goo, BREAK SURFACE, EMERGE FROM THE MIRROR WORLD. BooK IX-XI; 
CONSTRUCTION OF ~!ENT . .\.L IMAGE OF Goo BY RATIONAL !NfROSPECTION. BOOKS XII-XIV: HISTORY OF 
THE IMAGE IN EVERY MAN, A'lD FROM ADAM TO CHRIST, EXPLORED IN THE LIGHT OF SCRIPTURE. BOOK XV: 
THE ABSOLUTE INADEQUACY OR INTQUALITY OF THE TRINITARIAN IMAGE TO THE DIVINE EXEMPLAR 
TRINITY.-HILL.E.'THE MYSTERY OF THE TRINITY.' OP Crr.P81. 
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145 HILL.E."TIIEMYSTERY OF TIIE TRINITY.' 0PCIT.P81. 
"
6 
HILL.E. 'ST AUGUSTINE'S ""DE TRJNITATE." THE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS 
STRUCTURE.' OP CIT.P282. HILL'S DISCER.'lMENT OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MISSIONS A.\fD 
PROCESSIONS IN AUGUSTINE, IS ONE WHICH HE CLAIMS, AUGUSTINE 's PREDECESSORS DID NOT MAKE. IT IS 
HILL'S (AS IT IS BAR."iES') SUGGESTION THAT AUGUSTINE DID NOT NEGLECT THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO 
THE TRINITY. IN HIS TEXT "THE MYSTERY OF TIIE TRINITY.' HILL SPEAKS OF TWO APPROACHES TO 
THE TRINITY. THE ECONOMIC (CHAP 5.P45FF) &'ID THE TRANSCENDENTAL(CHAP 6.P54). THE ECONOlvllC. 
ANTI-NICENE THEOLOGIANS, INCLUDE JUSTIN, IRENAEUS, NOVATIAN AND TERTULLIAN. THE ECONO~IIC 
APPROACH DEALS 'W1TH THE TRINITY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE HISTORICAL EVENTS OF SALVATION. 
HILL, IDENTIFIES TWO MAIN WEAKNESSES WITH THIS APPROACH, WEAKh"ESSES 'W1TH WHICH NICAEA 
ATTEMPTED TO DE&. THE FIRST PROBLEM IS THAT WHEN ONE BASES ON1''S UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
TRINITY MERELY UPON THE ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES THEREOF, THE IMPRESSION GRANTED IS THAT BOTH THE 
SON .-\ND THE SPIRIT ARE MERELY THE FATHER 's REPRESENTATIVES IN CREATION AND SALVATION, ,\ND 
SUBORDINATE TO HIM. THE SECOND PROBLEM, IS THAT THE TRINITY ONLY BECOMES SUCH THROUGH THE 
HISTORICAL S& VIFIC PROCESS, FOR EXAMPLE THE SON IS CONSTITUTED THE SON ONLY THROUGH HIS DEATH 
AND RESURRECTION, WITH THIS APPROACH NO ACCOUNT (IN AUGUSTIN"E'S THINKING) IS TAKEN OF THOSE 
SCRIPTURAL VERSES, WHICH DEAL WITH THE PRE-EXISTENCE OF THE SON AND THE SPIRIT. SAYS HILL OF 
THE ECONO!v!IC APPROACH: THEIR PURSUIT OF IT RESULTS IN AN APPROACH THAT LACKS AN ADEQUATE 
DOCTRINE OR METAPHYSICS OF Goo.-HILL.E. 'TIIE MYSTERY OF TIIE TRINITY.' OP CIT.P54. THUS 
THE TRANSCENDENT AL THEOLOGI..-;,'i"S OF THE END OF THE THIRD AND THE BEGIN1'1NG OF THE FOlJRTH 
CENTL'RIES, SOt;GHT TO CORRECT THIS IMBALANCE, THROUGH THEIR ASSERTION OF THE ETERN&, 
llv~\IANENT, CONSUBST ANTIALITY OF THE PERSONS. WITH EACH OTHER. AUGUSTIN"E INSISTS THAT Goo IS 
NOT CONSTITUTED A TRIAD BY TIIE ECONOMY, HE IS REVEALED AS A TRIAD BY THE ECONOMY. 
HILL'S CLAIM, (IBID. CHAP 7.P65FF) IS THAT At;GUSTIN"E COMBIN"ED THE TWO APPROACHES, 
(TRA'lSCENDE:-.T &'ID ECONOlvllC) GIVING EQUAL ATTENTION TO BOTH APPROACHES, AND THUS ALLEGEDLY 
COMBINING THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF BOTH, WHILST NEGATING THE PROBLEMATIC ONES. IN RESPONSE TO 
RAHNER, HILL INSISTS THAT A CURSORY READING OF AUGUSTINE'S BOOKS II-IV, OF "DE TRINITATE' 
REVEAL THAT AUGUSTINE DOEST AKE THE ECONOMIC DllvlENSION TO THE TRINITY, SERIOUSLY. 
147 HILL.E.'ST AUGUSTINE'S "DE TRINITATE." TIIE DOCTRINAL SIGNIFICANCE OF ITS 
STRUCTURE.' Or CIT.P284. 
148 WOLFSON.H.A. 'TIIE PHILOSOPHY OF TIIE CHURCH FATIIERS.' Or Crr.P298. 
149 IBID.P308. HERE. WOLFSON QUOTES FROM THE 'METAPHYSICS.' OP CIT. BOOK XII.8.1074A. 
150 ARISTOTLE. "METAPHYSICS' OP CIT. BOOK V.1016A.32FF. P229FF: '(A) AS SOlvlE ARE SAID TO BE 
SO IN VIRTu1' OF THEIR CONTINL1TY; E.G., A FAGGOT IS MADE CONTINUOUS BY ITS STRING, A.'ID PIECES OF 
WOOD BY GLL"E ... A.'ID OF THESE THINGS THEMSELVES THOSE WHICH ARE NATURALLY CONTINUOUS ARE mm 
IN A TRUER SENSE THAN THOSE WHICH ARE ARTIFICIALLY CONTINUOUS.' .(B) ANOTHER SENSE OF "mm" IS 
THAT THE SUBSTRATE IS UNIFORM IN KIND. THINGS ARE lNIFOR.\I WHOSE FORM IS INDISTINGU1SHABLE TO 
SENSATION; . .\ND THE SUBSTRATE IS EITHER THAT WHICH IS PRIMARY, OR THAT 'Wl!ICH IS FIN& IN REL..\T!Ol< 
TO THE END. FOR 'WTh"E IS SAID TO BE Ol<E. AND WATER ONE. AS BEING SOMETHING FORMALLY 
Jl>,UISTINGU1SHABLE. A.\fD ALL LIQU1DS ARE SAID TO BE ONE (E.G., OIL AND WINE), AND lvlELTED THINGS; 
BECAUSE THE ULTIMATE SUBSTRATE OF ALL OF THEM IS THE SA.\,IE, FOR ALL THESE THINGS ARE W . .\TER OR 
VAPOUR. (C)- THINGS ARE SAID TO BE "01'"E" WHOSE GENUS IS 01'"E AND DIFFERS IN ITS OPPOSITE 
DIFFERENTIAE. ALL THESE THINGS TOO ARE SAJD TO BE "ONE" BECAUSE THE GENUS, WHICH IS THE 
SUBSTRATE OF THEDIFFEREVTIAE, IS 01'"E (E.G., '"HORSE," "MAN" AND "DOG" ARE IN A SENSE ONE, BECAUSE 
THEY ARE ALL ANIMALS); A.c'ID THAT IN A WAY VERY SIMILAR TO THAT IN WHICH THE MATTER IS 01'1'. 
S01'1ETIMES THESE THINGS ARE SAID TO BE "ONE" IN THIS SENSE, A.'i"D SOMETIMES THEIR HIGHER GENUS IS 
SAID TO BE ONE AND THE SAME (IF THEY ARE A FINAL SPECIES OF THEIR GENUS, THE GENUS, THAT IS, WHICH 
IS ABOVE THE GENER..\ OF WHICH THEIR PROXIMATE GENUS IS ONE; E.G., THE ISOSCELES AND EQUILATER.AL 
TRl&'lGLES ARE 01'"E AND THE SAME FIGURE (BECAUSE THEY ARE BOTH TRIANGLES), BUT NOT THE Sru\,IE 
TRIANGLES. AGAIN, THINGS ARE SAID TO BE "ONE" WHEN THE DEFINITION ST A TING THE ESSENCE OF ONE IS 
INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM A DEFINmON EXPLAINING TIIE OTHER; FOR IN ITSELF EVERY DEFINITION IS 
DISTINGU1SHABLE INTO GENUS AND DIFFERENTIAE. IN THIS WAY THAT WHICH INCREASES AND DECREASES IS 
ONE, BECAUSE ITS DEFINITION IS ONE; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF PLM"ES THE DEFINITION OF THE FORM IS 01'1'.' 
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WOLFSON.OP CIT.P3 l~. SUMMARISES THE ARISTOTELIAN VIEW AS FOLLOWS: 'FIRST •. .\.'iY UNITY OF 
ACCIDENTS WHICH INHERE (NA SUBJECT MAY BE CALLED ONE TOGETHER WITH TIIE SUBJECT IN WHICH THE 
SINGLE ACCIDENT OR MA.'JY ACCIDE1'fl"S INHERE .... SECOND. ·-""Y NUMBER OF OBJECTS MAY BE CALLED ONE 
IF COMBINED TO CAUSE A SINGLE COLLECTION. THIS IS ONE BY CONTINUITY. THIRD, TWO DIFFERENT 
L!QL1DS, Sl:CH AS OIL A.'ID WINE. MAY BE CALLED ONE, BECAUSE TIIEY HA VE A COMMON. UNDERLYING 
ELEME1'o, ..\.'ID TH.~T IS WATER. THIS IS CALLED UNITY OF SUBSTRATUM .. . FOURTH. THREE SPECIES OF 
BEINGS, SUCH AS HORSE. MAN AND DOG. MAY BE CALLED ONE, BECAUSE THEY ARE ALL ANIMALS. THIS IS 
CALLED lJ}JJTY OF GENUS. FlITH. TWO lNDIV!DliALS OF THE S . .\.\IE SPECIES. SAY SOCRATES AND PLATO. MAY 
BE CALLED ONE BECAUSE THEY HAVE ONE FOR~IULA (LOGOS) OR DEFINITION. THAT IS. RATIONAL ANIMAL ... 
THIS KIND OF RELATIVE UNITY IS DESCRIBED BY ARISTOTLE ALSO AS ONE IN SPECIES.' 
151 WOLFSON.H.A.'THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS.' OP CIT.P316. 
152 lBID.P316. 
153 IBID.P316FF. 
154 IBJD.P320. 
155 IBJD.P32J. SECOND 'OUSIA,' IN THE ARISTOTELIAN VOCABULARY, APPLIED TO BOTH SPECIES AND GENUS. 
156 HERE WE SEE TIIE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AUGUSTINE AND BASIL. BASIL INSISTED THAT TIIERE JS NO. 
BASIC, PRE-EXISTENT MATERIAL UNDERLYING THE THREE PERSONS. [F THIS WERE THE CASE, WE WOULD 
HA VE THE PROBLEM OF "FOUR GODS.' 
157 GoD JS ONE OBJECT. IN THREE SUBJECTS (UNA SUBSTANTIA, TRES PERSONAE). 'LATIN THEOLOGY TOOK ITS 
OWN P AT!L Nm AUGUSTINE ATTEMPTED ... TO CORRELA TE THE THREE SUBJECTS BY TIIE ANALOGY OF 
SUBJECT, OBJECT Nm RELATION.' -PRESTIGE.G.L. "GOD IN PATRISTIC THOUGHT.' OP CIT.P235. 
158 IBID.P235. 
159 WOLFSON. OP CJT.P350. SEE ALSO AUGUSTINE.A 'DE TRINJT.4TE.' BOOK VII.CHAP 6.1 I. IN: A 
SELECT LIBRARY OF THE NICENE AND POST NICENE FATHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN 
CHURCH.(TRANSLATED.SHEDD.W.G.T: 1978). VOL IIIPl 12FF. AUGUSTINE PRESENTS THREE 
POSSIBLE MEANINGS TO THE FORMULA: 'ONE ESSENCE, Nm THREE PERSONS.' FIRST\VE CAN HA VE THE 
THREE PERSONS AS THREE SPECIES, AND THE ONE ESSENCE AS ONE GENUS. OR WE Cill'J HA VE THE 
POSSIBILITY OF THE THREE PERSONS AS THREE INDIVIDUALS OR ENTITIES. Nm THE UNITY AS A SPECIES. THE 
THIRD OPTION, IS TO HAVE THE THREE PERSONS AS THREE INDI\1DUALS AGAIN, BUT THE UNITY OF ESSENCE, 
AS A SUBSTRATUM. At.;GUSTIN'E REJECTS THE FIRST POSSIBILITY. THREE HORSES, MIGHT BE SEEN AS BEING 
THREE HORSES (SPECIES), BUT ALSO THREE ( . .\.'ID NOT ONE) A.'JIMALS (GENUS). THREE HORSES CANNOT BE 
SEEN AS BEING 'ONE ANIMAL .. THIS FIRST OPTION, IF APPLIED TO THE TRINITY, RESULTS IN TRITIIEISM. FOR 
THE SAME REASON. AUGUSTINE REJECTS THE SECOND POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION: "THREE INDIVIDUALS AND 
ON'E SPECIES. 
'WE DO NOT THEREFORE USE THESE TER'-lS ACCORDING TO GENUS OR SPECIES. BUT AS IF ACCORDING TO A 
MATTER THAT IS COMMON ;1,,'lD THE SAME (NON IT.4QL'E SECUNDUMGENUSET SPEC!ES !STA DICIMUS; SED 
QUASI SECUNDUM COJ,,LHUNEM EAMDE.HQUE MATERIAM). JUST AS IF THREE STATL'ES 'N'ERE MADE OF THE SA.ME 
GOLD, WE SHOULD SAY THREE STATUES ONE GOLD, YET SHOULD NEITHER CALL THE GOLD GENUS, A,'JD THE 
STATL'ES SPECIES: NOR THE GOLD SPECIES ru"1l THE STATL'JOS I1'1lIVJDUALS.' -AUGUSTINE. DE TRJNITATE. ' 
]BID.Pll2. 
HOWEVER. SEE BA.SIL ON THE Sru\1E Sl.BJECT; 'THE DISTINCTION BETWEE"I OUSIA (THE ONE) Nm HYPOST.4SIS 
(TIIE THREE) IS TIIE S""\1E AS THAT BET\VEEN THE GEN'ERAL AND TIIE PARTICULAR; AS FOR INSTANCE, 
BET\1;'EEN THE ANIMAL ru'lD THE PARTICULAR '-IAN. WHEREFORE. IN THE CASE OF THE GoDHEAD, WE 
CONFESS ONE ESSENCE OR SUBSTANCE SO AS NOT TO GIVE AV ARIANT DEF!1'1TION OF EXISTENCE, BUT WE 
CONFESS A PARTICULAR HYPOSTASIS, IN ORDER THAT OUR CONCEPTION OF FATHER, SoN ru'lD HOLY SPIRIT 
MAY BE WITHO!Tf CONFt.;SION A1'1l SO AS NOT TO GIVE A V ARIA.NT DEFINITION OF EXISTENCE ... IF WE HA v'JO 
NO DISTINCT PERCEPTION OF THE SEP ARA TE CHARACTERISTICS, Nru>,1EL Y, FA TIIERHOOD, SONSH!P AND 
SANCTIFICATION, Bl.ff OUR CONCEPTION OF GoD FROM THE GENERAL IDEA OF EXISIBNCE, WE CANNOT 
POSSIBLY GIVE A SOUND ACCOUNT OF OUR FA.ITH. WE MUST THEN CONFESS OUR FA.ITH BY ADDING THE 
PARTICULAR TO TIIE COMMON. THE GoDHEAD IS COMMON, THE F ATIIERHOOD PARTICULAR. WE MUST, 
THEREFORE COMBINE TIIE TWO Nm SAY."! BELIEVE IN GoD THE FATHER."' -BASIL.'LETTER' 236.6, AS 
QUOTED BY BROWN.D. 'THE DIVINE TRINITY.' P276. 
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160 AUGUSTINE. IN EXPLAINING THE UNITY OF THE TRINITY ARGUES THAT THE LANGUAGE OF UNITY ~!UST BE 
A L\,'<GUAGE OF A COMMON' SUBSTANCE.' OR 'MATTER.' HE USES THE EXAMPLE OF THE THREE ST.HUES 
MADE OF 'ONE GOLD.' GoLDIS THE FATHER. THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT. SEE 'DETRINITATE .. ()p 
CIT.BOOK V.CHAP 8. SEE ALSO: SANCTIAURELLII AUGUSTIN!. 'ENARR~TJONES IN PSAL\!OS. 'U-
C. VOLi!. OPC!T.PSLYVIJI. SER!vf01.5FFP905: 'INFLrnSSUMJNLJMOPROFUNDI. ETNONEST 
SUBST,LVTIA. LVTELLEGJTUR ALIG .HODO SUBSTANT!.4, IILUD QUOD SUMUS QUJDQUJD SLUUS. SED HOC AD 
INTEILEGENDU\;f ALJQUANTO EST DJFFICILJUS, QUAMQUAM RES USITATAE SINT; SED QUIA JNUSITATUM L'ERBUM 
EST, INDIGETCOMkJE\DATIONJS ET EXPOSJTJONJS ALIQUANTULAE; CUI TAMEV SJ INTENT! FUERITJS, FORTASSJS IN 
EA NON LABORABIMUS ... NATURA£ IPSAE, SUBSTANTIA DJCUNTUR. DEUS EST QUAEDAM SUBSTANTIA; NA},f QUOD 
NUILA SUBCUNTUR. DEUS ESTQUAEDAM SUBSTANTIA; NAM QUOD .VUILA SUBCUNTUR. DEUS EST QUAEDAM 
SUBSTANTIA; NAM QUOD NUUA SUBSTANTIA EST NIHIL OMNJNO EST SuBSTANTIA ERGO A.LIQUID ESSE EST. VNDE 
ETIAM IN FIDE CATHOLICA, CONTR.4 UENENA QUORUMDAM HAERETJCORUM SIC AEDJFJCAMUR, UT DJCA.MUS 
PATRE.\f, ET FILIUM, ET SPIRITUM SANCTUM UNI US ESSE SUBSTANTJAE. QUID EST, UNJS SUB ST ANT IA.? ... ' 
MACKEY POI!'<TS OUT THE DIFFICULTY; 'BUT IT IS IMMEDIATELY OBVIOUS THAT THE TASK, AL WAYS AN 
EXTREMELY DELICATE ONE FOR ALL RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE, OF ASSERTING THE WllOLLY OTHERNESS OF GoD 
WHILE YET PRESERVING SOME AFFINITY WITH THOSE WHOM GoD HAS CREATED AFTER HIS OWN IMAGE AND 
LIKENESS, IS HERE JEOPARDISED BY ENCROACHING IMPRESSIONS OF INCREASING CRUDENESS: THE 
D!ST!1'CTION OF DIVP.JE AND CREATURELY IS NOW BETWEEN ONE KIND OF SUBSTANCE (STUFF. ALMOST) OF 
WHICH THERE IS JUST ONE EXAl>IPLE. J\.'lD ANOTHER Kl"JD OF SUBSTANCE OF WHICH THERE ARE \IA,'iY 
(THOUGH IT IS DIFFICULT TO KNOW WHAT IT COULD MEAN TO INCLUDE ALL CREATION UNDER ONE 
SUBSTANCE-CATEGORY), AND THE PROSPECT OF TELLI1'G OF THE RELATIONS BET\\iEEN THEM MUST AT LEAST 
BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED BY THIS KIND OF ABSTRACTION AND RIGIDITY.' -MACKEY.J.P.'THE 
CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE OF GOD AS TRINITY.' OP Cn.Pl54. 
161 SEE: RUDEBUSCH.G .. ARISTOTELIAN PREDICATION, AUGUSTINE, AND THE TRINITY.' 
P588. ALso: TESKE.R.J. 'AUGUSTINE'S USE OF "SUBSTANTIA" IN SPEAKING ABOUT GOD.' OP 
CIT.Pl47-163. 
162 RUDEBUSCH.G.OP 0T.P588. 'FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CATEGORY OF SLBSTANCE, MAN IS A SPECIES OF 
THE GENUS .,\.,'IIMAL: IN THE CATEGORY QUALITY; WHITE IS A SPECIES OF THE GENUS COWR 
163 IBID.P588. 
164 A VERTICAL PREDICATION IS TO PREDICATE SOMETHING OF A THING, THE SL1lJECT AND THE PREDICATION, 
BEING OF THE SAME CATEGORY: ADAM IS A MA<'I. VERTICAL PREDICATIONS, ASSERT A CATEGORY WITH 
THAT OF ANOTHER TYPE. 
165 
'WHAT THEN'? SHALL WE CALL THEFATHER THE PERSON OF THE SON AND THE HOLY SPIRIT. OR THE SON 
THE PERSON OF THE FATHER .,\,'ID THE HOLY SPIRIT, OR THE HOLY SPIRIT THE PERSON OF THE FATHER A,'']) 
THE SoN? BLT NOWHERE DO \\IE FIND THE WORD •'PERSON" COMMONLY USED IN THIS SENSE, ·"''m IN THIS 
TRINTIY WHEN W'E SAY THE PERSON OF THE FATHER, w'E lvlEAN "JOTH!1'G ELSE THAJ'1 THE SL1lST.'-''ICE OF THE 
FATHER.' -'DE TRJNJTA.TE.' BOOK Vll.6.11, AS QUOTED BY RUDEBUSCH.OP CIT.P590. FOR THE EAST. 
THE ONLY CHARACTERISTIC OF THE HYPOSTASES WHICH WE CAN STATE TO BE EXCLUSIVELY PROPER TO EACH, 
AND WHICH IS NE\'ER FOL"<D IN OTHERS, BY REASON OF THEIR CONSUBST ANTIALITY, IS FOUND IN THE 
RELATION OF ORIGIN. YET. THIS RELATION MCST BE UNDERSTOOD IN.,\.,'/ APOPHATIC SENSE. '0THERW1SE TO 
REGARD IT WOULD BE TO SUBMIT THE TRINITY TO A CATEGORY OF ARISTOTELI&'I LOGIC, THAT OF 
RELATION.'-LOSSKY.V.'THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY OF THE EASTERN CHURCH.'0POT.P54. IN 
AUGUSTINE, THE RELATIO"JSHIPS, INSTEAD OF BEING CHARACTERISTICS OF THEHYPOSTASES(PERSONS), ARE 
IDENTIFIED W1TH THEM. AQUINAS TOOK THIS PICTURE EVE"J FURTHER IN HIS TRINITY. 
166 RUDEBUSCH. OP CIT.P591FF. AUGUSTINE IN 'DE TRINITA.TE.' BOOK 7.4.8, SHOWS THAT WHILST THIS 
TYPE OF PREDICATION MIGHT WORK FOR STATENIENTS ABOUT ~!EN, PROBLEMS DEVELOP WHEN SPEAKING OF 
THE TRINITY. 
'FOR ABRAHAM, ISAAC AND JACOB, HA VE IN COMMON THAT WHICH IS MAN; THEREFORE THEY ARE CALLED 
THREE MEN: A HORSE ALSO A-ND AN OX. AND A DOG, HA VE IN COMMON THAT WHICH IS ANIMAL; THEREFORE 
THEY ARE CALLED THREE ANIMALS., -AUGUSTINE. 'DE TRINITA.TE., OP en.BOOK VII.4.7. Pl09 (HERE, 
WE ARE USING HADDAN'S TRANSLATION). 
RUDEBUSCH. OP Cn.P591FF. SCHEMATISES THIS ARGUMENT AS FOLLOWS: THus: 
I-ABRAHAM, ISAAC AND JACOB ARE THREE ANIMALS 
2-ABRAHAM, ISAAC AND JACOB ARE OF THE SAME NATURE (LE., HUMAN) 
3-THEREFORE. ABRAHAM, ISAAC AND JACOB ARE THREE MEN. 
PLACING THIS !XTO TRINIT ARIA.\! PERSPECTIVE, WE HA VE AS FOLLOWS: 
I-THE FATHER, SON, AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE TifREE PERSONS 
2-THE FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE OF THE SAME NATURE (LE., DIVINE) 
3-THEREFORE THE FATHER, SON AND HOLY SPIRIT ARE THREE GODS 
WHETHER WE SEE 'ESSE!<CE,' AS A GENERIC OR A SPECIFIC NAME, THE SAME HERESY RESULTS. 
w AUGUSTINE. A. 'DE TRINITATE.' OP CIT.BOOK VIL4.7.P939. 
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168 RUDEBUSCH.G. OP Crr.P593. IN 'DE TR!NITATE.' BOOK V.1.2, AS AN EXAMPLE. AUGUSTINE ADMITS 
THAT GoD IS ABOVE CATEGORIES. STANDARD PREDICATION APPLIES TO THINGS FALLING UNDER THE 
CATEGORIES, BUT GoD IS ABOVE ALL CATEGORIES. 
169 SEE "lOTE 168.lBID. 
I >O 'SED ALIAE QUAE DICUNTUR ESSENTIAE SJVE SUBSTANTJAE, CAPJUNT ACCIDENTIA, QUIBUS IN EIS FIAT VEL 
MAGNA VEL QUANTACUMQUEAfUTATJO: DEO AUTEM AL/QUID EJUSMODI ACC!DERE NON POTEST; ET IDEO SOLA 
EST INCOMAfUT.4B!LJS SUBSTANTIA VEL ESSENTIA, QUI DEUS EST, CUI PROFECT!O JPSUM ESSE, UDE ESSENTIA 
NOMINATAEST, .iIAXIMEAC VERISS!MECOMPET!T. '-'DETRINITATE.' OP err. BOOK V.IL3.P912. 
n RUDEBUSCH. OP CIT.P595. 
i-: ARISTOTLE.'METAPHYSICS.'VILIII.1029A.P319. 
1
" RUDEBUSCH. G. OP CITP596. 
I'' lBID.P596. Ru'DEBUSCH POINTS TO AUGUSTP.-IE' s WORDS HERE IN 'DE TRINITATE. ' 7. 6.11. OP err. SEE 
RUDEBUSCH.OP CrrP596. 
1 
'
5 LANCASTERS.H. 'THREE-PERSONED SUBSTANCE: THE RELATIONAL ESSENCE OF THE 
TRIUNE GOD IN AUGUSTINE'S "DE TRINIT.4TE."' OP CIT.P123. 
1 
''SEE LACUGNA.C.M. 'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.' OP CIT.P99: 
'NONETHELESS, AUGUSTINE'S PRINCIPLE WHICH FOLLOWS LOGICALLY FROM THE STARTING POINT I1' THE 
DIVINE UNITY f.\'STEAD OF THE ECO!<OMY OF SALVATION, TENDS TO BLUR ANY DISTI1'CTION AMONG THE 
DJVI1'E PERSOXS AND THEREBY FORMALISES I1' LATIN THEOLOGY THE BREACH BETWEEN OIKONOML4 AND 
THEOLOGL4. RELATED TO TIIIS IS AUGUSTil•.-E'S EMPHASIS ON THE UNITY OF THE DIVINE SUBSTA.\ICE AS PRIOR 
TO THE PLURALITY OF PERSONS. IF DIVmE Slc'BSTANCE RATHER THAN THE PERSON OF THE FATHER IS MADE 
THE HIGHEST ONTOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE-THE SUBSTRATUM OF DIVINITY AND THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF ALL 
TIMT EXISTS-THEN Goo MU EVERYTIIING ELSE IS, FINALLY IMPERSONAL. NOTHING IS SAID OF Goo 
ACCORDING TO .~CCIDENT, BF!', AUGUSTI1'"E ~IAINT All<S. NOT EVERYTHING IS SAID OF GoD ACCORDING TO 
RELATION. BECAUSE !TIS ETERNAL, THE SON'S RELATION TO THE FATHER IS NOT AN ACCIDENT; BUT THIS 
RELATION IS !<OT A PREDICATE OF THE SUBSTANCE EITHER BECAUSE THE FATHER IS NOT CALLED FATHER 
\\-Tl'H REFERE?<CE TO SELF (AD SE) BUT MTH REFERENCE TO ANOTHER (AD ALTERUM). SIMILARLY THE SON IS 
C.-\LLED SON ?<OT AD SE BUT AD ALTERNLM. THE FATHER IS GoD ACCORDING TO SUBST fu\ICE, THE SON IS 
Goo ACCORDI:\'G TO SUBSTANCE, AND THE SPIRITIS Goo ACCORDING TO SUB ST A.\ICE, BUT THE FATHER IS 
FATHER ACCORDI!<G TO RELATION, THE SON IS SON ACCORDI!<G TO RELATION. A.'ID THE SPIRIT IS SPIRIT 
ACCORDING TO RELATION. IN OBSERVING THIS TEACHI!<G IN AUGUSTmE, LACuGNA CONCLUDES THAT 
AUGUSTINE LOSES THE RELATIVE CHARACTER OF A DIVINE PERSON WHEN HE EQUATES PERSON WITH 
SLllSTANCE-L.~CUGNA.iBID.P89. THE METAPHYSIC.-\L FOL1•mATION OF THE CAPPADOCIAN DOCTRI'<"E OF THE 
TRl1'TIY HAD BEEN TO SEE THAT THE HIGHEST PRINCIPLE IS HYPOSTASJSNOT OUS!A, PERSON NOT 
SL'BSTA.'ICE ... '-IBID.PlOI. 
i ·- LANCASTER.S.H.OP CIT.P127. 
n lBID.P131. 
1
-
9 lBID.P132. 
180 SEE THE DISCUSSION OF AUGUSTINE JN 'DE TRINITATE.' OP CIT.BOOK Vil.I, AS REFLECTED UPON BY 
LANCASTER OP CIT.P133. SAYS AUGUSTmE: ' ... WHETHER WE CAN PREDICATE OF EACH PERSON IN THE 
TRINITY BY HI~JSELF, ANTI NOT JUST TOGETHER MTH THE OTHER TWO, SUCH NAMES AS GoD AND GREAT 
A.'ID WISE A.'ID TRUE AND OMNIPOTENT AND JUST ANYTHING ELSE THAT CAN BE SAID OF GoD WITH 
REFERENCE TO SELF AS DISTINCT FROM BY WAY OF RELATIONSHIP; OR WHETHER THESE NAMES CAN ONLY 8E 
PREDICATED \HIEN THE TRINITY OR TRIAD IS ~!EA~.' -AUGUSTINE. IBID. BOOK VII.I, AS QUOTED BY 
LANCASTER OP CIT.P133. 
181 AUGUSTINE. IBID.BOOK Vll.2, AGAIN WE ARE USING LANCASTER'S QUOTATION. OP CIT.P134. 
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1
" AUGUSTINE .• DE TRINJTATE.' OP CIT.BOOK Vil.CHAP 2.Pl07 (HERE. REFERRING TO SHEDD's 
TR.\NSL.\TION). ' ... HE IS CALLED THE SON IN RELATION TO THE FATHER: BUT HE rs W!SIJOMBY THXf 
WHEREBY HE IS ESSE"fCE. '-IBID. P 107. HERE ACGl 'ST!1'c IS STA UNG THAT THE SON IS SON RELATION ML Y. 
I.E .. IN RELATION TO THE FATHER, (\NON-SUBSTANCE PREDICAHON) BUT HE IS \VlSE. 'kTIH RESPECT TO THE 
ESSE1'CE, THE SUBST.\NCE OF THE GoDHE.\D. YET ... 'LET CS UNDERSTAND. THAT WHEN HE IS CALLED THE 
WORD. IT IS MEANT, \VlSDOM THAT IS BORN. SO AS TO BE BOTH THE SON AND THE IMAGE: A.'iD THAT WHEN 
THESE TWO WORDS ARE USED, NAMELY \VlSDOM IS BORN ... BOTH WORD. AND [MAGE, A.'iD SON, .\RE 
l'NDERSTOOD .. .\,'ID IN THESE NAMES ESSENCE IS NOT EXPRESSED ... ' -IBID.Pl07. 
183 LANCASTER.S.H. OP CIT.Pl34. 
184 LANCASTER. S.H. OP CrT.Pl38. 
"'THE PLATONIC TRJADIC CONCEPHON OF BEING IS CLEAR IN, AS AN EXA,\!PLE, THE 'TIMAEUS.' THE 
DEMilJRGE, DOES NOT CREATE 'EX NIHILO,' SO HE NEEDS 'BRUTE MATTER,' FROM WHICH TO CREATE. As HE 
CREATES, HE FASHIONS THE COSMOS, AFTER THE ETERNAL IDEAS. Two CONCEPTS IN THEMSELVES, ARE 
INADEQUATE WITHOITT A THIRD BEING ADDED TO THEM. UNITING THE TWO -ALLERS.R. THE NOTIONS 
OF TRIAD AND MEDIATION IN THE THOUGHT OF ST AUGUSTINE.' OP CIT.PSO 1, P523. 
186 IBID.P50L 
180 IBID.P504. 
188 !Bm.P507. 
189 IBID.P506. 
190 PLOTl1''US' THOUGHT IS NOT ENTIRELY DEVOID OF MOVEMENT, BUT THE MOVEMENT FROM THE 0NE TO 
Nous. IS A TYPE OF SELF-GENERATING, UNC01'SCIOUS, IMPARTATION OF BEING, DEVOID OF·"''"' 
PERSONALITY OR WILL. SUCH IS NOT THE CASE \VlTH CHRISTJ..\.,'i TR!NITARIA.NISM. 
191 Ism.P512. 
'" fsm.1'512. 
193 GREGORY.NAZIANZEN. 'ORATIO.XL.41.' IN: PATROLOGL4 GRAEC4. CURSUSCOMPLETUS. 
VOL XXXVI. (EDITED :MIGNE.J.P). As QLOTED BY LOSSKY. V: 1957. 'THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY 
OF THE EASTERN CHURCH. 'P46 
194 Ism.P515. 
195 lBID.P520. 
196 SEE: HARRISON. V. 'PERICHORESIS IN THE GREEK FATHERS.' OP CIT. P53: 'THE WORD 
"PERICHORESIS" HAS SERVED SEVERAL IMPORT.'-''IT PURPOSES IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGICAL 
CONCEPTUALISATION. IT PROVIDES A WAY OF ATTEMPTING TO EXPRESS HOW L"'<lTY AND DISHNCTION ARE 
CO~ffi!NcD IN THE TRINITY, IN THE INCARNATE LOGOS AND IN CREATION AS REUNITED \VlTII GoD.' 
191 SEE: BALAS.D.L. 'CHRISTIAN TRANSFORMATION OF GREEK PHILOSOPHY ILLUSTRATED 
BY GREGORY OF NYSSA'S USE OF THE NOTION OF PARTICIPATION.' OP CIT.Pl52. 
"'BALAS. Ism. P 154. 
1
"' 1Bm.Pl54. 
"''Ism.Pl55. 
'°
1 lBm.Pl55. 
"'' lBID.Pl56. 
:uJ SEE. FOR EXAMPLE: MEYENDORFF.J. 'BYZANTINE THEOLOGY. 'OP CrT.Pl63-164. 186-88. 
204 THIS IS THE IMPORT A.NT PREMISE IN RrsT'S BOOK ON AUGUSTl1'c. SEE: RJST.J.M: 
1994.' AUGUSTINE.ANCIENT THOUGHT BAPTISED.' RIST PLACES ALL OF AUGUSTIN'E'S THOUGHT 
INTO THE C01'TEXT OF THE TR . \.,'iSFOR~LUION OF CLASSICAL CULTURE. 
:os THE TWO STRA.';lJS OF 'SCIENTIA' .'-''ID 'SAPIENTIA,' ARE ALSO SEEN IN Tiffi THOUGIIT OF AQLlNA.S, LATER 
ON. UNLIKE AUGUSTINE, HE DlvlDES HIS THEOLOGY INTO THOSE THINGS \Ve CAN K.'fOW ABOUT GoD, 
THROVGB REASON ALONE, A.'JD THOSE THINGS WE CAN ONLY KNOW THROUGH REVELATION. 
"" SEE: ARMSTRONG.AH. 'ON NOT KNOWING TOO MUCH ABOUT GOD. THE APOPH.ATIC WAY 
OF THE NEOPLATONISTS M'D OTHER INFLUENCES FROM Ai'fCIENT PHILOSOPHY WHICH 
HA VE WORKED AGAINST DOGMATIC ASSERTION IN CHRJSTJAN THINKING.' OP CIT.Pl29FF. 
20
' lsm.1'130 
"'' IBID.P 132. 
"'' IBID.Pl37. To SOME EXTENT, THIS IS A COM!\!ENT, APPLICABLE TO CERT MN 'POSTMODERNISTS' TODAY 
WHO SEEK TO 'DECONSTRUCT' EVERYTHING IN SIGHT, DE1'YING THE V AL!DITY OF A.''1Y QUEST FOR THE 
LOGOS, FOR THE 'LOCATION' OF TRUTH. ANY DENIAL, IMPLIES AN AFFIRMATION. 
210 ARMSTRONG.AH.IBID.Pl-ti. 
211 !Brn.Pl.+2. 
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}l.:: HERE WE NEED ALSO TO RE:\lE:\lBER TH.-\T \\r1TH THE NEOPL.-.\TO~lSTS. ECST.--\TIC EXPERIE:'.,:CE OF THE 
'ONE' WAS AN 1'lPORT..\.'IT PART TO TilEIR SYSTH!. [TWAS THIS EXPERIE><CE THAT FOR:\IED Tiffi GO.\L OF 
ALL RATIONAL THOl'GHT. TRL"E RATIO><ALITY WAS E\IPLOYED BY PLOTl'-1.:s. OX1,Y TO BE THRO'W-,,. .\WAY. 
ONE TRl'E ECSTXrIC lJ'.10N 'WITH THE ONE C.U<lE ABOLT 
213 AGAIN. THE .'.RGL'}.!ENT IS HKEX FROM AfuVISTRONG.IBrn.Pl-t2FF. 
214 WE ARE, ONCE :\!ORE. REFERRl:<G TO THE CELEBRATED CO\l\lE'."f OF WrI"fGEXSTEIN IN THE 
'TR.J\CTATUS_' 
215 AYRES.L.'BETWEEN ATHENS AND JERUSALEM: PROLEGONIENA TO A.i"ITHROPOLOGY IN 
"DE TRLVITATE."' 0PCIT.P53. 
216 lBID.P 54. 
217 THIS IS ESSENTIALLY CORRECT. HOWEVER, WE C . .\.X"OT ACCEPT THAT HAVING SAID THIS. TilE TECHNICAL 
LANGUAGE OF BooK FIVE OF THE • DE TRINrIATE' FOR EXA.\,IPLE. IS :\lERELY Al'GUST!Xll SHOWING HIS 
READERS THAT TECHX1CAL L\ .. 'IGlJAGE DOESN'T WORK. AL THOl:GH Al'GUSTIXll DOES .\CKl\OWLEDGE THE 
LIMITATIONS OF TECHX1CAL UNGl'.\GE, HE SEE:\IS PRETTY :\ll:CH PREP.\RED TO ARGLll FOR.\ CERTAIN 
TECHNICAL VIEW OF Goo. FOR ALL THAT! AYRES !S BE!l\G TOO Sl\lPLISTIC HERE. 
218 AYRES.L.IBID.P60. 
219 IBIO.P60-61. WHAT FOLLOWS. IS A \!ODIFIC.\TIO>< OF . .\YRES '.RGnIEX"f. 
220 IBm.P6L To S01'lE EXTEN"f. 'Wll . .\.'ffICIP.UE AQl'IN.\S HERE. THO:\l.\S ALSO DE.\LT WITH THE TWO 
C01'IPOl><"ENTS OF SCIENCE .U..U RE.\SON, OR FAITH . .\.XU RE . .\SON. IX HIS SYSTE\L 
221 WE ARE QUITE CLOSE HERE. TO DERRIDA ·s DlLE\l'>lA CONCERSING . LOGOC'0/TRJSA/ .• 0N THE ONE HAND. 
HE WISHES TO GO BEYOND METAPHYSICS. YET OC' TilE OTilER H . .\.'.U HE .KJ;..-.;OWLEDGES THAT HE CONTINUES 
TO BE CONFINED TO \lETAPHYSICS IX .\LL OF HIS DISCOL 'RSE. 
222 As A CLASSIC CASE. IT IS WORTH 'lEC-.'TI0"<1NG .\G . .\1". THE ROLE OF THE MYTH IN THE 'SY\lPOSiliM' OF 
PLATO. SOCRATES CRITICISES THE ADEQCACY OF TilE MHH. CO,IPARED TO THE LOGOS. AFTER 'IAKING 
THIS CASE CLE.'.R, HE TllEN P.'.RADOXIC.\LLY ACKNOWLEDGES THE POSSIBLE ]',!PORT . .\."CE OF MY"fH, ONCE 
Tiffi ROl."rE OF TilE LOGOSH.\S BEEN FOLLOWED TO ITS ~l.\.'.'I~ll'\l A.'.U STILL FOl~ W . .\;'."f!XG. THIS IS 
'.\;'./OTHER KIKO OF MYTH .. Ins A TYPE OF \1\"fH TH.U .,CKNO\\LEDGES Tiffi PRJOR NEED TO TRA \llL THE 
PA TH OF LOGOS. 
223 SPEAKING OF A S1'IlLAR !SSlll. AYRES SPEAKING .\BOl "f Al.'Gl'STl'-"E SAYS: 'WHEN WE LE.'.RN, 
\lETAPHORIC.\LLY. TO LOOK IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. \\1IEC' WE CROSS INTO \\11.\TlS TER~IED ELSEWHERE 
"THE REGION OF FAITH." WE OOXOT n:STH.n"E ·' UGHT Tl'R.'."EDOX FOR l'S, . .\.'.U ARE ABLE TO LOOK 
DIRECTLY UPON GOD. _'\.,'I IMPOSSIBILITY OF COl'RSE. WE REACHED \\ll.\T C..\." BE TER.\<lED A PLACE WHICH 
WE CAN SEE BY THE LIGHT '"THE D!ST . .\."CE \\l!ICH cmlES FRml Goo. A LIGHT 'WllICH REMAI"5 .\LWAYS AT 
OR BEYOND THE HORIZON. '-IBID.P62-63. THIS SOl C..US .\L~!OST LIKE.\ STATE,lEC-."f OF LE\'IXAS. OR EVEN 
DERRIDA AYRES DOES SOT SEE~! TO PIO: l'P THE TENSION HERE. C..1s \\ll RE.\LL y KSOW Goo. OR CAN WE 
~OT? 
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ATONEMENT.P79-109, CARY.P.'ON BER.ALF OF CLASSICAL TRINITARJANISM: A CRITIQUE 
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'SEE THE INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS OF IC'IOWLES TO THE FIRST-TIME READER OF THOMAS. THE READER 
FINDS NONE OF THE LITERARY CHARM THAT ONE MIGHT DISCOVER IN THE ·coNFESSIONs· OF At.:GUSTINE. 
BY THOMAS'S TIME. THERE WAS A VERY ESTABLISHED WAY OF PROCEDURE, WITH RESPECT TO 
THEOLOGICAL METHOD. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON THE SCHOLASTIC METHOD, SEE: 
KRETZMANN.N. 'INTRODUCTION.' IN (EDI1ED: KRETZMANN.N, ET AL: 1982).TIIB 
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATER MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY. AERTSEN.J.' AQUINAS' 
PIDLOSOPHY IN ITS IDSTORICAL SETTING.' IN (EDITORS: KRETZMANN, STUMP.E: 1993).TIIB 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS. SOME ASSESSMENTS OF AQl'!NAS ARE SOMEWHAT 
EXTREME: 'THE PECULIAR GREAT'ffiSS OF AQUINAS, AS A MASTER OF TECHNICAL METHOD, LIES IN HIS 
COMBINATION OF FEARLESS STRENGTH OF REASONING WITH AN ENTIRE ABSENCE OF PERSONAL BIAS, AND IN 
HIS ABILITY TO RECOGNISE A.'JD PRODUCE HARMONY AND ORDER-TO RECOGNISE THEM INTHE UNIVERSE. 
AND TO PRODUCE THEM IN HIS OWN PHILOSOPHY-TO A DEGREE WITHOlIT PARALLEL AMONG THE GREAT 
PHILOSOPHERS OF THE WORLD.' -KNOWLES.D: 1963. 'TIIB EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL 
THOUGIIT.'OP CIT.P263. OTHER ASSESSMENTS ARE POSITIVE TO EXTREMES: ' ... ST THOMAS SUCCEEDED 
IN CONSTRUCTING A PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL WISOOM SO ELEVATED IN IMMATERIALITY THAT IT 
IS REALLY FREE OF EVERY PARTICULARISATION OF RACE OR ENVIRONMENT.' -MARJT AIN.J. 'THOMAS 
AQUINAS. 'OP CIT.P39. Kur-;G, WRITING FROM A FAR MORE CONTEMPORARY .4"'1D CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 
SAYS: 'WHY COULD NOT THOMAS-UNLIKE AUGUSTINE-CREATE A NEW PARADIGM. MAKE POSSIBLE A NEW 
OVERALL CONSTELLATION? ... THE .ANSWER IS THAT W11ILE WITH HIS PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGICAL SYSTEM 
THOMAS AQUINAS Ql:lTE SUBSTA.'ITIALLY MODIFIED AUGUSTINE'S LATIN PARADIGM. HE DID NOT REPLACE 
IT. INDEED, DESPITE ITS ENCYCLOPAEDIC (BlIT ULTIMATELY FRAG1'IENTARY) GREATNESS-HIS THEOl:OGY 
HAS ITS INDISPlIT ABLE LIJ>,!IT ATIONS AND DEFECTS .... HE RE~!AINED ... ESSENTIALLY BOUND TO THE 
PREVALENT AUGUSTINIAN THEOLOGY ... NEITHER IN THE OOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY NOR IN CHRISTOLOGY, IN 
SOTERIOLOGY NOR THE DOCTR!1''E OF THE CHURCH AND THE SACRAMENTS, 
DID HE FUNDAMENTALLY INVESTIGATE BEHIND THE PATRISTIC POSITION.'-
KlJNG.H.(TRANSLATED:B0WDEN.J:l994 .. GREAT CHRISTIAN TIDNKERS.'Pll5. KUNG ALSO 
POINTS 01.TfTHAT AQVINAS' SC!El'ff!FIC .'\ND METAPHYSICAL WORLD \~EW, ON WHICH HIS ENTIRE SYSTEM 
WAS BASED, WAS THAT OF GREEK ANTIQUITY, A COMBINATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN A."lD NEOPLATONIC 
TRADITIONS. 'THOMAS DRAWS HIS MODELS OF THEOLOGICAL EXPLANATION NOT SO MUCH FROM 
METAPHYSICS AS FROM ARISTOTELIA.'l SCIENCE, E.G. GRA~TATION. LIGHT, HEAT. CHEwllCAL PROCESS ..\ND 
PROPERTIES, BIOLOGICAL PROCREATION AND GROWTH, THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES A.'ID EMOTIONS. 
E\'ENTHE MOST IMPORTANT METAPHYSICAL CONCEPTS LIKE BEING . .\S SUCH. ACT AND POTENCY, RELATION, 
ACTUS PURUS, REST ON INSIGHTS FROM SCIENCE AND NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.' -IBID.Pll6. ' ... AND WE C.'u'l 
NOW ALREADY GUESS WHAT 1'!UST HAPPEN TO THE CONTENT OF THIS THEOLOGY ONCE ITS PHYSICAL. 
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, MEDICINAL A.'ID COSMOLOGICAL PRESUPPOSITIONS COLLAPSE-FOLLOWTNG THE 
COPERNICAN REVOLUTION AND VICTORY OF MA THE:-,,L·\TICS A.'ID EXPERIMENTATION. TO WHICH ARISTOTLE 
.'u'ID, OF COURSE ALSO THOMAS, COMPLETELY FAIL TO 00 JUSTICE.'-IBID.Pll8. WE RESPOND TO KUNG'S 
ASSESSMENT BY SA YING THAT HE GOES TOO FAR THE OTHER WAY. HE JUDGES THOMAS TOO MUCH FROM THE 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE, AND DOES NOT SEEM TO APPRECIATE THOMAS' ACHIEVEMENT FOR WHAT IT 
WAS AT THE TIME. [T MIGHT WELL BE THAT IN SEVEN HUNDRED YEARS TINIE. THE SA.~!E REMARKS MIGHT BE 
MADE OF THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS IN KcNG 's THEOLOGY AS \\'ELL. 
3 CLARKE.W.N. 'WHAT IS MOST AND LEAST RELEVANT IN Tiffi METAPHYSICS OF ST 
THOMAS TODA Y?'OP CIT.P4 ll-434. 
4 [BID.P413. 
5 BEING IS GOOD BECAUSE GoD CREATED IT. HERE, THE THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINE OF CREATION .'u'ID THE 
DISCIPLINE OF METAPHYSICS OVERLAP. IN THIS DICTUM. THOMAS' PHILOSOPHY PRESUPPOSES A 
THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE. HE CANNOT DEMONSTRATE RATIONALLY WHY AS AN 'A-PRIORI,' BEING IS 
INTELLIGIBLE AND GOOD. THOMAS, WRITING AS A CHRISTIAN THEOLOGIAN, IN A PRE-CRITICAL AGE, 
MERELY ACCEPTS THE TRUTH OF THIS ASSUMPTION. FOR A.'! EXAMPLE OF THOMAS' TREATMENT OF THE 
SUBJECT OF BEING AS GOOD, SEE: AQUINAS.T. 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA. 'PT 1.Q5.ART I: 'WHETIIBR 
GOODNESS DIFFERS REALLY FROM BEING?'P23. 'I A.'ISWER THAT, GooDNESS AND BEING ARE 
REALLY THE SAME, AND DIFFER ONLY IN IDEA; WHICH IS CLEAR FROM THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENT. THE 
ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN THIS, THAT IT IS IN SOME WAY DESIRABLE. HENCE THE PHILOSOPHER 
SAYS (ETHICS, J): GooDNESS IS WHAT ALL DESIRE.' 
6 CLARKE.OP CIT.P414. 
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"METAPHYSIC.\L THEOLOGY STANDS AT THE SUMMIT OF A HIERARCHY OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH HAS ITS 
ST..\RTI1'G POINT IN SENSE EXPERIE:-OCE. BEING AS BEING IS NOT AS SUCH A SENSIBLE OBJECT-THIS IS 
BECAUSE SO\IE BENGS . \RE SEPARATE FROM SENSIBLE MATTER-AND SO THERE IS A CONGR1JENCE BET\VEEN 
THE SUBJECT OF \IETAPHYSICS A.'\TD THOSE BEINGS IN Wl!ICH IT IS PRINCIPALLY INTERESTED A.'ID TOWARD 
\\llICH IT DIRECTS ITS DEMONSTRATIONS. YET BEING IS GIVEN IN THE FIRST. MOST IMMEDIATE AND 
CO"-"Fl'SED HUM.-1..'I APPREHENSION OF REALITY.' -HANKEY.W. "THEOLOGY AS SC!ENCE:PROCLUS 
AND THOMAS AQlJ1NAS. 'OP CITP84. 
8 Al:Gt:STI"-"E E:l.TENDED THIS VIEW OF BEING SPECIFICALLY TO THE BEING OF GOD, AS WE HA VE SEEN. 
AQl:INAS SYSTE\L\TISED AUGUSTINE'S INNOVATION FAR MORE THOROUGHLY, INDEED HE INCORPORATED IT 
!:\"TO l!IS EN"TIRE SYSTEM. THIS RECOGN!TlON OF THE EXISTENTIAL NATURE OF THOMAS. METAPHYSICAL 
THEOLOGY WAS FIRST RECOGNISED IN THE 1940'S BY GILSON A.'\TD OTHER PIONEERS St:CH AS MARITAIN. 
TH01'.llS\!, HAS BECOME A DISTINCT SYSTEM, WHERE THOMAS IS INTERPRETED FROM A SPECIFIC 
PERSPECTIVE. FOR EXAMPLE, HIS PHILOSOPHY WAS VARIOUSLY FOUND TO BE EXISTE!•."TIALIST, (GILSON, 
M.\R!T.-\JN, FABRO) IDEALIST, (ROUSSELOT. BRADLEY) REALIST (GILSON) A.'\TDCR!TlCAL 
(TRANSCENDEN"T AL THOWSTS SUCH AS; RAHNER, AND MARECHAL). 
SEE: HANKEY.W."AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?'OP CIT.PI34. OFTEN. THOMAS 
HAS BEEN REI:\TERPRETED ACCORDING TO MORE MODERN LINES OF THOUGHT IN ORDER TO RENDER THE 
CRITICIS\IS OF CllIBENT THINKERS, AIMED AT SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY, VOID WHEN IT CA1'.IE TO THOMAS. 
ONE VERY I\!PORTA.'-T EXAMPLE IS THE HEIDEGGERIAN CRITIQUE OF 'ON"TOTHEOLOGY.' V.-\JUOUS 
CONTE\!PORARY THO\!ISTS HA<"E SPECIFICALLY POINTED TO THOMAS' 'EXISTEN"TIAL' INTERPRETATION OF 
BEING. STATING THAT l!IS U1'IQUE METAPHYSIC CANNOT BE MA.DE SUBJECT TO THE HEIDEGGERIAN 
CRITIQL"E. FOR ffRTHER DISCUSSION ON THE SUBJECT OF THE DIFFERENT INTERPRETERS OF THOMAS. SEE 
PEGISAC.. AFfER SEVEN HUNDRED YEARS: ST. THOMAS AQUINAS IN 1974.' OP CIT P137-
153. 
IN CON°""ECTIO:-; TO THE "E:l.1STENTL\L' ANALYSIS OF BEING IN THOMAS. SEE; G!LSON.E: 1956. "THE 
CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS. 'NEW YORK: RA.i'JDOM HOUSE.CHAP 
L "EXISTENCE AND REALITY.' SEE ALSO GILSON.E. 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST THOMAS 
AQUINAS.OP CIT.Pl06: 'Now WE KNOW ONE THING WHICH IN THIS WAY POSSESSES ALL BEING; IT IS THE 
\"ERY THING OF WHICH WE PREDICATED THAT IT JS ITS O\VN BEING. A TH!KG ',1,1JJCH IS ITS OWN BEING. I.E. 
THE ESSEN"CE OF ',1,1JICH HAS ITS BEING OF ITSELF AND NOT FROM OUTSIDE, IS NECESSARILY ALSO THE WHOLE 
BENG, OR. IN OTHER WORDS. POSSESSES THE POWER OF BEING AT ITS l!IGHEST DEGREE.' SAYS COPLESTON: 
"!T HAS BEEN \l.\I:\"T AINED THAT ST. THOMAS, BY BRINGING ESSETO THE FOREFRONT OF THE PHILOSOPl!IC 
STAGE .. .\D\: . ..),_'-;CED BEYO't'-'D THE PHILOSOPHIES OF ESSENCE, PARTICULARLY BEYOND PLATO A.i'ID THE 
PHILOSOPHERS OF PU.TONIC INSPIRATION. THERE IS CERTAINLY TRL"TH n-; THIS CONTE>,"TJON: ALTHOCGH 
PLATO DID NOT D!SREG . .\RD THE Ql"ESTION OF EXISTENCE, THE SALIENT CHARACTERISTIC OF HIS PHILOSOPHY 
IS THE EXPLA"ATION OF THE WORLD IN TER.'-.!S OF ESSENCE. WHILE EVEN FOR ARISTOTLE, GoD. ALTHOUGH 
PL"RE ACT. IS PRl\!..\RILY THOCGHT OR IDEA. THE PLATONIC Goon RENDERED PERSONAL. MOREOVER . 
. \LTHOL"GH ARISTOTLE ENDEAVOURED TO EXPL,-\JN FORM AND ORDER IN THE WORLD AND THE INTELLIGIBLE 
PROCESS OF DE\"ELOP\IENT, HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE EXISTENCE OF THE WORLD ... WHEN ST.THOMAS 
INSISTED ON THE FACT THAT GoD IS SUBSISTENT EXISTENCE, THAT HIS ESSENCE IS NOT PRIMARILY 
GOODN"ESS OR THOL.GHT. BL"T EXISTENCE. HE WAS BUT RENDERING EXPLICIT TllE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
JEWISH .-1..'-TI CHRISTl.-1..'i'S VIEW OF THE WORLD'S RELATION TO GoD. '-COPLESTON.F. 'A IDSTQRY OF 
PIDLOSOPHY. 'VOL II.OP CIT.P308. 
9 CLARKE.OP ClT.Nl5. ALTHOL'GH WE SHALL CONSIDER HEIDEGGER MORE CLOSELY AT A LATER STAGE. 
A BASIC DISTINCTIO:-; CA.'1 BE MADE HERE. WHEN AQUINAS ENGAGES IN THE 'EXISTENTIAL A..1'fAL YTIC' OF 
BEING. HE IS NOT CON"SIDERING THE WHOLE OF BEING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF 'HUMA.'1 BEING,' THE WAY 
HEIDEGGER DOES. HEIDEGGER STUDIES BEING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE NATURE OF HUMAN BEl"JG. 
HE BELIE\"ES TH.U '-""E CAN ONLY TACKLE THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF BEING, IF WE FIRST CONSIDER THE 
BEING OF M.-1..". AS . .\..'-!OBSERVER OF BEING IN GENERAL. 'ALL EFFORTS OF THE EXISTENTIAL ANALYTIC HA VE 
ONE GOAL, TO Fl'<U .'\.POSSIBILITY OF ANSWERING THE QUESTION OF THE MEA..'-IING OF BEING. THE 
ELABORATION OF Tl!IS QUESTION REQlJ!RES A DEFIN!TION OF THAT PHENOMENON IN WHICH SOMETHING LIKE 
BEING BECO~IES ACCESSIBLE. THE COMPREHENSION OF BEING. BUT Tl!IS BELONGS TO THE ST ATE OF BE!KG 
OF HU~l.\N BEING. ONLY IF Tl!IS BEING HAS BEEN SUFFICIENTLY PRIMORDIALLY INTERPRETED, CA..'1 ONE 
l"NDERST.-1..'m THE COMPREHENSION OF BEING WHICH IS CONTAINED IN ITS STATE OF BEING. AND ON THIS 
BASIS RAISE THE QL"ESTION CONCERNING THE BEING WHICH IS COMPREHENDED BY IT AND CONCERNING THE 
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SUPPOSITIONS OF THIS CO\IPREHENSION. '-HE!DEGGER.M.(TRANSLATED: MACQUARR!E.L 
ROBINSON.E: 1962). 'BEING AND TIME. 'P424. WE HERE USE THE TR."-''ISLATION, PROVIDED BY 
GROSSMANN. SEE GROSSMANN.R "PHENOMENOLOGY A,'ID EXISTENTIALISM. AN 
INTRODUCTION. 'Op CIT.Pl52. THOMAS STUDIES THE EXISTENTIAL :-IATURE OF BEING THEOLOGICALLY. 
THAT IS TO SAY. ALL BEI:\fG EXISTS AS INTERPRETED BY GoD THE CREATOR OF BEING AS EXISTING. ON THE 
CONTR.~RY, HEIDEGGER VIEWS THE PROBLEM OF BEING FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF THE HUMAN BEING. THIS 
FORMS THE BASIS OF ONE OF THE FUNDA.\IENT .-\L CRITICISMS THAT RUSSELL MAKES OF AQUINAS. 
SPECIFICALLY .-\S A PHILOSOPHER. 'THE APPEAL TO REASON, IS IN A SENSE. INSINCERE, SINCE THE 
CONCLUSION TO BE REACHED, IS FIXED IN ADVANCE. '-RUSSELL.B: 1974.'HISTORY OF WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY.'P453. IN OUR OPINION, THIS CRITICISM OF AQUINAS, TELLS us MORE ABOUT RUSSELL'S 
BIAS, THAN THAT OF AQUINAS HI\ISELF. RUSSELL VIEWS .-\LL THE PHILOSOPHY OF OTHERS. THROUGH HIS 
OWN CONCEPTION OF HOW PHILOSOPHY \!UST BE DONE, 'IAMELY FROM A NON· THEISTIC, SO\!EWHAT 
EMPIRIC.-\L-POSITIVISTIC VIE\l!POINT. AQLlNAS WAS NOT AN OXBRIDGE PRODUCT, LIVING IN THE FIRST HALF 
OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. HIS CONCEPTION OF THE ROLE OF REASON. IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT TO THAT 
OF RUSSELL WHO \US SES AQUINAS' POINT. FOR A FURTHER INSIGHT INTO RUSSELL'S BROADER POSITION. 
THE READER IS REFERRED TO' A DEBATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: BERTRAND RUSSELL 
AND F.C. COPLESTON.' IN: HICK.J.(EDITOR: 1964). THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.P167-191. 
JO CLARKE. W.N.OP CIT.P416. IT NEEDS TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT COPLESTON DOES NOT AGREE WITH 
OCR VIEWPOINT. HE STATES THAT BOTH CO).!PONENTS OF 'ESSENCE' AND 'EXISTENCE' ."-'RE TOTALLY 
INTEGRATED INTO THOMAS' SYSTE\l, NEITHER ONE TAKING PRIORITY: 'YET WE MUST 'IOT IMAGil\"E THAT 
ESSENCE EXISTED BEFORE RECEIVING EXISTENCE (WHICH WOULD BE A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS) OR THAT 
THERE IS A KIND OF ::\'EUTRAL EXISTENCE \\·lIICH IS NOT THE EXISTENCE OF A .... ~ THING IN PA.RTICCLAR UNTIL 
IT IS lI'.'JITED WITH ESSENCE: THE TWO PRINCIPLES ARE NOT TWO PHYSICAL THINGS UNITED TOGETHER, BUT 
THEY ARE TWO COl-iSTITUENT PRDICIPLES WHICH ARE COMBINED AS PRINCIPLES OF A PARTICULAR BEING.' [N 
FACT, COPLESTON ARGUES THAT EXISTENCE IS PRIOR TO ESSENCE IN THOMAS. AS IT IS THE ACTUALISATION 
OF SO\!ETHING THAT ONLY HAO 'POTEKTI.-\L.' EXISTENCE IS THE ACTUALISATION OF POTENCY. COPLESTON 
AGAN: 'FOR ST.THOMAS, EXISTE:-ICE IS 'IOTA STATE OF THE ESSENCE, BUT RATHER THAT WHICH PLACES 
THE ESSENCE f.'i A STATE OF ACTUALITY.'-!BID.P335. OUR REPLY IS TO POINTOUfTHE SUBTLE ROLE THAT 
'ESSENCE' PLAYS IN THE PICTURE. 'EXISTEOiCE,' FULFILS THE SUPPLANTING, ACTUALISING ROLE OF 
SO\IETHING WHICH ALREADY 'EXISTS,' INTELLECTUALLY IN GERM FOR<"!. 
11 IbidP4 I 8. 
12 Ibid.P418. 
13 YET THOl>IAS ALSO CHOOSES TO SPEAK OF GoD AS SELF·IDEOiTICAL AND IMMlJTABLE. 1'i OTHER WORDS. 
WE ARE NOT THAT SLllE THAT IN" CONCEIVNG OF THE CONCEPT OF EXISTEN"CE, THO\IAS ).!A.'IAGED TO AVOID 
SO\!E OF THE PLATON1C PROBLEMS. N THE USE OF ESSENCE-EXISTENCE DISTINCTION. 
14 THROUGHOL"T HIS SYSTE\1, THO\tAS's THEOLOGY (AT CONv"ENIENT POINTS) COv"ERS FOR THE GAPS IN HIS 
PHILOSOPHY. ONE OF THE PROBLE'>IS THAT ARISE AS A CONSEQlJ"ENCE TO HIS fl'ffERPRETATION OF BEING, IS 
THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL 01'"E, OR THAT OF \!ENT .-\L 'INTENTIONALITY', How DOES THE \UND CO~!E TO 
ACTUALLY U1'"DERSTAND BEING, IN THIS w.w? TH01't~S HAS NO ."-''ISWER, HE illRELY BELIEVES THAT GoD 
HAS MYSTERIOUSLY 'ENDOWED' MAN WITH THE ABILITY TO KNOW THINGS IN THIS WAY. SEE .~SO 
GROSSMANN.R.OP CIT.P9. GROSSMA.';'N POINTS OUT THE PROBLEM WITH THE SCHOLASTIC 'IOTION OF 
EPISTE~IOLOGY AS FOLLOWS; 'ACCORDING TO THIS CONCEPTION, AS \\"E HA VE SEEN, A ).!ATER!.~ 
SUBSTA'ICE IS COMPOSED OF .'\.'I ESSENCE A.ND OF MATTER. THE ESSENCE DETERMINES WHAT Kf\l) OF 
MATERIAL THING IT IS ... WHEN A HUMAN BEING K'IOWS. THATIS, PERCEIVES A MATERIAL OBJECT, THE 
ESSENCE OF THE OBJECT IS SUPPOSED TO EXIST IN HIS MIND.' OUR POINT IS THIS, \\-1!EN THE SCHOL-\STIC 
TRADITION (INCLUDING THOMAS) RE~"ERTS TO THE ISSIJ"E OF WHAT MAKES A TI!ING RE.-\LL Y KNOW ABLE, IT 
IS THE 'ESSENCE,, OR THE INTELLIGIBLE FORM OF THAT ENTITY THAT IS IMPORTA.'IT, NOT ITS NETWORKING 
RELATIONSHIP WITH OTHER BEINGS. ST ATES COPLESTON: 'As HE HELD THAT THE INTELLECT KNOWS 
DIRECTLY THE ESSENCE, THE UNIVERSAL, ST. THOMAS DREW THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION THAT THE HU\IAN 
\UND DOES NOT KNOW DIRECTLY SINGULAR MATERIAL THINGS.,. THE INTELLECT, HOWEVER, COMES TO 
KNOW BY ABSTRACTING THE INTELLIGIBLE SPECIES FROM THE INDIVIDUALISING MATTER, A'ID IN THIS CASE 
IT CAN HA VE DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSALS ONLY.' -COPLESTON.F. 'HISTORY OF WESTERN 
PHILOSOPHY. 'OP CIT. VOL II.P391. 
15 CLARKE.Op CitP421. 
16 Ibid.P42 l. 
"AQUINAS.T. 'SU.VIAL4 THEOLOGICA.' Op Cit. PT 1.Q4.ART I.REPLY OBJ.2.P21. 
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18 IBID.PT l.Q4.ART 2.'WHETHER THE PERFECTIONS OF ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD?'P21. 
l9 ·IF WE LEAVE OUT RADICAL MONISMS. WHICH ELIMINATE HALF OF TI1E PROBLEM. ALL MET APHYS!CAL 
SYSTEMS V.'!IlCH ATTEMPT TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MA,'JY ARE EITHER 
"0N·P ARTIC!PATION DOCTRINES OR P ART!CIPAT!ON DOCTRINES .... ALL THEORIES WHICH ADMIT AND TRY TO 
EXPLAIN AN lMMA'IBNT BOND OF SIMILARITY CAN BE REDUCED DOWN TO SOME FORM OF PARTICIPATION 
THEORY, I.E. A THEORY OF PARTICIPATION IN SOME UNIFYING PERFECTION COMMON TO ALL.' -CLARKE.OP 
CIT.P422. 'I A"<SWER THAT, IT MUST BE SAID THAT EVERY BEING IN .~'N WAY EXISTING !S FROM Goo. FOR 
WHATEVER IS FOUND IN ANYTHING BY PARTICIPATION. MUST BE CAUSED IN IT BY PARTICIPATION, MUST BE 
CAUSED IN IT BY THAT TO WHICH lT BELONGS ESSENTIALLY ... '-AQUINAS. T. OP CIT .PT I. Q 44.AR T 
I. 'WHETHER IT BE NECESSARY THAT EVERY BEING IS CREATED BY GOD?'P229. 
20 IBID.P424. 
:i WE REFER HERE SPECIFICALLY TO LOCKE'S 'ESSAY. '2.13.19. 2.13.20, 2.32.2. 'LOCKE SAYS THAT THIS 
WAY OFT ALKING IS NO LESS MEA"<!NGFUL OR MEA,"<INGLESS IBAN THE EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHER'S TALK OF 
SUBSTANCE AS ASUPPORTFORQUAL!TIEs.'-YOLTON.J.W.'A LOCKE DICTIONERY. '0PCIT.P283. 
22 AQUINAS.T. 'SUMMA THEOLOG!CA. 'OP CIT.PT 1.Ql05.ART.5.P518. 
23TEXT FROM THE LATIN VERSIONAQU!NATJS.S. THQ,\1AE. 'SUMMA THEOLOG!AE. '.PRIMA 
PARS.Q105.ART.5.P499. 
24 CLARKE. OP CIT .P426. FRANKLY, (THOlv!AS' VIEW OF DIVINE SUBSTANCE EXCEPTED) WE FIND IBIS 
INTERPRETATION DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT, IF INDEED WE PLACE THOMAS (MODIFICATIONS N01WIIBST ANDING) 
!NTO THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION. THE TRADITION ST ANDS ORF ALLS ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
ACCIDENT ru"<D ESSENCE. Of COURSE, ARISTOTLE ACCEPTS THAT THERE IS SOME MUTUAL PENETRATION 
WITH REGARDS TO SUBSTANCE A,"<D ACCIDENT, BUT NOT TO THE PONr WHERE THE DISTINCTION IS BLLllRED 
TO THIS EXTENT. [F WE STRESS FIRSTLY THE CHANGE IN ACCIDE1'T, AND THEN GO ON TO SUGGEST A CLOSE 
AFFINITY BETWEEN ACCIDENT AND ESSENCE, THE DUALITY UPON WHICH THE ENTIRE SCHOLASTIC 
PHILOSOPHY RESTS. BREAKS DOWN. 
25 COPLESTON.F.OP CIT.P327. 
26 CLARKE.M.T.(EDITOR:1972).' AN AQUINAS READER. 'OP C!T.P32. THE QUOTE IS FROM CLARKE'S 
!1''TRODUCTORY SECTION. THOlv!AS ARGUES IBATNATURE PRODUCES EFFECT IN ACT, FROM BEING IN 
POTENTIALITY. As A CONSEQUENCE OF THIS, POTENTIAI,ITY PRECEDES ACT, AND FORMLESSN"ESS CO!v!ES 
BEFORE FORM ITSELF. Goo, IN HIS CREATION, CREATES BEINGS IN ACT our OF NOTHING .• ... DJCENDuM 
QUOD NATG'RA PRODUCIT EFFECTL\H JNACTU DE ENTE JN POTENT IA: ET !DEG OPORTET UT JN EIUS OPERATION£ 
POTENT/A TEMPORE PRAECEDATACTUM, ET JNFVRMITAS FORMATIONEM. SED DEUS PRODUCIT ENSACTU EX 
NIH/LO: ET IDEO SY:4TIM POTEST PRODUCER£ REM PERFECTAM, SECUNDuM MAGNITUDINEM SUAE V/RTUTJS. '-
AQU!NATf.:S.S.THQJJ,fAE.OP C!T.PRJAIA PARS.Q66.ART I.P322. 
CLARKE. IN DEFENDING THE ARISTOTEL!A,'l-THOMISTIC VIEW OF ACTIPOTENCY STATES 'THE INDISPENSABLE 
ROLE OF POTENCY AS A CONDITION OF POSSIBILITY FOR THE EXISTENCE OF ANY CO~IPLEX WHOLE THAT IS 
NOT A )JERE AGGREGATE.'-!BID.P427. HE THE'1 QUOTES AQuTNAS: 'ON SPIRITUAL CREATURES. 'ART 
3 .. NJ FOLLOWS: 'Our OF TWO E1'TITIES IN ACT!TIS IMPOSSIBLE TO ~!AKE A '1ATURAL OR lNTRI'ISIC UNITY 
(AN UNUM PER SE).'-!B!D.P427. CLARK THEN STATES: 'SucH ACOMBINATIONCANONLY BE AN AGGREGATE. 
A SOCIETY, Willi A UNITY OF ORDER PER!1APS, BUT NOT COALESCING FOR FORM, A GENUINE NEW BEING.' As 
WE SEE IT. CLARKE IS CORRECT, ONLY IF WE ASSUlv!E THE BASIC ARISTOTELIAN-THOMISTIC MET .-\PHYSICAL 
SCHEMA OF ESSENCE-ACCIDENT, Willi THE PRIMACY OF SL13STA'ICE AS THE CHIEF INDIVIDUATING CONCEPT 
IN ~!ETAPHYSICS. 
27 CLARKE.!BID.?430-434. 
28 CLARKE.W.N.OP CIT.P431. 
'9 ALL BEING EMANATES FROM A PARTICULAR AGENT, BUT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE OF ALL BEING IS GoD, THE 
NAME OF WHICH IS CREATION. 'DJCENDUM QUOD, SJCUT SUPRA DICTUM EST, NON SOLUM OPORTET 
CONSIDERARE EMANATIONEM ALICUIUSENTIS PARTICULAR/SABAL/QUO PARTICULAR/ AGENTE, SED ET/AM 
EMANATIONEM WTIUS ENTIS A CA USA UNIVERSAU, QUAE EST DEUS: ET HANC QUIDEM EMANATIONEM 
DESIGNAMUSNOMINECREATIONIS. '-AO!NATUS.S.THOJJ,fAE.OPCIT.PRfJJ,fA PARS.044.ART 4.P226. 
30 - _.. 
CLARKE.OP C!T.P432. 
31 IBID.P433. THOMAS ARGUES THAT Goo HAS 'PERSONAL RELATIONS' Willi PEOPLE, BUT THIS DOES NOT 
IMPLY AN 'IMPARTATION' OF Goo's ESSENCE. 
32 IN WHAT FOLLOWS. WE ARE PRIMARILY INDEBTED TO THE ARTICLE OF: AERTSEN.J. 'THE 
CONVERTIBILITY OF BEING AND GOOD IN ST.THOMAS AQUINAS. 'OP CIT. 
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33 AERTSEN.J.!Bm.P540. COMPARED TO KAN-r's APPROACH. IN THE SCHOLASTIC TRADITION THE 
'TR.'-l'SCENDENT ALS' ARE THOSE THAT STAND OPPOSED TO Tl!E 'c ATEGORIES.' THE TR.-1.,'JSCENDENT ALS ARE 
THOSE ATTRIBlITES OF BEING THAT 'TR.'1'SCEND' SENSORY EXPER!ENCE. WHICH IS INVOLVED IN TlIE 
APPREHENSION OF THE TRADITIONAL CATEGORIES. UNLIKE THE CATEGORIES. THE 'TRA.'JSCENDENTALS' DO 
NOT EXCLUDE EACH OTHER. BEING AS GooD. IS TRUE FOR ALL INSTANCES OF BEING. 'GooDNESS AND 
BEING ARE REALLY Tl!E SAME (DICENDUM QUOD BONUM ET ENS SUi'IT IDEM SECUNDUM RE\f: SED OIFFERUNT 
SECUNDUM RAT/ONEM TAN'IVM) AND DIFFER ONLY IN IDEA, W1UCH IS CLEAR FROM TllE FOLLOWING 
ARGUMENT. THE ESSENCE OF GOODNESS CONSISTS IN THATIT IS IN soi.IE WAY DESIRABLE. HENCE THE 
PHILOSOPHER SAYS (ETHIC.I.); GooDNESS IS WHAT ALL DESIRE (DICIT QUOD BONUM EST QUOD OMNIA 
APPETUNT).' -AQUINAS.T.'SUA!li\i4 THEOLOGJCA.'OPCIT.PART 1.QS.ART l.P23. 
34 AERTSEN.OPCIT.P452. 
35 SEE NOTE 33. 
36 AQUINAS.THOMAS.Or CIT.PART 1.Q 4.ARTA. AS MENTI01'"ED IN AERSTEN.J.Or Crr.P455 .. 
37 AERTSEN.J.OP Crr.P456. 
38 AQulNAS WOULD ANSWER TllE QUESTION OF TllE PROBLEM OF EVIL, BY SIMPLY STATING THAT EVIL IS NOT 
DEVOID OF BEING. 0NTHE CONTR.ARY, IT IS LACKING BEING. A MAN IS EVIL, BECAUSE HE LACKS TllE BEING 
OF VIRTUE.-AERTSEN.J.!BID.P459. 'BUT EVIL HAS NO FORMAL CAUSE, RATHER IT IS A PRIVATION OF FORM, 
LIKEWISE, NEITHER HAS IT A FINAL CAUSE. BUT R.ATl!ER !TIS A PRJV AT!ON OF ORDER TO THE PROPER END ... ' -
AQUINAS.T.OP CIT.PT l.Q 49.ART. l.P254. SEE ALSO: 
MAC OONALD.S. 'THE ESSEl£SSENTL4 ARGUMENT IN AQUINAS' DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA.' OP 
Crr.Pl57FF. 
39 SEE: AQUINAS.T.(TRANSLATED:MAURERA: 1963). 'THE DIVISION AND METHODS OF THE 
SCIENCES.QUESTIONS V AND VI OF HIS COMMENTARY ON THE DE TRJNJTATEOF 
BOETHIUS. ·or err. ALSO WIPPEL.J.F. 'METAPHYSICS AND SEPARATJO ACCORDING TO 
THOMAS AQUINAS.' 0PCrr.P431470. 
40 WIPPEL.J.!BID.P43 l. 
"' SEE IN THIS CONNECTION: GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS .• OP err. CHAP 
SIX. 'KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE: GILSON.E: 1956. 'THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF ST. 
THOMAS AQUINAS,' MARITIAN.J: 1948. 'EXISTENCE AND THE EXISTENT,' OWENS.J: 1953.' AN 
ELEMENT ARY CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS.' 
42 
'Bur IF ONE THING DOES NOT DEPEND ON ANOTHER WITH REGARD TO WHAT CONSTITlITES Tl!E 
INTEWGIBILITY OF THE NATURE, THEN THE INTELLECT CA'< ABSTRACT THE ONE FROM THE OTHER SO AS TO 
KNOW IT WITHOUT THE OTHER. THIS IS TRUE NOT ONLY IF THEY ARE SEPARATED IN REALITY, LIKE MA'J ''"'JD 
ST01'"E, BUT ALSO IF THEY ARE UNITED IN REALITY, WHETHER THEY ARE JOINED AS PART AND WHOLE (AS 
LETTER CAN BE lTNDERSTOOD WITHOUT SYLLABLE. BUT NOT VICE ~"ERSA AND ANIMAL WITHOUT FOOT. BUT 
NOT CONVERSELY); OREv"EN IF THEY ARE JOINED A~ FOR.\! IS lll'ITED TO MATTER AND ACCIDENT TO SU!lJECT 
(AS WHITENESS CAN BE UNDERSTOOD WITHOUT >1A'< AND \lCE VERSA). ACCORDINGLY. THROUGH ITS 
VARIOUS OPERATIONS THE INTELLECT DISTINGUISHES ONE THING FROM ANOTHER IN DIFFERENT WAYS. 
THROUGH THE OPERATION BY WHICH IT COMPOSES .4..'lD DIVIDES, IT DISTINGUISHES 01'"£ THING FROM 
ANOTHER BY L1'iDERSTANDING THAT THE ONE DOES NOT EXIST IN THE OTHER. THROl.:GH THE OPERATION 
HOW"EVER, BY WHICH IT UNDERSTANDS W'!IAT A THING IS, IT DISTINGUISHES ONE THIKG FROM ,\NOTHER BY 
KNOWING WHAT ONE IS WITHOUT KNOWING ANYTHING OF THE OTl!ER, EITHER THAT IT IS UNITED TO IT OR 
SEPARATED FROM IT. SO THIS DISTINCTION IS NOT PROPERLY CALLED SEPARATION, BUT ON!. Y THE FIRST. IT 
IS CORRECTLY CALLED ABSTRACTION, BUT ONLY WHEN THE THINGS, ONE OF WHICH IS KNOWN WITHOUT THE 
OTHER. ARE ON"E IN REALITY. FOR IF WE CONSIDER ANIMAL WITHOUT CONSIDERING STON"E, WE DO NOT SAY 
THAT WE ABSTRACT A1'1MAL FROM ST01'"E. IT FOLLOWS THAT SINCE. PROPERLY SPEAKING, WE CAN ONLY 
ABSTRACT THINGS UNITED IN REALITY. Tl!ERE ARE TWO SORTS OF ABSTRACTION CORRESPONDING TO THE 
TWO MODES OF UNION MENTIONED ABOVE, NAMELY THE UNION OF PART AND WHOLE, AND TllE UNION OF 
FORM AND MATTER. Tt!E FIRST IS THAT IN WHICH W"E ABSTRACT FROM MATTER, AND THE SECOND IS THAT IN 
WHICH WE ABSTRACT A WHOLE FROM ITS PARTS.' -AQUINAS.T. 'COMMENTARY ON THE DE 
TRINITATE OF BOETHIUS.'OPCIT.Q 5.ART 3.P30. 
AGAIN THOMAS SAYS; 'WE CONCLUDE THAT THERE ARE THREE KJNDS OF DISTINCTION IN THE OPERATION OF 
THE INTELLECT. THERE IS 01'"£ THROUGH TllE OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT JOINING AND DIVIDING WHICH IS 
PROPERLY CALLED SEPARATION; AND THIS BELONGS TO DIVINE SCIENCE OR MET !\PHYSICS. THERE IS 
ANOTHER THROUGH THE OPERATION BY WHICH THE QUIDDITIES OF THINGS ARE CONCEIVED WHICH IS THE 
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ABSTRACTION OF FORM FROM SENSIBLE MATIER: AND THIS BEL01'GS TO MATHEMATICS. A'lD THERE IS A 
THIRD THROUGH THE SA.\1IE OPERATION \VHICH lS THE ABSTRACTION ()FA. lJNIVERS . ..\L FRON! . .\ PA.RTIClfl. . .\R. 
:\.'JD THIS BELONGS TO PHYSICS A.i"JD TO ALL THE SCIENCES IN GE:'.\JERAL. BEC . .\USE SCIENCE DISREG.--\RDS 
.,CC!DENTAL FEATURES AND TREATS OF NECESSARY MATTERS. '-IBID.Q 5.ART 3.P334. 
43 WIPPEL.J. 'METAPHYSICS AND SEP ARA TIO ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS.' OP 
CIT.P433. FOR AQUINAS, GoD IS NOT THE SUBJECT OF ~IETAPHYSICS, RATHER IT IS BEING AS BEIC'<G. IF 
BEL'G AS BEING, OR BEING IN GENERAL IS THE SL1lJECT OF METAPHYSICS, THE METAPHYSICIAN SHOULD 
REASON FROM KNOWLEDGE OF THIS SL13JECT TO K\fOWLEDGE OF TIIE CAUSE OR PR!:'JCIPLE OF ALL THAT 
FALLS UNDER IT, THAT IS, BEING AS BEING. As AQUINAS VIEWS IT, THIS IS GoD. INSTEAD, GoDCA.'lONLY 
BE STUDIED INDIRECTLY AS THE PRINCIPLE OR THE CAUSE OF THAT WHICH IS BEING AS BEING.-
WIPPEL.J. 'METAPHYSICS.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS.OP 
CIT.(EDITED:KRETZMANN.N, STUMP.E: 1995).P86. 
44 IBID.P434. 
'5 'WHEN THE MATHEMATICIAN ABSTRACTS HE DOES NOT CONSIDER SO!>olETHlNG OTHERWISE THA..'1 IT IS. 
THU, HE DOES NOT THINK THAT A LINE EXISTS WITHOUT SENSIBLE MATTER, HE TREATS OF A LINE AND ITS 
PROPERTIES WITHOUT CONSIDERING SENSIBLE MATIER. ·-AQUINAS.T. 'COMMENTARY ON THE DE 
TRINITATE OF BOETIIlUS.' OP CIT.Q5.ART 3.P35. 
46 WIPPEL.J.Op CIT.P434. 
47
• ACCORDINGLY THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF THEOLOGY. THERE IS ONE THAT TREATS OF DIVINE THINGS, C'<OT 
AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SCIENCE BUT AS THE PRTh'CIPLES OF THE SUBJECT. THIS IS THE KIND OF THEOLOGY 
PURSUED BY THE PHILOSOPHERS AND THAT IS ALSO CALLED ~-IETAPHYSICS. THERE IS .'u'IOTHER THEOLOGY, 
HOWEVER, THAT INVESTIGATES DIVINE TH!l'GS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE AS THE SUBJECT OF THE SCIENCE. THIS 
IS THEOLOGY TAUGHT ll' SACRED SCRIPTURE. BOTH TREAT OF BEINGS THAT EXIST SEPARATE FROM MA TIER 
.'u'ID ~IOTION, BUT WITH A DIFFERENCE, FOR SOMETHl1'G CAN EXIST SEPARATE FROM MATTER AND MOTI0:-1 
I:-1 TWO DISTINCT WAYS; FIRST, BECAUSE BY ITS 1'ATURE THE TH!:'JG THAT IS CALLED SEPARATE IN :-10 WAY 
C.'u'i EXIST IN MATTER AND MOTION, AS Goo AND THE AXGELS ARE SAID TO BE SEPARATE FROM MATTER .'u\fD 
MOTION. SECOND, BECAUSE BY ITS NATURE IT DOES NOT EXIST IN MATIER .'u'<U MOTION; BUT IT CA..\f EXIST 
WITHOUT THEM. THOUGH WE SOMETIMES FIND IT WITH THEM. IN THIS WAY BEING, SUBSTANCE, POTENCY, 
ACT ARE SEPARATE FROM MATTER .~ND MOTION, BECAUSE THEY DO NOT DEPEND ON THEM FOR THEIR 
EXISTENCE, UNLIKE THE OBJECTS OF MATHEMATICS, \11HICH CA.'/ ONLY EXIST IN MATTER, THOUGH THEY CA.'/ 
BE L'l'DERSTOOD WITHOUT SENSIBLE MATTER. THUS PHILOSOPHICAL THEOLOGY INVESTIGATES BE!:'JGS 
SEP.\RATE IN THE SECOND SENSE AS ITS SLTBJECTS. A.1'\ITI BEINGS SEP AR.ATE IN THE FIRST SENSE ,\S THE 
PRINCIPLES OF ITS SUBJECT. BcT THE THEOLOGY OF SACRED ScRIPTCRE TREATS OF BEINGS SEPARATE IN THE 
FIRST SENSE AS ITS SUBJECTS, THOCGH IT CONCERNS SO\IE ITE~IS IN ~IA TIER .'u'/D MOTION INSOFAR AS THIS 
IS '-'EEDED TO THROW LIGHT ON DIVIN'E THINGS.' -AQUINAS.T.OP ClT.Q 5.ARTA.P45. 
48 WIPPELJ.Op Cit.P437. 
'
9 ONCE AGAIN, WE REPRODUCE THE RF.LEVANT TEXT l:'J THE 'COM~IE'-'TARY ON THE DE TRINITATE': 
'ACCORDINGLY, THROUGH ITS VARIOUS OPERATIONS THE INTELLECT DISTlNGUISHES 01'E THING FROM 
·°"'\OTHER IN DIFFERENT WAYS. THROUGH THE OPERATIO'i BY WHICH IT COMPOSES .'u\fD DIVIDES, IT 
DISTINGUISHES ONE THNG FROM ANOTHER BY LTJ\UERST.'u'IDlNG THAT THE OJ','£ DOES 'iOT EXIST N THE 
OTHER. THROCGH THE OPERATION HOWEVER. BY WHICH IT UNUERST.~'iDS 'k11AT A THING IS, IT 
DISTINGWSHES 01''E THING FROM ANOTHER BY ~'iOWlNG WHAT ONE IS WITHOUT KNOWING .'u'IYTHING OF 
THE OTHER, EITHER THAT IT IS lJNITED TO IT OR SEPARATED FROM IT. So THIS DISTlNCTION IS 'JOT PROPERLY 
CALLED SEPARATION, BUT ONLY THE FIRST. !TIS CORRECTLY CA.LLED ABSTRACTION. BUT ONLY WHEN THE 
THINGS, 01''E OF WHICH IS KNOWN WITHOlff THE OTHER, ARE 01''E IN REALITY. FOR IF WE CONSIDER A1'1MAL 
WITHOL'T CONSIDERING STONE, WE DO NOT SAY THAT 'k'E ABSTRACT ANIMAL FROM STONE. IT FOLLOWS 
THAT Sl:'JCE, PROPERLY SPEAKING, WE CAN ONLY ABSTRACT THINGS UNITED IN REALITY, THERE ARE TWO 
SORTS OF ABSTRACTION CORRESPONDING TO THE TWO MODES OF lJNION ME1''TIONED ABOVE, NAMELY THE 
UNION OF PART AND WHOLE, ."1-<U THE lJNION OF FORM A..'ID MATTER. THE FIRST IS THAT IN WHICH WE 
ABSTRACT FORM FROM MATIER, _"1-<U THE SECOND JS THAT IN WHICH WE ABSTRACT A WHOLE FROM ITS 
PARTs.'-AQUINAS.T.'COMMENTARYON THE DE TRINITATEOF BOETIIlUS.'Op CIT.Q5.ART 
3.P30. 
SEE ALSO WIPPEL 's COMME1''TS IN THE AQUINAS COMPANION:' BY EMPHASISING THAT THE SUBJECT OF 
~IETAPHYSICS IS BEING AS BEING, AQUINAS ALSO ESTABLISHES HIS POSITION ON A..N EARLIER CONTROVERSY 
CONCER1'1NG THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE SCIENCE OF BElNG AS BEING DEFINED BY ARISTOTLE IN 
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"METAPHYSICS" IV.1-2, .'u\ID THE "FIRST PHILOSOPHY," OR "DIVINE SCIENCE" DEVELOPED IN 
"METAPHYSICS" VJ. I. WHILE THE FIRST APPROACH EMPHASISES THE NON- PARTICULARITY OF THE SUBJECT 
MATTER OF THIS SCIENCE. THE SECOND SEEMS RATHER TO FOCUS ITS STLTIY ON ONE PARTICULAR KIND OR 
!Ll.."GE OF BEING: SEPARATE AND IMMATERIAL ENTITY. OR THE DIVINE. IF ARISTOTLE CLEARLY ATTE~!PTED 
TO IDENTIFY THESE TWO AS ONE ANDTHE SAME SCIENCE AT THE END OF METAPHYSICS VJ NOT ALL 
INTERPRETERS BELIEVED THAT HE SUCCEEDED.' -WIPPEL.J. 'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT. IN THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS. (EDITED: KRETZMANN.N, STUMP.E: 1995) P85. 
<o 
· WIPPEL.J.Op CIT.P439. 
;t AQUINAST. ·coMMENT ARY ON THE DE TR/NITA TE OF BOETHIUS. 'Op CIT.Q 5.ART 3.P33-I. 
52 IBID.P34. 
53 WIPPEL.J. 'METAPHYSICS AND SEP ARA TIO ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS.' OP 
0T.P440. 
54 WIPPEL.J.IBID.P440. 
55 1Bm.P44 l. 
56 IBID.P456. 
57 IBID.P457. 
58 AQUINAS.T.OP CIT.Q 5.ART 1.PI6-l 7. SEE ALSO: HALL.D.C: 1992 .. THE TRINITY.AN ANALYSIS 
OF ST THOMAS AQUINAS' £¥POSITJO OF THE DE IR/NITA TE OF BOETHIUS.' OP CIT.P90FF. 
59 SEE WIPPEL.J.F. 'THOMAS' AQUINAS' DERIVATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES 
(PREDICAMENTS).'0P CIT.Pl3-34. COMMENTING ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ARISTOTLE AND 
PLATO, \\1TH RESPECT TO IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCES, WE!SHEIPL STATES: 'FOR THOMAS, PLATO k'ID 
ARlSTOTLE AGREE ON THREE POil'rrs. FIRSTLY. IMMATERIAL SUBSTk'JCES PARTICIPATE IN THE SUPREME 
BEING, GOD. SECONDLY, THEY SHARE IN THE GOVERNING OF THE WORLD, .'u'JD THEY ARE DEVOID OF A."Y 
MATTER. THIRDLY, THEY SHARE IN THE GOVERMNG OF THE WORLD THROUGH DIVINE PROVIDENCE. 
HOWEVER. THE TWO THINKERS DIFFER ON THE FOLLOWING THREE POINTS. FIRSTLY, IN PLATO, SEPARATE 
SUBST.'u"CES ARE SPECIES OF ALL THINGS, WHILE FOR ARISTOTLE. THEY ARE INTELLECTIJAL BEINGS WHO 
KNOW THEMSELVES .'.\ID MOVE Tl!E SPHERES. PLATO DOES NOT LIMIT TIIE!R NUMBER TO THE MOVEABLE 
SPHERES. ARISTOTLE DOES NOT POSTIJLATE ANY SOULS !NTER,'.!EDIARY BETWEEN THE SOULS OF THE 
SPHERES, k"D THE SOUL OF MAN. AS DOES PLATO.' -WEISHEIPL.J.A. 'FRIAR THOMAS D' AQUINO. HIS 
LIFE, THOUGHT AND WORKS.'OP CIT.P318. 
60 AQUINAS.T. 'COMMENT ARY ON THE DE TRJNITATEOF BOETHIUS. 'OP CIT.QV.ART 1.P5. 
61 AQUINAS.T. 'SUA'1Jv.&1 THEOLOGJCA.'OP CIT.PT 1.Q29.ART 1.Pl56. 
"WIPPEL.J. 'METAPHYSICS.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS. OP C!T.Plll7. 
63 WIPPEL.J. 'THOMAS AQUINAS' DERIVATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES 
(PREDICAMENTS). 'OP CIT.Pl4. 
64 IBID.Pl4-l5. 
65 THOMAS BASES HIS METAPHYSICS HERE ON THE ·PHYSICS' OF ARISTOTLE. IN THIS TREATISE, ARISTOTLE'S 
SYNTHESIS OF ACCIDENT AL BEING AS OPPOSED TO SUBSTANTIAL BEING WAS THE RESULT OF HIS ATTEMPT TO 
UNDERSTAND . .\>'ID EXPLAIN THE MORE FUNDAME1'TAL AS OPPOSED TO THE LESS RADICAL TYPES OF CH.'\c\IGE 
INNATL'RE. 
66 IBID.Pl6. 
67 SEE WIPPEL.J. 'THOMAS AQUINAS' DERIVATION OF THE ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES.' OP 
C!T.P20-22. FIRSTLY, WE HA VE THE INDIV!DCAL SUBSTANCE OF WHICH ALL ELSE IS PREDICATED. 
SECONDLY, WE HAVE THOSE PREDICATES THAT ARE PREDICATED IN THE SUBJECT. THIS IS TifE PREDICATE OF 
QUANTITY. THIRDLY, WE HAVE THE PREDICA>,,IENTOFQUALITY. IN THE FOURTH CASE, THE PREDICATE OF 
QUALITY IS ONLY TAKEN WHEN THE ENTITY IS SEEN IN RELATION TO SOMETHING ELSE. THIS IS THE 
PRED!Ck\.IENT OF RELATION. IN THE FIFTH CASE, WE HAVE THE PREDICAMENT OF HAB!TUS. THIS REFERS TO 
SOMETHING THAT AL THOUGH AFFECTING THE SUBJECT, OR RELATED TO THE SUBJECT, IT IS ENTfRELY 
REALISED OUTSIDE OF THE SUBJECT. FOR EXAMPLE, SOCRATES IS WEARING A COAT. SIXTHLY, WE HA VE THE 
PREDICAMENT OF TIME. OR 'TIME WHEN.' THIS IS USED WHEN THE PREDICATE MEASURES THE SUBJECT WITH 
RESPECT TO TIME. THEN, SEVENTHLY, WE HA VE THE PREDICAMENT THAT MEASURES THE SUBJECT MTH 
RESPECT TO ITS PLACE. THIS PREDICAMENT, HOWEVER, DOES NOT MEASURE THE WAY THE PARTS ARE 
DISTRIBUTED INTHAT PLACE-WIPPEL.J. 'THOMAS AQUINAS' DERIVATION OF THE 
ARISTOTELIAN CATEGORIES. 'OP C!T.P2 l. THE EIGHTH CATEGORY ALSO CONCERNS ITSELF WITH 
'PLACE,' BUT IN A DIFFERENT MANNER. 'IF THAT FROM WHICH THE PREDICATE IS TAKEN MEASURES THE 
SUBJECT IN TERMS OF PLACE A1'TI IN TERMS OF THE WAY THE PARTS OF THE LOCATED BODY ARE ORDERED TO 
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ONE .'"'lOTHER. STILL A.'JOTHER PREDICAMENT RESULTS-(8) POSITION SITUS.' -[BIO.P2L WE C\N ILLl'STRATE 
THIS WITH THE STATEME~'. 'SOCRATES IS S!TIING.' WITHNlJMBER NINE, WE DEAL WITH ACTION. THIS 
PRED!C A TE IS PARTLY PRESENT IN THE SUBJECT. IN THAT THE SUBJECT!TSELF IS PERFOR!vllNG THE ACTION. 
WITH Ol'R TENTH PREDICAME}."f (PASSIO). 'TO BE ACTED UPON.' THE TERMINUS OF THE ACTION IS THE 
Sl'BJECT. AS THE SL'BJECT RECEIVES THE ACTION. 
68 How WOULD THOMAS REPLY TO K.'c'lT? OTHER THAN PERHAPS POINTING OUT CERTAIN LOGICAL 
INCONSISTE"ICIES, THOMAS WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO APPEAL TO FAITH, IN ORDER TO UPHOLD HIS 
REALISM. FOR EX,.>,,\;!PLE, HE yflGHT . .\!'PEAL TO GoD GR.'"'<"fING TO ADAM THE PRl\1LEGE OF NAMING THE 
·'""iIMALS (GEN 2: 19-20). WE HA VE HERE THE POSSIBLE ROOTS OF A CHRISTIAN 'EPISTEMOLOGY OF 
REALISM.' IN GRANT!};G ADAM THE RIGHT TO NA.VIE THE ANIMALS, GoD IS INDIRECTLY CONCEDING TO THE 
!vL.\N, HIS ABILITY TO 'K.'lOW HIS WORLD.' THOMAS, IN ANSWERING KANT. WOULD PROBABLY HAVE TO 
. .\!'PEAL TO HIS THEOLOGY, TO DEFEND HIS REALISM IN PHILOSOPHY. 
As AN ASIDE HERE, IT IS POSSIBLE, IN OUR OPINION TO APPLY THE 'VAN N!EKERKDICTUM' TO KANT AS 
\\'ELL AS TO CERTAIN THEOLOGIES. WE \\1LL RECALL THAT THE DICTUM CAN BE CITED ROUGHLY AS 
FOLLOWS: 
I -WE CANN OT K.'JOW GoD-IN-HIMSELF. 
2-WE C.-1..'J ONLY K.'lOW GoD-FOR-US. 
3-WE NOW PROCEED. IN OUR SYSTEY!ATIC THEOLOGY, TO SPEND AN ENORMOUS AMOU1'"f OF TIME. SPEAKING 
AllOL"f GoD-IN-HI:\ISELF. 
WE APPLY THIS VERY ROUGHLY TO KANT AS FOLLOWS'. 
1-WE CANN OT K.'lOW THE THING-IN-ITSELF (NOUMENAL WORLD). 
2-WE C.'"'J ONLY K.'lOW TIIE THING-FOR-US (PHENO!vIENAL WORLD). 
3-WE SPEND A GREAT DEAL OF TI:\IE. EVEN BL1LD!"IG A PHILOSOPHY, SURROUNDING THESE TWO PRIOR 
PREMISES. 
OCR PROBLE:\l IS. lF YOl' CAN ONLY KNOW THE TH!};G-FOR-US, THEN HOW CAN \V'E KNOW. OR SPEAK OF, OR 
EVEN :\L\KE THE DIST!"ICTION BET\\ 'EEN A REALITY AND A POSSIBLE, BUT UNK.'lOWN REALITY. IN THE FIRST 
PLA.CE? 
WE . .\LSO :\IE1'"l'ION IN THE TEX"f THAT!N DISTINCTION TO THE CATEGORIES IN T!JOMAS'S PHILOSOPHY. WE 
HAv'E THE 'TR . .\NSCENUENT . .\LS .. SEE:JOHNSON.H.J.'THE GRAMJ\1AR OF ESSE: RE-READING 
THOMAS ON THE TRANSCENDENTALS.' IN THOlvL<\S' THINKING THE TRANSCENDEN"f ALS ARE 
CERTAIN FEATLllES THAT ACCRUE TO ESSE AS SUCH. -IBID.P3. THESE ARE TERMS CONVERTIBLE WITH BEING. 
BL"f NOT SYNONY:\IS FOR IT. THEY ARE FEATlRES THAT CHARACTERISE THE NATURE OF ESSE!TSELF. WE 
Fl!'-1) THOMAS' MOST COMPREHENSIVE TREATMENT ON THE SUBJECT IN HIS 'DE VERITATE.' THIS WORK 
SEE1:S TO AS1: THE Ql'ESTION: WHAT IS TRU"TH? IT DOES SO BY SITlATINGTRlrfH lN THE FRM•IE OF THE 
TRA'lSCE>mE~'TALS.-IBID.P5. THE QUESTION IS, HOW IS BEING AS BEING. TO BE DIFFERENTIATED? THOMAS' 
FIRST .'c'JSWER IS BY THE 'CATEGORIES.' THE SECOND ~L<\N1'.'ER. IS BY THE TRANSCENDENT . .\LS. 'THE 
TRANSCENlJE'.'H . .\L :\!ODES ST AND "ABOVE" OR "BEHmD" THE CA TE GO RIES AND ST A.'lD TO ENS IN A '<OTHER 
WAY. WHILE THE CATEGORIES Div lDE THE GRADES OF BE!};G INTO EXCLUSl'>;'E GROUPS, THE 
T!L\NSCENDE>rfALS EXPRESS MODES OF ENS Wll!CH "FOLLOW UPON EVERY ENS. '" -IBID.P6. THE 
T!LlNSCEJ•mEN'T..\LS C . .\N BE REDUCED TO THREE: UNUM, BONUM ..\1'.lJ VER UM. UNW4 CARRIES THE !DEA OF A 
li1'1TY. BELONGING OR J\,!EMBERSHIP OF A GROUP OF THINGS. IT NAMES THE UNITY OF BEING IN GENERAL AND 
THE li1'1TY OF A P.ART!CULAR BEING. BONUM MEANS THE FITNESS OF BEING FOR THE \\1LL. TIIE DEPEl\lJENCE 
OF ALL rnmGs UPON THE DIVINE WILL AND THE PROPER PLACE FOR THEM IN DIVINE PROVIDENCE. VERUM 
SPEAKS OF THE TRlJ"fH OF THE HUMAN MIND WHICH DEPENDS UPON THE TRL"fH OF PRIOR THINGS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE DivlNE MIND.-lBm.Pl6. 
69 SEE FOR EXA\;lPLE: HANKEY.W: I 987. 'GOD IN HIMSELF.AQUINAS' DOCTRINE OF GOD AS 
EXPOUNDED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.'OPCIT, HANKEY.W.'AQUINAS' FIRST 
PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?'OP Crr. HANKEY.W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S 
EXISTENCE IN THE SUMMA THEOLGIAEOF THOMAS AQUINAS.' OP err, 
HANKEY.E. 'THEOLOGY AS SYSTEM AND AS SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS,' 
HANKEY. W_ 'POPE LEO'S PURPOSES AND ST THOMAS' PLATONISM,' HANKEY. W. 'THE 
PLACE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE ARGUMENTS OF 
AUGUSTINE'S DE TRIN!TATE. ANSELM'SMONOLOGJON_ AND AQUINAS' SU£1n 
THEOLOGL~E- 'OP CIT. 
·o HANKEY.W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE SUMALI 
THEOLOGMEOF THOMAS AQUINAS. 'OP CIT.P379-381 
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'I 'ST. THOMAS "<EVER RE.ill PLOTI1'US DIRECTLY ... THE A'1GELIC DOCTOR, INSTEAD. TOOK A GREAT 
INTEREST IN PROCLUS, IN PsEUDO-DIONYSIVS, A..'10 IN THE ·'DE CAUSJS" _ .. THE STREAM OF ARABIC 
NEOPLATONISM WHICH, ESPECIALLY WITH A VICE1'-;-IA, HAO .-\DECISIVE IMPORTANCE IN THE FIRST 
FORMATION OF THE THO!\!ISTIC CONCEPTION OF ESSE, OF THE DISTINCTION OF ESSENCE ANO ESSE ANO OF 
CAUSALITY., -F ABRO_C. 'PLATONISM, NEO-PLATONISM AND THOMISM. 'OP err.PSS. 
"HANKEY.W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE SUMMA 
THEOLOGME OF THOMAS AQUINAS.' OP Crr.P379. SAYS HANKEY:' INTHE TRADITTON OF THE GREEK 
THEOWGL4N PsEI.mo-DIONYSIUS, REPRESENTED IN THE WEST MOST STRONGLY BY JOHN SCOTUS 
ERIUGENA, MU fu'10WN TO THOMAS BOTH DIRECTLY, THROUGH THE TRANSLATIONS OF ERIUGENA ANO 
OTHERS, A..'10 INDIRECTLY, THROUGH JOHN OF DA..\!ASCUS ANO MA..'l:IMUS THE CONFESSOR, Goo IS fu'lOWN 
FIRST OF ALL .-\S NON-BEING ... THIS TR.illlTION H.-\S ITS ORIGINS IN THE INTERPRET .-\TION OF PLOTINUS BY 
IAMBLICHUS .'u'ID HIS FOlLO\VERS SYRIANt;S _4NQ PROCLUS, WHO IS (PROCLUS) ITS GREATEST EXPONEJ>"'f 
AND DIFFUSER. IN OPPOSITION TO THAT OF PoRPHYRY, WHO IDEl'ffIFIEO BEING .'u'.U THE ONE. THESE TWO 
CONTRARY INFLUENCES HAO THEIR C'.IEETING IN THOMAS. __ ' -IBIO.P379. IMPORTM"'f WORKS PI01''EERING 
THE STI.UY OF NEOPL.-\TONISM, .4ND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE LATER WEST .-\RE A,RMSTRONG.A.H. 'THE 
SELF-DEFINITION OF CHRISTIANITY IN RELATION TO LATER PLATONISM .. IN JEWISH AND 
CHRISTIAN SELF-DEFINITION. (EDITED SANDERS.E.P: 1980)_ THEREIS .\LSOE.RDooos' 
TRANSLATION .-\,'ID INTROOVCTION TO PRocws' THE 'ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY': 
PROCLUS.(TRANSLATED:DODDS_E_R: 1963)_ 'THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY.' SEE ALSO: 
GERSH.S: 1978_ 'FROM IAMBLICHUS TO ERIUGENA.' 
-, HANKEY. W. 'AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?' OP Crr.Pl35 TfIE REASONS FOR 
THIS SUPPRESSION, WERE >,,l<JSTLY POLITICAL. THE CHURCH DEEMED THE PLAT01'1SED VERSIONS OF THE 
ARABIC ARISTOTELIA..'l!SM IN THOMAS TO BE A DA'IGEROCS INFLLCNCE ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE .-1,,'.U 
NfORALS. 
'
4 IBIO.PJ38. 'IN SEARCHING FOR A liNIQUE PHILOSOPHICAL POSITION IN THOMAS WHICH WOULD JUSTIFY 
THE PECULIAR .-\L"'fHORITY HEW AS GIVEN IN THE ROMAN CHURCH, THO~!ISTS CHARACTERISED HIS 
PHILOSOPHY \HTII REMARKABLE liKu'JIMINITY .-\S .'u'l ONTOLOGY. THE PRIMACY GIVEN TO ESSE IN HIS 
PHILOSOPHY GA \'E HIS PHILOSOPHY OF BEING A PURITY AL TOGETHER UNIQCE. BECAUSE THIS PHILOSOPHY 
_-\LONE ESCAPED HEIDEGGER. S CRITICISM THAT WESTERI' PHILOSOPHY HAO FORGOTI'EN BEING. IT WAS THE 
REMANNG AL"'fHEJ>"TIC FUNDA,'\!E1'"'fAL PHILOSOPHY. FOR THOSE \\;1IO BELIEVED IN A CHRISTIA..'l 
PHILOSOPHY-ITSELF SUPPOSED TO BE A PHILOSOPHY OF BEING-THOMAS' ONTOLOGY WAS TO SET THE 
STANDARD. 0N THE OTHER HANO. OF THE VARIOCS "ESSE'<'TIALISMS" OPPOSED TO THIS ONTOLOGY OF ESSE. 
HENOLOGY APPEARED AS THE MOST DANGEROUS. Ii-.'VOL vlNG All OF THE PANTHEISTIC A,'<U OTHER ERRORS 
OF PAGA..'l NEOPL\TONISM AND ITS '10DERN IDE.-\LIST COL"'<"'fERP ARTS. IT IS THE EXTRAORDINARY 
REVERSAL TO FIND. HvL\,lEDIA TELY WITH THE OECLl'<"E OF THE OFFICIAL ONTOLOGIC.-\L TH01'!IS~L A.'1 
ASSERTION OF HENOLOGY AS A BASIS FOR CATHOLIC THEOLOGY. BL"'f '10RE IRONIC YET. PART OF THE 
APPE.-\L TO HE:--IOLOGY, IS THAT IT, :-<OT THONilSM, IS NOW CONCEIVED TO BE EXE~!PT FROM HEIDEGGER'S 
CRITICIS~!OF ONTO-THEOWGY ... ALso HE:--IOLOGY. WHICH U1'UERST A.'lDS THE FIRST PRINCIPLE AS THE OJ.-"E 
ABOVE BEING. SEEMS ABLE TO LE.ill ~!EN TO WORSHIP A Goo, \\;110 AS NOT BEING SATISFIES WHAT IS 
SOUGHT IN THE CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENON OF CHRIST!ru'l ATHEISM. fURTHER. SINCE WHAT IS BELOW 
HIE Ol'<"E IS SELF-CONSTITL"'fEO, HENOWGY PROVIDES THE ROOM WHICH ONTOLOGY DOES NOT FOR ~!ODER.'< 
FREEDOM. THIS JUDGEMENT THAT THE PRIORITY OF ESSENCE THREATENS FREEDOM tS OF COURSE PART OF 
C01'"'fEMPORARY EXISTENTIALISM.' -IBID.Pl38-9. IN GILSON'S FIRST CHAPTER OF HIS 'BEING AND SOME 
PHILOSOPHERS_' OP CIT, (CH I.BEING AND THE ONE). HE CONTRASTS THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
'ONE,' WHICH HE TERMS 'HENOLOGY,' AND THE SO-CAlLEO CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY OF 'BEING,' WHICH IS 
INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE FIRST TYPE. BECAUSE THE CHRISTiru'l UPHOLDS THE REALITY OF THE Goo OF 
EXODUS WHO REVEALS HIMSELF AS 'I AM WHO I A•\1,' THERE CANNOT BE ANYTHING IN CHRISTIAN 
METAPHYSICS THAT ts 'BEYOND BEING.' -GILSON.E. 'BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS.' OP 
Cn.P30. SEE ALSO AERTSEN.JA 'ONTOLOGY AND HENOLOGY IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 
(THOMAS AQUINAS, MASTER ECKHART AND BERTHOLD OF MOOSBURG)_ 'OP Crr.P121FF. 
WE, HO\l!EVER. DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THJ)-iKERS SUCH AS THOMAS REALLY SUCCEEDED IN ELIMINATING 
'HENOLOGICAL. ELE\!ENTS FROM THEIR PHILOSOPHY OF BEING. 
"HANKEY.W.'AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?' 0PCIT.P141. 
-
6 IB!D.P\42. 
IBID.Pl43. 
-, THIS IS NOT TO SL"GGEST THAT THOMAS DID NOT INCLUDE EXODUS IN HIS ARGUMENTS. HE CERTAINLY 
DOES Ql"OTE FROM THAT PASSAGE FREQUE:-ffLY. 
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'
9 HANKEY. W.OP Crr.P\44. IAMBLICHUS IS THE MAIN REPRESE1'TATIVE OF THE SYRIA..'! SCHOOL OF 
NEOPLATONlSM (D.A.D. 330), HEW AS A PUPIL OF PoRPHYRY. HE ALSO, UKE OTHERS IN HIS PARTICULAR 
SCHOOL. TENDED TO \lt:LTIPLY THE )ll)MBER OF THE HIERARCHY OF BEINGS, IAMBLICHUS, WE1'T FAR 
BEYOND PoRPHYRY .'c'ID PLoTINUS. IN HIS ATTEMPT TO REMOVE Goo FROM ALL CONT ACT WITH THE WORLD 
OF SENSE. ABoVE THE ONE OF PLOTINUS. HE POSITED A..'IOTHER ONE. STANDING BEYOND IT.-
COPLESTON.F. 'A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY. 'VOL LOP CIT.P476. PoRPHYRY. BY CONTRAST. 
IDENTIFIED THE FIRST PRINCIPLE WITH BEING. 
'
0 WHEN AR!STOTI.E SPEAKS OF THE IDEA OF BEING, IT IS INTELLIGIBLE, CAP ABLE OF RECEIVING 
PREDICATES. BUT Goo IS NOT DISTINGUISHED AS BEING. NEITHER IS HIS ACTIVITY IN THE ARISTOTELIAJ>I 
TRADmONWITHOLT SL'BJECT A..'ID OBJECT. INDEED IT IS SUBJECT AND OBJECT AND THEIR UNITY. SEE 
ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT. l072B l. 
81 SEE ALSO THE DISCl'SSION OF: WIPPEL.J.F. 'Jl.1ET APHYS!CS.' IN (EDITOR: KRETZMANN, 
STUMP.E: 1993). THE CAlvlBRIDGE COMPANION TO AQUINAS.OP Cn.P85FF. 
"HANKEY.W.OP CIT.P\44. 
"FABRO.C.'PLATONISM. NEOPLATONISM AND THOMISM: CONVERGENCJES AND 
DIVERGENCIES., OP C!T.P80. HERE, FABRO IS COMMEl'fflNG ON THE OPINIONS OF KREMER: 
KREJl.1ERK: 1966. 'DIE NEU PU TONJSCHE SEINSPHILOSOPHJE UND IHRE WIRKUNG A UF 
THOM~S >-V.VAQL1.V. 'IN STUDJEN ZUR PROBLEAIGESCHICHTE DERANTIKEN UND 
JJIITELILTERLJCHEN PH!LOSOPHJE. I. (LEIDEN). IT NEEDS TO BE POINTED OUT THAT FABRO DOES 
!>!OT AGREE l'TIH . .\LL OF KREMER. S OPINIONS OF THOMAS. 
84 HANKEY.WOP CIT.P146. AERTSENJ. 'ONTOLOGY AND HENOLOGY IN Jl.1EDIEV AL 
PHILOSOPHY (TIJOMAS AQUINAS, MASTER ECKHART AND BERTHOLD OF MOOSBURG).OP 
CIT.P\26.' Trn.:s THOMAS' COM1'IE!>ITARY ON THE "DECAUSIS" CAN LIKEWISE BE CONSIDERED A 
COl\L\,IE!>fTARY ON PROCLUS. '-!BID.P\26. 
85 HANKEY.W.0PCrr.Pl46. 
36 KORDIG.C.R 'THE MATHEMATICS OF l\i!YSTICISM: PLOTINUS AND PROCLUS' IN THE 
STRUCTURE OF BEING. A NEOPLATONIC APPROACH. (EDITED:HARRIS.RB: 1982).0P 
CIT.Pl 15-<i. 
87 !BID.Pl16. KORDIG IN HIS ARTICLE. BRINGS OLT THE COMMON PROBLEMS ASCRIBED TO AN IDEA OF THE 
ONE BEYOND BEING. IT IS EXTRE\!ELY DIFFICULT TO SAY ANYTHING ABOUT SUCH A TERM. WlTHOL"f 
CO\lPRO~llSING ITS STRICT TRANSCENDENT !>IATURE. FOR FURTHER INSIGHT INTO THIS PROBLEM SEE: DE 
RIJK.'CAUSATION AND PARTICIPATION IN PROCLUS. THE PIVOTAL ROLE OF SCOPE 
DISTINCTION IN HIS Jl.1ET APHYS!CS .. 'QcITE UNDERSTANDABLY, AT FIRST GLANCE AT LEAST, DoDDS 
CL..\.IMS THAT PROCLUS LAYS HIMSELF OPEN TO CHARGES OF INCONSISTENCY'. THE ONE, PROCLllS ASSERTS, 
CA'<'NOT SHARE ITS ATTRIBLTIS. YET WE ARE TOLD AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE ·'ELEMENTIQ" THAT 
"EVERY MA.'<'IFOLD IN SO\IE WAY PART AKES OFTHE ONE."' ... ' -IBID.PL FOR A RESPONSE TO DoDo's 
CRITICIS~!OF!NCOMISTEJ<CY IN PROCLCS. SEE: ME!JER.P.A.'PARTIC!PATION IN HENADS AND 
MONADS IN PROCLUS' THEOLOGL4 PLATONIC4 III.CHS 1-<i. IN ON PROCLUS AND HIS 
INFLUENCE IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY.OP ClT.P65-87. 'PARTICIPATION AS THE SOLVING OF 
THE TRANSCENDENCE-IMMANENCE PROBLEM' 
88 PROCLUS.(TRA.'ISLATED DODDS.E.R: 1963. 'THE ELEJl.1ENTS OF THEOLOGY. 'B.OF 
CAUSES.PROP 8.0P CIT.P9. 
89 IBID.PROP IO.Pl !FF. 
90 AERTSEN.J.A.OP CIT.P\26. 
91 IBID.P\28. 
92 AQUINAS.T. 'SO,JA.JA THEOLOGICA. 'OP err.PART 1.Q5.ART 2. 'IT IS SAID BY ARISTOTLE (DE 
CAUSIS) THAT THE FIRST OF CREATED THINGS IS BEING .. .IN IDEA BEING IS PRIOR TO GOODNESS (ENS 
SECDiDUM RATJONE.\J EST PRIUS QUA.\! BONUM). FOR THE MEANING SIGNIFIED BY THE NAME OF A THING IS 
THAT WHICH THE MIND CONCEIVES OF THE THING AND INTENDS BY THE WORD THAT ST A.'IDS FOR IT. 
THEREFORE TilAT IS PRIOR IN IDEA WHICH IS FIRST CONCEIVED BY THE INTELLECT.' 
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93 PROCLUS. 'THE ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY. 'Op en.PROP 123.PI09., ALL THAT IS DIVINE IS ITSELF 
INEFFABLE AND L'NKNOW ABLE BY ,\,'\TY SECONDARY BEING BECAUSE OF ITS SUPRA-EXISTENTIAL UNITY, BI.Tf 
IT MAY BE APPREHENDED Al'<U KNOW'N FROM THE EXISTENTS WHICH PARTICIPATE IN IT: WHEREFORE ONLY 
THE FIRST PRINCIPLE IS COMPLETELY UNKNOWABLE, AS BEING UNPARTICIPATED.' 
94 AQUINAS.T. 'DE CA USIS. 'PROPOSITI0.6A.47, AS QUOTED BY AERTSEN.J.OP CIT Pl32 .. 
95 HANKEY.W.' AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY. 'OP Cn.PI52. 
96 1BID.Pl55. IN THIS CONNECTION SEE ALSO: ROREM.P. 'PROCESSION AND RETURN IN THOMAS 
AQUINAS AND HIS PREDECESSORS.' OP CIT Pl47-163. 
91 AQUINAS.T.'SUMM4 THEOLOGICA.' OP CIT.FIRST PART.QUESTION I. THE NATURE AND 
EXTENT OF SACRED DOCTRINE. ARTICLES ONE THROUGH TO TEN: I-THE NECESSITY OF THIS 
DOCTRINE. 2-WHETHER IT IS KNOWLEDGE (SCIENCE). 3-WHETHER IT IS ONE OR MANY. 4-WHETHER IT IS 
SPECUL~TIVE OR PRACTICAL. 5-!TS COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCIENCES. 6-WHETHER IT IS WISDOM. 7-
WHA TIS ITS SUBJECT. 8-WHETHER IT IS ARGUMENTATIVE. 9-WHETHER IT SHOULD USE METAPHORS OR 
SYNIBOLIC EXPRESSIONS. 10-WHETHER THE SACRED WRITINGS OF THIS DOCTRINE MUST BE EXPOUNDED 
ACCORDING TO MANY SCIENCES. SAYS HANKEY: 'PETER LOMBARD'S MATERIAL IS LARGELY DRAWN FROM 
AUGUSTINE AND HIS EXPLICIT PRINCIPLES OF ORGANISATION ARE DERIVED FROM HIM AS WELL. THOMAS' 
STRUCTIJRAL TRANSFORMATIONS DEPEND UPON PRINCIPLES 01.TfSIDE AUGUSTINE'S WORLD. CHANGING THE 
FORMAL SUBJECT OF THEOLOGY FROM "RES ET SIGN A" TO GoD-ON WHICH THE SIMPLIFICArION OF THE 
SUMMA_IS BASED-IS, IN PART, A MOVE TOWARD AR!STOTEL!A.'i SCIENCE. THE DIVISION OF THE DE DEO 
COMES TO THOMAS THROUGH DIONYSIUS AND IS PROCLAN IN ITS PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS. THE STEP-BY-
STEP DEVELOPME1'T FROM THE UNITY OF SUBSTANCE THROVGH THE CONCEPTUAL DIVISION OF THE 
OPERATIONS TO THE REAL RELATION AND OPPOSITION OF THE PERSONS ALSO HAS A LATE NEOPLAT01'1C 
LOGIC BEHIND IT ... THE SHIFT FRO~! THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES OF Lo~IBARD IN MAKING Goo THE 
CE1'TRE OF THEOLOGY AS ITS OBJECT SEEMS TO DEPEND ON A GENUINE MOVE BY THOMAS IN THE DIRECTION 
OF ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE. AN AUGUSTINIAN SOURCE IS PRECLUDED. THOMAS' S VIEW CAN NOT COME, 
WITHOUT ARISTOTLE 's HELP. FRO"! THE PROCLAN NEOPLATONISM OF THE "LIBER DE LA USis'' OR OF 
DIONYSIUS, FOR WHICH Goo IN HIMSELF IS ABOVE SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE.' -HANKEY. W.J. 'GOD IN 
HIMSELF. AQUINAS' OOCTRJNE OF GOD AS EXPOUNDED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.' OP 
CIT.P 23. 
98
.AQUIN.ATIS.S. THO!v!AE. 'SW.IM.A THEOLOGIAE. 'QUAESTIO !ARTICULUS 1. 'UTRUAl SIT 
NECESSARIUM, PR4ETER PHILOSOPHIC.AS DISCIPLJN.AS, ALIA1'vf DOCTRINAM HABERI' P2. 
99 SEE WE!SHEIPL.J.A 'THE MEANING OF "SACR4 DOCRINA."' OP CIT.P68. 
100 AQUINAS.TOP CIT.Pl.(ENGLISH VERSION). 
101 WEISHEIPL.J.AOPCIT.P68. 
1°' IBID.P69. IT IS TRUE THAT THE ULTIMATE CAUSE (ULTIMATE END) AND TIIE CONCLUSION (EXISTENCE OF 
REVELATION) ARE TRUTHS OF FAITH, BUT THERE IS A NECESSARY CONNECTION BETWEEN THEM. THOMAS 
DOES NOT TRY TO 'PROVE' THAT THEOLOGY IS A SCIENCE, HE MERELY ASSl'MES THAT THIS IS INDEED THE 
CASE. 
103 IN THIS SENSE, DIVINE SCIENCE CA.'i 'BORROW' OTHER TRI.TfHS FROM OTHER SCIENCES, IN ORDER TO 
STUDY ITS Sl'BJECT MATTER :>,!ORE EFFECTIVELY. 'THE GREATER CERTAINTY OF THEOLOGY MIRRORS THE 
GREATER CERTAINTY OF FAITH IN COMPARISON WITH REASON. FINITE REASON ERRS WHEREAS THE INFINITE 
GOD DOES NOT. RATHER Goo REVE.~S; FAITH RECEIVES; SCIENTIFIC THEOLOGY DEDUCTIVELY 
SCHEMATISES WHAT IT HAS RECEIVED. FAITH IN Goo's REVELATION IS ),!ORE CERTAIN THAN REASON BI.Tf 
REASON IS Af3LE TO DEFE1'U THE CREDIBILITY OFF AITH AND TO ARTICULATE IT IN SCIENTIFIC FASHION.' -
BRADLEY.D.J.M. 'ARISTOTELIAN SCIENCE Al'ID THE SCIENCE OF THOMISTIC THEOLOGY.' 
OP CIT.Pl67. SAYS GAYBBA: 'IN THOMAS, THEN, AS IN BoNAVENTURE, THEOLOGY AND FAITH, THE 
PRODl'CTS OF HUMAN REFLECTION AND THE DIVINE REVELATION THAT IS THEIR SOURCE, ARE 
DISENTANGLED FROM EACH OTHER. INDEED, TIIE LATTER (FAITH; REVELATION) CANNOT STRICTLY 
SPEAKING BE REGARDED AS A SCIENTIA. FOR SC!ENTIA TO EXIST ONE REQUIRES REASONING-WHICH IS 
FOREIGN TO FAITH ... HENCE, ... HE DISTINGlJISHES BETWEEN THE HAB!TUS FIDE! AND THE HABIT US SC JEN TIA 
(SO AS TO REBI.TfTHE SUGGESTION THAT ONE CAN, AS IN ANY OTHER FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE, REJECT ONE 
ARTICLE OF FAITH AND STILL RET A!N THE HABITUS FIDEi. .. ). AND HE RE PEA TS THE POINT HE MADE IN THE 
PROLOGUE THAT, WHEREAS THE "HABITUS OF SCIENTIA DISPOSES ONE TO THE KNOW ABLE WAY OF 
REASONING," THEHABITUS OF FAITH ... "DISPOSES BY WAY OF NATURE, AS DOES THE HABITUS OF 
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PRINCIPLES_" __ .HOWEVER, THERE ARE STILL SOME INCONSISTENCIES. THEOLOGY'S DOCTRJNA IS VJEWED AS 
11'CLl"DING ITS OWN PRINCIPLES (REVEALED TRUTHS)- AND THE ENSEMBLE IS REGARDED-DESPITE HIS CLEAR 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAITH AND SC/ENT/A-AS A SCJENTIA., -GA YBBA.B_. ASPECTS OF THE 
MEDIEVAL HISTORY OF THEOLOGY.'OPCIT.PlOI. 
104 AQUINAS.T.OP CIT.PT I.QI.ART 6,9. 
1
°' SEE THE COMMENTS OF GAYBBA, REPRODUCED IN NOTE 103, ESPECIALLY: 'HOWEVER, THERE ARE STILL 
SOME INCONSISTENCIES. THEOLOGY'SDOCTRINA IS VIEWED AS INCLUDI1'G ITS OWN PRINCIPLES (RE~EALED 
TRUTHS)- AND THE ENSEMBLE IS REGARDED-DESPITE HIS CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN FAITH AND SC/ENT/A-
AS ASCJENTIA.'-GAYBBA.B.OP CIT.PIO!. 
106 AQUINAS.TOP CIT.PT l.QUES I.ART 5. 
10
' HANKEY. W. 'THE PLACE OF THE PROOF FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE IN THE SW\JMA 
THEOLOGIAEOF THOMAS AQUINAS. 'OP CIT.P374. THERE ARE MANY ASPECTS TO THOMAS' 
THEOLOGY THAT DO NOT, HOWEVER, ONLY COME FROM ARISTOTLE 's INFLUENCE_ PllOCLUS' SYSTEM AND 
THAT OF THOMAS ALSO HAVE SIMILARELEMENTs-HANKEY.W.J.'THEOLOGY AS SYSTEM AND AS 
SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOMAS AQUINAS. 'Op CIT.P86. COMMON TO PRoCLUS AND THOMAS, 
BUT NOT IN ARISTOTLE IS THE IDEA THAT ALL KNOWLEDGE IS COMPREHENSIBLE WITHIN THEOLOGY. 
PROCLUS' 'ELEMENTS OF THEOLOGY,' LOOKS AT ALL KNOWLEDGE FROM A DIVINE POINT OF VIEW. 
E~ERYTHING IS DEPENDENT UPON THE ONE. THE DIRECTION IS ALSO DIFFERENT: ARISTOTLE ARRIVES AT 
THE IDEA OF A FIRST CAUSE AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS 'METAPHYSICS .. 0N THE CONTRARY, WITH THOMAS 
AND PROCLUS. EVERYTHING STARTS WITH THE SIMPLICITY OF THE DIVINE BEING, WORKING DOWNW AROS-
IBID.P88. 'THE ARISTOTELIAN AND PROCLAN THEOLOGIES SEEM TO FIT NEATLY TOGETHER SO AS TO 
CONSTITL'TE THOMAS' UNIFICATION OF THEOLOGY AS SCIENCE OF THE FIRST PRINCIPLE-~ AS SUM.IWA OR 
SYSTEMATIC TREATMENT OF REALITY AS A WHOLE.'-IBID.P88. EACH CONTRIBUTED \llHAT THE OTHER HAD 
LACKED. ARISTOTLE DID NOT SHOW HOW TILU WHICH IS OTHER THAN THE FIRST EMERGED FROM IT A,'ID IS 
RELATED TO IT_ PROCLUS, ON THE OTHER HAND PLACED THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF THEOLOGY, INTO TOT AL 
INEFFABLE TRANSCENDENCE.-~ SO COULD NOT \IANIFEST WHAT IN THE CHARACTER OF THE PRINCIPLE 
MAKES IT THE INTELLIGIBLE SOURCE OF REALITY.-IBID.P88. THOMAS' SYSTEM TRIES TO COMBINE THE 
INEFFABILITY OF A FIRST PRINCIPLE. TO A,'l INTELLIGIBLE SYSTEM THAT CAN STILL SAY SO!v!ETHING ABOUT 
IT_ SEE ALSO: ROREM.P. 'PROCESSION AND RETURN IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND HIS 
PREDECESSORS. 'Op CIT.Pl47-!63. 
108 SEE: CAPUTO.J.D: l 982. 'HEIDEGGER AND AQUINAS. AN ESSAY ON OVERCOMING 
METAPHYSICS.'P2. 
109 [BID. P4_ [N SPEAKING SPECIFICALLY OF THE E.-\RLY HEIDEGGER 's CRITICISM OF SCHOLASTICISM. WE NEED 
TO REMIND OL'RSEL VES OF HIS OWN EARLY DEBT TO THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUSSERL IN PARTICULAR. 
PHEN01'!ENOLOGY AS A PHILOSOPHICAL DISCIPLINE IN.-\. POST-KANTIA'l AGE, IS CRITICAL OF NAIVE 
OBJECTl'lSM, THAT DOES NOT PROPERLY ACCOUNT FOR THE THINKING SUBJECT. THIS IS THE ARGUMENT IN 
Hl.'SSERL 's 'THE ORIGINS OF GEO~lETRY.' GALILEO, IN WORKING OUT HIS GEOMETRICAL THEORIES, FAJLED 
TO APPRECIATE THE 'LIFE-WORLD' FROM WHICH EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY EVOLVED. WORKING ONK.-\.NT'S 
TR-\_'lSCENDENTAL PHILOSOPHY, PHENOMENOLOGY SET our TO DISCOVER THE 'ESSENCE' OF THE ROLE OF 
THE SUBJECT IN THE CREATION OF OBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE (THUS AS DERRIDA WOULD POINT OUT, 
PHENOMENOLOGY, DESPITE ITSELF, ALSO SEARCHES FOR AN 'OBJECTIVE PRESENCE,' THAT OF THE ROLE OF 
THE MIND IN THE ACT OF EXEMPLIFICATION). THE PHENOMENOLOGISTS WORKED ON THE FOUNDATION OF 
THE IMPORT ANT WORK OF FRANZ BRENT ANO, WHO PERFECTED HIS THEORY OF EXEMPLIFICATION, UPON 
WHICH ML'CH OF MODERN PSYCHOLOGY AND OTHER PHENOMENOLOGICAL SCIENCES ARE BUILT-SEE 
GROSSMANN.R. 'PHENOMENOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALISM: AN INTRODUCTION,' OP 
CIT.CHAP 2_ BRENTANO: THE THESIS OF INTENTIONALITY. P29Ff_ INTENTIONALITY AS A THEORY 
IS A GENlHNE ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THE WEAfu'ffiSSES OF THE MED!EV AL THEORY OF THE MENTAL 
APPREHENSION OF ENTITIES. INTENTIONALITY SIMPLY ST ATES THAT IN ORDER FOR A MIND TO BE A MIND, IT 
"1\JST BE ORIENTED TOWARDS AN OBJECT. THUS THE COMPOSITION OF THE MENTAL ACT, INCLUDES BOTH 
THE SUBJECT A'lD THE OBJECT. THEREFORE PURE MEDIEVAL OBJECTIVISM, WHICH ASSUMES THATTHE MIND 
HAS NO MAJOR ROLE IN THE UNDERSTANDING. IS IMPOSSIBLE, HEIDEGGER'S EARLY CRITIQUE OF 
SCHOLASTICISM WAS MUCH INFLUENCED BY THE THEORY OF EXEMPLIFICATION. ON THIS SUBJECT, SEE ALSO: 
CAPUTO.J.D. 'HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS 'Op Cn.P69. 
TODAY, WITH THE ADVENT OF 'TRANSCENDENT AL THOMISM,' WE HA VE THE ATTEMPT TO COMBINE THE 
>IATURE OF THOMISM. WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 'SUBJECT.' 
110 SEEMARIONJ.L.(TRANSLATED: CARLSON.T.A: 1991).'GOD WITHOUT BEING.'P65. HERE. 
MARION IS SYNTHESISING HEIDEGGER'S OPINIONS. SPECIFICALLY AS FOUND IN: 
HEIDEGGER.M.(TRANSLATED: HART, ET AL) 'Pfl4NOMENOLOGJE UND THEOLOGIE.' 
WEGMARKEN.G.A.9.Pl 1-12. 
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HEIDEGGER AIMED MUCH OF HIS CRITICISMS OF SCHOLASTICISM AT THE WORK OF SUAREZ. WHOM HE 
FELT WAS SOMEWHAT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE TRADITION OF AQUINAS. CAPUTO SUGGESTS, HOWEVER. 
THAT THERE \VERE CERT AlN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THOMAS AND SUAREZ. HOWEVER, IT IS DEFINI1ELY 
THROUGH SUAREZ THAT CERTAIN SCHOLASTIC IDEAS, SUCH AS THE DIVISION BETWEEN THE METAPHYSICS OF 
'INFINITE BEING,' AND 'FINITE BEING.' CAME INTO THE MODERJ><1STIC SYSTEM OF WOLF, KANf AND 
DESCARTES. THE EARLY HEIDEGGER, IS SITU A TED IN THE POSITION OF PHENOMENOLOGY. IN THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES. OVER THE PAST FEW DEC ADES, WE HA VE SEEN TWO DIFFERENT APPROACHES OR REACTIONS TO 
PHENOMENOLOGY (THE SCHOOL TO WHICH THE EARLY HEIDEGGER ROUGHLY BELONGED). BOTH THESE 
SCHOOLS, SEEK TO GO BEYOND THE KANTIAN SUBJECT\OBJECT DIVISION, AND THE HUSSERLIAN CONCEPTION 
OF MEANING, DERIVED IN THE TRANSCENDENT AL SUBJECT. fIRSTL Y, THE STRUCTURALIST APPROACH TRIES 
TO DISPENSE WITH BOTH MEANING AND THE SUBJECT BY FINDING OBJECTIVE LAWS WHICH GOVERN ALL 
HUMAN ACTIVITY. THE OPPOSED DISCIPLINE, ROUGHLY TERMED AS 'HERMENEUTICS,' GIVES UP THE 
ATIEMPT OF THE PHENOMENOLOGISTS TO UNDERSTAND MAN AS A MEANING-GIVING SUBJECT. 
HERMENEUTICS ATIEMPTS TO FIND MEM1NG IN SOCIAL PRACTICES AND LITERARY TEXTS WHICH MAN 
PRODUCEs-DREYFUS.H, RABINOW.P. 'MICHEL FOUCAULT. BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND 
HERMENEUTICS. 'OP CIT.PXV. 
112 CAPUTO.J.D. 'HEIDEGGER AND AQUINAS. 'OP CrT.P69. 
113 
'WHENCE DO THE CONCEPTS OF EXISTENCE AND WHATNESS ARISE, THAT IS, WHENCE DO THEY GET THE 
MEANING THEY HA VE AS THEY ARE t;SED IN THE DISCUSSION OF THE SECOND THESIS TO WHICH WE HA VE 
REFERRED? ... WE SHALL ASK WHAT THEIR BIRTH CERTIFICATE IS A,'JD WHETHER IT IS GENUINE, OR WHETHER 
THE GENEALOGY OF THESE BASIC ONTOLOGICAL CONCEPTS TAKES A DIFFERENT COURSE TO THAT AT 
BOTTOM THEIR DISTINCTION AND THEIR CONNECTION HA VE A DIFFERENT BASIS.' -
HEIDEGGER.M. 'GRUNDPROBLEk!E DER PHANOkfENOLOGJE (GESAAn'.4 USGABE). 'PAR 
11.140\100.-AS QUOTED BY CAPUTO.J.OP CIT.P72. 
114 SEE: HEIDEGGER.M.(TRANSLATED:MACQUARRIE.J,ROBINSON.E: 1985). 'BEING AND 
TIME. 'Ill THE WORLDHOOD OF THE WORLD.H.71.PIOOFF. THE UNDERSTANDING OF HEIDEGGER'S 
CONCEPT OF VORSTELLUNG, IS BASED IN HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN TWO ONTOLOGICAL 'CATEGORIES:' 
'PRESENCE-AT ·HAND,' (VORHANDENDKNHEJT) AND "READY-TO·HA,'ID' (ZUHANDKN}. IN ORDER TO 
DEMONSTRATE THE ~IEANING OF THESE TERMS. HEIDEGGER BRINGS THEM DOWN TO THEIR USAGE IN THE 
REAL ERLEBEi.V OF THE EXPERIENCES OF LIFE, A.ND THE W.A...Y HUMA.i'J BEINGS INTERACT WITH THEIR WORLD 
A,'ID NATUR. READ!'IESS·TO-HAND, DEPENDS ON NATURE AS PRESENCE·TO·H"-"'ID. 'As THE ENVIRONME:-IT IS 
DISCOVERED, THE "NATURE,'' THUS ENCOUNTERED IS DISCOVERED TOO. IF ITS KIND OF BEING AS READY-TO· 
HAND IS DISCARDED. THIS "NATURE" ITSELF CAN BE DISCOVERED A,'ID DEFI1'ED SIMPLY IN ITS Pl'RE 
PRESENCE-AT-HA,'ID, Bur WHEN THIS HAPPENS, THE "NATURE" WIIICH STIRS AND STRIVES, WHICH ASSAILS 
A1'D ENTHRALS US AS LANDSCAPE. REMAINS fl!DDEN. THE BOTA,'\llST'S PLANTS ARE NOT THE FLOWERS OF 
THE HEDGEGROW; THE "SOURCE" WHICH THE GEOGRAPHER ESTABLISHES FOR A RIVER IS NOT THE 
"SPRINGHEAD" IN THE DALE.' -IBID.P\00. As HCMANS INTERACT WITH THEIR WORLD THEY INTERACT WITH 
IT AS PRESENCE-TO-HAND, AS HL"MANS INTHE WORLD (DASEIN}. 
SEE ALSO: BR.ANDOM.R. 'HEIDEGGER'S CATEGORJES IN BEING AND TIME.' IN HEIDEGGER: A 
CRJTICAL READER (EDITED: DREYFUS.H, HALL.H: 1992).0P CIT. 'IN DIVISION I OF BEING A,ND 
TIME. HEIDEGGER PRESENTS A NOVEL CATEGORISATION OF WHAT THERE IS, AND AN ORIGINAL ACCOUNT OF 
THE PROJECT OF ONTOLOGY AND CONSEQUENTLY THE NATURE A,'ID GENESIS OF THOSE ONTOLOGICAL 
CATEGORIES. HE OFFICIALLY RECOGNISES TWO CATEGORIES OF BEING: ZUDHANDENSEIN(READINESS-TO-
HAND) A,ND VORHANDENESEIN (PRESENCE-AT-HAND). VORHAh"DENETHINGS ARE ROUGHLY THE OBJECTIVE, 
PERSON INDEPENDENT, CAUSALLY INTERACTING SUBJECTS OF NATURAL SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY. ZUHANDENE 
THINGS ARE THOSE THAT A N"EO·KA,NT!AN WOULD DESCRIBE AS BEING IMBUED WITH HUMAN VALVES AND 
SIGNIFICANCE. IN ADDITION TO THESE CATEGORIES THERE IS HUMAN BEING ORDASEIN, IN WHOSE 
STRUCTURE THE ORIGINS OF THE TWO THING-ISH CATEGORIES ARE TO BE FOUND.' 
'YET IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND OUR WORLD, WE "'CHANGE" IT IN THAT WE DISTANCE OURSELVES .'IS LIVING 
SUBJECTS FROM ITS PRESENCE-TO-HAND, BRINGING ABOUT ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING AT ITS BEING, THAT 
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OF READINESS-TO-HAND. Af; SOON AS WE ENGAGE IN ANY TYPE OF ACTIVITY THAT REQUIRES "REFLECTIOJ<," 
ON THE WORLD, WE DISTANCE OURSELVES AS SUBJECTS, FROM THE WORLD, IN ORDER TO CONCEPTUALISE 
ITS ENTITIES AS BEI!<GS. THIS ABSTRACTION PROCESS, TENDS TO FORGET THE REAL, UNDERLYING 
ON'TOLOGICAL DIMENSIO!< FROM \HUCH READINESS-TO-HA.ND ORIGINALLY AROSE: PRESENCE-TO-HAND. IN 
FACT, TO All.-\.'100N THE DIMENSION OF PRESENCE-TO-HAND, JN THE APPRECIATION OF READINESS-TO-HAND, 
ONLY GRANTS US AN INEFFECTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF BEING. BEING IS 1'IEREL Y SEEN AS AN ABSTRACT 
THING, AND ENTITY. ''READINESS-TO-HAND" JS THE WAY JN WHICH ENTITIES AS THEY ARE "JN THEMSELVES" 
ARE DEFIN'ED ONTOLOGJCO-CATEGORICALLY. YET ONLY BY REASON OF SO!\,IETHING PRESENT-AT HAND. "IS 
THERE" ANYTHING READY-TO-HAND.' -IBID.PlO l. 
115 CAPUTO.J.Op CIT.P73. Now IT NEEDS TO BE SAID THAT THE CONCEPT OF 'PRODUCTIVITY,' IN THE 
SCHOLASTICS' UNDER ST ANDING OF ESSE, IS 01'.C BASED UPON THE METAPHYSICS OF CREATION. MANY 
CURRENT DAY THO MISTS, SUCH AS GILSON DEFEND THOMAS IN THIS WAY, ST A.TING THAT ONE CANNOT 
COMP ARE THOMAS' CONCEPTION OF ESSE, WITH THAT OF THE GREEKS. ALTHOUGH THE EARLY HEIDEGGER 
WOULD NOT DENY THIS, HE WOULD STATE THAT THE VIEW OF A BEING HA YING TO SUlT A PRIOR. 
METAPHYSICAL, INTELLIGIBLE PATTERN, BEFORE IT CAN BE A BEING, IS A VIEW THAT BOTH THE GREEKS AND 
THE ~lEDIEVAL SCHOLARS WOULD HOLD TO. 
116 IBID.P73. 
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IBID.P74. SEE ALSO CAPUTOJ.D. 'HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS.' OP CIT.P75. 'THUS THE 
CATEGORIES OF ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE HAv'E A TWO-FOLD SHORTCOMING. IN THE FIRST PLACE, THEY ARE 
THE CATEGORIES OF THINGS. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO MAN. NOR DO THEY APPLY TO GoD, WHO IS NOT A 
''TIIING" EITHER. '-IBID.P74. 
1 L8 CAPUTO.J.Op C!T.P74. 'THIS CLAIM ON HIS PART IS SUBJECT TO SERIOUS MJSCONSTRUAL. IF WE A.SSIJME 
THAT ''BEING" HERE IS TO BET AKEN II< SOME TRAD!TlONAL SENSE AS ESSENCE AND THAT HEIDEGGER IS 
THEREFORE ASSERTING THAT WE HA VE A PRE-CONCEPTUAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE SUMMw..f GENUS UNDER 
WHICH THE ENTITIES THAT MAKE UP THE WORLD-OURSELVES INCLVDED-F ALL AS SO MANY KINDS. WHAT HE 
IS REALLY SA.YING JS QUITE DIFFERENT, AND IT IS SOMETHING THATIS BOTH LOGICALLY PRIOR TO AND 
PRESLl'POSED BY ANY Sl.:CH TYPICALLY ~TAPHYSICAL CLAIM AS THIS. WHAT JS DISTINCTIVE OF THE KIND 
OF ENTITY THAT DASEIN IS. IS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE THE FACT THAT OTHER E1'TIT!ES ARE THERE FOR IT IN A 
WAY IN WHICH NO ENTITY -HEIDEGGER'S EXAMPLE IS A CHAIR AND A WALL-IS EVER THERE FOR A'10THER 
SUCH ENTITY THATIS NOT OF THE DASEIN TYPE. His WAY OF EXPRESSING THIS FOUNDATIONAL FACT ABOUT 
DASEJN-ITSELF AN EXPRESSION THAT MEANS "BEING-THERE"-JS TO SAY THAT DASEINIS IN THE WORLD IN 
THE MODE OF HAVING A WORLD AS OTHER KINDS OF ENTITIES THAT ARE IN THE WORLD IN THE MODE OF 
HA YING A WORLD AS OTHER KINDS OF ENTITIES THAT ARE IN TilE WORLD IN THE MODE OF SPATIAL 
INCLCSION DO NOT ... THE FACT THAT THEY ARE THERE AS ENTITIES JS SOMETHING THAT CAN BE 
UNDERSTOOD ONLY BY REFERENCE TO THE SPECIAL CHARACTER OF DASEIN, WHICH IS SUCH THAT IT 
"UNCOV'ERS" OR "CLEARS" ENTITIES, AND IT IS AS SO UNCOVERED OR CLEARED THAT THEY BECOME PART OF 
THE WORLD IN THE VERY SPECIAL SENSE OF THAT TERM THAT HEIDEGGER E!l-IPLOYS. THE WORLD IN THIS 
SENSE IS NOT JUST THE TOTALITY OF ENTITIES .~SIT IS ORDINARILY HELD TO BE. IT IS THE TOTALITY OF 
ENT!TlES AS UNCOVERED OR "PRESENT" THIS NOTION OF PRESENCE IS THE MOST GENERAL TERMTHAT 
HEIDEGGER USES TO CONV'EY THE STATUS THAT ACCRUES TO ENTITIES THAT ARE l;'NCOVERED OR 
CLEARED ... '-OLAFSON.FA 'THE UNITY OF HEIDEGGER'S THOUGIIT.' IN THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER. OP CIT.Pl00-101. 
ti
9 CAPUTO.J.D.'HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS.' OP CIT.P74. 
120 IBID.P76. SEE ALSO HEIDEGGERM.(EDITED:KRELL.D.F: 1996)'BASIC WRITINGS. 'OP CIT. ON 
THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH. Pl26: 'IN DA-SEJN THE ESSENTIAL GROUND, LONG UNGROUNDED, ON THE 
BASIS OF \\1UCH MAN IS ABLE TO EK-SJST, JS PRESERVED FOR HIM. HERE "EXISTENCE" DOES NOT MEAN 
EX!STENTIA IN THE SENSE OF OCCURRING OR BEING AT HAND. NOR ON THE OTHER HAND DOES IT ~AN, IN AN 
"EXISTENT/ELL" F A.SHION, MAN'S MORAL ENDEAVOUR ON BEHALF OF HIS "SELF," BASED ON HIS 
PSYCHOPHYSICAL POSITION. EK-SISTENCE, ROOTED IN TRUTH AS FREEDOM, JS EXPOSURE TO THE 
DISCLOSEDNESS OF BEINGS AS SUCH. "TRUTH" IS NOT A FEATURE OF CORRECT PROPOS!TlONS THAT ARE 
ASSERTED OF AN "OBJECT" BY A HUMAN "SUBJECT" AND THEN ".4.RE VALID" SOMEWHERE, IN WHAT SPHERE 
WE K,'10WNOT; RATHER. TRUTH IS DISCLOSURE OF BEINGS THROUGH WHICH AN OPENNESS ESSENTIALLY 
UNFOLDS. ALL HUMAN COMPORT~NT AND BEARING ARE EXPOSED IN ITS OPEN REGION.' -IBID.Pl27. 
121 IBID.P80. SEE ALSO: WATSON.S.'ON THE ERROR OF DASEIN.' OP CIT.P49FF. 
tn KORDIG.C.R 'THE MATHEMATICS OF MYSTICISM: PLOTINUS AND PROCLUS.' OP CIT.Pl 18. 
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123 CAPUTO.JD. 'HEIDEGGER AND THE SCHOLASTICS. 'Op CIT.P82FF. 
124 
lBlD.P82. TRlJfH OOES NOT~ AS Dl HEIDEGGER. ENTER INTO THE DEFINITlON OF BEING. INSTE:-\D VERUA!IS 
A TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTY OF BEING, \\iHICH ARISES INSOFAR AS BEING ENTERS INTO A RELATIONSHIP 
WITH THE INTELLECT.-1BID.P87. 
l:S FOR MUCH OF THIS SECTION. WE HA VE DEPENDED ON THE IMPORTANT WORK OF GELBER. COVERING THE 
TRINIT ARI.AN DEB.A TES, SPECIFIC.ALLY BET\VEEN THE PERIODS 1300-13 3 5. SEE GELBER. H. G: 
197-1. 'LOGIC AND THE TRINITY: A CLASH OF VALVES IN SCHOLASTIC THOUGHT,1300-
1335.'0P CIT. THE DISSERTATION HAS AS ITS FOUNDATION, THE TENSION BETWEEN THE NEED TO UPHOLD 
THE AUTHORJTY OF REVELATION .<\ND THE TEACHING OF THEMAGISTERIUM, TOGETHER WITH THE TENETS OF 
ARISTOTELIA'I PHILOSOPHY. BOTH ASPECTS WERE UTTERLY MA"IDATORY FOUNDATIONS TO A'IYTHING TH.AT 
~llGHT BE TERMED 'SCHOLASTICISM,' AT THIS TIME. GELBER SHOWS. HOWEVER, THAT WITH THE RECEPTION 
OF MUCH OF THE REST OF THE ARlSTOTELIA.'1 CORPUS INTO THE WEST, A.'ID THE ASCENT OF THE 'VIA 
MODERNA,' FURTHER TENSIONS BETWEEN ARISTOTLE'S LOGIC AND THE ORTHODOX TEACHING CONCERNING 
THE TRINITY, AROSE. GELBER'S DISSERTATION TRACES THIS TENSION, CHRONOLOGICALLY COMMENCING, 
WITH BONA VENTURE AND AQUINAS AT THE END OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, THROUGH TO THE 
FOURTEENTH, DEALING WITH INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS JOHN DUNS ScOTUS, DURAND DE SAINT PoRCAIN, 
HENRY OF GHENT .AND WILLIAM OF 0cKHAM. ONE OF HER PURPOSES, Sl~LAR TO THAT OF REIKO 
OBERMANN IS TO REFUTE THE IDEA THAT 0cKHAM AND HIS FOLLOWERS, WERE 'RADICAL REVISIONISTS' 
DISALLOWING ANY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REVELATION A'ID PHILOSOPHY. INDEED. THE NOMINALISM OF 
THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY CONTINUED TO TRY AND HARMONISE THE ORTHODOX TRINITY AND ARISTOTLE. 
ALTHOUGH IT HAD BECOME INCREASINGLY MORE DIFFICULT TO DO SO. OF INTEREST TO US, AND OUR 
PURPOSE, IS THE FACT TllAT GELBER, IN W.ANT!NG TO ILLUSTRATE THE TENSION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND 
THEOLOGY AT THIS TIME, CHOOSES THE TRINITY AS A LENS ONTO THE PROBLEM. 
126 GELBER.OP CIT.P318. 'FOR A CHRISTIAN, REVEALED TRUTH MUST BE THEY ARDSTICK AGAINST WHICH 
TO MEASURE OTHER TRUTHS. IF THE PRINCIPLES OF ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC ARRIVED AT CONCLUSIONS 
CONTRARY TO THE FAITH, THEN EITHER AF ALLACY MUST HA VE BEEN COMMITTED, OR THE PRINCIPLE IN 
QCESTION NEEDED REFORMULATION IN ORDER TO COVER ALL CASES. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THE 
TRINIT ARIA'I DEBATE UNDER STUDY, OF .ANY CRITICISM OF ARISTOTLE ALONG THE LINES OF NICOLAUS OF 
AUl'RECOURT. IF THE SCEPTICAL CRITICS OF ARISTOTLE AGAINST WHOM THE 0cKH~STS .AND ScOTISTS 
CONTENDED INF ACT EXISTED, AND COULD BE BROUGFIT TO LIGFIT, A LINE OF INFLUENCE MIGHT BE FOUND 
BETWEEN THE'<! AND AUTRECOURT. BUT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF AllTRECOURT'S HA YING BEEN 
INFLUENCED BY THE 0cKHAM!ST SCHOOL IN HIS REJECTION OF ARISTOTLE ... A CONFLICT BETWEEN 
ARISTOTELIA"I LOGIC .<\ND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY DID EXIST. THEREFORE, THE CHOICES OPEN TO A 
MEDIEVAL SCHOLASTIC WERE TO ACCEPT THE CHURCH'S TEACHINGS AND REJECT ARISTOTLE. WHICH IN 
MODERN TERMS WOULD EARN HIM THE TITLE OF A FIDEIST ."-"'ID SCEPTIC. OR HE COULD ACCEPT 
ARISTOTELIA'I LOGIC AND REJECT THE FAITH, WHICH WOULD HAVE EARNED HIM A QUICK CONDEMNATION IN 
HIS OWN AGE ... OR HE COULD ATTEMPT TO REFOfu\,JCLATE LOGIC. EITHER BY CREATING A LOGIC .APPLICABLE 
TO Goo AS HOLCOT DID, OR BY ATTEMPTING TO CHANGE BASIC ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES TO BRING THEM 
INTO LINE WITH THE TEACHINGS OF THE CHURCH. THE ATTEMPT TO REFORMULATE LOGIC INTERNIS OF 
CHURCH DOCTRINE WOULD, HOWEVER, LAY HIM OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF "THEOLOGISM" AS GILSON 
DEFINED IT. THATIS. OF REMODELLING PHILOSOPHY TO FIT BELIEF ... THUS, NO MATTER WHAT A MEDIEVAL 
SCHOLASTIC ATTEMPTED TO DO, HE WOULD BE OPEN TO CRITICISM UNLESS HE FOLLOWED STRICTLY THE LINE 
OF THE PARTICULAR DOCTOR DEAR TO THE HEART OF THE MODERN HISTORIAN STUDYING HIM. IN FACT. 
WITHIN THE MEDIEVAL CONTEXT THEOLOGISM WAS THE ONLY VIABLE WAY TO A VOID THE TRINITARIAN 
DILEMMA AND STILL RETAIN A PLACE FOR REASON IN THE THEOLOGICAL DISCUSSION. THE THOMIST 
DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE REALISM OF BELIEF AND REASON WAS NOT A WAY OUT WHEN THE TENETS OF 
BELIEF SEEMED TO CONTRADICT THE ~!OST FUND.AMENT AL RATIONAL PRINCIPLES.' -!BID.P3 l 9-20. 
IN THIS CONNECTION, SEE ALSO: MAIERU.A 'LOGIC AND TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY. DE MODO 
PREDICANDI AC SYLOGIZANDI IN DIVINIS.' OP CIT. MAIERU. IN THIS ARTICLE DISCUSSES THE 
EMPLOYMENT OF A MODAL TYPE OF LOGIC, ATTHE END OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY, AS A MEANS TO 
SOL VE THE ONENESS\THREENESS PROBLEM. THE TREATISE WHICH HE EXA~llNES, IS .ANONYMOUS AND IS 
TITLED: 'DO MODO PREDICANDI AC SYLOGIZANDI IN DIVINIS.' THE ANONYMOUS AUTHOR IS 
CONCERNED WITH ANALYSING THE TYPE OF SYLLOGISTIC PREDICATIONS MOST SUITABLE TO THE PERSON OF 
GoD AS A PLURALITY. TRADITIONAL. ARISTOTELLAN PROPDSITIONAL LOGIC ACCEPTS THAT ALL THE 
OPERATORS IN THE SYLLOGISM ARE TRUTH FUNCTIONAL. THE TRUTH OF A COMPLEX PROPOSITION STANDS 
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OR FALLS ON TIIE TRLTH OF ITS CONSTITUENTS. IN ALL SITUATIONS. ON THE OTHER HAND. MODAL LOGIC 
ACCEPTS THAT A CERTAIN SYLLOGISM. ~l!GHT ONLY BE TRUE, AT CERTAIN TIMES OR UNDER CERTAIN 
CIRCUMSTANCES. THE AUTHOR OF THE A.'IONYMOUS TREATISE ST ATES THAT THE MODUS ESSENDI OF Goo IS 
DIFFERENT TO THAT OF CREATURES. AND THUS TO EACH MOOE OF BEING, THERE MUST BE AN APPROPRIATE 
WAY OF CONSTRUCTING SYLLOGISMS. THATIS TO S.W, BECAUSE IN Goo WE CAN IDENTIFY DIFFERENT 
~!ODES A.'10 DISTINCTIONS, DIFFERENT SYLLOGISMS APPLY TO DIFFERENT MODES.-IBID.P248. IN Goo. WE 
HAVE A TRIPLE IDENTITY. FIRSTLY. \VE HA VE ESSENTIAL IDENTITY SINCE ALL THAT IS IN Goo IS IDENTICAL 
ACCORDING TO THE ESSENCE. SECONDLY. WE HA VE IDENTICAL OR PERSONAL IDENTITY, WHICH CONCERNS 
TIIE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE ESSENCE AND THE PERSONS, .~D BET\VEEN THE ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES AND 
THE PERSONS. THIRDLY. WE HA VE TIIE FORMAL OR PROPER IDENTITY, WHICH OBTAINS BETWEEN THE 
PERSONS AND THEIR PROPERTIES, A.'lD BETWEEN THE ESSENCE AND THE ESSENTIAL ATfRIBUTES-IBID.P248. 
BASED ON THESE DISTINCTIONS, CERTAIN PREDICATIONS OR PROPOSmONS APPLY. THESE ARE. ESSENTIAL, 
IDENTICAL A.'10 FORMAL PROPOSITIONS. THE ANONYMOUS AUTHOR TIIEN PROCEEDS TO OUTLINE A 
TRINITARIAN SYLLOGISTIC SYSTEM OF THE 'MODAL' TYPE, EACH SYLLOGISM PERTAINING TO A CERT AlN 
DISTINCTION IN Goo, BUT NOT NECESSARILY TO OTHER DISTINCTIONS. 
"'GELBER.H.G.OP CIT. !OFF. 
128 GELBER.H.G.'LOGIC AND THE TRINITY.' 0PCIT.Pl2. 
129 IN WHAT FOLLOWS. WE ARE FOLLOWING GELBER. IBID.Pl3FF. 
130 IBID.PB. 
131 IBID.Pl6. 
132 1BID.Pl7. 
133 IBIO.Pl7. HENNINGER SAYS: 'IN HIS SENTENCES COMMENT ARY. HE SAYS THAT IN ONE OF ITS SENSES 
"RATIO" MEA.'1S "NOTHING ELSE THAN THAT WHICH TIIE INTELLECT UNDERSTANDS OF THE SIGNIFICATION OF 
A.'lY NAME ... THE RATIO OF SOMETHING IS OFTEN GIVEN BY TIIE DEFIN1TION OF THE CONCEPT SIGNIFYING IT. 
BLT WITH THINGS THAT ARE NOT ABLE TO BE DEFINED, AS Goo's ATTRIBUTES AND TIIE CATEGORIES, THE 
RATIO IS WHATEVER THE INTELLECT DOES L'NDERST.-1.>'10 CORRECTLY BY THE CONCEPT SIGNlFYING THE 
REALITY.' -HENNINGER.M.G. 'RELATIONS.MEDIEVAL THEORIES 1250-1325. 'Op CIT.PIS. 
134 1BID.Pl7. 
135 IBID.PIS. 
136 IBID.P19. 
137 IBID.P20. 
138 ]BIO.P22. SAYS GELBER: 'YET HE SAID AT . .U'10THER POINT THAT ALTHOUGH RELATION IS ONLY A.RATIO 
THROUGH A COMPARISON TO THE ESSENCE, IT IS A THING (RES) COMPARED TO ITS CORRELATIVE OPPOSITE, 
REALLY DISTINGL'ISHED FROl'vI IT. 
139 SEE: HENNINGER.M.'RELATIONS.MEDIEVAL THEORIES 1250-1325.'0PCIT.PL 
140 'REL~TION IS OF ALL THE CATEGORIES LOWEST WITH RESPECT TO BEING. THIS IS SHOWN SAYS 
ARISTOTLE. BY THE FACT THAT RELATION PRESUPPOSES THE CATEGORIES OF QUANTITY .AND QUALITY. 
WHICH IN TURN PRESUPPOSE THE CATEGORY OF SUBST.~CE, AS THAT IN WHICH THEY INHERE. RELATION 
PRESUPPOSES THESE CATEGORIES AS ITS TE~'!S AND GROUND.' -CA VARN OS. C. 'THE CLASSICAL 
THEORY OF RELATIONS.' OP CIT.P51. HERE CAV ~'!OS IS COMMENTING ON THE AR!STOTEL!A.'1 
'CATEGORIES.'OP CIT.Vll.6B20-8. 
141 THIS IS VERY MUCH EVIDENT INTHE PLATONIC TRADITION. '-'1TH THE IDEA OF P1\RTICIPATION IN THE 
TRANSCENDENT FORM. 
142 WE HAVE TRIED TO ARGUE THAT EVEN HEIDEGGER'S THEORY OF 'DASEW.' FALLS INTO THIS TENDENCY. 
IT IS ALSO A PROBLEM fN KANT, WHERE THE REQC!RED 'SUBSTRATE,' IS NOW THE HUMAN MIND. 
143 ]N OTHER WORDS, THE RELATION PRESUPPOSES TIIE SUBST.~CE: 'A RELATION. INTHE BROADEST SENSE, 
IS "TIIE ORDER OF ONE THING TO ANOIBER (RELAT/O LATISSME SIJMPTA EST ORDO UN/US AD AL!UD)" -QUOTE OF 
THOMAS' 'ELEME?vTA. 'VOL !, AS QUOTED BY CAY ARNOS.C. 'THE CLASSICAL THEORY OF 
RELATIONS. 'OP CIT.P69. 
144 MULLER.E. 'REAL RELATIONS AND THE DIVINE: ISSUES IN THOMAS' UNDERSTANDING 
OF GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD. 'Op CIT.P674. IT w AS FAIRLY EASY FOR AUGUSTINE TO MAKE 
THIS RADICAL MODIFICATION OF ARISTOTLE, AS HEW AS NOT AN ADMIRER OF ARISTOTLE'S SYSTEM, AS WAS 
THOMAS. fuRTIIERMORE, AUGUSTINE WAS UNAWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS CHANGE, TO TIIE 
ARISTOTELIAN SYSTEM OF BEING. 
145 IBID.P675. 
146 ]BIO.P675. 
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147 
MULLER.E.'REAL RELATIONS AND THE DIVINE: ISSUES IN THOMAS' UNDERSTANDING 
OF GOD'S RELATION TO THE WORLD: 1BID.P675. SEE ALSO: 
KLUBERT ANZ.GP: 1963. 'INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING. 'P273. 
148 SPEAKING OF THOMAS, HENNINGER STATES: 'HE REPEATEDLY BEGINS DISCUSSING RELATIONS BY 
STATING THAT 
IN EACH OF THE NINE . .\CCIDENT AL CATEGORIES THERE IS A DISTINCTION BET\VEEN ACCIDENTAL BEING 
CO~!MON TO ALL NINE CATEGORIES AND THE RATIO OF THAT PARTICULAR CATEGORY. 
A.'ID: 
FOR EACH OF THE NINE ACCIDENTAL CATEGORIES, ACCIDENTAL BEING IS TO BE IN (TO ADHERE IN) A 
SUBJECT. 
HENCE, HE MAINTAINS THE TRADITIONAL VIEW OF AN ACCIDENT AS THAT \VHICH ADHERES IN (OR IS APT TO 
INHERE). THE ELEGANCE AND ECONOMY OF HIS SOLUTION LIE IN THE IDE1'TIFICATION OF THE ACCIDENT AL 
BEING (ESSE IN) OF A REAL RELATIONSHIP WTIH THE ACCIDE1'T AL BEING OF ITS FOUNDA T!ON. HENCE A REAL 
RELATION DOES INHERE IN ITS SUBJECT. THE RATIO OF A RELATION IS TO BE TOW ARD ANOTHER (ESSE-AD); IT 
IS AN INTELLIGIBLE ASPECT OF THU ONE ACCIDENT AL FOR'\! THAT IS ITS FOUNDATION .• -
HENNINGERM.OP CIT.Pl 76. 
BRIEFLY, 0cKHAM' S NO~flN AUST POSITION ON GENER . \L RELATIONS IS QUITE DIFFERENT. YET HE MAKES A 
CAREFUL DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PERSPECTIVE OF 'DIVINE REVELATION,' AND 'NATUR . .\L REASON .• 
WHEN IT COMES TO NATURAL REASON. RELATIONS ARE NOT SEPARATE THINGS. WITH RESPECT TO 'DIVINE 
REVELATION,' HE ACfu'IOWLEDGES (VNDOUBTEDLY WITH RESPECT TO THE TRINITY) THAT THEY CA,'! E:'aST 
AS SEPARATE THINGS-ADAMS.M.M. 'WILLIAM OCKHAM. 'VOL I. OP CIT.P215. HE EXPLAINS HIS 
THEORY OF RELATIONS WTIH RESPECT TO THE SEMANTICS OF ABSOLUTE AND CONNOTATIVE TERMS. 
RELATIONAL TERMS DO NOT DIRECTLY SIGNIFY ANY E:'\TRA MENTAL THING DISTINCT FROM THE RELATA (THE 
TWO ENTITIES COMPARED). INSTEAD, RELATIONAL TERMS ARE CONNOTATIVE A,'\D SIGNIFY BOTHRELATA (OR 
SIGNIFY ONERELATUMDIRECTLY .~''D THE OTHER CONNOTATIVELY), .~'ID ALSO CONNOTE THAT THE REL4TA 
EXIST IN A CERT AlN WAY. -HENNINGER.!BIO.Pl28. FOR A TO BECOME SIWLAR TO 8, IT IS NOT NECESSARY 
THAT A,'IY RELATIVE THING COME TO INHERE IN A. RATHER IT IS ONLY NECESSARY THAT SOMETHING 
BECOME WHITE. WHICH PREVIOVSLY WAS NOT WHITE-IBID.Pl29. AGAINST SCOTUS, 0cKHAM DE1'1ED THAT 
'THAT THERE ARE .~'IY RELATIVE ENTITIES-REAL OR UNREAL-DISTINCT FROM ABSOLUTE ENTIES.' -
ADAMS.MM. 'WILLIAM OCKHAM'. VOL I.OP CIT.P2!5. THE REASON FOR THIS IS THAT IF RELATIONS 
ARE RE • .\L THINGS. THEN THERE ARE AN INFINITE AMOUNT OF THINGS. AS THE SCOPE OF RELATIONS IS 
INFINITE. BUT THIS IS IMPOSSIBLE AS THERE CANNOT BE A,'! INFINITE AMOUNT OF THINGS. 
0cKHAM DE1'1ES THAT A RE . .\L REL.\TION OF. SAY, SI~IlLARITY IS PROPERLY SPEAKING IN THE WHITE THING. 
Hrs FORMULA IS INSTEAD: "THIS WHITE THING IS REALLY SIMILAR, ALTHOUGH SI~flLARITY IS NOT IN THE 
WHITE THING.' -IBID.Pl32. 'THE CENTRAL PARTS OF 0cKHAM'S THEORY OF RELATION CA.'I BE Sl'~!MARISED 
AS FOLLOWS; SENTENCES OF THE FORM "A RB" ARE TRL'E IF .AND ONLY IF A A.NDB EXIST IN THE WAY 
CONNOTED BY SL'BSTITUf!ONS FOR R. '-IBID.P 145. A RE . .\L RELATION DOES NOT HAVE A FOUNDATION. 
RELATIONAL TERMS DO NOT SIGNIFY AN ACCIDENTAL RELATIONAL FORM INHERING IN A SUBJECT. 
WHAT, IN OVROPIN10N IS ILLUWNATING ABOUT THE NOMINALISM OF 0cKHAM, IS THAT HIS POSITION IN 
RELATIONS. CLASHES WITH THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. REALISING THIS, 0cKHAM GETS OUT 
OF THE PROBLEM, BY POSITING 'TWO TYPES OF RELATIONS,' THOSE THAT PERT AlN TO 'DIVINE REVELATION,' 
AND THOSE WHICH PERTAIN TO 'NATURAL REASON.' THIS IS ANOTHER MANIFESTATION OF THE SAME 
PROBLEM. THE LOGIC THAT APPLIES TO GoD. IS NOT THE SA.ME AS THE LOGIC WHICH APPLIES TO MAN. 
NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THIS CLEAR DISTINCTION (SIMILAR TO THOMAS' DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEOLOGY 
AND PHILOSOPHY) OcKl!AM SPENDS A GREAT DEAL OF TIME APPLYING SECULAR PRINCIPLES OF LOGIC TO HIS 
THEOLOGY! FOR COVERAGE OF A SIWLAR PROBLEM SEE ALSO: HENNINGERM.G. 'HENRY OF 
HARCLAY ON THE FORM.AL DISTINCTION IN THE lRINITY.' OP CIT.P250FF. 
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-HENNINGER.M.OP CIT.Pl 7. 'WITH RESPECT TO REAL RELATIONS BET\1iEEN TWO SUBJECTS THERE ARE 
TWO GROLNUS: ACTION .\Nil PASSION. SOME SUCH RELATIONS ARE ""AS BEING \~lll.\T IS CH.-1.NGED BY" AND 
·'BEING WHAT CHAXGES." "BEING FATHER OF A1'1) BEING SON OF AND so FORTH." Tms IS DISTINGUISHED 
FROM CASES IN WHICH '"THE TRUTH ABOLT XTHAT IT IS RELATED TOY IS DUE TO SOMETHING REAL IN X. Bl.'T 
THE TRUTH ABOUT Y THAT IS RELATED TO XIS "!OT DUE TO ANYTHING REALIN Y." SUCH ASY).-IMETRICAL 
RELATIONS EXIST BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE AND THE THING K.'101\IN: MY KNOWLEDGE OF SOME ETERNAL THING 
DEPENDS ON THE EXISTENCE OF THAT THING, THAT THING'S EXISTENCE DOES NOT DEPEND ON MY K.'IOWING 
IT. MY K.'IOWLEDGE IS MEASURED BY THE THING KNOWN. THUS MY K.'IOWLEDGE HAS A REAL RELATIO"I TO 
THE THING K.'10\\l"I. THE THING K.'IOWN HAS ONLY A RATIONAL RELATION TO MY KNOWING. THIS 
ASYMMETRY OCCURS, THOMAS MA.INT AINS, WHENEVER THE TWO TERMS OF THE RELATION ARE "!OT OF THE 
SAME ORDER. IT IS THIS. FOR INSTANCE, WHICH DISTINGUISHES BETWEEN THE BEGETTING OF THE SON, WHO 
IS OF THE SAME ORDER AS THE FATHER. A1'1J THE CREATING OF THE WORLD, WHICH IS NOT OF THE SAME 
ORDER OF THE CREATOR. '-MOLLERE.OP C!T.P676-77. 
150 
-FOR EXPOSITIONS OF THE ROLE OF THE HOLY SPIRIT IN THOMAS' TRINITY, SEE PELIKAN .J. 'THE 
DOCTRINE OF THE FIL(X1UE IN THOMAS AQUINAS AND ITS PATRISTIC ANTECEDENTS. AN 
.'-''IALYSIS OF SUMMA THEOLOGL4E. PART I. QlJESTION 36. 'OP CIT. TORRE.M.D. 'ST JOHN 
DEMASCENE AND ST THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE ETERNAL PROCESSION OF THE HOLY 
SPIRIT.' OP CIT. 
151 HANKEY. W.J. "THE PLACE OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN THE 
ARGUMENTS OF AUGUSTINES' DE TRINITATE, ANSELM'S .~!ONO LOGION, AND AQUINAS' 
SUM1vl4 THEOLOGL4E.' Op CitPI02. SEE ALSO: 
LONERGAN.BJ(EDITED:BURRELL.D:l967). 'VERBUM.WORDAND IDEA IN AQUINAS.'OP 
CIT.P206. FOR FURTHER STlJDIES ON THE IMAGE OF THE TRINITY IN MAN. SEE: CIAPPl.L. 'THE 
PRESENCE, MISSION, AND INDWELLING OF THE DIVINE PERSONS IN THE JUST. 'OP CIT. 
SQUIRE.A 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMAGE IN THE DE VERITATE OF ST THOMAS. 'OP CIT, 
HISLOP.I. 'MAN. THE IMAGE OF THE TRJNITY ACCORDING TO ST THOMAS. 'OP CIT. 
MERRJELL.D.J: I 990. 'TO THE IMAGE OF THE TRJNITY. A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
AQUINAS' TEACHING. 'Op CIT. SAYS MERRIELL. CONCER_'ITNG THE INTELLECTUAL IMAGE OF THE 
TRINITY IN THE SDJMA OF AQUINAS: 'FIRST, THOMAS DEFINES THE !).-!AGE OF THE TRIN1TY PRIMARILY IN 
TER-'-!S OF THE TWO PROCESSIO"IS OF INNER WORD .-1.!'<lJ LOVE. SECONDLY, HE NEVER EXPLICITLY MENTIONS 
THE TRIAD OF '..-!EMORY. U"lllERST.\,NDING, AND WILL. IF A.'.'Y ANALOGUE IS GIVEN FOR THE FIRST PERSON IN 
THE TRIN1TY. !TIS THE '>fiND ITSELF OR SIMPLY THE RATIONAL CREATURE. THERE IS NO ~JENTION OF 
1'lE'>IORY. THO~L\S PREFERS TO SPEAK OF BOTH Goll THE FATHER AND THE MIND AS PRJNC!P/UM OF THEIR 
RESPECTIVE PROCESSIONS.' -MERRJELL.D.J.OP CIT.Pl54. THO~L\S DOES NOT TREAT THE IMAGE IN MAN AS 
PART OF THE ACTUAL EXPOSITION OF THE TRINITY ITSELF. [NSTEAD. IT IS DEALT \\1TH IN HIS TREAH!ENT OF 
MAN AS CREATURE. IN THE 93'" QUESTION OF THE FIRST PART OF THESW.-1!.-IA. 
152 IBID.P206. 
153 HANKEY. W.J. "THEOLOGY AS SYSTEM AND SCIENCE: PROCLUS AND THOM.AS 
AQUINAS. 'Op CIT.P89. 
"
4 BUTTERWORTH.E.D. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND 
SAINT BONA VENTURE.' OP CrT.P63. 
155 
'HAVING CONSIDERED WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNITY OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE, IT RE~!AINS TO TREAT OF 
WHAT BELONGS TO THE TRINITY OF THE PERSONS IN Goll. A.ND BECACSE THE DIW.-.1' PERSONS ARE 
DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER ACCORDING TO THE RELATIONS OF ORIGIN. (ET QUIA PERSONAE D!VINAE 
SECUNDuM REIATIONES ORIGIN!S DJSTINGUUNTURj THE ORDER OF DOCTRINE LEADS US TO CONSIDER FIRSTLY, 
THE QUESTION OF ORIGIN OR PROCESSION; SECONDLY, THE RELATIONS OF ORIGIN ( ... SECUNDO, DE 
RELAT!ONIBUSORIGINIS); THIRDLY, THE PERSONS (TERTIO, DE PERSONIS). '-AQUINAS.T. 'SUMNL4 
THEOLOGJCA.' OP CIT.PT I.ART 2.Q27. PI47. 
156 LACUGNA.C.M. 'THE RELATIONAL GOD: AQUINAS AND BEYOND. 'Op CIT.P653. IT MIGHT BE 
TRC1' TO SAY THAT WE CAN KNOW Goll EXISTS THROUGH OBSERVING HIS IMPRINT ON CREATION. YET THIS 
K.'IOWLEDGE OF Goll AS CREATOR IS KNOWLEDGE OF THE GoDHEAD AS SUCH. NOT THE THREE PERSONS. WE 
C""'I ONLY KNOW THE THREE PERSONS, AND THEIR DISTINCTIONS, THROUGH REVELATION. 
157 IBID.P653. LACuGNA AGREES THAT IT rs THOMAS' OUTWORKING OF THE RELATIONS IN GoD THAT ARE 
SEMINAL TO HIS lJNUERSTANDING OF THE TRINITY. 'THE CATEGORY OF RELATION IS THE KEY TO THOMAS' 
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TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY.'-LACUGNA.C.M.'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.' OP 
Crr.152. 'HO\\IEVER. IF THIS IS INDEEDTHE CASE. THEN WHY DOES NOT THOMAS BEGIN HIS STUDY OF THE 
PLURALITY IN GoD WITH THE RELATIONS IN GoD? WHY DOES HE BEGIN WITH THE PROCESSIONS? THE 
DIVINE tvllSSIONS (INCARNATION. THE SENDING OF THE SPIRIT) ARE ONLY HA>'lDLED IN Q ·B. AT THE END OF 
DE DEG T'RINO, BRINGING ABOUT THE BRJDGE INTO THOMAS' THEOLOGY OF CREATION. "RELATION" (PROS 
TI FOR ARISTOTLE A>'m AD UQUID FOR BOETHIUS) INDICATES THE REFERENCE OF mm THING TO ANOTHER. 
RELATION IS ALWAYS BASED ON .c\..'lOTHER CATEGORY-FOR EXAMPLE QUANTITY (AS IN "DOUBLE AND 
HALF"). ARISTOTLE SAYS THAT EVERY RELATIVE TERM. IF PROPERLY PREDICATED, HAS A CORRELATIVE. 
FOR EXAMPLE, SLAVE IMPLIES MASTER ... RELA TIONALITY MAY NOT BE PREDICATED OF A SINGLE SUBJECT. 
Bl7f ONLY OF TWO IN REFERENCE TO EACH OTHER. ONE CAN SEE WHY THIS CATEGORY WOULD BE GENIAL IN 
THE TRINITARIAN TRADITION, SINCE IT ALLOWS ONE TO INTRODUCE DISTINCTIONS IN THE GODHEAD 
WITHOUT INTRODUCING DIVISION INTO GoD. '-IBID.P654. SAYS RICHARD OF ST VICTOR:' ON THE BASIS OF 
THESE THINGS, CONSIDER HOW IMPOSSIBLE IT IS FOR SOME ONE PERSON IN DIVINITY TO LACK THE 
FELLOWSHIP OF ASSOCIATION. IF HE WERE TO HA VE ONLY ONE PARTNER, CERTAINLY HE WOULD NOT LACK 
ONE WITH WHOM HE MIGHT SHARE THE RJCHES OF HIS GREATNESS. BUT HE WOULD NOT HA VE ANYONE WITH 
WHOM HE tvllGHT SHARE TIIE DELIGHTS OF CHARITY ... HE ALONE POSSESSES THE SWEETNESS OF SUCH 
DELIGHTS WHO HAS A PARTNER AND A LOVED ONE INTHE LOVE THAT HAS BEEN SHOWN TO HIM. AND SO 
SHARING LOVE CANNOT EXIST AMONG ANY LESS TH.'\N THREE PERSONS ... ONE CANNOT BE LACKING IN \\1IAT 
PLEASES HIM. SO IN DIVINITY IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR TWO PERSONS NOT TO BE UNITED WITH A THIRD.' -
RICHARD OF ST VICTOR(TRANSLATED: ZINN.G.A: 1979). 'THE TRINITY. 'Op err.BOOK 3. 
CHAP XIV.P386. 
Of COURSE, IN HIS THEOLOGY OF RELATIONS. AQUINAS REFLECTS THE ARISTOTELl.'\N AGENDA OF HIS Tl1'!E. 
AQUINAS DOES PLACE A CERTAIN EMPHASIS ON THE TRJUNE PERSONS AS THINKING 'SUBJECTS,' IN HIS 
UNRAVELLING OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE PLURALITY OF THE GoDHEAD. HOWEVER AQUINAS' MODEL OF 
RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH REFLECTING A CERTAIN NE\\INESS, (SEE MAIN TEXT) STILL REMAINS OVERTLY 
'ONTOLOGICAL.' THATIS TO SAY. WHAT PRJMARJLY CONSTITUTES THE SEPARATE PERSONS WITHIN THE 
GoDHEAD AS PERSONS, IS THE UNIQUE 'STUFF.' OF WHICH THEY ARE COMPOSED. AD1'DTIEDLY, THIS 
'STUFF,' IS A RADIC . .\.L MODIFICATION OF ARISTOTLE'S STATIC ONTOLOGY; THERE IS A MOVEMENT TOWARDS 
A GREATER APPRECIATION OF RELATIONALITY AS COMPRJSING THE HEART OF THAT 'STUFF.' INTHE 
CONSTRUCTION OF FUTURE TRINITARIA>'l THEOLOGIES, IT 1'DGHT BE HELPFUL TO INVESTIGATE, MICHEL 
FOUCAULT'S VIEW ON POWER RELATIONS. FOUCAULT, WRJTING ATTHE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. 
'<lSUALISED A RADIC . .\.L NEW 'ONTOLOGY' OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THINKING SUBJECTS. THIS WAS A 
RENDITION OF THE RELATIONS BETWEE"J THlN'KING SUBJECTS. AS BEING PRJMARILY RELATIONS OF POWER. IN 
STATING FOUCAULT'S POSITION THUS. IT IS NECESSARY TO SAY THAT FOUCAULT HIMSELF. WOULD NOT 
SUPPOSE THAT HIS RENDERING OF TllE 'POWER PRJNCIPLE' IS ONTOLOGICALLY CONSTITUTIVE OF SLllJECTS. 
HOWEVER OUR POINT IS THAT IN Fm;cAULT, WHAT MAKES THE SUBJECT AN INDIVIDUAL IN HIS WORLD. IS 
NOT THE TYPE OF 'St:BSTA;'ICE' OF WHICH THE SUBJECT IS MADE. BUT THE POWER RELATIONS BETWEEN 
HI~ISELF, OTHER SUBJECTS AND THE INSTITUTIONS WITH WHICH HE INVOLVES HIMSELF. IN THIS WAY, POWER 
RELATIONS PROVIDE THE 'LOGICAL FORM,' COMPRJSING THE NETWORK OF THINKING SUBJECTS AND THEIR 
WORLD. IN THIS SENSE. POWER-RELATIONS CA>'I BE VIEWED AS ONTOLOGICAL- SEE: RABINOW.P. 
DREYFUS.H.L.:1982. 'MICHEL FOUCAULT.BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS .. 
FOR A HELPFUL SU:VIM..\.RY OF Fot:CAULT'S POSITION. SEE HIS AFTERWORD: 'THE SUBJECT AND 
POWER.' P208FF. THE ABOVE SPECULATIVE .'\ND TENTATIVE SUGGESTION OF THE POSSIBILITY OF VIEWING 
THE READING THE TRJNIT..\.RIAN RELATIONS AS 'RELATIONS OF POWER.' BASES ITSELF UPON FOUCAULT'S 
OWN SUMMARY HERE, OF HIS POSITION. OF COURSE, IF ONE HAD TO INVESTIGATE THE POSSIBILITY OF A 
TRlNITARIAN APPLICATION OF FOUCAULT. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE NECESSARY TO EMPTY THIS APPLICATION 
OF TIIE NEGATIVE (AND MAR.XIST) CONNOTATIONS EMBEDDED IN FOUCAULT'S VIEW. 
158 BUTTER WORTH.E.J. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY IN SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS AND 
SAINT BONA VENTURE. 'Op Crr.P68. SEE ALSO 'SUMMA THEOLOGJCA. 'OP CIT.PT I.Q 27.ART 
I. 'WHETHER THERE IS PROCESSION IN GOD?' ART 2. 'WHETHER ANY PROCESSION IN GOD 
CAN BE CALLED GENERATION?' ART 3. 'WHETHER ANY OTHER PROCESSION EXISTS IN 
GOD BESIDES THAT OF THE WORD?' ART 4. 'WHETHER THE PROCESSION OF LOVE IN GOD 
IS GENERATION?' ART 5. 'WHETHER THERE ARE MORE THAN TWO PROCESSIONS IN GOD?' 
159 AQUINAS.TOP CIT.PT I.Q 27.ART 5.PlS 1-2. 
160 IBID.PT I.Q27.ART 5.Pl5 l. 
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161 HANKEY.W.J.'AQUINAS' FIRST PRINCIPLE: BEING OR UNITY?' 0PCIT.Pl59. 'INOO!NGSOHE 
IS ACCUSED OF REDUCING THE PROPER CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF Goo TO Tl!E NATURALLY KNOWN 
PLATONIC CONCEPTION OF IJN1TY.' -!BID.Pl59. 
162 IBID.Pl60 
163 IBID.Pl63. 'HERE, INTHE DE DEO UNO, IT IS MANIFEST BY THE SEPARATION OF TWO SETS OF NAMES. THE 
FIRST BEGINS IN SIMPLICITY AND ENDS IN UNITY; SUBSTA.'ICE BEING MORE SIMPLE THAN ACT, IS CENTRED 
AROUND UNITY. THE SECOND BEGINS IN KNOWLEDGE. AND PASSING THROUGH WILL AND POWER, ARRIVES 
AT BEATITUDE ... THATIS, OPERATION BEING MORE DIVIDED THAN SUBSTANCE IS CENTRED AROUND 
INTELLECT OR NOUS. '-[BID.Pl63. 'IN AQlJINAS' ARISTOTELIAN EPISTEMOLOGY THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE 
MIND WHICH KNOWS, IS REFLEXIVE UPON ITS ACT.' -[BID.Pl64. 
164 lBID.Pl66. 
165 BUTIBRWORTH.E.J.OP CIT.P68. 
166
' THE IDEA OF RELATION, HOWEVER, NECESSARILY MEANS REGARD OF ONE TO A>'IOTHER, ACCORDING AS 
ONE IS RELATIVELY OPPOSED TO ANOTHER (DE RATIO NE AUTEM RELATJONJS EST RESPECTUS UNJUS AD 
ALTERUM, SECUNDUM QUEM ALIQUJD ALTERJOPPONITUR RELATIVE). SO AS IN GoD THERE IS A REAL RELATION 
THERE "1UST ALSO BE A REAL OPPOSITION. THE VERY NATURE OF RELATIVE OPPOSITION INCLUDES 
DISTINCTION.' -AQUINAS.T. 'SUMMA THEOLOGICA.' OP CIT PT LQ 28.ART 3.Pl53. 
167 BUTIBRWORTH.0PCIT.P71. SEEALSOLACUGNAC.M.'GODFOR US.THE TRINITY AND 
CHRISTIAN LIFE. 'OP Crr.Pl53: THE DIVINE PERSONS ARISE OUT OF REAL RELATIONS V.1THIN Goo. IF 
THE PERSONS WERE DERIVED FROM LOGICAL RELATIONS ONLY, THEN PERSONS WOULD BE ACCIDENTS OF THE 
DIVINE NATURE. DIVINE SIMPLICITY PRECLUDES ACCIDE1'"1'S IN GoD. THEREFORE RELATIONS ARE IDENTICAL 
v.1TH THE DMNE ESSENCE.' SAYS THOMAS: 'HENCE, THERE ),!UST BE REAL DISTINCTION IN Goo, NOT 
INDEED. ACCORDING TO THAT WHICH IS ABSOLUTE-NA.\IELY ESSENCE ( UNDE OPORTET QUOD IN DEO SIT 
REALIS DISTINCTJO, NON QUJDEA1 SECUNDUAI REM ABSOLUTAM, QUAE EST ESSENTIA) \\/11EREIN THERE IS 
SUPREME UNITY AND SIMPLICITY (IN QUA EST SUMA,JA UNITAS ET SIMPLJCITAS) -BUT ACCORDING TO THAT 
WHICH IS RELATIVE (SEDSECUNDuM RE'W RELATIVAM). '-AQUINAS.TOP err.PT I.Q 28.ART 4.Pl53-4. SEE 
ALSO SIMILAR REMARKS OF AQlJINAS IN 'SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES. 'BOOK LGOD. OP CIT. CHAP 
3 LP140. '1HAT THE DIVINE PERFECTION AND PLURALITY OF DIVINE NAMES ARE NOT 
OPPOSED TO THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY.' 
168 LACUGNAC.M. 'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE. 'OP CIT.Pl54. 'THESE 
PROCESSIONS ARE TWO ONLY AS ABOVE EXP0l;1'UED. 01'.'E DERIVED FROM THE ACTION OF THE INTELLECT, 
THE PROCESSION OF THE WORD; .4..'ID THE OTHER FROM THE ACTION OF THE WILL, THE PROCESSION OF LOVE. 
IN RESPECT OF EACH OF THESE PROCESSIONS TWO OPPOSITE RELATIONS ARISE. ONE OF WHICH IS THE 
RELATION OF THE PERSON PROCEEDING FROM THE PRINCIPLE. THE OTHER IS THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE 
HIMSELF. THE PROCESSl01' OF THE WORD IS CALLED GENERATION INTHE PROPER SENSE OF THE TERivI, 
WHEREBY IT IS APPLIED TO LIVING THINGS. Now THE RELATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF GE1'.'ERATION IN 
PERFECT LIVING THINGS IS CALLED PATERNITY, ic'ID THE RELATION OF THE ONE PROCEEDING FROM THE 
PRINCIPLE IS CALLED FILIATION. BUT THE PROCESSION OF LOVE HAS NO PROPER NAME OF ITS OWN, AND SO 
NEITHER HAVE THE ENSUl1'G RELATIONS A PROPER NA.\,lE OF THEIR OWN. THE RELATION OF THIS PRINCIPLE 
PROCEEDING IS CALLED SPIRATION; AND THE RELATION OF THE PERSON PROCEEDING IS CALLED PROCESSION 
ALTHOUGH THESE TWO NAMES BELOl'G TO TI!E PROCESSIONS OR ORIGINS THE..,ISELVES, AND NOT TO THE 
RELATIONS.'-AQUJNAS.TOP CIT.PT l.Q 28.ART 4.P\54. 'WITH RESPECT TO THE THREE PERSONS, 
THOMAS PREFERS TO USE THE TERMHYPOSTASIS, RATHER THAN THE LATIN PERSONAE. THIS TERM 
EMPHASISES THE SUBSISTENT REALITY OF THE PERSONS AND IT IS THIS REALITY THAT THOMAS INTENDS TO 
TRANSFER TO THE RELATIONS THAT DlST!NGlJISH AND CONSTITu"1'E THE PERSONS.' -
BUTIBRWORTH.E.J.OP CIT.P79. 
169 KRETZMANN.N. 'TRINITY AND TRANSCENDENT ALS.'OP CIT. IN WHAT FOLLOWS, WE RELY 
SOMEWHAT ON THIS ARTICLE OF KRETZMANN, BUT WE ARE NOT LOOKING FOR PRECISELY THE SAME 
CON1''ECTIONS THAT HE DOES IN THOMAS. 
l70 'REASON MAY BE EMPLOYED IN TWO WAYS TO ESTABLISH A POINT; FIRSTLY, FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
FlJRNISHING SUFFICIENT PROOF OF SOME PRINCIPLE, AS IN NATURAL SCIENCE ... REASON IS EMPLOYED IN 
ANOTHER WAY, NOT AS FURNISHING A SUFFICIENT PROOF OF A PRINCIPLE, BUT AS CONFIR1'fiNG AN ALREADY 
ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLE ... '-AQUINAS.TOP CIT.PT LQ32.ART l.Pl69. 
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171 IN FACT, KRETZl\IANN SHOWS THAT THOMAS CLAIMS THAT HE C."N PROVE' THAT WE CANNOT PROVE 
THROt:GH RATIONAL REASON ALONE, THE PLURALITY OF THE PERSONS. THOMAS PROCEEDS IN THIS 
MANNER: FIRSTLY HE ST ATES THAT WE CAN ONLY REASON PROPERLY FROM THE EFFECTS TO THE CAUSE OF 
THOSE EFFECTS. SECONDLY, THE 'CREATIVE' DIMENSION TO Goo, IS NOT TO BE LOCATED IN ONE OF THE 
THREE PERSONS. BUT ONLY IN THE UNITY OF THE GODHEAD. THUS ALL INFERENCE FROM EFFECTS TO THE 
CREATOR, WILL BRING US ONLY TO THE ONE Goo.-KRETZMANN.N.OP ClT.P80_ SEE ALSO: 
AQUINAS.T.OP CIT.PT I.Q 32.ART L 
170 IBID.P8 l. 
"'AQUINAS.T.Op CIT.PT LQ 39.ART 8.P200-20 I. 
174 KRETZMANN.N.OP Cn.P83. 
175 
'Now_ WE CA.'1 HAVE NATURAL COGNITION OF THE ATIRIBUTES APPROPRIATED TO THE PERSONS, B!Tf WE 
CA'I HA VE NO NATURAL COGNITION AT ALL OF THE PROPER ATTRIBUTES OF THE PERSONS.' -
AQUINAST 'QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VERITATE.' Q IO.A 13C.-AS QUOTED BY 
KRETZMANN.OP Cn.P84. 
n 
' KRETZMANN_N OP CIT.P87. 
177 IBID.P87. 
178 EVERYTHING THAT IS 'ONE,' IS ONE IN THE RESPECT IN WHICH IT IS CONSIDERED TO BE. EVERYTHING 
THAT 'IS,' IS A TRUE INSTANCE OF WHATEVER !TIS. EVERYTHING THAT IS GOOD OF ITS KIND, IS GOOD IN 
THAT IT HAS THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THAT KIND.-KRETZMANN.N. 'TRINITY AND 
TRANSCENDENTALS.' OP CIT.P88. 
179 IBID.P88: 'THE ONLY SORT OF CONCEPTUAL ADDENDUM ,\V AILABLE TO THE CONCEPT OF BEING, 
THEREFORE, IS THE SORT THAT EXPRESSES SOMEWAY IN WHICH BEING OCCURS, AND ANY CONCEPTUAL 
.-WDENDUM THAT MUST A TI ACH DIRECTLY TO THE CONCEPT OF BEING WILL EXPRESS A MODE OF BEING 
ITSELF TIIAT IS N"OTEXPRESSED BY THE NAME BETh<G 
180 !BID.P90_ 
181 lBID.P9l. 
182 
'AGAIN, ACCORDING TO THE ASSUMPTION BY WHICH WE HOLD THAT THE IDEAS EXIST, THERE WILL BE 
FORMS NOT ONLY OF SUBSTANCES BUT OF MANY OTHER THINGS (SINCE THE CONCEPT IS ONE NOT ONLY IN 
THE CASE OF Sl'.BSTA.NCES, BUT ALSO IN THE CASE OF OTHER THINGS; AND THERE ARE SCIENCES NOT ONLY 
OF SUBST A.NCES BUT OF OTHER THINGS AS WELL; AND THERE ARE A THOL'SAND OTHER SIMILAR 
CONSEQUENCES); BUT ACCORDING TO LOGICAL NECESSITY, ."-''ID FROM THE VIEWS GENERALLY HELD ABOUT 
THEM, IT FOLLOWS THAT IF THE FORMS ARE PARTICIPATED IN, THEN THERE CAN ONLY BE IDEAS OF 
Sl'BSTA.'ICES_ FOR THEY ARE NOT PARTICIPATED IN QUA ACCIDENTS; EACH FORM CAN ONLY BE 
PARTICIPATED INSO FARAS IT IS NOT PREDICATED OF A SUBJECT. I MEAN. E.G., THATIF ANYTHING 
PARTICIPATES IN ''ABSOLUTE DoUBLENESS" IT PARTICIPATES ALSO IN "ETERNAL." BUT ONLY 
ACCIDENT ALLY; BECAUSE IT IS AN ACCIDENT OF DoUBLENESS TO BE ETERNAL. THUS THE FORMS MUST BE 
St'BST A.'ICE_ Ber THE SAME NAMES DENOTE SUBST-"'ICE IN THE SENSIBLE _-\S IN THE IDEAL WORLD: 
OTHERWISE WHAT MEANING WILL THERE BE IN SAYING THAT SOMETHING EXISTS BESIDE TI-IE PARTICUL.-\RS, 
I.E. THE UNITY COMPRISING THEIR MlJL TIPLICITY? IF THE FOR.\·! OF THE IDEAS AND OF THE THINGS WHICH 
P.-\RTICIPATE IN THEM IS THE SAME, THEY WILL HAVE SOl\IETHING IN COMMON (FOR WHY SHOULD DUALITY 
MEAN ONE -"'ID THE SAME THING IN HIE CASE OF PERISHABLE "TWOS" -"'ID THE ''Twos" WHICH ARE MANY 
BUT ETERNAL, AND NOT IN THE CASE OF THE IDEA OF DUALITY AND A PARTICULAR "Two"?); BUT IF THE 
FORM IS NOT THE SAME, THEY WILL SIMPLY BE HOMONYMS; JUST AS THOl:GH ONE WERE TO CALL BOTH 
CALLIAS AND A PIECE OF WOOD "MAN"WITHOUT REMARK!l';G ANY PROPERTY COMMON TO nIEM_' -
ARISTOTLE. 'METAPHYSICS.' Op CIT.LIX.6-10.P65-67. ARISTOTLE CONTINUES, STAT!l';G THAT THE 
IDEA OF THE FORMS OOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF EARTHLY, SENSIBLE THINGS. THIS IS 
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT THE 'SUBSTANCE' OF THINGS, AS THEY _-\RE NOT REALLY 'IN' THINGS. NEITHER DO 
THE FORMS CONTRIBUTE TO THE 'EXISTENCE' OF ENTITIES, .-IS THEY ARE NOT 'PRESENT' IN THE THINGS THAT 
PART AKE OF THEM. -IBID. P69. 'FlIRTHER, IT WOULD SEEM IMPOSSIBLE THAT THE SUBSTANCE AND THE TH!l';G 
OF WHICH IT IS THE SUBSTANCE EXIST IN SEPARATION; HENCE HOW CAN THE IDEAS, IF THEY ARE THE 
SlJBSTA'lCES OF THINGS, EXIST IN SEPARATION FROM THEM?'-IBJD.1.IX.14.P69. 
183 TE VELDERA: 1995.'PARTICIPATION AND SUBSTANTIALITY IN THOMAS AQUINAS.'P4-5. 
THIS TEXT OF TE VELDE, BASED ON HIS DOCTORAL RESEARCH, DEALS WITH THE ISSUE OF SUBST ANTIALITY 
AND P ARTIC!PATION IN AQUINAS ACCORDING TO HIS DOCTRINE OF CREATION. INTERESTINGLY ENOUGH, TE 
VELDE DOES NOT TAKE HIS DISCUSSION INTO THE TRINITY OF THOMAS, \1-llERE IN OUR OPINION, THOMAS' 
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SYNTHESIS OF TI!ESE TWO TERMS (SL1lSTANCE ,\,'ID PARTICIPATION) IS EVEN MORE POIGNANT THAN IN HIS 
VIEW OF CREATION. 
184 1Brn.P9. 
185 lBID.PIO. TE VELDE GIVES AN OVERVIEW OF THOMAS' OPINIONS CO'-ICERNING THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
PARTICIPATION AS OUI"LINED BY THOMAS IN THE COMMEN"T ARY ON THE 'DE HEBDOMADIBUS:' 'THO:>,IAS 
BEGINS WITH A KIND OF ETYMOLOGICAL EXPL"-'"IATION: "TO PARTICIPATE" IS, AS IT WHERE, TO TAKE AP ART 
OF SOMETHING. (PARTEMCAPERE). THIS IS WHAT TilE TERM "PARTICIPATION" MEANS ... WE MAY THEREFORE 
SPEAK OF PARTICIPATION, THOMAS GOES ON, WHEN SOMETHING RECEIVES (OR HAS) IN PARTICULAR 
FASHION THAT WHICH BELONGS TO ANOTHER UNIVERSALLY ... THE SUBJECT IN QUESTION IS NOT IDEl'<"T!CAL 
\\i!TH THE PERFECTION WHICH IT POSSESSES, WHICH LEAVES THE POSSIBILITY OPEN FOR OTHER SUBJECTS TO 
SHARE IN THAT SAME PERFECTION. THO~IAS GOES ON TO OBSERVE THAT PARTICIPATION CAN TAKE PLACE IN 
THREE DIFFERENT WAYS. PARTICIPATION CAN BE APPLIED, FIRST, TO THE LOGICAL RELATIONS OF SPECIES 
AND INDIVIDUAL. FOR EXAMPLE, MAN IS SAID TOP ARTIC!PATE IN ANIMAL.' -[BID.Pll-12. TE VELDE GOES ON 
TO MAKE TilE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT POINT. '[T DOES NOT SEEM THAT THOMAS'S INTENTION IS TO ATTACH 
ONTOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES TO THIS LOGICAL PARTICIPATION. BY APPLYING PARTICIPATION TO THE 
RELATION OF INDIVIDUAL A."ID SPECIES AND OF SPECIES AND GENUS, HE IS NOT ENDORSING THE PLATOI:-<lC 
VIEW THAT TilE SPECIES EXISTS BY ITSELF SEPARATELY FROM TilE INDIVIDUALS AND THE GENUS 
SEP ARATEL y FROM TilE SPECIES., -IBID.Pl2. Tms IS THE KEY TO UNDERSTANDING THOMAS' OVERCOMING 
OF THE TENSION BETWEEN PLATO A.'ID ARISTOTLE. WHILE APPRECIATING THE CREATED PARTICIPATION OF 
ALL INDIVIDUALS IN THE CREATOR HIMSELF. THOMAS DOES NOT WISH TO DENY TilE ESSENTIAL SELF OF THE 
ENTITY, ONTOLOGICALLY. THUS MAN IS AN A.'l!MAL ESSENTIALLY, NOT JUST THROUGH HIS PARTICIPATION 
AS AN EXISTENT IN GoD'S CREATIVE POWERS. 
'THE SECOND KIND OF PARTICIPATION CONCERNS THE RELATIONS OF MATTER-FORM A.'ID SUBJECT 
ACCIDENT. FOR A SUBSTANTIAL OR AN ACCIDENT AL FORM, WHICH CONSIDERED IN ITSELF IS UNIVERSAL, IS 
RESTRICTED TO TllIS OR THAT SUBJECT!N WHICH IT IS RECEIVED. WHEN AN ACCIDENTAL OR A SUBSTANTIAL 
FORM IS ACTuALLY RECEIVED IN ITS APPROPRIATE SUBJECT OR ITS APPROPRIATE MATTER IT IS THEREBY 
LIMITED AND RESTRICTED TO THE SM&:. HENCE TilE RECEIVING PRINCIPLE MAY BE SAID TO PARTICIPATE IN 
THE RECEIVED FORM ... THIRDLY, AQUINAS CONCLUDES ... BY N011NG THAT SOMETIMES AN EFFECT IS SAID 
TO PARTICIPATE IN ITS CAUSE, AND ESPECIALLY WHENTHE EFFECT IS NOT EQUAL TO THE POWER OF THE 
CAl:SE. '-!BID.P\3-14. 
186 TE VELDE.R..OP CIT.P28. 
181 lBID.P29. 
188 [BID.P79. 'THE PROBLEMS OF PRECISELY HOW FINITE BEINGS ARE RELATED TO THE INFINITE AND 
SUPREME BEING A."ID THE MANNER OF IMPARTING OR SHARING PERFECTION BY THE ABSOLL'TE ARE NOT 
FOUND ADEQUATELY TREATED illff!L WE COME TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF BEING, AND CAUSALITY AS 
DEVELOPED BY ST.THOM-\5 AQUINAS.' -ANNICE.M. 'IDSTORICAL SKETCH OF THE THEORY OF 
PARTICIPATION.' 0PC!T.P79. 
189 [BID.Pl15. 'AT OTHER PLACES THOMAS INTRODUCES THE VOCABULARY OF PARTICIPATION IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE CAUSALITY OF FORM. IN COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES WE HA VE TO DISTINGUISH THREE 
ELEMEl:-<"TS. TO WIT MATTER, FORM AND BEING ITSELF. FORM IS THE PRINCIPLE OF BEING, SINCE BY 
RECEIVING FORM, MATTER COMES TO PARTICIPATE IN BEING; HENCE BEING RESULTS FROM TilE FORM 
PRINCIPLE. MORE PRECISELY: !TIS THE COMPOSITE THING THAT PAR TIC IPA TES IN THE BEING WHICH 
BELONGS TO IT THROUGH ITS FORM.'-1BID.P2! 9. 'EVERYTHING WHICH IS PARTICIPATED IS COMPOSED TO THE 
PARTICIPATOR AS ITS ACT. BUT WHATEVER CREATED FORM THAT ONE SUPPOSES, SlJBSISTING PER SE, MUST 
NEEDS PARTICIPATE IN EXISTENCE; BECAUSE EVEN LIFE ... PARTICIPATES IN EXISTENCE ... BUT 
UNPARTIC!PATED EXISTENCE IS LIMITED BY TilE CAPACITY OF TilE ONE PARTICIPATING. WHEREFORE GoD 
ALONE, WHO IS His OWN ACT OF EXISTENCE, IS PURE ACT AND INFINITE.' -AQUINAS.T.OP CIT.PT l.Q 
75.ART 5.P367. 
190 IBID.P255. 
191 !BID.P255. 
192 FABRO.C.'THE INTENSIVE HERMENEUTICS OF THOMISTIC PHILOSOPHY. THE NOTION OF 
PARTICIPATION.' 0PCIT.P459. 
193 [BID.P465. 
194 AQUINATIS.T. 'SUMMA THEOLOGIAE.' Op CIT. PT 1.Q 75.ART 6.P355. 
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195 F ABRO.C.Op Crr.P467 ..... IT BECOMES CLEAR THAT IN THOMISTIC SPECULATION THE NOTION OF 
PARTICIPATION EXPRESSES THE ULTIMATE POINT OF REFERENCE BOTH FROM THE STATIC VlEWPOINT OF THE 
CREATFRE 'S STRUCTL"RE AND FROM THE DYNA.WC VIEWPOINT OF ITS DEPENDENCE ON GoD. THIS NOTION 
TAKES FROM PLAT01'1S\! TIIE IDEAOF EXHIPLAR RELATIONSHIP AND ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION BETViEEN 
PARTICIPATING BEING .'-''ID ESSE SUBSISTENS, AND FROM ARlSTOTELIANISM THE PRINCIPLE OF REAL 
COMPOSITION AND REAL CAUSALITY AT EVERY LEVEL OF PARTICIPATED. FINITE BEING .• -[BID.P469. SAYS 
FAY: 'ON THE 01\'E H.'-''ID ST. THOMAS HAST AKEN THE ARlSTOTELIA.'I DOCTRINE OF POTENCY AND ACT 
\\111CH WAS, PRIOR TO ST THOMAS. USED ONLY TO EXPLAIN PHYSICAL CHANGE. AND MADE A lJNIQllE 
METAPHYSICAL APPLICATION, PLACING THIS THEORY AT THE VERY CENTRE OF HIS METAPHYSICS.' -
FAY.T.'PARTICIPATION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF PLATONIC AND NEOPLATONIC 
THOUGHT IN THE METAPHYSICS OF THOMAS AQUINAS., OP err.PS I. 
FOR FURTHER INFOR\IATION ON THIS SUBJECT. SEE ALSO: CLARKE. W.N. 'THE LIMITATION OF ACT 
BY POTENCY:ARISTOTELIANISM OR NEOPLATONISM?'OP CIT.Pl67-94. 
196 LINDBECK.G.'PARTICIPATION AND EXISTENCE IN THE INTERPRETATION OF THOMAS 
AQUINAS. 'OP Crr.P\25 
1
9'1 F ABRO.C.OP CIT.P471. 
198 LINDBECK.G.OP CIT.Pl 12. 
199 SEE: TRINKHAUS.C. 'LORENZO VALLA ON THE PROBLEM OF SPEAKING ABOUT THE 
TRINITY. 'OP C1T.P27FF. 
'
00 CAMPOREALE.S.l. 'LORENZO VALLA: Ulv!ANESL~!O E THEOLOGL4.' (FLORENCE:l972), 
IDEM 'RENAISSANCE HUMANISM AND THE ORIGINS OF HUMANIST THEOLOGY.' IN 
HUMANITY AND DIVINITY IN RENAISSANCE AND REFORMATION. (EDITORS: 
0' MALLEY.JET AL: I993), AS QUOTED BY TRINKHAUS.C.OPCIT.P27. THE WORKOFVALLATO 
WHICH TRINKHAUS REFERS IN HIS ARTICLE. IS PRIMARILY THE DIFFERENT EDITIONS OF HIS 'REPASTINAT!O .• 
SEE: VALLAL.'REPASTINATIO DIALECT/CE ET PHILOSOPHIE' 2 VOLS. (EDITOR: ZIPPEL.G: 
1983).PADUA. 
:ol IN FACT. VALLA ·s SYSTEM REDL"CES THE ARISTOTELIA.'I PREDICAMENTS FROM TEN TO THREE 
'ELEMENTS. '-TRINKHAUS.OP C!T.P28. FURTHERMORE, HE DOES NOT ENTIRELY SUCCEED IN DISPOSING OF 
THE IDEA OF 'SUBSL'-''ICE' WHEN SPEAKING OF GOD, DESPITE HIS CRITICISMS OF OTHERS WHO HA VE \!ADE 
USE OF THE TERM. V . .\.LLA WENT THROLGH VARIOUS EXPOSITIONS OF Tiffi TRINITY, HIS FINAL EXTANT 
\'ERSION BEING A,,'I ATTEMPT TO TRY AND PORTRAY THE TRINITARIAN PERSONS ACCORDING TO THE SUN'S 
RAYS. A CERTAIN QLALITY OF THE SUN IS NOT COMPARED DIRECTLY TO A TRl1'1TARIAN PERSON, HOWEVER. 
INSTEAD THE SUBST . .\.'ICE OF T!IE SliN AND THE ACTIONS OF ITS PROPERTIES WILL BE COMPARED TO THE 
ESSENCE OF Goo ·"-'""D THE ACTIONS OF THE PERSONS.-IBID.P46. 
'
0
'FoR A SUMMARY OF RECENT DE'.'ELOPMENTS INTRr.-<lTY-THINKING. SEE; THOMPSON.I. 'MODERN 
TRINITARIAN PERSPECTIVES.' OP CIT P349FF. 
'
0
' SEE PLA.'ITINGA.C. 'THE THREENESS\ONENESS PROBLEM OF THE TRINITY. 'OP CIT.P43. 
'THE SITUATION LOOKS DOCTRINALLY F."-'~llLIAR: COHERENT VIEWS ON EITHER ENU OF A SPECTRUM ARE 
CALLED HERETIC . .\.L. WHILE THE J\llDDLE VIEW, TRYING TO HA VE IT BOTH WAYS. SEEMS UTTERLY 
PARADOXICAL A1'U LITERALLY UNBELIEVABLE.' PL.~INGA SEES THE TRINITY AS A LOGICAL PROBLEM. 
THEREFORE, IN ORDER FOR THE TRINITY TO BE UPHELD AS A BIBLICAL DOCTRINE. PlA,,'JfING A ST A TES THAT 
THIS 'PARADOX' ML"ST BE SOLVED. His OWN SOLUTION IS A REJECTION OF THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF 
TlIE ASEITY OF GoD. HOWEVER. IN OUR OPINION, HE DOES NOT QUITE GET HIMSELF OL"T OFTllE LOGICAL 
DILEMMA EITilER. WHAT IS ALSO INTERESTING IS THE FACT THAT PLA>'ITINGA SPENDS MOST OF HIS TIME 
TRYING TO SOL VE THE ONENESS-TllREENESS PROBLEM. YET HE DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY rusTIFY HIS 
PRE~llSE: WHY MUST IT BE SOLVED LOGIC . .\.LLY IN THE FIRST PLACE? Do THE ScRIPTlJRES INSIST THAT WE 
NEED TO UNDERST_.\._'11) THE PERSON OF Goo EXHAUSTI\'ELY? CAN WE NOT ACCEPT THAT REASON 'CA..'J ONLY 
GO SO FAR?' IN RECENT YEARS, V AR!Ol:S ADDITIONAL ARTICLES HAVE APPEfuRED, SUGGESTING THAT THE 
TRINITY IS A 'RATIONAL PROBLEM.' SEE: KELL Y.C. 'CLASSICAL THEISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE TRINITY,' DA VIS.S.T: 1983.'LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF GOD,' Y ANDELL.K.E.'THE 
MOST BRUTAL AND INEXCUSABLE ERROR IN COUNTING?: TRINITY AND CONSISTENCY.' 
BARTEL.T.W.'THE PLIGHT OF THE RELATIVE TRINITARIAN,' 
CA.IN.I. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AND THE LOGIC OF RELATIVE IDENTITY,' 
MACNAMARA.I. ET AL. 'LOGIC AND THE TRINITY.' 
'°" LACUGNA.C.M. 'PHILOSOPHERS AND THEOLOGIANS ON THE TRINITY.' OP CIT. 
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205 IBID.Pl 72. 'LOGICAL ANALYSIS CANNOT SUBSTllUIB FOR THE BROADER TASK OF EXEGESIS \VHICH IS 
REQUIRED IN THE CASE OF ANY PAST HUMAN ST ATEME1''T AND OF THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES IN A 
PARTICULAR WAY. EXEGESIS IS A COMPREHENSIVE TASK AND IS CONCERNED WITH THE WHOLE RANGE OF 
FACTORS (SOCIAL, CULTURAL, LINGLlSTIC-SYMBOL!C AND PSYCHOLOGICAL) WHICH TAKEN TOGETHER, 
SHED LIGHT ON A TEXT A.'lD ITS MEA.'l!NG. THE TRINITARIAN PASSAGES WHICH THE PHILOSOPHERS HA VE 
SINGLED our HAVE BEEN LIFTED our OF THEIR HISTORICO-THEOLOGICAL CONTEXTS AND THEREFORE THEY 
ASSUME AN EERIE ONE-DIMENSIONALITY WHICH OBTAINS FOR VERY FEW HUMAN STATEMENTS. '-IBID.Pl 72. 
'HISTORY IS THEREFORE THE SOURCE AND CONTEXT FOR TRINITARIAN REFLECTION, BOTH 
METHODOLOGICALLY AND MATERIALLY.' -IBID.Pl 73. 
206 WE FEEL THATPLANTINGA TO SOME EXTENT, (OP CIT) MAKES THIS lvllSTAKE. HE DIS1'llSSES THOMAS' 
VIEW OF THE SIMPLICITY OF GoD AS UNBIBLICAL AND NEOPLATONIC. THIS IS EVEN MORE THE CASE WITH 
BURNS.RM. 'THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY IN ST THOMAS. 'OP CIT. 
207 BURNS.RM.OP CIT.P274.' ... THE NEOPLATONIST ASSUMPTION OF THE SIMPLICITY OF THE FIRST 
PRINCIPLE HAD PERMEATED \/1RTUALLY EVERY ASPECT OF THOMAS' THEOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
BACKGROUND, BEING AFFIRMED BY, FOR EXAMPLE, ST AUGUSTINE, PsEUDO DIONYSIUS, AND ST ANSELM, 
ALTHOUGH IN EACH OF THESE CASES THE TERMS' MEANING WAS RADICALLY MODIFIED BY THEIR 
TRINITARIANISM SO THAT IN EFFECT IT CAME TO MEAN "UNITY" RATHER THAN SHEER SIMPLICITY. MUCH 
MORE SPECIFICALLY WE MUST RECOGNISE THE EXTREMELY FORMATIVE INFLUENCE UPON THOMAS OF 
ARABIC NEOPLAT01'1SED ARISTOTELIANISM MEDIATED THROUGH FIGURES SUCH AS AVICENNA AND 
MAIMONIDES. ALL THINKERS IN THIS TRADITION POSITED AN ABSOLUTELY SIMPLE FIRST PRINCIPLE AS THE 
LOGICALLY INEVITABLE CULMINATION OF A QUASI-MATHEMATICAL, NECESSITARIAN VIEW OF 
"KNOWLEDGE" . \ND ITS SYSTEMATISATION IN "SCIENCE" INCLUDING METAPHYSICS AND 
THEOLOGY .... FOLLOWING THIS LEAD, THEN, AQUINAS WITH MANY OTHER C01''TEMPORARY LATINS SEES 
KNOWLEDGE OF ALL THINGS AS ANALOGOUS TO GEOMETRY: JUST AS FROM KNOWLEDGE OF THE "ESSENCE" 
OF A TRIANGLE WE KNOW THAT THE SUM OF ITS INTE~'JALANGLES MUST BE 180 DEGREES, SO, BY INSIGIIT 
INTO THE "ESSENCE OF MAN HIMSELF" WE KNOW THAT SUCH,\ ST ATE~IENT AS "sm,fE RATIONAL ANIMALS 
ARE FOUR-FOOTED" IS FALSE IN ITSELF. '-1BID.P274. 
'IT WOULD BE ABSURD TO ENVISAGE SUCH A PRINCIPLE AS IN TURN RESULTING FROM EITHER FURTHER 
PRINCIPLES BEYOND ITSELF, FOR THEN TI!EY WOULD BE MORE ULTL'!ATE ... '-1BID.P275. 
208 BURNS.R.OP CIT.P279. 
209 HERE, BURNS OP CIT.P279, QUOTES FROM THE 'PHYSICS.' l.5. 
210 IBID. P279. 
211 BURNS.R.OP CIT.P276. 
112 BARTH IN HIS IMPORT."J'<T BOOK ON ANSELM, MAKES A SIMILAR POINT CONCERNING ANSELM'S 
'ONTOLOGICAL' ARGU1'1ENT. SEE THE DISCUSSION OF BARTH'S BOOK IN: McCORMACK.B.L: 1995. 'KARL 
BARTH'S CRlTICALL Y REALISTIC DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY.' P 4I2FF. HE SUGGESTS THAT 
ANSELM IS SEEKING TO l;'NDERS'f A.'lD WHAT HE ALREADY ACCEPTS BY FAITH. FAITH IS THE FIRST PRE"1JSE. 
THOMAS, IN HIS ARGUMENTS HOWEVER, DOES '!OT SEEM TO CONSCIOUSLY SHOW AWARENESS OF THE FACT 
THAT HE IS MAKING THIS PRIOR FAITH DEDUCTION. HE, INDEED, BELIEVES THAT HE C.~ PROVE THE 
EXISTENCE OF Goo THROUGH RATIONAL ARGUMENTATION. 
213 WE HA VE SHOWN THAT, IN OUR OPINION THE ESSENTIA DIMENSION SEEMS TOT AKE PRIORITY, DUE TO 
THOMAS' SUBSCRIPTION TO THE ARISTOTELIAN 01'TOLOGY. 
214 OF COURSE, THOMAS DOES 1'0T SEE IT THIS WAY. BECAUSE OF THE PROCL.~'1 SYSTEMATIS!1'G SPIRIT OF 
THE SUMMA, THOMAS (AS WITH BARTH) SYSTEMATISES THE ENTIRE PROCESS OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 
L'NDER ONE SYSTEM OR MOVEMENT: EYITUS-REDIWS. WE HA VE ONE MOVEl>IENT FROM Goo, THROUGH 
MA.'J, CREATION AND SO ON-BACK TO Goo AGAIN. THOMAS USES THE SAME CONCEPTUAL FWW 
THROUGHOUT, AND DOES NOT SEEM TO SEE THIS PARADOX. 
215 MUCH OF THE FOLLOWING PARAGRAPH IS BASED ON CERTAIN OF BALES' ARGUMENTS. SEE, 
BALES.E.F 'A HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN PLOTINUS.' 
IN THE THOMIST.OPCIT.VOL 47.1983.Pl97-208. 
216 As WE HA VE SEEN HEIDEGGER ARGUED THAT BY THE TIME OF ARISTOTLE .~D PLATO, THE REAL ISSUE OF 
BEING HAD BEEN FORGOTTEN, IN THAT THEY ONLY INTERPRETED THE IDEA OF BEI1'G IN POSITIVE TERMS. 
UNCONCEALMENT (ALETHEIA) BECOMES THE DURATION OF PRESENCE. WHAT IS CONCEALED REMAINS WHAT 
IS UNTHOUGHT BY Tiffi GREEK THINKERS-IBID.P201-202. SEE ALSO HEIDEGGER'S ARGU!v!ENTS IN 
HEIDEGGERM. 'BEING AND TIME.' OP C1T.P47, HEIDEGGER.M. 'WHAT IS CALLED 
TIITNKJNG'!' HEIDEGGERM.(TRANSLA TED: STAMBAUGH.I: 1972)_ 'TIME AND BEING_' 
HEIDEGGERM.(TRANSLATED: HERTZ.P.D: 1971). 'ON THE WAY TO LANGUAGE,' 
HEIDEGGERM.'WH.ATIS METAPHYSICS?' IN CLASSICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 
METAPHYSICS. (EDITED: DE GEORGE.RT: 1%6). 
'" BALES.E.F.OP CIT.P202. 
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Ol8 ']TWAS THIS SCHOLASTIC A.'<D ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION THAT FOR'>!ED THE BASIS OF "IODERN IDEALIS~I 
BEGINNING WITH DESCARTES AND ESPECIALLY SPINOZA. FOR SPINOZA, REALITY WAS ITSELF ABSOLUfE 
BEING, NOT NON-BEING OR THE BEYO"iD BEING. fu>D IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT HEGEL'S NOTION OF THE 
ABSOLUTE WAS MOl:LDED IN THE !"!AGE OF ARISTOTLE'S AND SPINOZA'S Goo. HEGEL'S CHIEF CLAIM WAS 
THAT THINKING A'-D BEING ARE THE SA"!E, AND THAT NEGATIVITY, NOTHINGNESS, IS WHAT MAKES FOR THE 
DYNAMIC, INTER.'IAL LIFE OF THE ABSOLUfE_ '-IBID.Pl99. 
'
19 IBID.P207. 
''° PLOTINUS.'E:VNEAD.' OP CIT.Ill. 7.5, AS QUOTED BY BALES.OP CIT.P206. IN THIS REGARD, IT SEEMS 
TO US THAT BARTH'S SCHEME FITS INTO THE PLoTINIAN PARADIGM, MORE SO THAN EVEN HEIDEGGER, YET 
BALES DOES NOT SEEM TO NOTICE THIS. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER EIGHT 
-'As QUOTED BY BAMBACK.C.R: 1995_ 'HEIDEGGER. DILTHEY AND THE CRISIS OF 
HISTORICISM. 'P267_ 
8 
'CIRCUMFESSION: FIFTY-NINE PERIODS AND AND PERIPHRASES. 'IN BENNINGTON.G AND 
DERRIDAJ: 1993.' JACQUES DERRIDA,' AS QUOTED BY CAPUTO.J.D_ 'THE PRAYERS AND TEARS 
OF JACQUES DERRIDA 'PVXII_ 
1 SOCRCES FOR THIS CHAPTER CONSu'LTED INCLUDE: LACUGNAC.M: 199 L 'GOD FOR US.THE 
TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN LIFE.' OP CIT, BALES.E.F.' A HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OF 
NEGATIVE THEOLOGY IN PLOTINUS.' IN THE THOMIST.VOL-+7.1983.P197-208, 
TORRANCE.AI: 1996. 'PERSONS IN COMMUNION.AN ESSAY ON TRJNIT ARIAN DESCRIPTION 
AND HUMAN PARTICIPATION,' GUNTON.C.E: 1993.'THEONE, THE THREE AND THE MANY. 
GOD, CREATION AND THE CULTURE OF MODERNITY,' MOLTMANN.I,(TRANSLATED: 
KOHL.M: 1993). 'THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM,' MARSHALLB: 1987. 'CHRISTOLOGY IN 
CONFLICT,' BERKOUWERG C.(TRANSLATED: BOER.H.R: 1956).'THE TRIUMPH OF GRACE IN 
THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH,' KUNG.H.(TRANSLATED: BOWDEN.J: 1994).'GREAT 
CHRISTIAN THINKERS_ 'Op CIT, WEBER.0.(TRANSLATED: COCHRANE.AC: 1953)_ 'KARL 
BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS,' BUSCH.E.(TRANSLATED: BOWDEN.I: 1976)_ 'KARL 
BARTH.HIS LIFE FROM LETTERS AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL TEXTS,' HUNSINGER G: 
199 L 'HOW TO READ KARL BARTH. THE SHAPE OF HIS THEOLOGY,' JENSON.R W.'KARL 
BARTH. 'IN (EDITED: FORD.D.F: 1989) 
THE MODERN THEOLOGIANS. AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY, WILL!S.W. W: 1987. 'THEISM, ATHEISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
TRJNITY,' JENSEN.R W: 1969. 'GOD AFTER GOD. THE GOD OF THE PAST AND THE GOD OF 
THE FUTURE SEEN IN THE WORK OF KARL BARTH.' GUNTON. C.E. 'THE TRIUNE GOD AND 
THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATURE,' IN (EDITED: SYKES.S. W: 1989) KARL BARTH: 
CENTENARY ESSAYS, TORRANCE.T.F. 'KARL BARTH, BIBLICAL AND EV ANGELICAL 
THEOLOGIAN,' McCORMACK.B.L: 1995. 'KARL BARTH'S CRITICALLY REALISTIC 
THEOLOGY,' SYKES.S.W.'BARTHON THE CENTRE OF THEOLOGY.' IN (EDITOR: SYKES.S.W: 
1979). KARL BARTH.STUDIES OF HIS THEOLOGICAL METHOD, WILLIAMS.RD. 'BARTH ON 
THE TRIUNE GOD.' IN (EDITED: SYKES.S.W: 1979).KARL BARTH.STUDIES OF HIS 
THEOLOGICAL METHOD.OP CIT, ROBERTS.RH. 'BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF TIME: ITS 
IMPLICATIONS.' IN (EDITED: SYKES.S.W: 1979). KARL BARTH.STUDIES OF HIS 
THEOLOGICAL METHOD.OP CIT, SCHLEIERMACHERF.D.E.(TRANSLATED: MACINTOSH.RR, 
ET AL: 1989).'THE CHRISTIAN FAITH,' FISHERS: 1989.'REVELATORYPOSffiVISM?BARTH'S 
EARLIEST THEOLOGY AND THE MARBURG SCHOOL,' LESLIE.RC: 1991. 'TRINITARIAN 
HERMENEUTICS. THE HERMENEUTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF KARL BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF 
THE TRINITY,' McGRATH.A.E: 1990. 'THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMAN CHRISTOLOGY,' 
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HARNACK.A.(TRANSLATED: BUCHANAN.N: 1905). 'IIlSTORY OF DOGMA. 'VOL I.OP CIT. 
BAMBACK.C.R: 1995. 'HEIDEGGER, DILTHEY. AND THE CRISIS OF HISTORICISM,' MAGEE.B: 
1997.'CONFESSIONS OF A PHILOSOPHER,' DERRlDA.J.(TRANSLATED: LEAVEY.J.P: 
1978).'EDMUND HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY,' DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 
1978). 'WRITING AND DIFFERENCE,' P ANNENBERG. W. 
(TRANSLATED: BROMILEY.G.W: 1991). 'SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 'VOL I. 
2 THIS IS NOT TO SUGGEST THAT BARTH REJECTS THE NOTION OF DoGMATICS AS A SCIENCE. IT IS, HOV.'EVER, 
A UNIQUE SCIENCE IN THAT ITS OBJECT DETE~fiNES THE PRIOR METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED. As SUCH, IT IS A 
UNIQUE SCIENCE, RADICALLY DIFFERENT TO ALL OTHER PURSUITS OF HUMAN WISDOM. 
3 BOTH PANNENBERG /\ND KASPER CRITICISE BARTH FOR PLACING THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY INTO THE 
LOCUS OF THEOLOGICAL PROLEGOMENON, OTHER TH/IN THE TRADffiONAL DOCTRINE OF GoD. 
P.'\NNENBERG STATES THAT: 'IT IS NOT A MATERIALLY SATISFYING SOLUTION.'· 
PANNENBERG.W.'SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 'OP CITVOL l.P300, KASPER. W.'DER GOTT JESUS 
CHRJSTU.' P379. PANNENBERG MENTIONS THAT KASPER HAS RECOGNISED, HOWEVER, THAT THE 
PLACEMENT OF THE BARTHl/\N TRINITY WITHIN ITS UNIQUE LOCUS OF REVELATION IN THE DoGMATICS. IS 
DUE TO HIS REJECTION OF THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF THE NINETEENTH CENTIJRY. MCCORMACK PUTS IT 
THIS WAY: 'BARTH WAS CONCERNED TO OPPOSE A CONCEPT OF REVELATION WHICH WAS GUILTY OF A 
DEIFICATION OF THE CREATURE-EVEN IF Tiffi CREATURE IN QL'ESTION WAS NAMED JESUS OF NAZARETH. GoD 
.<\LONE IS THE CONTENT OF REVELATION ... THIS IS THE SA~IE BASIC CONCERN WHICH HAD ALSO ANIMATED 
BARTH IN ROMANS II. Bur NOW HE SAW CLEARLY THAT ONLY A DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY COULD GROUND 
THIS VIEW OF REVELATION ... ' -McCORMACK.B.L. 'KARL BARTH'S CRITICALLY REALISTIC 
DIALECTIC THEOLOGY.' OP CIT.P35 l. 'BARTH WAS ANNOUNCING HIS REJECTION OF EVERY IDEALISTIC 
DERIVATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY ON THE BASIS OF ANA PRIORI ANALYSIS OF "PURE 
SUBJECTIVITY" (AS OCCURRED, FOR EXA,\,fPLE, IN HEGEL). THE CONCEPT OF THE WORD OF GoD MUST 
NEVER BE TREATED, IN ."-"'I IDEALISTIC FASHION, AS PURELY FORMAL (I.E. EMPTY OF CONTENT). JN /\,'JD FOR 
ITSELF, THE WORD OF Goo IS ALREADY THE FULLNESS OF CONTENT., -IBID.P 352. 'THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN BARTH'S DOCTRINE AND HEGEL'S SHOULD BE CLEAR. THIS IS NOT AN IDEALISTIC DOCTRINE OF 
THE TRINITY, FOR IT DOES NOT UNDER ST /\ND THE SUBJECTIVITY OF GoD AS THE IDEAL PROJECTION OF 
HUMAN SUBJECTIVITY. IT IS A CRITICALLY REALISTIC DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY WHICH BEGINS, IN A 
POSTERIORI FASHION, WITH THE FACT OF THE DIVINE SELF-REVELATION ... BARTH'S DERIVATION OF THE 
TRINITY IS THUS THE FRUIT OF /IN ANALYSIS OF A CONCRETE ACT OF A CONCRETELY EXISTING SUBJECT.'· 
IBID.P354. SEE ALSO: JENSEN.R.W. 'KARL BARTH.' IN (E.DITED: FORD. D.F: 1989) THE MODERN 
THEOLOGIAi'IS. AN INTRODUCTION TO CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY. OP CIT.P42. 
PARTICULARLY. IT IS THE HUMAN AUTONOMY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT THAT BARTH IS SEEKING TO 
DESTROY IN THE ABSOLlJTE AUTONOMY OF THE SELF-REVEALING Goo OF JESUS CHRIST. FuRTHERMORE, HE 
IS ALSO SEEKING TO DESTROY HEGEL 's CLEAR-CUT IDENTITY BETWEEN THE SELF-UNFOLDING Goo AND THE 
PROCESS OF HISTORY. REVELATION IS TO BE FOUJ<.l) IN HISTORY, BLT IS NEVER TO BE IDENTIFIED WITH IT. 
LACUGNA, ALTHOLGH ALSO ADMITTING THAT BARTH SHOWS A REACTION TO Tiffi ENLIGHTENMENT. ALSO 
COMMENTS ON HIS INDEBTEDNESS TO IT: 'THE IRONY IS THAT WHILE BARTH OPPOSED MUCH OF THE ETHOS 
OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT BECAUSE IT SEEMED TO HIM TO MAKE Goo SLBJECT TO THE CREATURE, BARTH 
CLEARLY OPERATED WITHIN THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF CRITICAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE HE REGARDED GoD AS 
ON'E PERSONAL SUBJECT ... ' -LACUGNA.C.M. 'GOD FOR US. THE TRINITY AND CHRISTIAN 
LIFE. 'P252. 
THE 'DOGMATICS' MANIFESTS A CLEAR REACTION, TRINITY-WISE TO THE THOUGHT OF fEL'ERBACH A.ND 
SCHLEIERMACHER. BARTH ACKNOWLEDGES SCHLEIERMACHER'S IMPORTk'JCE IN HIS WORK ON NINETEENTH 
CENTURY THEOLOGY. SEE BARTH.K.(TRANSLATED: COZINS.B: 1959). 'FROM ROUSSEAU TO 
R!TSCHL. 'P306FF. NEVERTHELESS AS IS WELL-KNOWN, BARTH CRITICISES SCHLEIERMACHER' S RELIGION 
OF IDENTITY. BARTH'S TRINITY IS SPECIFICALLY AIMED THEREFORE, AS A RESPONSE TO SCHLEIERMACHER'S 
VIEW EXPRESSED AS FOLLOWS: 'DoGMATIC PROPOSITIONS ARE DOCTRINES OF THE DESCRIPTIVELY DIDACTIC 
TYPE, IN V.l!ICH THE HIGHEST POSSIBLE DEGREE OF DEFINITENESS IS Al/,IED AT.' -
SCHLEIERMACHER.F.D.E.(TRANSLATED: MACKINTOSH.H.R, ET AL: 1986). 'THE CHRISTIAN 
F AJTH. 'P78. SAYS SCHLEIERMACHER: ' ... THIS DOCTRINE ITSELF AS ECCLESIASTICALLY FRAMED, IS NOT AN 
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IMMEDIATE UITERANCE CONCERNING THE CHRISTIAN SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS. BUT ONLY A COMBINATION OF 
SUCH UTTERANCES.' -IBID.P738. IN CONNECTION WITH BARTH'S TRJNITARLIN REACTION TO FEUERBACH, 
SEE WAITE WILLIS. W. 'THEISM, ATHEISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 'P38FF. FOR A 
Fl:-IB, GEN'ERAL !NfRODUCTION TO BARTH'S MARBURG BACKGROL')I]), SEE ALSO 
FISHER.S.'REVELATORY POSITIVISM? BARTH'S EARLIEST THEOLOGY AND THE MARBURG 
SCHOOL.' WITH OUR INTRODUCTORY SECTION TO KARL BARTH. WE ARE PARTLY FOLLOWING THE 
ARGUMEl•rf ATION AS REPRODUCED IN OUR ARTICLE NORMAN.M: 1995. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE 
TRINITY. POINTERS ON A LINE OF DEVELOPMENT. WITH ATIENTION TO AUGUSTINE. 
BARTH AND THE CURRENT PROBLEM' OP Crr.P37-94. 
4
LESLIE.B.C.'TRINITARIAN HERMENEUTICS. THE HERMENEUTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 
KARL BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY. 'OP CIT.P35, NORMAN.M. 'THE DOCTRINE OF 
THE TR!N!TY.'OP CIT.P42. WE HA VE HERE, A CERTAIN NEOPLATONIC REALISM THAT HAS BEEN UNIQUELY 
REINTERPRETED, VIA CERT A1N IDEALIST SCHOOLS OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT. BARTH UPHOLDS THE SAME 
IRREVERSIBLE MOVEMENT IN HIS TRJNITARIANISM: FROM GoD TO MAN /\;'ID BACK AGAIN. VAN NIEKERK 
INTERPRETS THIS AS ORDER OF BEING TO ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE. SEE: 
VAN NIEKERK.E: 1984. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN KARL BARTH'S DOGMATICS. 'P35FF. 
'THE TWO MOVEMENTS JN CHURCH 0oGMATICS (THE ONE ORJGINATING WITH Goo, THE OTHER WITH MA;'J) 
ARE BASED ON TWO PRIMORDIAL IDEAS BUILT INTO BARTH'S CONCEPT OF REVELATION FOR WHICH THERE 
ARE HISTORJCAL ANALOGIES.' -[BID.P38. 
5 HUNSINGERG: 1991. 'HOW TO READ KARL BARTH. THE SHAPE OF IDS THEOLOGY.' 
'WENDING ONE'S WAY THROUGH THE "CHURCH 0oGMATICS" CAN BE MADE EASIER IF ONE LEARNS TO 
RECOGNISE THE PRESENCE OF SEVERAL CONSTANTLY RECURRJNG ~!OTIFS ... THE MOTIFS ARE ADJECTIVAL JN 
FORCE, NOT SUBSTANTIVE. ·-[BID.P28. 
6 !Brn.P32. 
1 
lBID.P35. THIS CONTRASTS BARTH. TO SCHLEIERMACHER's VIEW OF THE OBJECTIVITY IN Goo, OF WHICH 
BARTH MAKES Tiffi FOLLOWING COMMENTS: 'FEELING IS THE CENTRE, DOMINANT OVER K.'JOWJNG AND 
DOING. BECAUSE IT JS UNDERSTOOD AT ITS DEPTHS AS RELIGIOUS FEELING OR BECAUSE IT IS THE FEELING OF 
ABSOLlJ'TE DEPENDENCE. As CONSCIOUSNESS OF ABSOLlJ'TE DEPENDENCE. RELIGION MUST BE UNDERSTOOD 
AS LIFE .. .IN HLMAN SELF-CONSCJOUSN'ESS, THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THIS OTHER IS INCLUDED. POSITED. 
REVEALED. INSOFAR AS SELF-CONSCJOUSN'ESS IS FUND AMENT ALLY CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE OTHER THAT 
ABSOLL'TELY DETER1'1INES IT. IT IS THEREFORE CONSCIOUS OF A WHENCE') OF A FOUNDATION FOR 
ABSOLLTE DEPENDENCE, OF THE ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR SELF-CONSCIOUS BEING AS IT JS ... SUCH 
ACTCALISATION JS THEREFORE REALLY ACTUALISATION OF THE Goo CONSCIOUSNESS. ONE CAN EVEN DARE 
AFFIR~f THAT "GoD IS GIVEN TO US IN FEELING JN AN ORIGINAL WAY" -GJ\'EN MANIFESTLY AS THE NON-
OBJECTIVE CACSE. THE EFFECT OF \\'HJCH IS EVERYWIIBRE OBJECTl'.'E, YET THE FEELING IS OBJECTLESS IN 
DISTINCTION TO KNOWING AND DOING. [N SO FAR AS SCHLE!ER~!ACHER, DESPITE THIS RESERVATION (LE. 
THE CAUSE-GoD-IS NOT OBJECTIVE, WHILST THE EFFECT-THE FEELING-IS OBJECTLESS) SOCGHT TO RENDER 
·COMPREHENSIBLE THE GJVENESS OF Goo's BEING IN FEELING WITH THE CATEGORY OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, 
THE PREPONDER,\NCE OF NATURALISM IN HIS DESCRJPTJON OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE APPEARS TO BE 
SUBSTANTIATED.' -BARTH.K. 'SCHLE!ERMACHER.D/E THEO LOGIE UND DIE KJRCHE. 'P.163-4. AS 
QUOTED BY FISHERS. 'REVELATORY POSITIVISM/ BARTH'S EARLIEST THEOLOGY AND THE 
MARBURG SCHOOL. 'OP CIT.P3 J6_ 
8 SEE: TORRANCE.T.F. 'KARL BARTH. BIBLICAL AND EV ANGELICAL THEOLOGIAN. 'Op CIT.P 
52-3. 
9 SEEBARTH.K: 1932. 'KJRCHL!CHE DOGMATIK. '(K'D).1.1.D!E LEHRE VOA!/ WORT 
GOTTES.(PROLEGOMElvA ZUR KJRCHL!CHEN DOGAL4TIC).PAR 7.DAS WORTGOTTES, DAS 
DOGAIA UND DIE DOGMATIK.2.DOGMATIKALS WISSENSCHAFTP291FF. 
10 NORMAN.MOP CIT.P49. 
11 THE TRUTH OF THE OBJECTIVITY OF Goo's REVELATION IS ALSO GUARANTEED BY Goo, IN THAT THE 
THREE TRJNlTARJAN COMPONENTS OF THE REVEALER, THE REVEALDNESS AND THE REVELATION ITSELF ARE 
GUARANTEED TO MAN AS GoD MAKES UP ALL THREE COMPON'ENTS TO MAN AS THEY COME DOWN TO HIM JN 
THE REVELATION OF JESUS CHRIST. 
12 NORMAN.M.!BID.P49. 
13 HUNSINGER.G.OPCrT.P41. 
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14 THE DOCTRINE JS A WORK OF THE CHURCH. As SUCH, IT DOES NOTIMMEDIATELY RISE AS IS, FROM THE 
BIBLE. INSTEAD, THE TRINITY IS A TRANSLATION AND EXEGESIS OF BIBLICAL WITNESS TO REVELATION-
WEBER.0.(TRANSLATED:COCHRANE.A; 1953). 'KARL BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS.AN 
INTRODUCTORY REPORT.P3~. THE TRINITY FORMS BARTH'S ANSWER TO THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL. 
HERMENE!ffiCAL, REVELATION AL AND APOLOGETIC PROBLEMS IN THE SCOPE OF DoGMATICS. 'FOR BARTH. 
THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY HAS TO DO WITH THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF 
Goo.' -W A!TE W!LL!S.!BID.P38. 'IT WAS A PRIMARY PRINCIPLE OF BARTH'S BIBLICISMTHAT NO 
CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE CAN BE PROPERLY GROUNDED OR RIGHTLY EXPANDED EXCEPT ON THE BASIS OF THE 
SELF-REVELATION OF GoD ATIESTED L'l HOLY SCRIPTIJRE. Bur IT WAS ALSO HIS '.\,IASTERFLTL CONVICTION 
THAT FAR FROM BEING ONE DOCTRINE .~\10NG OTHERS THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY OCCUPIBS A 
CE1'TRAL AUfHORIT ATIVE PLACE IN THE FOUNDATION OF ALL TRUE KNOWLEDGE OF Goo, AND THEREFORE 
MUST BE ALLOWED TO EXERCISE A CONTROLLING ROLE IN ALL THEOLOGICAL EXPl..A.'lATION AND DOGMATIC 
FORMULATION ... ' -TORRANCE.T.F.OP CIT.Pl20. 
15 
'WOI.LEN WIR DIE 0FFENBARUNG WIRKLICH VON IHREM SUBJEKT, VON GOTT HER VERSTEHEN, DANN MUSSEN 
WIR VORALLEM VERSTEHEN, DAB DIESES !HR SUBJEKT, GOTT, DER 0FFENBARER, IDENTISCH !ST MIT SEINEM TuN 
IN DER 0FFENBARUNG, IDENTISCH AUCH MIT DESSEN WJRKUNG. DIES IST DER ZUNACHST BLOB ANZUZEIGENDE 
SACHVERHALT, DURCH DEN WIR GWS ANGEWIESEN SEHEN, DIE lEHRE VON DER 0FFENBARUNG MIT DER LEHRE 
VON DEM DREIEINIGEN GOTT zu BEGINNEN. '-BARTHKK,D.1.1.PAR 8.0P CIT.P3 l 2. (GE). SAYS VAN 
NIBKERK; ' ... IN THE LOGICAL MATERIAL ORDER THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY CONCERNS THE WORD OF 
GoD AS SUBJECT-PREDICATE-OBJECT, AND IN THE ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE AS PREDICATE-SUBJECT-OBJECT .. -
VAN NIEKERK.E. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN KARL BARTH'S CHURCH 
DOGMATICS. 'Op C!T.P63. 
16 BARTH.K.K\D.l.1.0P CIT.P318. SAYS BARTH Fl'RTHER: 'THE STATEMENT, UNDERSTOOD THUS. THAT 
Goo REVEALS HIMSELF AS THE LORD, OR WHAT THIS STATEMENT IS MEANT TO DESCRIBE, AND THEREFORE 
REVELATION ITSELF AS ATIESTED BY SCRIPTIJRE. \VE CALL THE ROOT OF THE DOCTRl1''E OF THE TRINITY 
(DEN SO VERSTANDENEN SATZ: GOTT OFFENBART SICH ALS DER HERR BZW: DAS, WAS DIESER SATZ BEZEICHNEN 
WILL, ALSO DIE DURCH DIE S'CHRIFI' BEZEUGTE 0FFENBARuWG SELBER NENNEN WIR "DIE WURZEL DER 
TRINITATSLEHRE).' 
17 THE TRINITY ALTHOUGH PART OF THE DOCTRINE OF Goo. IS ALSO PRIOR TO IT. THIS IS BECAUSE THE 
TRINITY FORMS THE NECESSARY SHAPE THAT ANY DOGMATIC THEOLOGY HAS TO ASSUME. INDEED. IT FORMS 
THE VERY SHAPE THAT THINKING ABOUT Goo HAS TO ASSt::VJE. THE TRINITY IS THE HERNIBNEUf!C KEY INTO 
THE 'DoGMATICS,' AGAIN, WE SPEAK HERE OF MUCH MORE THA.'l SIMPLY STRUCTl.'.RE. WE ARE "iOT 
SUGGESTING THAT THE 'DoGMATICS' THEREFORE TAKES A TRINITARIA.'l SHAPE, I.E., THAT ITS FIRST 
SECTION DEALS WITH THE FIRST PERSON OF THE TRINITY, (GoD-CREATIONETC) THE NEXT WITH THE 
SECOND PERSON. (CHRIST-]NCAR-'lATION-RECONCILIATION) AND THEN THE FINAL SECTION, THE SPIRIT 
(SMlCTIFICATION, THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIE"iCE OF SALVATION ETC). THERE MIGHT BE SUPERFICIAL 
SIJ\-fILARITIES IN THE 'DOG1'1ATICS' TO THIS SUGGESTED STRUCTURE, BUT ITS RE.AL TRINITARIAN STRUCTURE 
GOES EVEN DEEPER THA.'.' THIS. WITH THE TRINITY AS PROl..EGOMENON, WE LEAR-'l SOl\;IBTHINGOF THE 
CONTRAST BETWEEN THE SPECl.'.LATIVE THEOLOGIA NATURALIS AND THE THEOLOGY WHICH FROM THE 
BEGINNING TO END IN ACCORDANCE WITH REVELATION, IS ORIE"iTED TO ]ESCS CHRIST ALONE. WE ARE 
IDENTIFYING THE BE ING THAT WE ARE GOING TO TALK OF, WHEN WE DO THEOLOGY ... [N THE BAR THI AN 
TRINITY WE HA VE TWO SPECIFIC Dll\;IBNSIONS. THERE IS FIRSTLY THE CONSTRUCTIVE OR DOGMATIC 
COMPONENT WHICH GENERATES THE BASIC THEOLOGICAL CATEGORIES, (THE :VIODES OF FATHER. SON MID 
HOLY SPIRIT) APPLIES THESE CATEGORIES TO ELLCIDATE OUR EXPERIBNCE OF Goo AS REVEALER. 
REVELATION AND REVEALDNESS. -NORMAN.M.OP CIT.PS0-51. 
18 
' ... FEUER.BACH INSISTED NOT ONLY ON A SENSUOUS OBJECT OF IrnOWLEDGE, BLT ALSO THAT THE OBJECT 
REMAIN A SUBJECT DETERMINING HUMAN THINKING ABOUT IT ·°'"'ID NEGATING ALL ABSTRACT, SPECULATIVE 
THINKING WHICH ATIEMPTS TO CONTROL IT. WE HA VE SEEN THAT THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRl1'1TY AS 
DEVELOPED BY BARTH INTERPRETS THE GoD WHO IS KNOWN CONCRETELY AS A SENSUOUS OBJECT. Em 
THIS DOCTRINE OF THE T.R!NITY ALSO REFLECTS THE GoD WHO IS AND REMAINS SUBJECT OVER ALL HUMAN 
KNOWLEDGE OF HIMSELF .... THE Goo OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY, THEN, HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH 
AN ABSTRACTION FROM HUMAN SELF-CONSCIOlJSNESS OR EXPERIENCE. AT NO POINT ARE KNO'-"LEDGE AND 
SPEECH ABOUf Goo AUTONOMOUS HUMAN POSSIBILITIES ... THIS TRl1'1TARIAN THINKING PREVENTS 
THEOLOGY FROM BECOMING A HUMAN PROJECTION.' -W.W A!TE. WILLIS.OP CIT.P46-47. 
19 NORMAN.M.OP CIT.P53. 
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oo THIS IS A SOMEWHAT BROAD IDEA. IN CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGIES REMINISCENT OF THE 'MODER.'<' 
P . .\RADIGM, WE ALSO FIND Sl:VUL,.\R TER~IS. WHICH CO~IE UP OUT OF HIE 'SUBST.-1.,'<CE' ~IENTALITY OR WAY 
OF THINKING: 'ROOT METAPHOR.' 'META-NARRATIVE,' AND SO ON. 
cl THUS MICHEL FOUCAULT BELIEVED THAT THE COMMON. METHODOLOGICAL PRINCIPLE PERVADING MUCH 
OF ENLIGHTE'i\.IENT DISCOURSE, WAS THE PRINCIPLE OF POWER. INTERESTINGLY, IN BARTH THE 'IOTIFS 
THAT CONTEND FOR THE TITLE OF 'THE PRIMARY SUBSTANCE IN HIEOLOGY,' ARE :-JOT SPECIFICALLY THOSE 
THAT SPEAK OF 'GoD-IN-HIMSELF.' INSTEAD HIEY SCRROt;ND THOSE CONCEPTS WHICH BARTH USES TO 
SPEAK OF GoD. THIS IS D!JE TO HIS RADICAL REINTERPRETATION OF HIE TIVJ)ITIONAL ARISTOTELIAN 
HERITAGE IN THEOLOGY. 
"FOR THIS SECTION, WE ARE PRIMARILY INDEBTED TO THE FOLLOWING SECONJ)ARY SOURCES: 
SYKES,SW. 'BARTH ON THE CENTRE OF THEOLOGY.' IN (EDITED: SYKES.S.W: 1979). KARL 
BARTH. STUDIES OF ms THEOLOGICAL METHOD.Op Cit v AN 
NIEKERK.E. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN KARL BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS, 'Op Cit, 
GUNTON.CE. 'THE TRIUNE GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATURE.' IN (EDITED: 
SYKES.S.W: 1989).KARL BARTH: CENTENARY ESSAYS. 
"LOWE.W: 1993.'THEOLOGY AND DIFFERENCE. THE WOUND OF REASON. 'P33FF. 
" Ibid.P33. 
"THE QUOTE FROM THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS IS TAKEN FROM L0WE.!BID.P33. IN HIS IMPORT ANT 
RECEl'ff WORK ON BARTH'S THOCGHT, MCCOR.\,L~CK HAS SUCCESSFULLY (AS HAVE ]NGRID SPIECKERMANN 
.-1,,'<D MICHAEL BEINTKER) . .\RGUED THAT KARL BARTH'S BREAK WITH NINETEENTH CENTURY 'LIBERALISM' 
IN 1915, IN HIE FORM OF A CRITICALLY REALISTIC DIALECTIC THEOLOGY. WAS AN ESSENTIAL METHOD THAT 
REMAINED WITH HIM FOR THE REST OF HIS LIFE. THE COMMON IDEA OF ABARTHIAN 'TURN' TO A ':-1£0-
0RTHODOX' FOR"1 OF THEOLOGY WHICH IS USUALLY THOUGHT TO HA VE TAKEN PLACE WITH HIE 'CHURCH 
DoGMATics' 1N 1931-2, IS FALSE. SEE: McCORMACK.B.L. 
'KARL BARTH'S CRITICALLY REALISTIC DIALECTICAL THEOLOGY. 'OP CrT.PVIIFF. MOST 
TR.IDITIONAL WORKS ON BARTH. IDENTIFY A 'PARADIGM SHIFT.' FROM AN EARLIER 'DIALECTICAL 
THEOLOGY,' TO A LATER' MALOGICAL THEOLOGY,' OR AN EARLIER STRUGGLE \\Till THE 'ANALOG/A ENT!S,' 
RESULTING IN THE LATER 'ANALOGIA FIDE!.' THEANALOGL4 ENTJSIANALOGL4 FIDE! INTERPRETATION IS FOUND 
IN COMMENT A TORS SUCH AS MCGRATH. 'THE IDEA OF P AR.IDOX IS REPLACED BY THE IDEA OF ANALOGY. ' -
McGRATH.AE.'THE MAKING OF MODERN GERMAN CHRISTOLOGY.'Pl33. HOWEVER, 
'OPPOSITIONAL THINKING' WAS NOT ABANDONED BY BARTH, LATER ON 1N LIFE. 'BARTH'S 
DEVELOPMENT .... DID NOT ENT . .\.IL THE ABANDONME1' T OR EVEN THE WEAKENING OF HIS EARLY 
COMMITMENT TO "DIALECTICAL HIEOLOGY." Hrs 'IATURE HIEOLOGY IS BEST UNDERSTOOD AS A 
DISTINCTIVE FORM OF "DIALECTIC . .\.I. THEOLOGY."' -McCORMACK.B.L.OP CIT.PIX. 
"WE DO NOT FIND AQUINAS, OR LUHIER AND CAL VIN. SPEAKING IN THIS REDUCTIONISTIC MANNER ABOLT 
'A CENTRE OF HIEOLOGY.' DESPITE THE FACT THAT EACH THEOLOGIA.'\f PLACED CERTAIN MOTIFS INTO A 
CENTR.~L FOCCS-SEE SYKES.S.W.OP CIT.Pl9FF. N HIS SECONJ) EDITION OF THE 'CHRISTIAN F.UTH.' 
SCHLEIERMACHER BmLDS A CASE FOR A HIEORY OF RELIGION. BASED UPON HUMAN RELIGIOUS 
COKSCIOUSNESS. 'THIS PREP ARA TORY MATERIAL, \\IHICH INCLUDES A WIDE-RANGING SERIES OF 
"BORROWINGS" FROM RELATED DISCIPLINES ... AMOUNTS IN EFFECT TO A THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY.' -
SYKES.S.W.OP CIT. INHIE CASE OF ScHLEIER"1ACHER AND MOST OF HIS PEERS, THE PROLEGOMENON TO 
HIEOLOGY ESTABLISHES THE SCIENTIFIC PRINCIPLES BY WHICH WE PROCEED IN UNDERSTANDING THE 
HIEOLOGICAL TASK ITSELF. OF COURSE. BARTH WAS TO REJECT THIS. THERE CAN BE NO PROLEGOMENON 
THAT IS NOT ALSO PART OF DoGMATICS AS WELL. 'SCHLEIERMACHER'S ASSERTION THAT HIS INTROD!'CTION 
IS NOT ITSELF DOGMATICS IS QUITE UNTENABLE.' -BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'Op CIT.1\1.PAR 
2.P38. ' ... THAT PROLEGOMENA TO DOGMATICS ARE POSSIBLE ONLY AS PART OF DOGMATICS ITSELF. THE 
PREFIX PRO IN PROLEGOMENA IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD LOOSELY TO SIGNIFY HIE FIRST PART OF DOGMATICS 
RATHER THAN THAT WHICH IS PRIOR TO IT.' -IBID.PAR 2 .P42. THIS HAS SPECIFICALLY, FOR BARTH, A 
TRINITARIAN SIGNIFICANCE. 'THE MOST STRIKING ANTICIPATION OF THIS KIND WILL CONSIST IN HIE FACT 
THAT WE SHALL TREAT OF THE WHOLE DOCTRIN'E OF THE TRINrTY AND THE ESSENTIALS OF CHRISTOLOGY IN 
THIS CONNECTION, NAMELY, AS CONSTITUENT PARTS OF OUR ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF THE WORJ) OF 
GoD. '-IBID.PAR2.P44. 
MANY OF BARTH'S PREDECESSORS OUTLINED HIE DOGMATIC TASK FROM A CENTR..\,,L MOTIF. IT MIGHT HA VE 
BEEN THE 'INNER LIFE OF JESUS,' THE 'FAHIERHOOD OF GoD,' 'HIE KINGDOM OF GoD,' AND SO ON. 'FOR 
R!TSCHL. CHRISTOLOGICAL STATEMENTS WERE REDUCED TO AN ETHICALLY DETERMINED "VALlc'E 
JUDGEMENT," ANJ) FOR HERMANN THEY WERE ONLY RELATED TO HIE "INNER LIFE" OF JESUS AS THE 
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LOCATION OF REVELATION. '-WEBER.0.(TRANSLATED: GUDER.D.L: 1981).'FOUNDATIONS OF 
DOGMATICS. 'Op CIT.VOL l.P203. 'WE SHALL BE ABLE TO FIND A SIGNlFICANCE IN ALL THESE THINGS 
THAT ARE TOLD OF HIM, BUT NOT UNTIL \VE HAVE COME TO KNOW JESUS HIMSELF IN HIS INNER LIFE.'-
HERMANN.W.(TRANSLATED:MICKLEMN, ET AL: 1927). 'SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY. 'P 50. 
HARNACK SPOKE OF THE 'ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY,' SAYING; 'JN THE PROCLAMATION OF Goo AS FATHER. 
AS \\/ELL AS IN THE OTHER PROCLAMATION THAT ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE KINGDOM FOLLOWING THE WILL 
OF Goo IN LOVE, ARE TO BECOME ONE WITH THE SON AND THROUGH HIM WITH THE FATHER. THE MESSAGE 
OF THE REALISED Kr:-.:GDOM OF Goo RECEIVES ITS RICHEST, INEXHAUSTIBLE CONTEl'iT THE SON OF THE 
FATHER WILL BE THE FIRST ·BORN AMONG MANY BROTHERS.' -HARNACK.A. 'HISTORY OF 
OOGMA.'VOL I.OP CIT P65. 
27 SYKES.S.W. 'BARTH ON THE CENTRE OF THEOLOGY. 'OP CIT.P32. HERE, PARTLY, SYKES 
QUOTES FROM BARTH'S 'PROTEST AND THEOLOGY IN NINETEENTH CENTURY. 'P454. THE POST· 
DESCARTIA.N SWING TOW ARDS THE 'SURJECT_' OR THE CONCEPT OF THE EGO, IS OF COURSE VERY MUCH 
PRESENT IN BARTH .-\ND ms PREDECESSORS IN THE ENLIGHTENMENT TRADITION. IN BARTH p ARTICULARL y' 
WE SEE THIS INFLUENCE IN HIS PERCEPTION OF Goo AS THE INDISSOLUBLE SUBJECT, WHO PRESENTS HIMSELF 
AS OBJECT. 
28 
'FOR US THEREFORE. CHURCH DOGMATICS IS NECESSARILY REFORMED DOGMATICS. (K!RCHUCHE 
DOGMATIK !ST ALSO FUR UNSNOTWENDIG REFDRMIERTE DOGlvfATIK .. . )' -BARTH.K. 'CHURCH 
DOGMATICS. 'OP CIT.1\2.PAR 23. DOGMATICS AS A FUNCTION OF THE HEARING 
CHURCH.P831.(EE). Wrrn CALVIN, PARTICULARLY, THERE IS NO 'CENTRE OF THEOLOGY' AS SUCH-
SYKES.S.W.OP CIT.P24. THE '[NSTITUTIO' ARRANGES THE SCRIPTURAL DATA IN THEIR VARIOUS LOCI, BUT 
NOT ACCORDING TO A SINGULAR MOTIF. 
29 SYKES HERE PO!l>"TS OUT THE SUBSTM"TIAL DIFFERENCE BETWEENHA.RNACK'S POSITION, A.ND THAT OF 
BARTH. SAID HARNACK: 'IF THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST STANDS AT THE CE1'"TRE OF THE GOSPEL, HOW 
ELSE CA,'\! THE BASIS FOR RELIABLE AND COMMUNAL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS PERSON BE GAINED BUT THROUGH 
CRITICAL-HISTORICAL STUDY SO THAT AN IMAGINED CHRIST IS NOT PUT IN PLACE OF THE REAL ONE? WHAT 
ELSE BESIDES SCIE!'."flFIC THEOLOGY IS .-IBLE TO UNDERTAKE THIS STUDY?'-SYKES.S.W.OP CIT.P27. HERE 
QUOTING THE HARNACK-BARTH CORRESPONDENCE, IN (EDITED: RUMSCHEIDT.H.M: 
1972).'REVELATION AND THEOLOGY. AN ANALYSIS OF THE BARTH-HARNACK 
CORRESPONDENCE OF 1923 '. BARTH'S ANSWER TO HAR'IACK IS AS FOLLOWS: 'THE RELIABILITY AND 
COMMUNALITY OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST AS THE CE!'."fRE OF THE GOSPEL CAN BE 
NOMo OTHER THAN THAT OF GOD-AWAKENED FAITH. CRITICAL-HISTORICAL STCDY SIGMFIES THE DESERVED 
AND NECESSARY E!'.D OF THOSE "FOUNDATIONS" OF THIS KNOWLEDGE WHICH ARE NO FOL'NDATIONS AT ALL 
SINCE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN LAID BY GoD HIMSELF.' -'BARTH-HARNACK 
CORRESPONDENCE. 'IBID.P35. SAYS BARTH FURTHER: 'IN A CHRISTIAN DOG~!ATICS THE POSITION 
USUALLY OCCUPIED IN DOGMATIC SYSTEMS BY AN ARBITRARY CHOSEN BASIC VIEW BELONGS BY RIGHT TO 
THE WORD OF Goo •. 'c'ID THE WORD OF Goo ALO!'.'E.(AN DIE STELLE, DIE IN EINEM DOGA!ATISCHEN SYSTEM 
IRGENDEINE WILLKLRLICH GEWAHLTE GRUNDANSCHAUUNG EL'IZUNEHMEN PFLEGT, GEHORT IN EINER 
KIRCH UC HEN DOG,>lATIK DAS WORT GOTTES SELBST UND DAS WORT GOTTES GANZALLEIN). THIS OBJECT. 
WHICH ~!UST DICTATE DOGMATIC ~!ETHOD, IS THE WORD OF GoD ITSELF, !TIS NOT A CONCEPTION OF IT. IT 
IS NOT THEREFORE A BASIC DOGMA, TENET, PRINCIPLE OR DEFINITION OF THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY 
(DER GEGENSTAND DER DOGMATIK, DER DIESER IHRE METH ODE DIKTIEREN MUB, !ST DAS WOT GOTTES UND 
KEINE KONZEPTION VOM WO RTE GOTTES, ALSO KEIN GRUNDDOGMA, KEIN FUNDAMENTALSATZ, KEIN PRINZIP, 
KEINE DEFINITION VOM WESEN DES CHRISTENTUMS, UBERHAUPT KEENE VERFUGBARE W:4HRHEIT). IT IS NOT 
ANY KIND OF TRUTH THAT CAN BE CONTROLLED. DoGMATICS CERTAINLY HAS A BASIS, FOUNDATION M'D 
CE1'"TRE. BUT ... THIS CENTRE IS °'OT SO'&THING WHICH IS liNDER OUR CONTROL, BUT SOMETHING WHICH 
EXERCISES CONTROL OVER us. '-BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'J\2.0p err.PAR 24.00GMATICS 
AS A FUNCTION OF THE TEACHING CHURCH.P867.(EE). 
30 BAR.TH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' OP CIT.J\2.P865. WHILE BARTH DOES ACKNOWLEDGE THE 
APOLOGETIC IMPORTANCE OF CREDAL STATEMENTS, HE DOES CAUTION AGAINST SUBSTITL"TING CREEDS FOR 
DOGMATICS. (REDAL STATEMEN"TS ARE NOT DOGMATIC STATEMENTS. DoGMATICS, IS NOT CHURCH 
CONFESSION, BUT THE CONFRONTING OF THE CHURCH'S PROCLAMATION WITH THE WORD OF GoD. THE 
WORD OF GoD, THEN, CANNOT BE REPLACED BY SOME NOTION OF THE 'ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY.'· 
SYKES.S.W.OP CIT.P35. 
399 
31 BARTH.K.(EDITED: JUNGEL.E. ULRJCH.I: 198l)'FIDESQUAERENSJNTELLECTuM: ANSEUIS 
BEWEJS DER EX/STENZ GOTTESJM ZUSAMJIENH.LVGSEI.VES THEOLOGJSCHE.N PROGRAM1'viS.. 
ENGLISH TRANSLATION: BARTH.K.(TRANSLA TED: ROBERTSON.I. W: I %0). 'F!DES QUAERENS 
l:VTELLECTCW. ANSELM'S PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD IN THE CONTEXT OF HIS 
THEOLOGICAL SCHEME.' IN HIS BOOK ON A'iSEnl. BARTH SETS OUT TO DEMONSTRATE THAT ANSEL~! 
IS NOT ATTEl\;lPTING A 'PROOF' FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GoD. BARTH SEES ANSELM'S PROGR.'\.\1 AS FOLLOWS: 
HE IS WISHING TO THINK AITER THAT WHICH IS ALREADY REVEALED IN THE CREED. THIS IS INTELJJGERE. -
McCORMACK.B.L.OP Crr.P429. 'THE IJ\/TEUIGEREIS SUCCESSFUL WHE:-1 IT ACHIEVES A VERA RATIO, THAT 
IS, WIIEN THE REASON OF THE SEEKER (THE NOETIC RATIO) IS BROUGHT INTO CONFORl\;fi1Y WITH THE 
INHERENT RATIONALITY OF THE OBJECT (THE ONTIC RATIO).' -1BID.P429. BARTH. 'FJDESQUAERENS 
INTELLECTUM.' OP err. P47 .(ENGLISH TRANSLATION). HOWEVER, THE ONTIC RATIO PRECEDES AND 
GROUNDS THE NOETIC RATIO-McCORMACK.B.L.OP Crr.P430. 
32 SYKES.S. W.OP CIT.P36-7. 'THE MOST SUCCINCT DEFINITION OF THE CONCRETISING MOVEMENT FROM 
GoD THROUGH REVELATION TO FAITH IS THE FORMULA ORDER OF BEING: ORDER OF KJ>IOWLEDGE. USUALLY 
BARTH EXPRESSES THE DIRECTION OF THE ONGOING DlvTNE ACT AND THAT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND 
EXPERIENCE AS: 
(GoD) SUBJECT- OBJECT : OBJECT- SUBJECT (MAN) ... THE ORDER OF BEING-THE MOVEMENT FROM THE 
DIVINE SUBJECT TO THE DIVINE OBJECT (REVELATION) IS SEEN IN TRINITARIAJ>f TERMS AS PROCEEDING 
BETWEEN FATHER .'\."JD SON IN THE UMTY OF THE SPIRIT. IN ''Clll;RCH DoGMATICS" ORDER OF BEING AND 
ORDER OF KNOWLEDGE ARE NEVER DIRECTLY OR ONTICALLY IDENTIFIED.' -VAN 
NIEKER.K.E. 'METHODOLOGICAL ASPECTS IN KARL BARTH"S CHURCH DOGMATICS. "Op 
CIT.P204-5. 
33 SYKES.S. W.OP Crr.P37. 
34 BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'OP CIT.IV\1.P3. AS POINTED our BY SYKES.S.W.OP Crr.P39. 
35 IBm.P7. 
36 NORMAN.M.OP CIT.P70. 
" SEE TORRANCE.A.I. 'PERSONS IN COMMUNION.AN ESSAY ON TRINITARIAN DESCRIPTION 
AND HUMAN PARTICIPATION.'OP CIT.P214. 
38 IBID.P2 ! 4. 
39 JENSON.R W. 'GOD AFTER GOD. THE GOD OF THE PAST AND THE GOD OF THE FUTURE IN 
THE THEOLOGY OF KARL BARTH. 'OP CIT.P102. HERE, JENSON ALSO QUOTES FROM KARL 
BARTH. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.'OP CIT.I\! .P315. THE IDEA OF THE THREENESS OF GoD IS NOT TO BE 
SEEN AS A THINKING OF THREE INST A.,'\fCES OF ONE DEITY. BUT THREE EVE'ITS OF ONE DEITY. 
'° JENSEN.R. W.OP CIT.P 108. 'THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF HIS BEING AS SUBJECT IS GUAR,'\.'iTEED BY Tiffi 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE ULTNATE REALITY OF THE THREE \!ODES OF BEING IN THE ESSE1'CE OF GoD ABOVE 
.'\.'iD BEHIND WHICH THERE IS NOTHING HIGHER (GERARDE DIE [J,VAUFWSLICHKEIT DES SUBJEKTSEINS WIRD 
GARANTIERT DURCH DIE ERKENNTNIS DER lETZWIRKIJCHKEIT DERDREI SEINSWEISEN IM WESEN GoTTES, UBER 
ODER HINTER DER ES KEIN HOHERES GJBT).' 
41 SEE BARTH.K.!BID.l\1.PAR 9. THE TRIUNlTY OF G0D.P348. 'THE Goo WHO REVEALS HIMSELF 
ACCORDING TO SCRIPTURE (DER GOTT, DER SICH VACH DER SCRJFT OFFENBART ... j IS O!-."E IN THREE 
DISTINCTIVE ~!ODES OF BEING SUBSISTING IN THEIR Ml!TLAL RELATIONS: FATHER, SON . .\ND HOLY SPIRIT. IT 
IS THLS THAT HE IS THE LORD, (!ST ELVER IN DRE! EJGENTUMLJCHEN, IN JHREV BEZJEHUNGEN UNTEREJNANDER 
BESTEHENDEN SEINWEISEN: V4TER, SOHN UND ffEILJGER GEIST. So !ST ER DER HERR, ... ) I.E., THE THOU WHO 
"IEETS l\;f.'\N'S I AND UNITES HIMSELF TO THIS! AS THE INDISSOLUBLE SUBJECT A.,'\fD THEREBY AND THEREN 
REVEALS HIMSELF TO HIM AS HIS GoD.'-BARTH.K.OP CIT.l\1.PAR 9.THE TRIUNITY OF 
GOD.P348.(EE). 
42 IBID.PAR 9.P350. 
43 
'DREIE!NIGKEIT GOTTES HEIBT NICHT DREJFACHE GoTTHEIT, WEDER IM SLVN EINER VJEUiEIT VON 
GOTTHEITENNOCH IM SINN DES BESTEHENS ELVER VIEUiEJT VON ]NDJVIDUEN BZW. VON TEILEN INNERHALB DER 
EINEN GOTTHEIT. '-BARTHK. 'KIRKlICHE DOGJ\IATIK. 'Op CJT.1\1.PAR 9.GOTTES DREIEINIGKEJT.DIE 
EINHEJT JN DER DRE/HEIT. 'P368. (GE). 'THE NAME OF THE FATHER, SON A.'iD SPIRIT MEANS THAT Goo 
IS THE ONE GoD IN THREEFOLD REPETITION, AND THIS IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE REPETITION ITSELF IS 
GROUNDED N HIS GoDHEAD, SO THAT IT IMPLIES NO ALTERATION IN HIS GoDHEAD, .'\ND YET IN SUCH A WAY 
ALSO THAT HE IS THE ONE GoD ON!. Y IN THIS REPETITION. SO THAT HIS ONE GoDHEAD ST ANDS ORF AILS 
WITH THE FACT THAT HE IS GoD IN THIS REPETITION ... , -BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'Or 
CIT.I\ I.PAR 9 P350.(EE). 
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44 
BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'OP CIT.P35 l. 
45 lBID.P35 l. THUS \VE ARE SPEAKING THREE TIMES OF ONE DIVINE 'L' NOT THREE DIVINE Ts, I '.4BER NICIIT 
VON DRE/ GOTTLICHEN ]CH. SONDERN DRE!k!AL VON DEM EINEN GOTTLICHEN ]CH !ST IN IHRDIE REDE).-
IBID.P370.(GE). 
46 IBID.P352.(EE). 
41 
'IN THE PREDICATE AND OBJECT OF THE CONCEPT REVELATION WE !v!UST AGAIN HAVE. AND TONO LESS A 
DEGREE, THE SUBJECT ITSELF. REVELATION AND REVEALING WJST BE EQUAL TO THE REVEALER' 'Sou DIE 
0FFENBARUNG ALS GEGENWART GOTTES ERNST GENOJ;L~fEV WERDEN, SOLI. ES EINEN LEGITIMEN 
0FFENBARUNGSGLAUBEN GEBEN, DANN DUR.FEN CHRISTUS UND DER GEIST IN KEINEM SINN UN7ERGEORDNETE 
HYPOSTASEN SEIN. 'IBID. 
48 IBID.P 353.(EE). 
49 IBID.P354. 
50 1Brn.P374.(GE). 
51 1Brn.P374 (GE). 
52 lB!D.P355.(EE).BARTH POINTS OUT THAT IN TRADITIONAL VOCABULARY, 'PERSONAE,' CAN ALSO MEAN 
MASK, GIVING POSSIBLE NEW SUPPORT TO THE SABELLIAN NOTION OF THREE MMlFESTATIONS, BEHIND 
WHICH WAS A FOURTH.-IBID.P355.(EE). HE DOES, HOWEVER, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT AUGUSTINE DID, IN HIS 
RETENTION OF THE TERM, ACKNOWLEDGE THAT NO REAL ADEQUATE TERM WAS SUFFICIENT TO DESCRIBE 
THIS GREAT MYSTERY.-[B!D.P355. BARTH ACKNOWLEDGES SIMILARLY THAT NO HUMAN CONCEPTION OR 
TERM, ADEQUATELY DESCRIBES THE MYSTERY. HE THEN POINTS OUT THAT THOMAS HAD THE UNIQUE 
DISTINCTION OF UNITING THE CONCEPT OF PERSON, 'NlTH THAT OF RELATION IN HIS SUMM4.-[B!D.P357.(EE). 
BARTH FEELS THAT THOMAS' EXPOSITION OF THE GoDHEAD AS COMPRISING RELATIONS, WAS A BETTER 
METHOD OF 11'TERPRETATIONTHA.'lTHE USE OF THE TERM .PERSONS. '-IBID.P357. BARTH FEELS THAT 
'PERSON,' IN A CONTEMPORARY DOGMATICS, IS MORE APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF GoD. THA,'l TO THE 
TRINITY.-1Bm.P358. 'FOR IT FOLLOWS FROM THE TRINITARIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE GoD REVEALED IN 
SCRIPTURE THAT THIS ONE GoD IS TO BE CNDERSTOOD NOT JliST AS IMPERSONAL LORDSHIP, LE., AS POWER, 
BUT AS THE LORD. NOT JUST THE ABSOLLTE SPIRIT BUT AS PERSON, I.E. ,.\SAN J EXISTING IN ,\ND FOR ITSELF 
WITH ITS OWN THOCGHT AND WILL. '-IB!D.P358-9. 
53 IBID P3 78. (GE). 
54 1Brn.P359.(EE). 
55 IB!D.P359.(EE). 
56 IBID.P359.(EE). 
5' !Bm.P360.(EE). ' ... NOR CAN THERE BE ANY POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THE MODES OF BEING lvllGHT 
COALESCE AND DISSOLVE 11'TO ONE. IN THIS CASE THE MODES OF BEING WOULD NOT BE ESSE1'TIAL TO THE 
DIVINE BEING.' -IBID.P360. 
58 lBID.P362.(EE). 'IN THE REVELATION ATTESTED IN THE BIBLE GoD ALWAYS MEETS us, AS WE HAVE SEEN, 
INV AR YING ACTION IN ONE OF HIS ~!ODES OF BEING, OR. MORE ACCURATELY, AS DISTINGl!lSHED OR 
CHARACTERISED IN ONE OF HIS MODES OF BEING' (WOHL BEGEGNET UNS GOTT IN DER BIBLISCH BEZEUGTE"l 
OFFEN BAR UNG, WIE WIR SAHEN, IMMER WIEDER ANDERS HANDELND, IMMER WIEDER IN JE EINER SELIVSWEISE, 
GENAUER GESAGT: AL.SGEZEICHNET, CHARAKTERISIERT IN JE DIESER ODERJEVER SELIVSWEISE). 'BUT THIS 
RELATIVELY DISTINCT REVELATION OF THE THREE MODES OF BEING DOES NOT IMPLY A CORRESP01'UING 
DISTINCTION WITHIN THEMSELVES, SO SURELY IT ALSO .4..'lD SPECIFICALLY POINTS TO THEIR UNITY IN THIS 
DISTINCTION.' -!B!D.P362.(EE). 
59 1Bm.P363.(EE). 
60 1Bm.P363.(EE). 
61 IB!D.P363.(EE). 
62 IB!D.P366.(EE). 
63 !Brn.P388.(GE). 
64 lBID P370.(EE). 
65 1Bm.P371.(EE). 
66 1Bm.P371.(EE). 
67 lB!D.P372.(EE). 
68 JENSON.R. 'GOD AFTER GOD. THE GOD OF THE PAST AND THE GOD OF THE FUTURE SEEN 
IN THE WORK OF KARL BARTH. 'OP CIT.Pl 10. 
69 WILLIAMS.R. 'BARTH ON THE TRIUNE GOD. 'Op CIT.Pl88. 
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'
0 ALAN.J.TORRANCE. 'PERSONS IN COMMUNION.AN ESSAY ON TRJNITARIAN DESCRIPTION 
AND HUMAN PARTICIPATION.WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO VOLUME ONE OF KARL 
BARTH'S CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'OP CIT. MOST OF OUR REFLECTIONS UPON THIS WORK. ARE BASED 
UPON CHAPTER FO\.'R. P2 l3FF. 
71 [Blll.P2 l6 
., WILLIAMS.R "BARTH ON THE TRIUNE GOD. 'Op C!T.Pl6l. 
73 TORRANCE.A.OP CIT.P238. 
'4 IBID.P239. 
'
5 WILLIAMS.R.OP C!T.Pl56. 
76 
TORRANCE.A.OP CIT.P24 l. LA CUGNA COMES TO A SIMILAR CONCLUSION. SEE LACUGNA. C.M. 'GOD 
FOR US.' OP CIT.P252. MOLTMA'<N ALSO MAKES SOME REMARKS ON THIS SITIJAfION IN BARTH. SEE 
MOL TMANN.J. 'THE TRINITY AND THE KINGDOM. 'OP CIT.Pl39FF. HE SHOWS THAT IN MODERN 
EUROPEAN TIMES THE IDEA OF GoD IS NO LONGER THOUGHT OF AS SUPREME SUBSTANCE BlIT AS 'ABSOLUTE 
SUBJECT' (Pl39). MOLTMANN PLACES THE UNDERLYING INFLUE1'CE AS THAT OF GERMAN IDEALISM. HE 
POINTS our THAT THE DIVINE MONAS IS THE ABSOLUTE IDENTICAL SUBJECT. GoD IS THE SUBJECT OF HIS OWN 
REVEL.\TION. SELF-COMMUNICATION IS THE VERY ESSENCE OF SALVATION (Pl39). IN HIS ILLUMINATING 
ARTICLE ON BARTH. WILLIAMS ALSO MAKES THIS POINT. 'THE DEVIL, OR THE ACTIVE POWER OF EVIL, OR 
THE FORCE OF SIN \\'HICH KEEPS MAN IN SLAVERY. ALL THESE ARE ABSENT FROM BARTH'S THEOLOGY: 
THERE IS NO CHRJSTl:S VICTOR STORY TO BE TOLD. THE HUMAN PREDICAME1'"f IS IGNORANCE. AND BARTH, 
BY TAKING THIS AS AXIOMATIC, ALIGNS HIMSELF WITH PRECISELY THAT LIBERAL THEOLOGY WHICH HE IS 
CONCERNEDTOATTACK ... '-W!LL!AMS.0PCIT.Pl73. THUS, (SAYSMOLTMANN0PC!T.Pl39) GoDIN 
ETER1'1TY CORRESPONDS TO BOURGEOIS CULTIJRE OF PERSONALITY. 'Our OF THE DIVINE THOU, MA'l 
RECEIVES HIS PERSONAL EGO AND BECOMES THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPERIOR TO Tiffi WORLD. FOR THESE 
HISTORICAL REAS01'S IT IS QUITE UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE EARLY CHURCH'S TRINITARIA'l FOR~IUIX 
UNA SL.BSTJLWIA-TRES PERSONAE SHOULD NOW BE REPLACED BY THE FORMULA; ONE DIVINE SUBJECT IN 
THREE ~!ODES OF BEING. '-IBID.Pl39. 
BARTH DOES 'IOT START \1;1TH THE TRINITY INSTEAD HE STARTS WITH THE Afffl-SCHLEIERMACHER 
CONCEPTION OF THE LoRDSHIP A'ID THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GoD, AS REVEALED IN HIS REVELATION. THIS IS 
THE 'ROOT OF THE DocTRINE OF THE TRINITY.' THE IDEA OF SELF-REVELATION SECURES THE ABSOLUTE 
SUBJECTIVITY OF Goo-MOL TM.ANN.J.OP CIT.Pl40. THE TRIMTY THEREFORE IS EMPLOYED FOR THE 
SUBORDINATE PURPOSE OF SECURING THE ABSOLUTE SL1lJECTIVITY OF GoD. FOR BARTH. THE LORDSHIP OF 
GoD PRECEDES THE TRINITY. THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY CAREFULLY SECURES ITS SUBJECTIVITY FROM 
BECOMING OBJECTl\UY TO HUMAN BEINGS-IBID.Pl41. IF THE NOTION OF THE SUPREME SUBJECTI\1TY OF 
GoD IS PARA..~!OL1'"f. THE IDEA OF THE 'THREE PERS01'S,' AS PERSONS, FALLS TO ONE SIDE. [T BECO~!ES 
IMPOSSIBLE TO SPE.\K OF PERSONS TO WHOM SL1lJECTIVITY AND '[-NESS' WOULD HAVE TO BE DESCRIBED IN 
RELATION TO THE OTHER PERSONS-[BID.P 141. MOL H!ANN RIGHTLY POINTS TO THE FACT THAT IN 
ScRIPTCRE THERE IS NO IDEA OF Goo REPEATING HIMSELF IN SELF-REFLECTION THREE TIMES. EVE:< WITH 
THE 1932 'DoGMATICS' WlffiRE BARTH CHOSE TO PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPT OF THE CONCRETE 
REVELATION IN JESCS CHRIST, NOT Goo HIMSELF, THE SAME DETERMI1'1NG PARADIGM STILL APPLIED. As 
WITH MANY OF BARTH'S OTHER 11'TERPRETERS, MOLTMANN DE~IONSTRA TES THAT IN THE AREA OF 
PNE!;~fATOLOG Y, BARTH 's DOCTRINE OF THE TRI~1TY PARTICULARLY BECO~!ES SUBJECT TO PROBLEMS. -
lBID.Pl42FF. As !NTHE AUGUSTINIA'l TRADITION, THE SPIRIT IS 1'!ERELY THE u1'1TY OF THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN FATHER .'c'lD SON. 
'
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MOL TM.ANN.J.OP C!T.Pl43. 
78 As WE HAVE SEEN, N AQUINAS THERE IS AMOVE1'!ENT AWAY FROM THIS APPROACH. ALTHOUGH HE DOES 
EMPLOY Su1lSTANCE LA'lGUAGE, IN HIS DOCTRINE OF THE RElATIONS, TlffiRE IS A DEEPER u'NDERSTANDING 
OF THE NEED TO MORE THOROUGHLY 'INTEGRATE,' THE THREE PERSONS. AQUINAS W AfffS TO MOVE BEYOND 
THE STRICT ONTOLOGICAL DISTINCTIVENESS OF THE TRADITION AL SUBSTANCE LANGUAGE OF 
ARISTOTELIANISM. THE DOCTRINE OF 'RELATIONS,' AND 'PERICHORESJS' SEEKS TO BALANCE SUBSTANCE-
LANGUAGE OUT WITH A 'PARTICIPATION CONCEPT' AS WELL. THIS IS WHY, WITH HIS ACTIJALISTIC AND MORE 
FLUlD PHILOSOPHY OF GoD, BARTH PREFERS THOMAS WlffiN HE (THOMAS) SPEAKS ABOlIT RELATIONS, 
OTHER THA'l PERSONS. THE BARTHIAN DOCTRINE OF 'MODES OF BEING,' IN OUR OPINION, IS TO SOME 
EXTENT ADEVELOP~!ENT OF THE 'RELATIONS-LANGUAGE' OF AUGUSTINE AND PARTICULARLY, AQUINAS, 
RATHER THA"i 'PERSON' LANGUAGE. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE CHARGE OF SABELLIAMSM HAS BEEN BROUGHT 
AGAINST BARTH. HOWEVER, IN AN I1'"TERESTING SENSE, BARTH DOES NOT ACTUALLY COMPLETELY RID 
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HIMSELF OF THE SO-CALLED 'PERSON' (SUBSTANCE) PARADIGM. WE SEE THIS WHEN HE TRIES TO USE THE 
IDEA OF THE SPIRIT TO 'JOIN TOGETHER' THE OTHER DISTINCT CONTINUANTS, THE REVEALER .\ND HIS 
REVELATION. THE SPIRIT SEEMS TO BE THE 'PARTICIPANT' BETWEEN TWO 'SUBSTANTIAL' CONCEPTS. 
"MOL TMANN.J.0P CIT.Pl43. FOR AN EXPOSITION OF THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE NOTION OF 
A THINKING SUBSTA.'<CE, SEE: MICHAEL.E, ET AL. 'TWO EARLY MODERN CONCEPTIONS OF 
MIND: REFLECTING SUBSTANCE AND THINKING SUBSTANCE.' IN JOURNAL OF THE 
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.VOL 27.l989.P29FF. 
so OF COliRSE, WE DO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT BARTH SUPERFICIALLY SPEAKS OF GoD AS ESSENCE .\ND 
SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, IN OUR OPINION, THIS IS MERELY A CAPITVLATION TO TRADITIONAL ORTHODOXY 
WITH \\'lllCH HE WISHES TO ALIGN HIMSELF. IN ACTUALITY BARTH'S DEITY MOVES TOW ARDS A REJECTION 
OF TRADITIONAL ARISTOTELIAN ESSENTIALISM. EVEN IF HE DOES NOT ENTIRELY PULL IT OFF. 
81 BARTH DOES NOT CONSISTENTLY ACCEPT THE DUAL INDEPENDENT ROLES OF NATURAL SCIENCE AND 
THEOLOGY. DOGMATICS AS THE SERVANT OF THE WORD OF GoD, HAS A PRIOR ROLE TO THE SCIENCES. 
DoGMATICS IS THE TRUE SCIENCE. 
82 THE QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ONE AND Nous IN PLoTINUS, IS GREATER THAN IT IS 
BETWEEN Nous A.'ID SOUL. THERE IS THEREFORE AN ONTOLOGICAL GRADING IN PLOTINUS, HYPOSTASES. 
NOT SO IN BARTH. THE HUMA.'l BODY OF JESUS EXCEPTED, ALL THREE OF BARTH'S MODES ARE EQUALLY 
TRANSCE1'UENT, EQUALLY GoD. THERE IS NO GRADING OF GoD'S BEING IN BARTH. 
S3 IN PLOTINUS, Sour. IS THE HYPOSTASIS, MEDIATING THE ONE TO THE WORLD. IN BARTH, THE SPIRIT AND 
THE SoN ARE INVOLVED FIRSTLY MEDIA TING GoD TO HIMSELF, A.'lD THEN IN THE IMMANENT SENSE, 
MEDIATING MAN TO GoD. WITH THEOLOGY, THE SO-CALLED THIRD MAN ARGUMENT IS NO LONGER AN 
ISSUE. How CA.'J MANY MEN 'PARTICIPATE' INTHE ONE GoD? IN BARTH, THE DILEMMA IS 'SOLVED,' 
THROGGH THE CITING OF SUPERNATURAL GRACE. IT IS NOT A RATIONAL ISSUE AT ALL. NEVERTHELESS. 
THERE ARE SOME INTERESTING CONTINUITIES BETWEEN BARTH AND PLOTINUS HERE AS WELL. PLATO, TRIED 
TO SOL VE THE PROBLEM BY STATING THAT THE 'IMAGE' OF THE FORM RESIDES IN THE PARTICIPANT, NOT 
THE FORM ITSELF. PLoTI1'1JS FINDS THIS UN ACCEPT ABLE. HE FEELS FOR AUTHENTICITY, REAL 
PARTICIPATION MUST BE PRESENT. PLOTI1'1JS, REVERSES TIIE MOVEMENT. INSTEAD OF THE FORM MOVING 
DOWNWARDS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE SENSIBLE, THE SENSIBLE MOVES UPWARDS TOW ARDS THE FORM. THIS 
PREVENTS .\NY COMPROMISING OF THE FORM. WE FIND PRECISELY THE SAME CONCEPT IN BARTH, WITH THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN Goo .\ND MAN. IT IS NOT Goo THAT MOVES OOWNW ARDS, BUT MAN WHO MOVES 
GPW ARDS IN JESUS CHRJST. THE INCARNATION ULTIMATELY DOES NOT BRJNG GoD DOWNWARDS, BFf MAN 
UPWARDS. 
84 TORRANCE.A.Or CIT.P246. 
"BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'Op CIT.l\1.P338. 
86 TORRANCE.A.0PCIT.P247. 
87 IBID.P254.(EE). 
88 IBID.P255. THE APPROPRJATE REFERENCES TO THE 'DOGMATICS' HERE, ARE 'CHURCH DOGMATICS' 
l/l.P390, l\l.P390.(EE). 
89 TORRANCE.A.OP CrT.P258. 
90 lBID.P259. 
91 TIJNGEL.E.(TRANSLATED: HARRIS.H: 1%6). 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.GOD'S BEING 
IS IN BECOMING.' 
92 IBID.P76, AS QUOTED BY GUNTON.C. 'BECOMING AND BEING.THE DOCTRINE OF GOD IN 
CHARLES HARTSHORNE AND KARL BARTH. 'OP CIT.P143. 
93 GUNTON.C. OP CiT.Pl47. 
94 TIJNGEL.E. 'THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY.GOD'S BEING IS IN BECOMING. 'OP CIT.P62. 
95 BARTH.K.'CHURCHDOGMATICS.'OPCIT.II\1.PAR28.THEBEINGOF GOD AS THE ONE WHO 
LOVES IN FREEDOM.P260.(EE). 
96 IBID.P260.(EE). 
91 IBID.P260.(EE). 
98 IBID.P261.(EE).IN ALL FAIRNESS TO BARTH, fIE DOES WORK OUT !IIS VIEW OF GoD'S TRANSCENDENCE 
(BEYOND BEING) IN A MORE CONSISTENT SENSE, THEN DID AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS. WE HA VE ARGUED 
THAT BOTH OF HIS PREDECESSORS HERE, IN SOME SENSE, ALSO SPOKE ABOUT A Goo BEYOND BEING. YET 
NEITHER ONE OF THEM WERE CONSISTENT IN THAT THEY STILL ASCRJBED TO Goo, THE LANGUAGE OF BEING. 
AT LEAST BARTH ACCEPTS THE CHALLENGE. EITHER Goo IS PART OF BEING OR BEYOND BEING. IF HE IS 
BEYOND BEING, THEN SOMEHOW OUR LANGUAGE ABOUT HIM MUST NOT SIMPLY BE THE SAME KIND OF 
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LANGCAGE .<S OCR LA.1'GUAGE OF OTHER ENTITIES. BARTH CONCLUDES THAT IT ~!CST BE A L..\.,'iGCAGE THAT 
IS SUBSU1vIED BENE.~TH THE 'CONTROL. OF GOD. EVE:\ THEN. TlIE WORD OF Goo IS NOT TO BE REDL'CED TO 
A L,\.1'GUAGE OF BEING. 
99 lBID.P26 L 
100 JUNGEL.E.OP C!T.P44. 
101 lBID.P61. 
102 
FOR THIS SECTION WE HA VE RELIED TO SOME EXTENT UPON: GUNTON.C.E. 'THE TRIUNE GOD AND 
THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATURE.' IN (EDITOR: SYKES.S. W: 1989.) KARL BARTH: 
CENTENARY ESSAYS. 0PCIT.P46FF. 
103 SEE MOLNAR.P.D. 'THE FUNCTION OF THE IMMANENT TRINITY IN THE THEOLOGY OF 
KARL BARTII: IMPLICATIONS FOR TODAY.'OP CIT.P367. ' ... BUT ABSOLUTELY ESSENlHL THAT 
ALONG WITll ALL OLDER THEOLOGY WE MAKE A DELIBERATE A.'ID SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN TlIE 
TRINITY OF Goo AS WE MA y KNOW IT IN THE IN TlIE WORD OF Goo REVEALED, \liRfITEN A.'ID PROCLAl\IED, 
AND GoD 'S IMMANE1'T TRINITY, I.E., BET\1iEEN "GoD IN HIMSELF" . .\ND "GoD FOR US," BETWEEN TlIE 
"ETERNAL HISTORY OF GoD," AND HIS TEMPORAL ACTS .. IN SO DOING WE MUST ALWAYS BEAR IN MIND THAT 
THE "GoD FOR us" DOES NOT ARISE AS AMATIEROFCO!JRSE OIJTOFTlIE "GoDIN HIMSELF," THAT !TIS NOT 
TRUE AS A STATE OF Goo WHICH WE CA.'1 FIX AI<D ASSERT ON THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPT OF MA.'1 
PARTICIPATING IN HIS REVELATION, BUT THAT !TIS TRL"E AS AN ACT OF GoD, AS A STEP WHICH GoD TAKES 
TOW ARDS MAN AND BY WHICH MA.'1 BECOMES TlIE ~l.-1.'I THAT PART!CIP A TES IN HIS RE VELAT!ON. THIS 
BECOMING ON MAN'S PARTIS CONDIT!ONED FROM WITHOUT. BY Goo, WHEREAS GoD IN MAKlNG THE STEP 
BY WHICH TlIE WHOLE CORRELATION IS FIRST FASHIO~'ED IS NOT C01'TIIT!ONED FROM 1N1THOUT BY MA."i. FOR 
THIS REASON ... THEOLOGY CANNOT SPEAK OF MAN IN HIMSELF, IN ISOLATION FRO~! Goo. BUT AS IN THE 
STRICT DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY AS THE PRESUPPOSITION OF CHRISTOLOGY, IT ~!L"ST SPEAK OF GoD IN 
HIMSELF, IN ISOLATION FROM MA.'1, WE KNOW OURSELVES ONLY AS THOSE ADDRESSED BY Goo's WORD, 
BUT PRECISELY AS THOSE ADDRESSED BY Goo's WORD WE \llJST IG'iOW GoD AS THE 01''E WHO .illDRESSES 
US IN FREEDOM, AS THE LORD, WHO DOES NOT EXIST ONLY ."8 HE .illDRESSES US, BFf EXISTS AS THE ONE 
WHO ESTABLISHES A.'ID RATIFIES THIS RELATION A.'ID CORRELATION. 1N110 IS ALSO GoD BEFORE IT. IN 
Hl~ISELF. IN HIS ETERNAL HISTORY.' 
'
04BARTil.K.'CHURCHDOGMATICS.'OPCn.I\LPAR5. THE NATURE OF THE WORD OF 
GOD.Pl 72.(EE). 
105 MOLNAR.H.OP C!T.P367 
106 lBID.P377 
107 BARTil.K. 'CHURCHDOGMATICS.'OPCIT. !Il\3.THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION. P87. THIS 
PASSAGE WAS BROL'Gf!T TO OUR ATIENT!ON BY GUNTON.OP CIT.P47. 
108 BARTil.K.'CHURCH DOGMATICS.' Op Cit.III\3.Pl44.(EE). 
10
' GUNTON.C. 'THE TRIUNE GOD AND THE FREEDOM OF THE CREATURE. 'Op Cit.P52. 
110 Ibid.P52. 
111 GUNTON.C.'GOD'S BEING IS INBECOMING.'Op Cit.Pl62. 
112 ROBERTS.RH.'BARTH'S DOCTRINE OF TIME.' IN (EDITOR: SYKES.S.W: 1979).KARL 
BARTII.STUD!ES OF ms THEOLOGICAL METIIOD.Op Cit.P88FF. 
113 THERE ARE VARIOUS PLACES IN THE COMMEKI'ARY WHERE THE PARADOX OF HISTORY OR Th\IE IS 
EVIDENT. SEE, FOR EXAMPLE, BARTH'S lNTRODUCT!O"f: 'THE RESL'RRECT!ON FROM THE DE.ill IS. HO'W'EVER, 
TlIE TRANSFORMATION; THE ESTABLISHING OR DECLARATION OF THAT POINT FRO\! ABOVE, AND THE 
CORRESPONDING DISCERNING OF IT FROM BELOW. THE RESlJRRECT!ON IS THE REVELATION: THE DISCLOSlNG 
OF JESUS AS TlIE CHRIST, TlIE APPEARING OF Goo, A.'\TI TlIE APPREHENDING OF Goo IN JESUS. THE 
RESURRECTION IS THE EMERGENCE OF THE '<ECESSITY OF Gl~TNG GLORY TO Goo ... IN TlIE RESURRECTION 
THE '<EW WORLD OF TlIE HOLY SPIRIT TOUCHES THE OLD WORLD OF THE FLESH. BL'T TOUCHES IT AS A 
TANGENT TOUCHES A CIRCLE, THAT IS, WITHOL'T TOUCHING IT .... THE RESURRECTION IS THEREFORE AN 
OCCURRENCE IN HISTORY, WHICH TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE GATES OF JERUSALEM L'l THE YEAR AD. 30, 
INASMUCH AS IT TlIERE "CAME TOP ASS," WAS DISCOVERED A.'ID RECOGNISED. BL'T IN AS MUCH AS TlIE 
OCCURRENCE WAS CONDITI01''ED BY THE RESLllRECT!ON, IN SO FAR, TllATIS, AS IT WAS NOT TlIE "COMING 
TO PASS,n OR TlIE DISCOVERY, OR THE RECOGNITION, WHICH CONDITIONED ITS NECESSITY AND APPEARANCE 
AND REVELATION, THE RESURRECTION IS NOT A.'I EVE7''T IN HISTORY AT ALL. '-BARTH.K.(TRANSLATED: 
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HOSKYNS.E.C: 1933). 'THE EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS.'INTRODUCTION.THE AUTHOR TO HIS 
READERS.P30. 
114 ROBERTS.OP CIT.P92. 
115 BARTH.K.(TRANSLATED: COZENS.B: 1952). 'FROM ROUSSEAU TO RITSCHL. BEING THE 
TRANSLATION OF ELEVEN CHAPTERS OF DIE PROTESTANTISCHE THEO LOGIE JM 19. 
JAHRHUNDERT. 'Op CIT.P277. 
116 IBID. P277. IN THE 'PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE,' HEGEL ASSERTS: . IN THE POSITIVE SENSE OF TIME 
ONE CAN THEREFORE SAY THAT ONLY THE PRESENT IS, WHILE WHAT IS BEFORE AND AFTER IS NOT. THE 
CONCRETE PRESENT IS HOWEVER, THE RESULT OF THE PAST, AND IS PREGNANT WITH THE FUTURE. THE 
PRESENT IS THEREFORE PREGNANT WITH ETERNITY.' -HEGEL. G. W.F. 'THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
NATURE. '(ENGLISH TRANSLATION.LONDON 1970).P86, AS QUOTED BY ROBERTS.!BID.P94. 
117 ROBERTS.OP CIT.P93. 
118 IBID.P94. 
119 THE IMPORTANT PART OF THE 'DOGMATICS' HERE IS 'CHURCH DOGMATICS.'THE DOCTRINE OF 
CREATION. Ill\2.PAR 47. 'MAN IN HIS TIME.' 
120 BARTH.K. 'CHURCH DOGMATICS. 'Ill\2. THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION.OP CIT.PAR47.MAN 
IN HIS TIME.P527-529. 
121 ROBERTS.RH.OP CIT.Pl05. 
122 SEE BAMBACK.C.R: 1995. 'HEIDEGGER, DILTHEY, AND THE CRISIS OF HlSTORICISM. 'OP 
CIT.P2FF. 0rHER TEXTS OF IMPORTANCE, DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE ARE: 
NIETHAMMERL.(TRANSLA TED: CAMILLERP: 1992). 'POSTHISTORIE.' FUKUY AMA.F: 
1992.'THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN,' ROTH.MS: 1988.'KNOWING AND 
HISTORY.' VA TTIMO. G. (TRANSLATED: SNYDERJ: 1988). 'THE END OF MODERNITY.' 
HELLER.A: 1993.' A PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN FRAGMENTS .. 
"'' VATTIMO.G.(TRANSLATED: SNYDERJ: 1988). 'THE END OF MODERNITY. 'OP CIT, AS QUOTED 
BY BAMBACK.C.OP CIT.PS_ IN A SENSE WE MIGHT TERM THIS CURRENT THESIS' THEME AS SOMEWHAT 
INDEBTED TO THE PARADIGM OF MODERNITY. IN TIIAT WE ARE TRACING OUT CERTAIN IDEAS IN St;CH A 
MANNER AS TO PRESUPPOSE A CONTINUITY IN THE HISTORY OF SUCH IDEAS. 
124 NORMAN.M.OP CIT. 
125 
' ... READINO CANNOT LEGITIMATELY TRA. 'lSGRESS THE TEXT TOWARD SOMETHING OTHER THAN IT. 
TOW ARD THE REFERENT (A REALITY THAT JS METAPHYSICAL, HISTORICAL, PSYCHO BIOGRAPHICAL, ETC.) OR 
TOWARD A SI01'1FIER OlffSIDE THE TEXT. WHOSE CONTENT COt;LD TAKE PLACE, COULD HA VE TAKEN PLACE 
OUfSIDE OF LANGUAGE, THAT IS TO SAY, IN THE SENSE THAT WE GIVE HERE TO THAT WORD, OUTSIDE OF 
WRITING IN GENERAL ... THERE IS :-JO HORS-TEXTE... '-DERRIDAJ.(TRANSLATED: SPIVAK. G.C: 
1976).'0F GRAMMATOLOGY.'P\58. 
106 W ARD.G; 1995.'BARTH, DERRIDA AND THE LANGUAGE OF THEOLOGY. 'Op CIT.P256. 
127 IBID.P236. 
1
" IBID.P238. 
129 IBID.P241. 
130 SEE DERRIDA'S 'END OF THE BOOK AND THE BEGINNING OF WRITING' IN: 
DERRIDAJ.(TRANSLATED SPIV AK.G.C: 1976). 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY. 'OP CIT.P6FF. 
THE QUOTE HERE IS FROM: PARMENIDES (EDITED: FREEMAN.K: 1948). 'FRAGMENTS FIVE AND 
EIGHT.' IN ANCILLA TO THE PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHERS, AS QUOTED BY 
CRITCHLEY.S. 'THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE IN DERRIDA.PART ONE. 'P3. SEE ALSO THE 
RELEVANT DISCUSSION IN: WOOLHOUSE.RS: 1993. 'DESCARTES, SPINOZA, LEIBNIZ.THE 
CONCEPT OF SUBSTANCE IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY METAPHYSICS. 'P 190FF. 
CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOGOS AND PRESENCE, SAYS DERRIDA: 'As THE FACE OF PURE 
INTELLIGIBILITY, IT REFERS TO AN ABSOLUTE LOGOS TO WHICH IT IS IMMEDIATELY UNITED. THIS ABSOLUTE 
LOGOS WAS AN INFINITE CREATIVE SUBJECTIVITY IN MEDIEVAL THEOLOGY: THE INTELLIGIBLE FACE OF THE 
SIGN REMAINS TURNED TOW ARDS THE WORD AND THE FACE OF Goo .. -THE SIGN AND DIVINITY HA VE THE 
SAME PLACE AND TIME OF BIRTH. THE AGE OF THE SIGN IS ESSENTIALLY THEOLOGICAL. PERHAPS IT WILL 
:-JEVER END .... THEBOOKOFNATUREANDGoo's WRITING, ESPECIALLY IN THE MIDDLE AGES, ALL THAT 
FUNCTIONS AS METAPHOR IN THESE DISCOURSES CONFIRMS THE PRIVILEGE OF THE LOGOS A.'<D FOUNDS THE 
"LITERAL" MEANING THEN GIVEN TO WRITING: A SIGN SIGNIFYING A SIGNIFIER ITSELF SIGNIFYING AN 
ETERNAL VERITY. ETERNALLY THOCGHT AND SPOKEN D1 THE PROXIMITY OF A PRESENT LOGOS.' -
DERRIDA .. J. 'OF GRAMMA TOLOGY' IBID.Pl3-l*. SEE ALSO BROWN.D: l 987.'CONTINENT AL 
PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN THEOLOGY.AN ENGAGEMENT."Op CIT.P34. 
131 CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.PS. 
132 DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: LEA VEYJ.P: 1978). 'EDMUND HUSSERL "S ORIGIN OF 
GEOMETRY. (l 'ORIG/NE DE L4 GE'O.ME'TRIE).OP CIT. 
133 CRITCHLEYS.OP CIT.P6. 
134 IBID.P6. 
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135 DERRIDA.J. "INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY.'OP CrT.Pl27. DERRIDA 
CONTINUES: 'STARTING FROM THIS INAUGURAL INFINITISATION, MATHEMATICS COGN!ZES NEW 
INFlNITISATIONS WHICH ARE SO MANY INTERIOR REVOLUTIONS. FOR, IF THE PRIMORDIAL INFINITISATION 
OPENS THE MA THEMATIC AL FIELD TO INFINITE FECUNDITIES FOR THE GREEKS, IT NO LESS FIRST LIMITS THE A 
PRIORI SYSTEM OF THAT PRODUCTIVITY. THE VERY CONTENT OF AN INFINITE PRODUCTION WILL BE 
CONFINED WITHIN A'! APRIORI SYSTEM WHICH. FOR THE GREEKS, WILL AL WAYS BE CLOSED.' -IBID.Pl27. 
136 HUSSERL. 'ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY. 'AS QUOTED BY DERRIDA IN HIS INTRODUCTION.OP CrT.Pl29. 
131 DERRIDA.I.OP CIT.Pl30. 
138 CRITCHLEYS.OP C!T.P8. 
139 IBID.PIO. SEE DERRIDA.I. 'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS: AN ESSAY ON THE THOUGHT OF 
EMMANUEL LEVINAS. 'P79FF. IN (TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1978).WRITING AND DIFFERENCE. 
140 DERRIDA.I. 'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS. 'OP CIT.Pl 10. THIS TEXT HAS BEEN BROUGHT TO OUR 
ATTENTION BY CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.PIO. 
141 IT IS AT THIS POINT THAT A GREAT MA>'IY OF DERRIDA'S CRITICS FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION. IF DERRIDA IS 
TRYING TO 'OVERCOME' METAPHYSICS .>\ND CRITICISE \\;1JAT HE TERMS 'LOGOCENTRISM,' HE HAS TO USE 
THE VERY LANGUAGE OF LOGOCENTRISM HIMSELF, IN ORDER TO SO THIS. DERRIDA THUS, IN THE EYES OF HIS 
CRITICS, DECONSTRUCTS HIMSELF. THEREFORE HIS ENTIRE PROJECT IS L'TTERLY NONSENSICAL AND 
SCARCELY WORTH ANY ATTENTION AT ALL. THESE CRITICS ARE NOT READING DERRIDA CAREFULLY 
ENOUGH. HE IS WELL AWARE OF THIS PROBLEM, AND AS WE SHALL SEE IN THE CHAPTER ON DERRIDA, 
DERRIDA DOES PROvlDE A REASON WHY HE FEELS THAT THE DECONSTRUCTIVE PROJECT IS STILL POSSIBLE, 
DESPITE THIS PARADOX. 
NOTES FOR CHAPTER NINE 
1 THIS '0EDIP AL' FRAGMENT OF DECONSTRCCTIVE PASTICHE 'WAS COMPOSED BY TERRY EAGLETON. THE 
AVAJ•ff-GARDE ENGLISH CRITIC, IN FILIAL DISOBEDIENCE TO THE MODERN FATHER OF DECONSTRUCTION, 
JACQUES DERRIDA,' SAYS KEARNEY WHO QUOTES EAGLETON'S PLAYFUL LINES IN HIS CHAPTER ON 
DERRIDA. SEE: KEARNY.R: 1986. 'MODERN MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY. 'Pl 13. 
SOURCES ON DERRIDA FOR CHAPTERS NlNE AND TEN. INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: 
CAPUTO.ID. 'MYSTICISM AND TRANSGRESSION: DERRIDA AND MEISTER ECKHART.' IN 
(EDITOR: SIL VERMAN.H.J: 1989). DERRIDA AND DECONSTRUCTION. 
BERNET.R. 'INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERL'S ORIGIN OF GEOMETRY.' IN (EDITOR: 
SIL VERMAN.H.J: 1989).DERRIDA AND DECONSTRUCTION.OP CIT, 
BROWN.D: 1987.'CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN THEOLOGY,' 
ELLIS.IM: 1989. 'AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION.' OUTHW AITE.W. 'GENERAL 
INTRODUCTION. 'IN (EDITOR: OUTHW AITE. W: 1996). THE H.ABERMAS READER. 
lNGRAFFIA.B.D: 1995.'POSTMODERNTHEORY AND BIBLICAL THEOLOGY,' 
MATTHEWS.E: 1996. 'TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY,' 
KEARNEY.R: 1986. 'MODERN MOVEMENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY,' 
BHASKAR.R: 1994.'PLATO ETC.THE PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY AND THEIR RESOLUTION,' 
BLACKBURN. S: 1984. 'SPREADING THE WORD,' BESTS, 
KELLNER.D: 1991. 'POSTMODERN THEORY,' DEWS.P: 1995. 'THE LIMITS OF 
DISENCH.ANTMENT.ESSAYS ON CONTEMPORARY EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY,. 
DU TOIT.C. W. 'THE END OF TRUTH?' IN (EDITOR: DU TOIT.C. W: 1996).NEW MODES OF 
THINKING ON THE EVE OF A NEW CENTURY, DEGENAAR.J. 'THE COLLAPSE OF UNITY.' IN 
(EDITOR: DU TOIT.C.W: 1996).NEW MODES OF THINKING ON THE EVE OF A NEW 
CENTURY.OP err. v AN NIEKERK.E. 'THE RESURGENCE OFF AILED MACRO-AND 
406 
MICROSCALE IMPERIALISMS IN LOCAL TWENTIETH-CENTURY FUNDAMENTALISMS.' IN 
(EDITOR: DU TOIT.C.W: 1996).NEW MODES OF THINKING. OP CIT. 
TOULMIN.S: 1990. 'COSMOPOLIS. THE HIDDEN AGENDA OF MODERNITY.' 
JEFFERSON.A 'STRUCTURALISM AND POST-STRUCTURALISM.' IN (EDITORS: JEFFERSON.A 
ET AL: 1992).MODERN LITERARY THEORY, NORRIS.C: 1993.'THETRUTHABOUT 
POSTMODERNISM.' NORRIS.C: 1996. 'RECLAIMING TRUTH.CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE 
OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM,' NORRIS.C: 1987.'DERRIDA,' 
SMITH.R: 1995.'DERRIDAAND AUTOBIOGRAPHY.' CRITCHLEY.$: 1992.'THEETIIlCS OF 
DECONSTRUCTION.DERRIDA AND LEVIN AS,' CULLER.J. 'JACQUES DERRIDA.' IN (EDITOR: 
STURROCK.J: 1979).STRUCTURALISMAND SINCE, RORTY.R: 1990.'PHILOSOPHY AND THE 
MIRROR OF NATURE,' DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED:BASS.A: 1993). 'WRITING AND 
DIFFERENCE,' DERRIDA.J.(EDITOR: ELISABETH WEBER: 1992). 'POINTS ... INTERVIEWS, 1974-
1994,'DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: SPIVAK.G.C: 1976).'0F GRAMMATOLOGY,' 
DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1981). 'POSITIONS,' DERRIDAJ.(TRANSLATED: 
JOHNSON.B: 1981).'DISSEMINATION,' SEARLE.J.R.' A REPLY TO DERRIDA,' IN GLYPH.VOL 
l.1977.P\98-208, FISH.S.E.'WITHTHE COMPLIMENTS OF THE AUTHOR, REFLECTIONS ON 
AUSTIN AND DERRIDA.' IN CRITICAL INQUIRY.VOL 8.1982.P693-721, 
ROBBINS.I. W. 'PRAGMATISM AND THE DECONSTRUCTION OF THEOLOGY, 'IN RELIGIOUS 
STUDIES.VOL24. l 988.P375-384, W ARD.G. 'WHY IS DERRIDA IMPORT ANT FOR THEOLOGY?' IN 
THEOLOGY.VOL95.1992.P263-70, SCHARLEMANN.R.P.'DECONSTRUCTION: WHAT IS IT?' IN 
DIALOG. VOL 26.1987.Pl84-188, DAV ANEY.S.G.'OPTIONS IN POST-MODERN THEOLOGY.' IN 
DIALOG.VOL 26.1987.Pl96-200, GODZlEBA.A.J. 'ONTOTHEOLOGYTO EXCESS: IMAGINING 
GOD WITHOUT BEING.' IN THEOLOGICAL STUDIES.VOL 56.1995.P3-20, 
DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: PORTER.C ET AL). 'THE PRINCIPLE OF REASON: THE UNIVERSITY 
IN THE EYES OF ITS PUPILS.' IN DIACRITICS. VOL 13.1983.P3-20, NORRIS.C. 'LIMITED THINK: 
HOW NOT TO READ DERRIDA.' IN DIACRITICS. VOL 20.1990 P 17-36, TREY. G.A 'THE 
PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY; HABERMAS' POSTMODERN ADVENTURE.' IN 
DIACRITICS. VOL l 9. ! 989.P67-79, 
HOLDHEIM.W. W: 1989. 'ON JACQUES DERRIDA'S "PAUL DE MAN'S WAR" IV.JACQUES 
DERRIDA'S APOLOGIA. 'IN CRITICAL INQUIRY. VOL15. l 989.P784-803, MILBANK.I. 'CAN A 
GIFT BE GIVEN? PROLEGOMENA TO A FUTURE TRINJT ARIAN METAPHYSIC. 'IN MODERN 
THEOLOGY. VOL 11.1995.Pll 9-161, JONES. W.T. 'DE CONSTRUCTING DERRIDA: BELOW THE 
SURF ACE OF DIFFERANCE. 'IN MET APHILOSOPHY. VOL 23. l 992.P230-250, NOVITZ.D. 
'THE RAGE FOR DECONSTRUCTION. 'IN THE MONIST.VOL69.1986.P39-55, SCRUTON.R. 'UPON 
NOTHING. 'IN PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS.VOL l 7. l 994.P48 l-506, 
CARRIER.D. 'DERRIDA AS PHILOSOPHER. 'INMETAPHILOSOPHY. VOL 16.1985.P221-152, 
ALFINO.M. 'ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE. 'IN PHILOSOPHY AND 
RHETORIC.VOL24.199LP143-152, RORTY.R.'PRAGMATISM CATEGORIES, AND 
LANGUAGE.'INPHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.VOL 70.l961.Pl97-223, RORTY.R.'PHILOSOPHY AS 
A KIND OF WRITING; AN ESSAY ON DERRIDA. 'IN CONSEQUENCES OF 
PRAGMATISM.ESSAYS.1972-1980. DERRIDA.I. 'THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ACTUALITY. 'IN 
RADICAL PHILOSOPHY. VOL 68. l 994.P28-41, BERSANI.L. 'FROM BARCHELARD TO 
BARTHES. 'IN PARTISAN REVIEW.VOL 34.1967.P215-32. DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: WEBER.S. 
MEHLMAN.J). 'SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT.' IN GL YPH.VOLl. l 977.Pl72-97, 
SEARLE.J.R. 'REITERATING THE DIFFERENCES: A REPLY TO DERRIDA. 'IN GLYPH. VOL 
1.1977.Pl 98-208, GASCHE.R 'DECONSTRUCTION AS CRITICISM. 'IN GLYPH. VOL 6.1979 Pl 77-
215, DERRIDA.J. 'LIMITED INC.ABC. 'IN GLYPH. VOL 2.1977.Pl62-254, SMITH.J. 'HUSSERL, 
DERRIDA, HEGEL, AND THE NOTION OF TIME.' IN INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUARTERLY. VOL 36. \ 996.P287-302, TERENCE.L.N.' AQUINAS' CONCEPT OF SUBSTANTIAL 
FORM AND MODERN SCIENCE. 'IN INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY. VOL 
36. !996.P303-3 \8, MILLERS. 'DERRIDA AND THE INDETERMINANCY OF MEANING. 'IN SOUTH 
AFRICAN JOURNAL OF PHJLOSOPHY.VOL 9.1990.P24-27, ROSENTHAL.S.B. 'SIGN, TIME AND 
THE VIABLILITY OF TRACE: DERRIDA AND PIERCE.' IN INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUARTERLY.VOL 36.1996.Pl9-28, NORRIS.C. 'DECONSTRUCTION, POSTMODERNISM AND 
PHILOSOPHY: HABERMAS ON DERRIDA.' IN PRAXIS INTERNATIONAL. VOL 8.1989.P426-445, 
HOY.D. C. 'SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: HABERMAS' CRITIQUE OF DERRIDA. 'IN PRAXIS 
INTERNATIONAL.VOL8.1989.P447-464. PEPERZAK.A: 1993.'TOTHE OTHERAN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS,' DA VIS.C: 
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1996. 'LEVIN AS.AN INTRODUCTION,' BERNASCONI.R 'LEVINAS AND DERRIDA.THE 
QUESTION OF THE CLOSURE OF METAPHYSICS. 'IN (EDITOR: COHEN.RA: 1986).FACE TO 
FACE WTI1I LEVINAS, SMITH.H. 'THE RELIGIOUS SIGNIFICANCE OF POSTMODERNISM. 'IN 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY.VOL 12. 1995.P409-22, NORRIS.C. 'HOME THOUGHTS FROM 
ABROAD: DERRIDA. AUSTIN AND THE OXFORD CONNECTION. 'IN PHILOSOPHY AND 
LITERATURE.VOL 10.1986.Pl-25, FOTl.V.M.'PRESENCE Ai'ID MEMORY: DERRIDA, FREUD, 
PLATO, DESCARTES.'INGRADUATE FACULTY PHILOSOPHY JOURNAL.VOL ll.1986.P67-82. 
CAPUTO.J.D:l997.'THE PRAYERS AND TEARS OF JACQUES DERRIDA,' 
NORRIS: 1991. 'DECONSTRUCTION THEORY AND PRACTICE,' PRIESTS. 'FRENCH 
PHILOSOPHY.' IN (EDITOR: HONDERJCH.T: 1995).THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 
.OP err, KOBLENTZ.E.D. 'DECONSTRUCTION DECONSTRUCTED: THE RESURRECTION OF 
BEING.'IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. VOL 18. 19%.PS-IO. CLARK.AK.' AUGUSTINE AND 
DERRIDA; READING AS FULFILMENT OF THE WORD. 'IN NEW SCHOLASTICISM. VOL 
55.198LP104-112, DE SAUSSURE.F.(TRANSLATED: BASKIN.W: 1959).'COURSE IN GENERAL 
LINGUISTICS,' WYSCHOGROD.E. 'TIME AND NON-BEING IN DERRIDA AND QUINE.' IN 
JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY. VOL 14. 1983.Pl 12-126, 
CRITCHLEY.S.'THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE JN DERRIDA.PART ONE.' IN JOURNAL OF THE 
BRITISH SOCIETY FOR PHENOMENOLOGY. 'VOL 23. 1992 P3-l 9. CRITCHLEY.S. 'THE PROBLEM 
OF CLOSURE IN DERRIDA PART TWO. 'IN JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH SOCIETY FOR 
PHENOMENOLOGY. VOL 23.1992.PI27-145. DERRIDA.(TRANSLATED: ALLISON.D.B).'SPEECH 
AND PHENOMENA. 'IN (EDITOR: KAMUF.P: 1991). A DERRIDA READERBETWEEN THE 
BLINDS. 'CHOREOGRAPHIES.' WRITTEN INTERVIEW WITH JACQUES DERRIDA, 
CONDUCTED BY McDONALD.C.V.(IRANSLATED: McDONALD.C.V.).IN (EDITOR: KAMUF.P: 
1991). ADERRIDAREADERBETWEEN THE BLINDS.OP CIT, SPINOSAC.'DERRIDAAND 
HEIDEGGER: ITERABILITY AND EREIGNJS.' IN (EDITORS: 
DREYFUS.H, HALL.H: 1992). HEIDEGGER: A CRITICAL READER RAPAPORT.H: 
1989. 'HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA REFLECTIONS ON TIME AND LANGUAGE,' 
SIL VERMAN.H. 'DERRIDA. HEIDEGGER, AND THE TIME OF THE LINE.' IN (EDITOR: 
SIL VERMAN.H: 1989). DERRIDA AND DECONSTRUCTION, GUIGNON.C.B. 'INTRODUCTION .. 
IN (EDITOR: GUIGNON.C.B: 1993). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER 
FREDE.D. 'THE QUESTION OF BEING: HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT.' IN 
(EDITOR: GUIGNON.C: 1993). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER, 
HEIDEGGERM. 'THE END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE TASK OF THINKING.' IN (EDITOR: 
KRELL.D.F: 1993).BASIC WRITINGS.REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION. 
DANCEY.I: 1994. 'INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY,' DERRIDA.I. 
(TRANSLATED: BRAULT.P, ET AL: 1993). 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND.THE SELF PORTRAIT AND 
OTHER RUINS,' DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: FREIDEN.K: 1989). 'HOW TO A VOID SPEAKING 
DENIALS,' DILLON.M.C: 1995. 'SEMIOLOIGAL REDUCTIONISM.' DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: 
WOOD.D, ET AL: 1995). 'KHORA .. IN ON THE NAME, 
HART.K: 1989.'THE TRESPASS OF THE SIGN,' TAYLORM.C: 1990.'TEARS,' 
DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BENNINGTON.G: 1991). 'CIRCUMFESSION.FIFTY-NINE PERIODS 
AND PERIPHRASES,' AUSTIN.J.L: 1970. 'PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS.' 
2 IN THIS CASE WITNESS THE REFUSAL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIOOE IN 1990, TO ISSUE DERRIDA WITH 
A>'l HONORARY DOCTORATE. LATER, THE AWARDrNG WENT AHEAD IN 1992, AFTER A VOTE WAST AKEN-SEE: 
NORRIS.C: 1996. 'RECLAIMING TRUTH. CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE OF CULTIJRAL 
RELAT!VISM.'P222FF. DERRIDA, HIMSELF SPEAKS ON THIS ISSUE IN: DERRIDA.I. 
(TRANSLATED: KAMUF, ET AL; 1992). 'POINTS ... ' INTERVIEWS. l 974-1994.P399FF. 
3 SEE: PRIEST.S. 'FRENCH PHILOSOPHY.' IN (EDITOR: HONDERICH.T: 1995).THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY.OP CIT.P297FF. 
4 SEE: BESTS, KELLNERD: 1991. 'POSTMODERNISM.CRITICAL INTERROGATIONS. 'Pl 7FF. 
5 IBID.Pl?. 
6 IBID.Pl7. 
7 IBID.P2L 
'BROWN.D: 1987. 'CONTINENT AL PHILOSOPHY AND MODERN THEOLOGY. 'OP CIT.P XII. 
9 PRIESTS OP Cn.P300. 
10 KEARNEY.R. 'MODERN MOVEl'vlENTS IN EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY. 'P2. 
11 IBID.P2. 
11 BERSANLL. 'FROM BARCHELARD TO BARTHES. 'IN PARTISAN REVIEW.VOL 34. 1967. 
P215FF. 
13 BOUVERESSE.J. 'WHY I AM SO VERY UNFRENCH.' IN 
(EDITOR: MONTEFIORE.A: 1983).PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE TODAY.P8FF. 
14 1BID.P9. 
15 IBID.P9. 
16 IBID.P24. 
17 IBID.P24. 
18 IBID.P25. 
19 IBID.Pl8. 
20 STURROCK.I. 'INTRODUCTION.' IN (STURROCK.I: EDITOR: 1979).STRUCTURALISM AND 
SINCE.P17. 
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21 As WITIITHE LATER WORK OF 8ARTHES. THE WR!TING OF JACQUES DERRIDA IS BOTH A CONTINUATION 
AND CRJTIQUE OF STRUCTURALISM. WE ARE, SAYS DERRJDA, STILL INSIDE STRUCTURALISM AS FAR AS IT 
CONSTITUTES 'AN ADVENTURE OR VISION. A CONVERSION IN THE WAY OF PUITING QUESTIONS TO .-\J-N 
OBJECT. SINCE WE TAKE NOURJSHMENT FROM THE FECUNDITY OF STRUCTURALISM, IT IS TOO SOON TO 
DISPEL OUR DREAM. WE MUST MUSE UPON WHAT IT MIGHT SIGNIFY FROM \VITHIN IT. IN THE FlJTL'RE IT \VILL 
BE 11''TERPRETED, PERHAPS, AS A RELAXATION, IF NOT A LAPSE, OF THE ATTENTION GIVEN TO FORCE, WHICH 
IS THE TENSION OF THE FORCE ITSELF, FORM FASCINATES WHEN ONE NO WNGER HAS THE FORCE TO 
UNDERSTAND FORCE FROM WITHIN ITSELF, THAT!S, TO CREATE. THAT IS WHY LITERARY CRITICISM IS 
STRLCTURAL!ST IN EVERY AGE, IN ITS ESSENCE Ai'\fD DESTINY,' -DERRIDAI.(TRANSLATED: BASS: 
1978).'WRITING AND DIFFERENCE.'P 4-5. 'AT THAT TIME STRUCTURALISM WAS DOMINANT. 
"DECONSTRUCTION" SEEMED TO BE GOING IN THE SAME DIRECTION SINCE THE WORD SIGNIFIED A CERTAIN 
ATTENTION TO STRLCTURES (WHICH THEMSELVES WERE NEITHER SIMPLY IDEAS, NOR FORMS, NOR 
SYNTHESES, NOR SYSTEMS). To DECONSTRUCT WAS ALSO AN ANT!STRUCTURALIST GESTLRE, AND ITS 
FORTUNE RESTS IN PART ON THIS Ai\IBIGUITY. STRUCTURES WERE TO BE UNDONE. DECOMPOSED 
DESEDIMENTED (ALL TYPES OF STRUCTURES, LINGUISTIC. "LOGOCENTRJC," "PHONOCENTRJC" -
STRUCTURALISM BEING ESPECIALLY AT THAT TIME DOMINATED BY LINGUISTIC MODELS AND BY A SO-
CALLED STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS THAT WAS ALSO CALLED SAUSSURJAN-SOCIO-INSTITUflONAL. POLITICAL. 
CULTURAL, A.'1D ABOVE ALL AND FROM THE START PHIWSOPHICAL). '-DERR!DAJ. 'LETTER TO A 
JAPANESE FRIEND.' IN (EDITOR: KAMUF:P: 1991). A DERRIDA READER.BETWEEN THE 
BLINDS.P272. 
"DE SAUSSURE.F.(TRANSLATED:BASKIN.W: 1959). 'COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS.'Pl. 
23 IBID.Pl. 
'"IBID.P2. 
'5 'SOlvIEONE PRONOUNCES THE FRENCH WORD NU"BARE." A SUPERFICIAL OBSERVER WOULD BE TEMPTED 
TO CALL THE WORD A CONCRETE LINGUISTIC OBJECT; BL"T AMORE CAREFUL EXAMINATION WOULD REVEAL 
SUCCESSIVELY THREE OR FOUR QUITE DIFFERENT THINGS. DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE WORD IS 
CONSIDERED AS A SOUND, AS THE EXPRESSION OF AN IDEA, AS THE EQmV ALENT OF THE LATIN NUDUM, ETC. 
FAR FROM IT BEING THE OBJECT THAT Ai"ITEDA TES THE VIEWPOINT, IT WOULD SEEM THAT IT IS THE 
VIEWPOINT THAT CREA TES THE OBJECT; BESIDES, NOTHING TELLS US IN ADVANCE THAT ONE WAY OF 
CONSIDERJNG THE FACT IN QUESTION TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER THE OTHERS OR IS IN ANYWAY SLPERJOR TO 
THEM.' -IBID.PS. 
26 KEARNEY.R.OP CIT.P240. 'THE LINGUISTIC ENTITY EXISTS ONLY THROUGH THE ASSOCIATING OF THE 
SIGNIFIER \VITH THE SIGNIFIED., -DE SAUSSURE.F.1Bm.P102. 'THE LINGmSTIC SIGN UNITES. NOT A THING 
AND A NAME, BUT A CONCEPT AND A SOUND-IMAGE. THE LATTER IS NOT THE MA TERJAL SOUND, A PURELY 
PHYSICAL THING, BUT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPRINT OF THE SOUND, THE IMPRESSION THAT IT MAKES ON 
OUR SENSES.' -IBID.P66. 'THE LINGUISTIC ENTITY EXISTS ONLY THROUGH THE ASSOCIATION OF THE 
SIGNIFIER wrrn THE SIGNIFIED. WHENEVER ONL y ONE ELEMENT IS RETAINED, THE ENTITY v ANISHES; 
INSTEAD OF A CONCRETE OBJECT WE ARE FACED WITH A MERE ABSTRACTION,' -IBID.PJ03. 
27 MATTHEWS.£. 'TWENTIETH-CENTURY FRENCH PHILOSOPHY. 'P 137. 
"DE SAUSSURE .. F.OP CIT.P9. 
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"IBID.P9. 
30
ROBEY.D. 'MODERN LINGUISTICS AND THE LANGUAGE OF LITERATURE. 'IN 
(JEFFERSON.A AND ROBEY.D: EDITORS: I 982).MODERN LITERARY THEORY.OP C!T.P46. 
LA'IGUAGE PROVIDES THE THEORETIC.AL CONTENT TO OUR STUDY. [T PROVIDES THE CORPUS OF LINGUSTIC 
RULES WHICH USERS OF THE L\,'IGUAGE MUST OBEY. IF THEY ARE TO ENGAGE IN MEANINGFUL SPEECH. 
SPEECH rs THE DAY-TO-DAY MA>'<lFESTATION OF L."-"'IGUAGE. WE ~!UST THEREFORE. GO BEYOND EVERY-DAY 
SPEECH. WE MUST GO 'BEHIND,' TO THE UNDERLYING LA'IGUAGE. IN ORDER TO COMPREHEND THE RULES 
SPEECH USES. 'TO GIVE LANGUAGE FIRST PLACE !NTHE STUDY OF SPEECH. WE CA'I ADVANCE A FINAL 
ARGUMENT: THE FACULTY OF ARTICULATING WORDS-WHETHER !TIS NATURAL OR NOT-IS EXERCISED ONLY 
WITH THE HELP OF THE INSTRUMENT CREATED BY ,\COLLECTIVITY ru'ID PROVIDED FOR ITS USE; THEREFORE 
TO SAY THAT LANGUAGE GIVES UNITY TO SPEECH IS 
NOT FANCIFUL.' -F.DE SAUSSURE.OP CIT.Pl I. 
31 KEARNEY.0PCIT.P241. 
32 DE SAUSSURE.F.OP CIT.P66. 
33 MATTHEWS.E.OP CIT.Pl37. 
34 DE SAUSSURE.F.OP CIT.P68. 'PoLITE FORMULAS. FORINST."-"'ICE, THOUGH OFTEN IMBUED WITH A 
CERTAIN NATURAL EXPRESSIVENESS (AS IN THE CASE OF A CHINESE WHO GREETS HIS EMPEROR BY BOWING 
00\llN TO THE GROUND NINE TIMES), .ARE NONETHELESS FIXED BY RULE; IT IS THIS RULE AND NOT THE 
INTRINSIC VALL'E OF THE GESTURES THAT OBLIGES ONE TO USE THEM. SIGNS THAT ARE WHOLLY ARBITRARY 
REALISE BETTER THAN THE OTHERS THE IDEAL OF THE SE~llOLOGICAL PROCESS; THAT IS WHY LANGUAGE, 
THE MOST COMPLEX AND UNIVERSAL Of ALL SYSTEMS OF EXPRESSION, IS ALSO THE MOST CHARACTERISTIC: 
IN THIS SENSE LINGUISTICS CAN BECOME THE \!ASTER-PATTERN FOR ALL BRANCHES OF SEMIOLOGY 
AL THOUGH LANGUAGE IS ONLY ONE PARTICULAR SEMIOLOGICAL SYSTEM ... THE WORD ARBITRARY ALSO 
CALLS FOR COMMENT. THE TERM SHOULD NOT !MPL Y THAT THE CHOICE OF THE SIG1'1FIER IS LEFT ENTIRELY 
TO THE SPEAKER (WE SHALL SEE BELOW THAT THE C.'DIVIDUAL DOES NOT HA VE THE POWER TO CHANGE A 
SIGN IN fu'IY WAY ONCE IT HAS BECOME ESTABLISHED IN THE LINGUISTIC COMMUNITY); J MEAN THAT IT IS 
UNMOTIVATED, 1.E, ARBITRARY IN THAT IT . .\CTUALLY HAS NO NATURAL CONNECTION WITH THE SIGN1FIED.'-
IBID.P68-9. 
35 IBID.P71. 
36 KEARNEY.R.OP CIT.P245. 
37 
DE SAUSSURE.F.0PCIT.Pl20. 
38 BEST.S, KELLNER.D.OP CIT.P21.0BVIOUSLY, NOT ALL won.D AGREE WITH SAUSSURIAN LINGUISTIC 
THEORY. ' ... AS AGAINST THE POST-STRUCTCRALISTS . \ND FOLLOWERS OF SAUSSURE EMPSON DENIES (I) 
THAT LANGUAGE IS A NETWORK OF PURELY ·'.ARBITRARY" CODES AND CONVENTIONS: (2) THAT THESE 
CONVENTIONS ARE BEST UNDERSTOOD INTER.VIS OF Tf!E LIKEWISE ARBITRARY LINK BETWEEN SIGNIFIER .A.'<'D 
S!GMFJED: (3) THAT fu'IY ASPIRANT "'SCIENCE" OF STRUCTURAL LINGUISTICS WILL RESPECT THIS CONDITION 
AN'D HENCE NOT CONCERN ITSELF WITH ISSl'ES OF TRUTH, REFERE:<CE, PROPOSITIONAL MEM1NG OR OTHER 
SUCH''EXTRANEOUS" FACTORS. AND (4) THAT SUCH A "'SCIENCE"' '-'!UST IN M'Y CASE ACfu'iO\VLEDGE ITS 
OWN INEVITABLY CULTURE-BOUND CHARACTER. ITS TEXTUAL CONSTITL 'TION OR TRA'iS!ENT STATCS AS A 
PRODUCT OF THIS OR THAT LOCALISED "DISCOURSE" LACKING AN'Y CLAI~l TO ULTIMATE VALIDITY OR 
TR\.,'TH. ON THE CONTRARY, HE ARGL'ES; THERE IS A "'GRAMMAR' OF COMPLEX WORDS WHICH CORRESPONDS 
TO CERT A.IN BASIC LOG!CO-SEMA1''TJC OPERATIONS. AND "1 THE .ABSENCE OF WHICH \VE WOULD BE UNABLE 
TO IN1'ERPRET EVEN THE SIMPLEST FORMS OF \'ERBAL BEHAVIOUR ... HERE. AS WE HA v'E SEEN, EMPSON IS 
MUCH CLOSER TO PHILOSOPHERS IN THE ANGLO-A\IERIC."-"'1 "'ANALYTICAL"' TR.ADITION-THINKERS LIKE 
FREGE, RUSSELL A'ID QUINE-THAN TO .ANYTHING "1 THE FRENCH POST-STRUCTURALIST LINE OF DESCENT.'-
NORRJS.C. 'THE TRUTH ABOUT POSTMODERNITY. 'OP C!T.Pl62. 
39 DERRIDAJ.'DIFFERANCE.'IN (EDITOR: KAMUF.P: 1991).A DERRIDA READER.OP CIT.P65. 
40 IBID.P67. SEE ALSO: SCHARLEMANN.R.P. 'DECONSTRUCTION: WHAT IS JT'l'OP C1T.Pl86FF. 
41 SPEAKING OF SAUSSURE'S LINGUISTICS HERE. DERRIDA STATES; 'IT HAS MARKED, AGAINST THE 
TRADITION, THAT THE SIGNIFIED JS INSEPARABLE FROM THE SIG1'1FIER, THAT THE SIGNIFIED AND SIGNIFIER 
ARE THE TWO SIDES OF ONE M'D THE SAME PRODUCTION ... BY EMPHASISING THE DIFFERENTIAL ANDFORAlAL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF SEMIOLOGICAL FUNCTIONING, BY SHO'WTNG THAT IT "IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR SOUND, THE 
MATERIAL ELEMENT, ITSELF TO BELONG TO Lru'IGUAGE" AND THAT "IN ITS ESSENCE IT (THE LINGUISTIC 
SIG1'1FIER) JS NOT AT ALL PHONIC;" BY DESUBST A:>ff!ALISING BOTH THE SIGNIFIED CONTENT AND THE 
"'EXPRESSIVE SliBSTA'iCE" -WHICH THEREFORE IS NO LONGER IN A PRIVILEGED OR EXCLUS!v'E WAY PHONIC-
BY ~!.'\KING LINGUISTICS A DIVISION OF GE1''ERAL SEMIOLOGY. SAUSSURE POWERFULLY CONTRIBUTED TO 
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TURNlNG AGAINST THE METAPHYSICAL TRADITION THE CONCEPT OF THE SIGN THAT HE BORROWED FROM 
IT.' -DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1972). 'POSITIONS.' SEMIOLOGY AND 
GRAMMATOLOGY.tNTERVIEW WITH JULIA KRISTEV A.PIS. SAYS DERRIDA FURTHER: 'THE 
MAINTENANCE OF THE RIGOROUS DISTINCTION-AN ESSENTIAL AND JURIDIC AL DISTINCTION-BETWEEN THE 
S/GNANS AND THE SIGNATUM, THE EQUATION OF THE SIGNATL\H .-\ND THE CONCEPT, INHERENTLY LEAVES 
OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF THINKING A CONCEPT SIGNIFIED IN .4.ND OF ITSELF, A CONCEPT SIMPLY PRESENT FOR 
THOUGHT, INDEPENDENT OF A RELATIONSHIP TO LANGUAGE, THAT IS OF A RELATIONSHIP TO A SYSTEM OF 
SIGNIFIERS. BY LEA YING OPEN THIS POSSIBILITY. SAUSSURE-A..'iD IT IS INHERENT EVEN IN THE OPPOSITION 
SIGNIFIER\sIGNffiED, THAT IS IN WHICH WE WERE JUST SPEAKING-SAUSSURE CONTRADICTS THE CRITICAL 
ACQUISITIONS OF EXIGENCY OF WHAT I HAVE PROPOSED TO CALL A "TRANSCENDENT AL SIGNIFIED," WHICH 
IN AND OF ITSELF, IN ITS ESSENCE, WOULD REFER TO NO SIGNIFIER, WOULD EXCEED THE CHAIN OF SIGNS, 
AND WOlJLD NO LONGER ITSELF FUNCTION AS A SIGNIFIER. 0N THE CONTRARY, THOUGHT, FROM THE 
MOMENT THAT ONE QUESTIONS THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH A TRANSCENDENT AL SIGNIFIED, AND THAT ONE 
RECOGNISES THAT EVERY SIGNIFIED IS ALSO IN THE POSITION OF A SIGNIFIER, THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN 
SIGNIFIED AND SIGNIFIER BECOMES PROBLEMATICAL AT ITS ROOT. '-IBID.P20. 
42 DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: BASS.A: 1972). 'POSillONS.' SEMIOLOGY AND 
GRAMMATOLOGY.INTERVIEW WITH JULIA KRISTEV A.OP CIT.P29. 
43 lBID.P20. 
44 SPIVAK.G.C: 1974.'TRANSLATOR'SPREFACE' IN JACQUES DERRIDA.OF 
GRAMMA TOLOGY.P L VIII. 'AR.\!ED \NlTH THIS SIMPLE YET POWERFUL INSIGHT-POWERFUL ENOUGH TO 
"DECONSTRUCT THE TRANSCENDENTAL SIGNIFIED"-THAT THE SIGN. PHONIC AS WELL AS GRAPHIC, IS A 
STRUCTURE OF DIFFERENCE, DERRIDA SI:GGESTS THAT WHAT OPENS THE POSSIBILITY OF THOUGHT IS NOT 
~IERELY THE QUESTION OF BEING, BUT ALSO THE NEVER-ANNULLED DIFFERENCE FROM THE "COMPLETELY 
OTHER." SUCH IS THE STRfu'iGE "BEING" OF THE SIGN: HALF OF IT ALWAYS "NOT THERE" AND THE OTHER 
HALF ALWAYS "'NOT THAT." THE STRUCTL1IB OF THE SIGN IS DETER~IINED BY THE TRACE OR TRACK OF THAT 
OTHER WHICH IS FOREVER ABSENT. THIS OTHER IS OF COURSE NEVER TO BE FOUND IN ITS FULL BEING. As 
EVEN SUCH EMPIRICAL EVENTS AS A..'iSWERING A CHILD'S QUESTION OR CONSULTING A DICTIONARY 
PROCLAIM, 01'"E SIGN LEADS TO A..'iOTHER .'\ND SO ON lNDEFINITELY.'-[BID.PXVll. 
"DERRIDA.J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY. 'Op CIT.P6. 
46 IBID.P30. 
47 1BID.P30.HERE DERRIDA QUOTES SAUSSURE.OP CIT.P45. 
4S [BID.P39. 
49 1BID.P5 l. 
so DERRIDA.J. 'SEMIOLOGY AND GRAMMATOLOGY. 'OP CIT.P22. CONTEMPORARY LINGUISTS AND 
OTHERS HAVE CRITICISED SAUSSL1IB HERE FOR REDUCING THE SIGNIFIC.-'uNCE OF THE SIGNIFIER TO A 
"PSYCHOLOGIS:\-1.' 
51 BARTHES.R.(TRANSLA TED: LA VERS.A: 1967). 'ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY. "Pl6, AS QUOTED 
BY NORRJS.C. 'DECONSTRUCTION.THEORY AND PRACTICE. 'Op CIT.P27. 
52 NORRJS.C.OP CIT.P27. 
53 HERE WE MUST TAKE NOTE OF NORRIS' WARNING: .... DECONSTRUCTION IS NOT SIMPLY A STRATEGIC 
REVERSAL OF CATEGORIES WHICH OTHER\NlSE REMAIN DISTINCT AND UNAFFECTED. IT SEEKS TO UNDO BOTH 
A GIVEN ORDER OF PRIORITIES AND THE VERY SYSTEM OF C01'CEPTLAL OPPOSITION THAT MAKES THAT 
ORDER POSSIBLE. THUS DERRIDA IS EMPHATICALLY NOT TRYING TO PROVE THAT"WRITING" IN ITS NORMAL, 
RESTRICTED SENSE IS SOMEHOW MORE BASIC THA..'i SPEECH.' -N0RRJS.C.!BID.P3 l. 
54 
'THIS PRI1'CIPLE COMPELS US 1'0T ONLY TO PRIVILEGE ONE SUBSTANCE-HERE THE PHONIC, SO CALLED 
TEMPORAL, SlJBSTru'iCE·WHILE EXCLUDING ANOTHER-FOR EXAMPLE, THE GRAPHIC. SO CALLED SPATIAL, 
SlJBST.-'u'iCE·BL"f EVEN TO CONSIDER EVERY PROCESS OF SIGNIFICATION AS A FORMAL PLAY OF 
DIFFERENCES.' -DERRIDA.J.' SEMIOLOGY AND GRAMMATOLOGY. 'Op CIT.P26. 
55 IBID.P29. 
56 DERRIDA.J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY. 'OP CIT.P56. 
57 ]BID.P63. 
58 DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED:WOOD.D, BENJAMIN.A: 1988). 'LETTER TO A JAPANESE 
FRIEND. 'IN (EDITORS: WOOD.D, BERNASCONI.R: 1988).DERRIDA AND DIFFERA.NCE. Pl. 
59 ]BID.P I.DERRIDA SAYS FURTHER: 'BUT IN FRENCH "DESTRUCTION" TOO OBVIOUSLY IMPLIED AN 
ANNIHILATION OR A NEGATIVE REDUCTION MUCH CLOSER PERHAPS TO NIETZSCHEAN "DEMOLITION" THAN 
THE HEIDEGGERIAN INTERPRETATION OR TO THE TYPE OF READING THAT I PROPOSED. So I RULED THAT OUT. 
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I REMEMBER HAVING LOOKED TO SEE IF THE WORD "DECONSTRUCTION" (WHICH CAME TO ME QUITE 
SPONT.'u'JEOUSLY) WAS GOOD FRENCH. I FOUND IT IN THE LITTRE' . .. PERHAPS l COULD CITE SOME OF THE 
ENTRIES FROM THELITTRE'. "DE'CONSTRUCTION'.ACTION OF DECONSTRUCTING. GRAMMATICAL TERM. 
DISARRANGING THE CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS IN A SENTENCE ... l. TO DISASSEMBLE THE PARTS FROM A 
WHOLE ... 2.GRAMMATICAL TERM ... TO DECONSTRUCT VERSE, RENDERING IT, BY THE SUPPRESSION OF 
METER, SIMILAR TO PROSE."' -lBID.P2. NEVERTHELESS, AFTER PROVIDING THESE DEFIMTIONS, DERRIDA 
GGES FURTHER AND STATES THAT THESE DEFThlTIONS THEMSELVES NEED TO BE DECONSTRUCTED. HE THEN 
STATES THAT THERE IS A STRONG LlNK BETWEEN STRVCTURALISM A.'ID DECONSTRUCTION AS BOTII SEEK TO 
CONCERN THEMSELVES WITH STRUCTURES IN TEXTS. DECONSTRUCTION HOWEVER, IS A FUNDAMENTALLY 
ANTI-STRUCTURALIST PRACTICE. 'STRUCTURES WERE TO BE UNDONE, DECOMPOSED, DESEDIMENTED (ALL 
TYPES OF STRUCTURES, LINGUISTIC, "LOGOCENTRIC," "PHONOCENTRIC" -STRUCTURALISM BEING 
ESPECIALLY AT THAT TIME DOMINATED BY LINGUISTIC MODELS AND BY A SO-CALLED STRUCTURAL 
LINGUISTICS THAT WAS ALSO CALLED SAUSSURIA.'l-SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL, POLITICAL, CULTURAL, AND 
ABOVE ALL AND FROM THE START PHILOSOPHICAL). THIS IS WHY, ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES, THE 
MOTIF OF DECONSTRUCTION HAS BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH "POSTSTRUCTURALISM' ... BFf THE UNDOING, 
DECOMPOSING, AND DESEDIMENTING OF STRUCTURES, IN A CERTAIN SENSE MORE HISTORICAL THAN THE 
STRUCTURALIST MOVEME1''T IT CALLED INTO QUESTION, WAS NOT A NEGATIVE OPERATION. RATHER THA.'< 
DESTROYING, IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO UNDERST . .\ND HOW AN "ENSEMBLE" WAS CONSTITUTED AND TO 
RECONSTRUCT IT TO THIS END.' -IBID.P3. DERRIDA STATES THAT HE HAS NEVER BEEN ENTIRELY SATISFIED 
WITH THE TERM. IN THE WORK OF DECONSTRUCTION, ONE, IN A SENSE, PUTS ASIDE ALL PHILOSOPHICAL 
CONCEPTS, WHILE REAFFIRMING THE NECESSITY OF RETURNING TO THEM, AT LEAST L1''DER ERASURE. SEE 
ALSO, SCHARLEMANN.RP: 'DECONSTRUCTION: WHAT IS IT?' OP CIT.Pl85, FOR FURTHER 
DEFINfTIONS OF DECONSTRUCTION AS 'DESTRUCTIVE CRJTICISM.' 
60 NORRIS.C. 'DECONSTRUCTION THEORY AND PRACTICE. 'OP CIT.P31. 
61 JOHNSON.B.'TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.' IN (TRANSLATED: JOHNSON.B: 
1981).'JACQUES DERRIDA 'DISSEMINATION. 'PXV. SAYS NORRIS: ' ... DECONSTRUCTION IS THE 
VIGILANT SEEKING-OUT OF THOSE" APORIAS," BLINDSPOTS OR MOME1''TS OF SELF-CONTRADICTION WHERE A 
TEXT INVOLllNT ARIL Y BETRAYS THE TENSION BETWEEN RHETORIC AND LOGIC, BETWEEN WHAT IT 
MANIFESTLY MEANS TO SAY AND WHAT IT IS NONETHELESS CONSTRAINED TO MEAN.' -
NORRIS.C. 'DERRIDA 'Pl9. SEE ALSO: DERRIDA.J. 'LETTER TO A JAPANESE FRIEND. 'OP CIT.P4. 
62 CULLER.J. 'JACQUES DERRIDA' IN (EDITOR: STURROCKJ: 1979).STRUCTURALISM AND 
SINCE.OP CIT.Pl58. 
63 [BID.Pl58-9. 'THE "APPARE1''T TRANSCENDENCE" OF THE VOICE THUS RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT THE 
SIGNIFIED, WHICH rs ALWAYS IDEAL BY ESSENCE, THE "EXPRESSED" BEDEUTUNG, IS IM!>IEDIATELY PRESEJ\'T 
IN THE ACT OF EXPRESSION. THIS IMMEDIATE PRESENCE RESULTS FROM THE FACT THAT THE 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL "BODY" OF THE SIGNIFIER SEE~!S TO BE EFFACED AT THE VERY MOMENT IT IS 
PRODUCED, IT SEEMS ALREADY TO BELONG TO THE ELEMENT OF IDEALITY. IT PERFORMS A 
PHENOMENOLOGICAL REDUCTION ON ITSELF, TRA.'JSFORM!NG THE WORLDLY OPACITY OF ITS BODY INTO 
PlJRE DIAPHANEITY. THIS EFFACEMENT OF THE SENSIBLE BODY AND ITS EX'TER!ORITY IS FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 
THE VERY FORM OF THE IMMEDIATE PRESENCE OF THE SIGNIFIED ... EVEN WHILE REPRESSING DIFFERENCE BY 
ASSIGNING IT TO THE EXTERIORITY OF THE SIGNIFIERS. HUSSERL COULD NOT FAIL TO RECOGNISE ITS WORK 
AT THE ORIGIN OF SENSE AND PRESENCE.' -DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED: ALLISON.D.B). 'SPEECH AND 
PHENOMENA 'IN (EDITOR: KAMUF.P: 1991). A DERRIDA READER.BETWEEN THE BLINDS.OP 
CIT.P20-24. 
64 INTERVIEW WITH JACQUES DERRIDA. CONDUCTED BY CATHERINE DA YID OF LE 
NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR. 9m SEP.1983.IN (EDITOR: BER.NASCONI.R, WOOD.D: 1988).DERRIDA 
AND DIFFERANCE.OP CIT.P71. 
65 
'THE l\'EW SENSE OF WRITING WITH WHICH ONE ASSOCIATES THE TERM DECONSTRUCTION HAS EMERGED 
FROM THE CLOSE READINGS THAT YOU HA VE GIVEN TO TEXTS AS DIVERGENT AS THOSE OF PLATO, 
ROUSSEAU, MALLARME', AND OTHERS. IT IS ONE IN WHICH TRADITIONAL BINARY PAIRING (AS IN THE 
OPPOSITION OF SPIRIT TO MATTER OR MA.'< TO WOMA.'<) NO LONGER FUNCTIONS BY THE PRJVILEGE GIVEN TO 
THE FIRST TERM OVER THE SECOND. IN A SERIES OF INTER VIEWS PUBLISHED UNDER THE TITLE POSITIONS IN 
1972, YOU SPOKE OF A TWO-PHASE PROGRA.\I (PHASE BEING UNDERSTOOD AS A STRUCTURAL RATHER THA.'1 
CHRONOLOGICAL TERM) NECESSARY FOR THE ACT OF DECONSTRUCTION. IN THE FIRST PHASE A REVERSAL 
WAS TOT AKE PLACE IN WHICH THE OPPOSED TERMS WOULD BE INVERTED. THuS WOMAN, AS A PREVIOUSLY 
SUBORDINATE TERM, MIGHT BECOME THE DOM!Nk'<'T ONE IN RELATION TO MAN. YET BECAUSE SUCH A 
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SCHE~IE OF REVERSAL COL'LD m;LY REPEAT THE TRADITIONAL SCHEME (IN WHICH THE HIERARCHY OF 
DUALITY IS .<LWAYS RECOSSTITlTED), IT ALONE COULD NOT EFFECT ANY SIGNIFICANT CHA,'\fGE. CHANGE 
WOULD ONLY OCCl'R THROUGH THE "SECOND" AND MORE RADICAL PHASE OF DECONSTRUCTION IN WHICH A 
''NEW" CONCEPT WOuLD BE FORGED Sl~ll LT A,'l'EOUSLY. THE ~IOTIF OF DIFFERANCE, AS N'EITHER A SIMPLE 
"CONCEPT" SOR A MERE "WORD." HAD BROUGHT US THE NOW FAMILIAR CONSTELLATION OF ATTENDANT 
TERMS: TRACE. SUPPLEMENT, PHARMAKON, ANDOTHERS.'-McDONALD.C.V. lN 'CHOREOGRAPHIES.' 
WRITIEN INTERVIEW WITH JACQUES DERRIDA, CONDUCTED BY 
McDONALD.C. V.(TRANSLA TED: McDONALD.C. V).IN (EDITOR: KAMUF.P: 1991).A DERRIDA 
READERBETWEEN THE BLINDS.Op Cit.P447. 
60 NORRIS.C. 'DERRIDA ·0p Cit.P25. 
67 
RORTY.R 'PHILOSOPHY AS A KIND OF WRITING.AN ESSAY ON DERRIDA 'IN 
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM.ESSAYS.1972-1980.0p Cit.P97. 
68 lbidP97. 
"'MACANN.C. 'JACQUES DERRIDA'S THEORY OF WRITING AND THE CONCEPT OF 
TRACE.'0PCIT.Pl9. 
70 
MACANN.IBID.Pl99. SAYS M,C,<\..NN: 'ANOTHER NNME GIVEN BY DERRJDA TO THIS CONCEPT OF 
"DIFFERANCJ!" IS "TRACE.'' THE CONNECTION WITH W'RITING HERE IS MORE OBVIOUS FOR THE OBJECT OF THE 
INVEl<TION OF WRITING W.'8 SURELY TO LEA VE A PERMANENT TRACE AS OPPOSED TO THE TRANSITORY 
PHENOMENON AS THE SPEECH ACT.' SEE ALSO: CRITCHLEY.S. 'THE ETHICS OF 
DECONSTRUCTION. 'Op Crr.P37 
71 
DERRIDAJ. 'FORCE AND SIGNIFICATION.' IN MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY. OP CIT.Pl3. TH!s 
PASSAGE IS POINfED otrr BY CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.P37. TIME IS VERY MUCH ASSOCIATED WITH THE 
ARISTOTELIAN BEING, AS A PRESENCE. SoMETHING 'IS,' BEC.,USE IT 'IS' (NOW). AN ENTITY IS CONSTITUTED 
AS AN 'ETE!U'\fAL PRESE!<T' WE C.'-''\f SEE. FOR EXAMPLE, THIS IN THE IDEA OF THE CONSTITimON OF THE 
HUM.-1..'\f MIND. TRADITI01'AL MODELS OF INfEl<TIONALITY AND PHENOMENOLOGY. VIEW THE IDEAL OBJECTS 
OF THE MIND .'8 COl 'NTERPARTS OF THE NATFRAL OBJECTS IN REALITY AS CONSTITUTED ENTIRELY AS A 
'PRESENT' INTHEIR ENTIRETY •. '8 A ME:-.TAL SENSE OR STATE. IN THE CASE OF DESCARTES, SAYS DERRJDA, 
WE HA VE THE SA,'1.!E PROBLEM IN THAT \VE HA v'E THE POSSIBILITY OF THE NOTION OF ABSOLlffE PRESENCE AS 
PRESENCE TO ITSELF, OR SUB.TECTIVITY. -SEE.MACANN. C.OP CIT.Pl 98. HOWEVER, AN OBJECT!S HARDLY 
PRESE!'-.'T TO ITSELF. WITHOUT IT BEING DIFFERENJIATED FRO:\'.( THAT WHICH IT IS NOT. "THE CONSTITIJTION 
OF SGCH OBJECTS REQWRES A SCCCESSION OF PURE ERLEBNISSE, TO PROVIDE THE DIVERSITY WITHIN WHICH 
THE OBJECT WILL APPEAR AS IDE:-.TITY ... ' 
-IBID.Pl98. UNDERSTANDING OF A 'CENTRE' IMPLIES THE K.'>:OWLEDGE OF ITS MARGINS. WE HAVE SEEN 
THIS IN AcGUSTINE's TRI:-.lTY. SEE ALSO: ROSENTHAL.S.B. 'SIGN, TIME, AND THE VIABILITY OF 
TRACE. 'SMITH.I. 'HUSSERL. DERRIDA, HEGEL, AND THE NOTION OF TIME,' DERRIDAJ. 
(TRANSLATED: REE.I: 1994). 'THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ACTUALITY.' INTERVIEW WITH 
BRIGITTE SOH!vl ET AL. RAPAPORT.H: 1989. 'HEIDEGGER AND DERRIDA.REFLECTIONS ON 
TIME AND LANGUAGE.' 
'
0 DERRIDA.J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY. 'IN THE DERRIDA READERBETWEEN THE BLINDS.OP 
C!T.P42-3. SAYS DERRIDA FURTHER: 'THE. "OITTSIDE" NID ''OBJECTIVE" EXTERIORITY WHICH \VE BELIEVE 
'NC K..'l"OW AS THE '.\IOST F . ..\.\fILIAR THl\\"G IN THE WORLD, AS F.-\~IlLIARITY ITSELF, WOULD NOT .JJ>PE.~ 
WITHOUT THE GRA.\IME, \\TIHOlcT DIFFERENCE AS TEMPORALISATION, WITHOITT THE NONPRESENCE OF THE 
OTHER INSCRIBED \\1THI:-. THE SENSE OF THE PRESENT. WITHOITT THE RELATIONSHIP TO DEATH AS THE 
CONCRETE STRUCTCRE OF THE LIVING PRESE1'T ... ALL DUALISMS, ALL THEORIES OF THE IMMORTALITY OF 
Tiffi SOUL OR OF THE SPIRIT, .'8 WELL AS ALL MONIS'.\!S ... ARE THE U1'1QUE THEME OF A METAPHYSICS WHOSE 
ENTIRE lflSTORY WAS CO~IPELLED TO STRIVE TOWARD HIE REDUCTION OF THE TRACE. THE SCBORDINATION 
OF THE TRACE OF THE FCLL PRESENCE SUlv!MED UP IN THE LOGOS ... AS LIFE WITHOUT DIFFERANCE. ' -
IBID.P43. 
73 SEE DERRIDAJ.(TRANSLATOR: BASS.A: 1986). 'DIFFERANCE.' IN MARGINS OF 
PHILOSOPHY.Pl-27. 'ON THE OTHER HAND, IWILLHAVETOBEEXCUSED!FI REFER, AT LEAST 
IMPLICITLY. TO SOME OF THE TEXTS J HA VE VENTURED TO PliBLISH. THIS IS PRECISELY BECAUSE I WOULD 
LIKE TO ATTEMPT, TO A CERTAIN EXTENT, AND EVEN THOUGH IN PRINCIPLE AND IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THIS 
IS IMPOSSIBLE, AND IMPOSSIBLE FOR ESSENTIAL REASONS, TO REASSEMBLE IN ASHEAFTHE DIFFERENT 
DIRECTIONS IN WHICH I HA VE BEEN ABLE TO ITTILISE WHAT I WOULD CALL PROVISIONALLY THE WORD OR 
CONCEPT DIFFERANCE, OR RATHER TO LET IT IMPOSE ITSELF UPON ME IN ITS NEOGRAPHISM, AL THOUGH WE 
SHALL SEE DIFFERANCE IS NEITHER A WORD NOR A CONCEPT.' ·IBID.P3. 
14 
•... ALSO BYPASSES THE ORDER OF .'\PPREHENSION IN GENERAL.' -IBID.P4. 
'
5 IBID.N. 
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16 
.... -WHEN J SAY "WlTH AN E" OR "V.'ITH AN.<" -W1LL REFER UNCIRCUMVENT ABLY TO A WRITTEN TE.\TTHAf 
KEEPS WATCH OVER ~!Y DISCOLRSE, TO A TE>.< THAT I AM HOLDING IN FRONT OF ME, THAT I WlLL READ, 
. .\.,'\1) TOWARD Wl!ICH I NECESSARILY WILL ATTEMPT TO DIRECT YOLR HA.'IDS AND EYES. WE WlLL BE ABLE 
NEfTHER TO DO WlTHOlff THE PASSAGE THROLGH A WRITTEN TEXT, NOR TO AVOID THE ORDER OF THE 
DISORDER PRODL'CED WITHIN IT-A.'ID THIS, FIRST OF ALL, IS WHAT COUl'ITS FOR ME.' -IBID.P4. 
77 IBID.PS. ,, 
IBID.P7. 
19 IBID.P7. 
80 IBID.P7. 
81 lBID.P7. 
82 lBID.P9. 
83 [BID.P9. 
"[BID.P9. 
85 IBID.PIO. 
86 IBID.Pl I. 
87 IBID.PH. 
'"IBID.Pl2. 
89 IBID.Pl3. 'IT IS BECAUSE OF DIFFER4NCETHAT THE MOVEMENT OF SIGNIFICATION IS POSSIBLE ONLY IF 
EACH SO-CALLED, "PRESENT" ELEME:-.<, EACH ELEMENT .'\PPEARING ON THE SCENE OF PRESENCE, IS 
RELATED TO SO>lETHING OTHER TH.'-''1 ITSELF. THEREBY KEEPING WITHIN ITSELF THE MARK OF THE PAST 
ELEMENT. AND ALREADY LETTING ITSELF BE VITIATED BY THE MARK OF ITS RELATION TO THE FUTURE THAN 
TO WHAT IS CALLED THE PAST. AND CONSTITUTING WHAT IS CALLED THE PRESENT BY MEANS OF THIS VERY 
RELATION TO WHAT!T IS NOT: WHAT IT ABSOLUTELY IS ::<fOT, NOT EVEN .~ PAST OR A FUTURE AS A MODIFIED 
PRESE1'T AN INTERVAL MUST SEPARATE FROJ\,I WHATITIS NOTIN ORDER FOR THE PRESEl•IT TO BE ITSELF. 
BL< THIS INTERVAL THAT CONSTITUTES IT AS PRESENT MUST BY THE SAME TOKEN, DIVIDE THE PRESENT IN 
. .\.,'\U OF ITSELF. THEREBY ALSO DIVIDING. ALONG WITH THE PRESENT, EVER\oH!NG THAT IS THOUGHT ON 
THE BASIS OF THE PRESENT, THAT IS. IN OUR ~lETAPHYSICAL LA.'lGUAGE, EVERY BEING, A.'ID SINGULARLY 
SLBSTANCE OR THE SUBJECT. IN CONSTITL'TJ};G ITSELF. JN DIVIDING ITSELF DYNAMICALLY, THIS ll'ITERV AL IS 
WHAT ~GHT BE CALLED SPACING, THE BECOMING-SPACE OF TIME OR THE BECOMING-SPACE OF TIME OR THE 
BEC01'1ING-TIME OF SPACE ... '-IBID.Pl3. 
90 lBID.P23. HERE, DERRIDA IS QUOTING HEIDEGGER'S ARGUMENT OF HIS 1946 TEXT. 
91 lBID.P23. 
92 IBID.P23. 
93 IBID.P23. 
94 IBID.P24. 
95 [BID.P24. 
96 lBID.P25. 
97 [BID.P26. 
98 [BID.P27. 
99 lBID.P26. 
JOO lBID.P27. 
101 FOR J\,IUCH OF WHAT FOLLOWS IN THIS PARAGR,'\PH, WE ARE ll·mEBTED TO: SPINOSA. C. 'DERRIDA 
AND HEIDEGGER: ITERABILITY AND EREIGNIS., OP err. 
102 DERRIDA.J. 'DIFFERANCE., OP err.Pl I. 
103 IBID.P 24. SEE ALSO SPINOSA.COP err.P272. 
104 
'ESSENTIALLY AND LAWFULLY, EVERY CONCEPT IS INSCRIBED IN A CHAIN OR IN A SYSTEM WITHIN WHICH 
IT REFERS TO THE OTHER, TO OTHER CONCEPTS, BY MEA.'lS OF THE SYSTEMATIC PLAY OF DIFFERENCES. SUCH 
A PLAY, DJFFERANCE, IS THUS NOT LONGER SIMPLY A CONCEPT, BUT RATHER THE POSSIBILITY OF 
CONCEPTUALITY, OF A CONCEPTUAL PROCESS A.'lD SYSTEM IN GENERAL.'-DERRIDA.IBID.Pll, AS QUOTED 
BY SPINOSA.e.OP CIT.P274. 
10
' SPINOSA.!Bm.P282. 
106 [BID.P283. 
107 
'(T)HE NORvlS OF ~MU~! INTEWGIBILITY ARE NOT ABSOLUTE .~D A HISTORICAL, BUT MERELY MORE 
ST ABLE THAN OTHERS. THEY DEPE1'U UPON SOCIO-INSTITUTIONAL C01'UITIONS, HENCE UPON NONNATURAL 
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RELATIONS OF POWER THAT BY ESSENCE ARE MOBILE AND FOUNDED UPON COMPLEX CONVE1''TIONAL 
STRUCTCRES THAT IN PRINCIPLE MAY BE .\.'IALYSED. DECONSTRUCTED. AND TRANSFOIB•IED: AND. IN FACT. 
THESE STRUCTURES ARE IN Tiffi PROCESS OF TRANSFORMING THEMSELVES PROFOUNDLY AND. ABOVE ALL. 
VERY RAPIDLY ... "'DECONSTRUCTION"' IS FIRSTLY THIS DESTABIUSATION ON THE MOVE.' -THIS QLOTE OF 
DERRJDA "s 'AFTERWORD.' IS TAKEN FROM SPINOSA.C.IBID.P284. 
108 SCHARLEMANN.R.P. 'DECONSTRUCTION: WHAT IS ITT' OP CIT.Pl84. 
l09 DERRIDA REFERS TO HEIDEGGER IN A GREAT MANY PLACES IN HIS WORK. Two ESSAYS OF IMPORTANCE 
ARE HIS ·ousH AND GRAMME.' (1972), AND 'L. ESPRIT' (1987). 
11 
o ' ... THAT SIMPLE AW ARE1'"ESS OF SOMETHINCJ-PRESENT-AT HAND, WHICH PARMENIDES HAD ALREADY 
TAKEN TO GUIDE HIM IN HIS OWN IN'TERPRET ATION OF BEING-HAS THE TEMPORAL STRVCTURE OF A PURE 
"'MAKING PRESENT" OF SOMETHING THOSE ENTITIES WHICH SHOW THEMSELVES IN THIS AND FOR IT, AND 
WHICH ARE UNDERSTOOD AS ENTITIES IN THE MOST AL'THENTIC SENSE, THUS GET INTERPRETED WITH 
REGARD TO THE PRESENT; THATIS, THEY ARE CONCEIVED AS PRESENCE (OUS!A). '-HEIDEGGER.M.'BEING 
AND TIME. 'OP Crr.P48. 
111 SEE: FREDE.DOROTHEA. 'THE QUESTION OF BEING: HEIDEGGER'S PROJECT.' IN (EDITOR: 
GUIGNON.C: 1993). THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER.P47FF. KRELL POINTS OUT 
THAT IN ACTUALlTY. HEIDEGGER WAS A.'IALYSING THE WORK OF THOMAS OF ERFURT. SEE 
KRELL.D.F. 'GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF BEING.' IN (EDITOR: KRELL.D.F: 
1996). BASIC WRITINGS.REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION.OP err.PIO. 
112 lmD.P47-8. 
113 IBID.P49. SEE ALSO, IN THIS CONNECTION: RORTY.R. "PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF 
NATURE.'OPCrr. 
114 IBID.P52-3. 
LJS SEE HERE PAR 25. OF 'BEING AND TIME.' 'DASEIN IS AN ENTITY WHICH IS IN EACH CASE I MYSELF; 
ITS BEING IS IN EACH CASE MINE. THIS DEFINITION INDICATES AN ONTOLOGICAUY CONSTITIJTIVE ST ATE, BL'T 
DOES NOT ~!ORE THAN INDICATE IT. ATTHE SA.\IE TIME THIS TELLS LS ONTJC4UY(THOUGH IN A ROUGH AND 
READY FASHION) THAT IN EACH CASE AN"T' -NOT OTHERS-IS THIS ENTITY. THE QUESTION OF THE "WHO" 
ANSWERS ITSELF IN TERMS OF THE ·'J" ITSELF. THE "SUBJECT." THE SELF. THE "WHO" IS WHAT MAINTAINS 
ITSELF AS SOMETHING IDENTICAL THROLGHOUT CHANGES IN ITS EXPERIENCES AND WAYS OF BEHAVIOUR. 
.-\ND 'W11ICH RELATES ITSELF TO THIS CHANGING "AULTIPLICITY ... '-HEIDEGGER.M. 'BEING AND 
TIME. 'Op Crr.Pl50. 
116 lmD.Pl50. 
117 SEE. IN THIS CONNECTION: DuBOIS.P: 1991. 'TORTURE AND TRUTH.' P91FF. 
118 IBID.Pl85 
119 lmD.Pl85 
"
0 IBID.Pl85. SCHARLEMANN. IN HIS ARTICLE, BRINGS THIS ESSAY OF HEIDEGGER TO HIS READERS 
ATTE1''TION. 
101 IN THIS PARAGRAPH. WE ARE P.aj{TLY RELYING ON THE .aj{TfCLE OF SIL VERMAN.H.J. 'DERRIDA. 
HEIDEGGER, AND THE TIME OF THE LINE. 'Op CIT. 
122 IBID.Pl57. 'To UNDERSTAND HEIDEGGER'S TURN TO THE HISTORY OF BEING. WE NEED TO SKETCH OUT 
THE ROUGH CONTOURS OF HIS HISTORIUJ .. STORY. IT STARTS WITH THE ASSUMPTION, BASED ON AREADING 
OF PRE-SOC RA TIC TEXTS. THAT AT THE DAWN OF WESTER\! CIVILISATION THERE WAS A "FIRST BEGINNING," 
IN WHICH THE GREEKS BROUGHT TO LIGHT THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE-THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
BEING AND ENTITIES-BY ASKING THE QVESTION: WHAT ARE E1''TITIES? OR WHAT IS THE BEING OF ENTITIES? 
THIS HAS BEEN THE "GUIDING QL"ESTION" (LE!TFRAGE) OF WESTERN THOUGHT TO THIS DAY.' -
GUIGNON.C.B. 'INTRODUCTION.' IN (EDITOR: GUIGNON.C.B: 1993). THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER.OP CIT.Pl6. 
123 IBID.Pl57. 
124 IBID.Pl57. 
125 IBID.Pl58. 
126 KRELL.D.F. 'GENERAL INTRODUCTION: THE QUESTION OF BEING. 'OP CIT.P24. 
127 SPINOSA.C.OP CIT.P276. 
128 IBID.P226. 
129 CRITCHLEY.S. 'THE PROBLEM OF CLOSURE IN DERRIDA.PART TWO. 'Pl27FF. 
130 HEIDEGGER.M 'THE END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE TASK OF THINKING.' IN (EDITOR: 
KRELL.D.F: 1993).BASIC WRITINGS.REVISED AND EXPANDED EDillON.P432. 
131 THis IS POINTED OUT BY CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.Pl28. CRITCHLEY HERE QUOTES FROM 
BERNASCONI.R. 'FACE TO FACE WITH LEVIN AS." IN (EDITOR: COHEN.R: 1986). FACE TO 
FACE WITH LEVINAS. NEW YORK: STA TE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS. 
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132 OF IMPORT.;,,'JCE HERE IS NORRIS.C: 19%. 'RECLAIMING TRUTH.CONTRIBUTION TO A 
CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL RELATIVISM.' CHAPTER 2: RAISING THE TONE: DERRIDA 
KIERKEGAARD AND THE RHETORIC OF TRANSCENDENCE.P73FF. READERS ARE ALSO REFERRED 
To: DERRIDAJ. 'OF AN APOCAL YPfIC TONE RECENTLY ADOPTED IN PHILOSOPHY.' IN 
(EDITOR: COWARD.H: 1992). DERRIDA AND NEGATIVE THEOLOGY.P25-7L 
133 CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.Pl29. 
134 DERRIDAJ. 'LA PHENOMENOLOGIE ET LA CLOTURE DE LA METAPHYSJQUE. 'EPOCHES. 
ATHENS.1966. THIS QUOTE IS TAKEN FROM CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.Pi30. HE IS HERE QUOTING FROM AN 
UNPUBLISHED ESSAY OF DERRIDA. 
135 CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.Pl33. 
136 IBID.Pl33. 
137 DERRIDA.J. 'OF GRAMMATOLOGY.'OP CIT.Pl9. WE ARE INDEBTED TO 
SCHRIFTA: 1995.'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY.' Pll, FOR DRAWING ATTENTION TO THIS 
PASSAGE OF DERRIDA. 
"' SCHRIFT.A: 1983. 'NIETZSCHE AND THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION: 
HERMENEUTICS, DECONSTRUCTION, PLURALISM. 'Pl68. 
139 NIETZSCHE.F.(TRANSLATED: HOLLINGDALE.R.J: 1990). 'BEYOND GOOD AND EVIL.' 
PART ONE.SEC 2. ON THE PREJUDICES OF PHILOSOPHERS.P34 
140 SCHRIFT.A. 'GENEALOGY AND\AS DECONSTRUCTION: NIETZSCHE. DERRIDA AND 
FOUCAULT ON PHILOSOPHY AS CRITIQUE.' IN (EDITOR: SIL VERMAN.H.J, ET AL: 1988). 
POSTMODERNISM AND CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY.P20L 
141 SCHRIFT.A: 1995. 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY. 'Op CIT.P22 
140 IBID.P22. 
1
"' ONE OF THE MORE RENOWNED PASSAGES IN FOUCAULT IS FOUND AT THE END OF 'THE ORDER OF 
THINGS.' HERE, FOUCAULT SAYS: 'IF THOSE ARRANGEMENTS WERE TO DISAPPEAR AS THEY APPEARED, IF 
SOME EVENT OF WHICH WE CA'J AT THE MOMENT DO NO MORE THAN SENSE THE POSSIBILITY· WITHOUT 
K.'JOWING EITHER WHAT ITS FORM WILL BE OR WHAT IT PROMISES-WERE TO CAUSE THEM TO CRUMBLE. AS 
THE GROUND OF CLASSICAL THOUGHT DID, AT THE END OF THE EIGHTEEN"fH CENTURY, THEN ONE CAN 
CERTAINLY WAGER THAT MA.'J WOUW BE ERASED, LIKE A FACE DRAWN IN SAND AT THE EDGE OF THE SEA.' -
FOUCAULT.M.(TRANSLATED: TAVISTOCK PUBLICATIONS LTD: 1970). 'THE ORDER OF 
THNGS. 'P387. 
1
" SCHRIFT.A. 'NIETZSCHE'S FRENCH LEGACY. 'Op CIT.P27. 
145 SEE: KEARNEY.R. 'DIALOGUE WITH EMMANUEL LEVINAS.' IN (EDITOR: COHEN.RA: 1986). 
FACE TO FACE WITH LEVIN AS. SAYS LEVIN AS: 'INDEED, FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF PHILOSOPHICAL 
METHOD AND DISCIPLINE, ] REMAIN TO THIS DAY A PHENOMENOLOGIST.' ]BID.Pl4. 
146 
'IT IS TRUE THAT PHILOSOPHY. IN ITS TRADITIONAL FORM OF ON"fOTHEOLOGY AND LOGOCEl'i"fRISM-TO 
USE HEIDEGGER'S AND DERRIDA'S TERMS-HAS COME TO A.'J END. BUT IT IS NOT TRUE OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE 
OTHER SENSE OF CRITICAL SPECULATION AND INTERROGATION.' -LEVINAS IN RESPONSE TO 
KEARNEY . .IBID.P33. 
147 
'WE CANNOT OBVIATE THE LANGUAGE OF META.PHYSICS. AND YET WE CANNOT, SPEAKING, BE SATISFIED 
WITH IT: IT IS N'ECESSARY Bt;"f NOT ENOUGH. J DISAGREE, HOWEVER, WITH DERRIDA'S INTERPRETATION OF 
THIS PARADOX. WHEREAS HE TENDS TO SEE THE DECONSTRl:CTION OF THE WESTERN METAPHYSICS OF 
PRESENCE AS AN IRREDEEMABLE CRISIS, 1 SEE IT AS A GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY FOR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY TO 
OPEN ITSELF TO THE DIMENSION OF OTHERNESS AND TRANSCENDENCE BEYOND BEING.' -LEVJNAS.IBID.P28. 
148 HOWEVER, IN THIS CONNECTION SEE: CAPUTO.JD: 1997. 'THE PRAYERS AND TEARS OF 
JACQUES DERRIDA' SEE ALSO DERRIDA'S OWN, RECENT REFLECTIONS ON THEOLOGICAL ISSUES OF 
FAITH IN 'THE GIFT OF DEATH,' AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND.' 
149 
'TOTALITE' ET IN FINI.' ( 1961 ), AND 'AUTREMENT QU' ETRE OU AU-DELA ' DEL ESSENCE.' FOR A 
BIBLIOGRAPHY OF HIS WORKS, SEE PEPERZAK.A: 1993. 'TO THE OTHER.AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS. 'P235FF. 
150 HIS CRITICISMS A.RE QUITE SIMILAR TO THOSE OF DERRIDA. IN THE CASE OF HUSSERL, BEING IS 
APPREHENDED BY THE CONSCJOUSN'ESS AS 'PRESENCE.' DESPITE HIS ADMIRATION FOR HUSSERL, LE VINAS 
APPROVES OF HEIDEGGER'S MOVING BEYOND HUSSERL IN HIS WCATION OF BEING IN IBMPORALITY. 
SOMETHING WHICH HUSSERL DID NOT DO. 
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' ... HEIDEGGER SHOWED THAT THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SEARCH FOR EIBRNAL TRUTHS AND ESSENCES 
VLTIMAIBLY ORJGINAIBS IN TIME. IN OCR IBMPORAL AND H!STORJCAL EXPERIENCE.' -LEVINAS IN 
ANSWER TO KEARNEY.OP CIT.Pl6. CONCERNING HEIDEGGER. LEVINAS SAYS: 'FOR ME. HEIDEGGER 
NEVER REALLY ESCAPED FROM GREEK LANGUAGE OF INIBLLIGIBILITY AND PRESENCE. EVEN THOCGH HE 
SPENT MUCH OF llIS PllILOSOPll!CAL CAREER STRUGGLING AGAINST CERT A1N METAPHYSICAL NOTIONS-IN 
PARTICULAR THE OBJECTIFYING NOTION OF PRESENCE AS VORHANDENHEIT, WHICH EXPRESSES ITSELF IN OUR 
SCIENTIFIC A.'\ID IBCHNOLOG!CAL CAIBGORJSATION OF THE WORLD-HE ULT!MAIBLY SEEMS TO ESPOUSE 
ANOTHER, MORE SUBTLE AND COMPLEX, NOTION OF PRESENCE ASANWESEN, THAT IS, THE COMING-INTO-
PRESENCE OF BEING.' -]BID.P20. 
151 
'FOR ETHICS, IT IS ONLY IN THE INF!NIIB RELATION WITH THE OTHER THAT GoD PASSES (SE PASSE), THAT 
TRACES OF Goo ARE TO BE FOUND. Goo THUS REVEALS llIMSELF AS A TRACE, NOT AS AN ONTOLOGICAL 
PRESENCE-SUCH AS ARJSTOTLE DEFINED AS A SELF-TllINKING-THOUGHT AND SCHOLASTIC MET APHYS!CS 
DEFINED AS AN IPSUM ESSE SUBSJSTENS OR ENS CA USA SUI. THE Goo OF THE BIBLE CANNOT BE DEFINED OR 
PROVED BY MEANS OF LOGICAL PREDICTIONS AND ATTRJBUTIONS. '-IBID.P3 l. 
152 
'WE CAN NEVER COMPLEIBL Y ESCAPE FROM THE LANGUAGE OF ONTOLOGY AND POLITICS.' -IBID.P22. 
153 1BID.P25. 
154 SEE PEPERZAKA 'AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF EMMANUEL LEVINAS. 'OP 
CIT.P213. 
155 LEVINAS.E.(TRANSLATED: LINGIS.A: 1981). 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND 
ESSENCE. 'Op err.PS. 
156 Ism.PIO. 
157 PEPERZAK.OP CIT.P217. 
158 LEVINAS.E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE. 'OP CIT.PS-6. 
159 PEPERZAK.OP CIT.P217. 
160 IBID.P218. 
161 LEVINAS.E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE. 'OP CIT.P7 
162 1BID.P48. 
163 PEPERZAK.OP CIT.P222. 
164 LEVINAS.E. 'OTHERWISE THAN BEING OR BEYOND ESSENCE. 'OP CIT.P94. 
165 Ism.P93. 
166 IBID.Pl5 l. 
161 PEPERZAK.OP CIT.P228. 
168 M~CQUARRIE .>.LSO MAKES THIS POINT IN ms IBXT: MACQUARRIE.I: 1994. 'HEIDEGGER A<"ID 
CHRISTIANITY. 'P55. 
169 SEE, FOR E.XAMPLE. KOBLENTZ'S CRITICISM OF DERRIDA'S IDEA OF WHAT BEING IS, IN: 
KOBLENTZ.E.D. 'DECONSTRUCTION DE CONSTRUCTED: THE RESURRECTION OF BEING. 'OP 
CIT. KOBLENTZ's CRIT!CISM ALSO TAKES ISSlJE WITHDERRJDA 's NARROW CONCEPT OF BEING, NA.VIEL¥, 
BEING AS PRESENCE OR LOGOCENTRJSM. Sf!E SPEAKS OF A 'NEW PARADIGM OF BEING,' AS THE COSMIC 
REAL.-!BID.P9. IN MOST OF WHAT FOLLOWS IN THE NEXT SECTION. WE SHALL BE RELYING ON THE 
EXCELLENT BOOK OF CRJTCHLEY. SEE: CRITCHLEY.S: 1993. 'THE ETHICS OF DECONSTRUCTION.' 
no IBID.PIS. HERE CRJTCHLEY IS REFERRING TO THE DERRJDA-ANDRE' JACOBS INIBRVIEW, AS 
REPRODUCED IN 'ALTERITES,' PARIS: OSIRIS.1986.P?0-72. 
171 CRITCHLEY.S.IbidP I ?FF. 'THE RESPECT FOR THE SINGULARITY OR TIIE CALL OF THE OTHER IS UNABLE 
TO BELONG TO THE DOMAIN OF ETHICS, TO THE CONVENTIONALLY AND TRADITIONALLY DEIBRMC'-<'ED 
DOMAIN OF ETHICS.' HERE, CRJTCHLEY IS QUOTING 0ERRJDA AGAIN, IN THE ABOVE- MENTIONED 
INIBRVIEW. 
172 DERRIDAJ.0PCIT.P71, ASQUOIBD BY CRITCHLEY.S.OP CIT.Pl6. ATTHE SAME TIME, IT NEEDS TO 
BE SAID THAT THERE IS MUCH DISCUSSION ABOUT HOW DERRJDA READS LEVINAS. AFTER LEvlNAS HAD 
COMPLEIBD 'TOTALITY AND INFINITY,' DERRJDA RESPONDED WITH A LANDMARK, REACTIONARY ESSAY: 
'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS,' APPEARJNG IN 'MARGINS OF Pll!LOSOPHY.' AL THOUGH WE SHALL NOT 
DEAL WlTll TllIS INIBRPRETATION OF LEVIN AS BY DERRJDA, IN ANY DETAIL, \;'E SHALL MAKE A FEW 
OBSERVATIONS. THERE ARE TWO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT WHEN IT COMES TO DISCUSSING DERRJDA ON 
LEVIN AS. THERE ARE THOSE INIBRPREIBRS THAT FEEL DERRJDA IS HARSHLY CRJTICISING LE VINAS IN 
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'VIOLENCE AND METAPHYSICS.' LE VINAS, IN WANTING TO RISE ABOVE METAPHYSICS CAPITULATES 
TOWARDS THAT SELF-SAME METAPHYSICS HIMSELF. ASTUTE READERS OF DERRIDA WILL OBSERVE THAT 
DERRIDA OFTEN EMPLOYS THIS CRITICISM OF MANY OTHER TEXTS OPERATING WITHIN THE DECONSTRl'CTIVE 
GENRE. fOR AN ASSESSMENT OF DERRIDA ON LH1NAS THAT FALLS ROUGHLY INTO 
THIS PARADIGM, SEE FOR EXAMPLE: DA VIS.C: 1996.'LEVINAS.AN INTRODUCTION. 'P63-9. HOWEVER. 
WE FND THE SECOND SCHOOL OF INTERPRETATION MORE CONVINCING. INTO THIS SCHOOL, FALL THINKERS 
SUCH AS CRITCHLEY AND BERNASCONI. SEE: BEfu'IASCONI.R. 'THE TRACE OF LE VINAS IN 
DERRIDA .• IN (EDITORS: BERNASCONl.R. WOOD.D: 1988). 'DERRIDA AND DIFFER.ANCE. 'Op 
CIT.P 13FF. THE LATTER SCHOOL HA VE ARGUED THAT DERRIDA rs NOT SIMPLY DISMISSING LEVINAS. BUT IN 
HIS CHARACTERISTIC MANNER DECONSTRUCTING LEVIN AS' TEXTS. THIS DECONSTRUCTION OF LEVINAS 
EMPLOYS BOTH AFFIRMATION OF THE HEART OF WHAT LEV!NAS IS DOING, WHILST AT THE SAME TIME. 
ACKNOWLEDGING THE DIFFICULTIES LE >TNAS FACES IN HIS ATTEMPT TO 'REDUCE' THE SAID TO THE SA YING. 
173 CRITCHLEY MAKES THE COMMENT THAT MANY OF DERRIDA'S MOST ESTEEMED COMMENT A TORS 00 NOT 
ACKNOWLEDGE THIS ETHICAL POSSIBILITY IN DERRIDA. HE NAMES INDIVIDUALS SUCH AS NORRIS, BLOOM 
A.'ID HABERMAS WHO, IN HIS OPINION, HA VE MADE THIS OMISSION. 
174 DANCEY HAS THE FOLLOWING TO SAY ABOUT CLASSIC SCEPTICISM: IT ALWAYS DEPENDS UPON AN 
ARGUMENT. SINCE IT DEPENDS UPON AN ARGUMENT, IT DEPENDS ALSO UPON A CONCLUSION. THE SCEPTICAL 
CONCLUSION IS THAT KNOWLEDGE rs IMPOSSIBLE.-DANCEY.J: 1994. 'INTRODUCTION TO 
CONTEMPORARY EPISTEMOLOGY.'P7. 
THE CORRESPONDENCE AND COMMENTARY ON THIS MUCH PUBLICISED DEBATE IS ENORMOUS. IN OUR 
SUMMARY OF THE DEBATE, WE ARE PARTLY FOLLOWING: 'ALFINO.M. 'ANOTHER LOOK AT THE 
DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE.' THE HISTORY IS AS FOLLOWS, THE BASIC ISSUE IS THE MATTER OF THE 
WAY DERRIDA READS J.L AUSTIN'S LANDMARK TEXT 'How TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS., THUS TIIE 
INTERPRETATION OF THE LATER DEBATE BETWEEN DERRIDA AND SEARLE. IN SOME SENSE. REQlllRES AN 
UNDERSTANDING OF AUSTIN'S SO-CALLED 'SPEECH-ACT' THEORY.' DERRIDA'S COMMENTS A.'<'D 
INTERPRETATIONS OF AUSTIN FIRST APPEARED IN HIS ESSAY. 'SIGNATURE EVENT CONTEXT,' DELIVERED AS 
A CONFERENCE PAPER IN 1971, A.'lDTHENPRINTEDIN ?v1ARGESDE LA PHILOSOPHY,' IN 1972. !TWAS ALSO 
REPRINTED IN THE JOHN HOPKINS UNIVERSITY PERIODICAL. 'GLYPH.' AT THIS POINT, JOHN SEARLE WAS 
ASKED TO MAKE A REVIEW OF IT. THISHEDIDANDIT APPEARED IN THE 1977, 'GLYPH 2.' lNTHE SAME 
EDITION, WE ALSO FIND DERRIDA'S SOMEWHAT LENGTHY REPLY TO SEARLE, ENTITLED: 'LIMITEDINCABC ... ' 
AFTER THIS, SEARLE WROTE ONCE AGAIN ON DECONSTRUCTION IN AN ARTICLE ENTITLED: 'THE WORLD 
TuRNED UPSIDE DoWN.' THIS APPEARED JN THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS. VOL 30.NOVEMBER 
7.1983. IN FEBRUARY THE NEXT YEAR, Lours MACKEY PUBLISHED A REPLY TO SEARLE, ALSO IN THE NEW 
YORK REVIEW. SEARLE THEN REPLIED TO MACKEY, SHORTLY AFTER THAT (NEW YORK REVIEW. VOL 
31.FEB.1984). 
175 ALFINO.M.' ANOTHER LOOK AT THE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE.'Op Cit.Pl44. 
176 ALFINO.M.'ANOTHERLOOK AT THE DERRIDA-SEARLE DEBATE. '0PCIT.P145. SEE ALSO THE 
COMMENTS OF FISH.S. 'WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE AUTHOR: REFLECTIONS ON AUSTIN 
AND DERRIDA.'P696FF, NORRJS.C. 'HOME THOUGHTS FROM ABROAD: DERRIDA AUSTIN, 
AND THE OXFORD CONNECTION. 'PIOFF. 
177 ALF!N0.0P CITP146. SEE ALSO AUSTIN'S COMMENTS: 'HOWEVER, ALTHOt:GH THESE lffTERA'lCES 00 
NOT THEMSELVES REPORT FACTS AND i-\:RE NOT THEMSELVES TRUE ORF Al.SE, SAYING THESE THINGS DOES 
VERYOFTENJMPLYTHATCERTAINTHINGS ARE TRUE A.'IDNOTFALSE ... F!RSTOF ALL, IT IS OBVIOUS THAT 
THE CONVENTIONAL PROCEDURE WHICH BY OUR UTTERA.'lCE WE ARE PURPORTING TO t:SE Mt:ST ACTUALLY 
EXIST .. .IT'S WORTH REMEMBERING TOOTilAT A GREAT MANY OF THE THINGS WE 00 ARE AT LEAST IN PART 
OF THIS CONVENTIONAL KIND. PHILOSOPHERS AT LEAST ARE TOO ,\PT TO ASSUME THAT AN ACTION IS 
ALWAYS IN THE LAST RESORT TIIE MAKING OF A PHYSICAL MOVEMENT, WHEREAS IT'S t:SUALLY, ATLEAST IN 
PART. A MATTER OF CONVENTION. THE FIRST RULE IS, THEN, THAT THE CONVENTION INVOKED Ml:ST EXIST 
AND BE ACCEPTED.'-AUSTIN.J.L: 1970. 'PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS .. PERFORMATIVE 
UTTERANCES. P237. 
118 !Bm.P147. 
1 79 IN THIS CON!-.'ECTION, SEE THE DISCUSSION IN HART .K: 1989 .'THE TRESPASS OF THE SIGN.' 
P3FF. 
180 NORRJS.C.OP CIT.P2. 
181 FISH.S. 'WITH THE COMPLIMENTS OF THE AUTHOR: REFLECTIONS ON AUSTIN AND 
DERRIDA. 'Op CIT.P713. 
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181 NORRIS.C. 'H0/1.-!E THOUGITTS FROM ABROAD: DERRIDA. AUSTIN, AND THE OXFORD 
CONNECTION. 'Op CIT.PS. 'AGAIN, DERRIDA IS FAR FROM DENYING THAT WE DO REQUIRE AT !EAST SOME 
PRESL'MED GE'.'IBRAL GRASP OF . .\..'I AlJTHOR'S Pl'RPOSE IN ORDER TO READ .-1.<'IY TEXT WHATSOEVER. 
INTERPRETATION, AS HE PlJTS IT. "'OPERATES A FORTIORI WITHIN THE HYPOTIIESIS THAT I FULLY 
UNDERSTAND WHAT THE AlJTHOR ~ANT TO SA y. PRO'o1DING HE SAID WHAT HE MEANT." (P 199). Bur THIS 
IS AN EMPIRICAL FACT ABOlJT THE PSYCHOLOGY OF READER RESPONSE AND NOT ANY KIND OF GUARANTEE, 
SUCH AS SPEECH-ACT THEORY WOULD CLAIM, THAT . .\NY KIND OF UNDERSTANDING MUST INDEED HA VE 
TAKEN PLACE.' 
183 IBID.PS. HERE, NORRIS IN RECORDING DERRIDA'S OWN OPINIONS, IS QUOTING FROM 
DERRIDA.J. 'LIMITED INC ABC ... 'OP CIT.Pl99. 
184 DERRIDA.J. 'OF GRAMMATOLCXJY. 'Op Cit.Pl58. 
185 NORRIS, GASCHE', CRITCHLEY TOGETHER WITH SPIVAK ,.\ND OTHERS ARE THE BETTER INFORMED (AND 
BETTER READ CRITICS) WHO HA VE PRO'o1DED WELL-ATTESTED CASES TO THE FACT THAT DERRIDA IS 
MISUNDERSTOOD BY THOSE WHO ACCUSE HIM OF RELATIVISM. SEE; NORRIS. C. 'DERRIDA. 'Op err. 
READERS ARE REFERRED PARTICULARLY TO THE SECOND CHAPTER; 
'PHILOSOPHY/LITERATURE. 'Pl8FF. NORRIS RE1U!L'IS TO THE QUESTION AGAIN, IN DEALING WITH 
ELus' BOOK. IN NORRIS. c 'LIMITED THINK: HOW NOT TO READ DERRIDA . 'Op err. IN IBIS 
ARTICLE, NORRIS CONVINCINGLY SHOWS THAT AL THOUGH THERE IS MUCH MERIT TO ELLIS' WORK, HE HAS 
NOT READ DERRIDA CAREFULLY ENOUGH. NORRIS RE1URNS TO THE MATTER OF DERRIDA AND RELATIVISM 
IN NORRIS. 'C. 'RECLAIMING TRUTH.CONTRIBUTION TO A CRITIQUE OF CULTURAL 
RELATIVISM. 'Op err. SEE PARTICULARLY THE FINAL CHAPTER; 'OF AN APOPLECTIC TONE 
RECENTLY ADOPTED IN PHILOSOPHY. 'P222FF. SEE ALSO: NORRIS.C. 'THE TRUTH ABOUT 
POSTMODERNISM. 'OP Crr.P280FF. HERE, NORRIS PROVIDES A CRITIQUE OF RORTY'S READING OF 
DERRIDA IN HIS: 'PHILOSOPHY AS A KIND OF WRITING. 'OP err. SEE ALSO GASCHE' s PENETRATING 
STUDY: GASCHE.R. 'DECONSTRUCTION AS CRITICISM. 'Op err. 
ONE OF THE MOST ABLE CRITICS OF DERRIDA IS JURGEN HABERMAS. SEE HIS 'THE PHILOSOPIDCAL 
DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY.' SECONDARY LITERATURE ON HABERMAS' CRITIQUE INCLUDE; 
TREY.G. 'THE PIDLOSOPIDCAL DISCOURSE OF MODERNITY; HABERMAS' POSTMODERN 
ADVENTURE. 'OP CIT, HOYD.C. 'SPLITTING THE DIFFERENCE: HABERMAS' CRITIQUE OF 
DERRIDA. 'OP CIT, NORRIS.C. 'DECONSTRUCTION, POSTMODERNISM AND PHILOSOPHY: 
HABERMAS ON DERRIDA. 'Op CIT. SEARLE'S CRITICISMS ARE STILL WORTH READING (SEE HIS WORKS 
AS REFERRED TO ABOVE). OJ..'E OF THE ~!OST ABLE CRITIQUES OF DECONSTRUCTION, IN GENERAL IS THAT OF 
ELLIS. SEE ELLIS. J.M., AGAINST DECONSTRUCTION. 'OP err. THE v ALUE OF THIS BOOK LIES IN THE 
AUTHOR'S CALL TO ASSESS ALL TEXTS ACCORDING TO S01'!E VERIFIABIE ST AND ARDS, SUIT ABLE TO THE 
KIND OF RIGOR ONE MIGHT EXPECT IN . .\..'<Y ACADEMIC DISCIPLINE. NORRIS ('LIMITED THINK: HOW NOT TO 
READ DERRIDA') HOWEVER, HAS ILLL'STRATED THAT ALTHOUGH ELLIS IS CORRECT IN CALl.JNG FOR A 
RESPONSIBIE READING, HIS (ELLIS') CRITICISMS OF DECONSTRUCTION MIGHT WELL APPLY TO S01'!E OF 
DERRIDA'S DISCIPIES, BFf NOT TO DERRIDA HIMSELF. DERRIDA IS NOT THE DISCIPLE OF 'FREEPLAY' THAT 
HE IS ~!ADE OUT TO BE. ELLIS' READIKG OF DERRIDA IS FLAWED BECAUSE HE HAS NOT CONCENTRATED 
SUFFICIENTLY UPON THE PRIMARY AS OPPOSED TO SECONDARY SOURCES. OTHER CRITICISMS INCLUDE: 
CARRIER.D. 'DERRIDA AS PHILOSOPHER. 'Op CIT, KOBLENTZ.E.D. 'DECONSTRUCTION 
DECONSTRUCTED: THE RESURRECTION OF BEING.' 
OP CIT.NOWITZ.D. 'THE RAGE FOR DECONSTRUCTION. 'OP CIT. SCRUTON.R. 'UPON 
NOTHING. 'OP CIT. WIDTE.D.A 'ON THE LIMITS OF CLASSICAL REASON: DERRIDA AND 
ARISTOTLE. 'Op CIT, MILLERS. 'DERRIDA AND THE INDETERMINANCY OF MEANING. 'OP CIT. 
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NOTES FOR CHAPTER TEN 
1 WYSCHOGROD.E. 'TIME AND NON-BEING IN DERRIDA AND QUINE. 'OP CIT.Pl 15FF. 
2 CONSIDER THE ILLUSTRATION OF THE STROBE-LIGHT AND ITS ROLE IN PHOTOGRAPHY. BEFORE WE C . .\..'1 
SPEAK OF .<\c'1Y SINGLE CONCEPT, \VE HAVE TO SEP.-\RATE THAT CONCEPT OR ENTITY, FROM THE CONTINUU:VI. 
JUST AS A CAMERA AND STROBE-LIGHT. STOPS A DIFFERENTIATING MOVEMENT OR SEQUENCE. IN THIS 
CONNECTION. SEE ALSO MILLERS. 'DERRIDA AND THE INDETERMINANCY OF MEANING. 'Op CIT. 
IN THIS ARTICLE, MILLER SHOWS HOW UNTENABLE, THE INDETERMNABLE VIEW OF MEANlNG rs. WHEN IT IS 
BASED L"PON THE IDEA OF MEA'1ING AS AN ENDLESS SEQUENCE OF DIFFERENCES. 'IN THE THIRD PLACE, THIS 
WHOLE CONCEPTION INVOLVES A CONFUSION BETWEEN THE MATTER OF HOW A SIGN ACQUIRES WHATEVER 
1'IEANJNG IT HAS, AND THE MATTER OF WHAT ITS HA YING THAT :VIEANING CONSISTS IN. WE NEED TO 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE ACCOUNT OF THE PROCESS WHEREBY A TERM COMES TO MEAN WHATEVER IT 
MEANS, AND THE ACCOUNT OF WHAT ITS HA VINO THAT 1'!EANING CONSISTS IN AND IT IS NOT THE CASE THAT 
WHAT THE MEANING OF A TERM CONSISTS IN-AND Tl!EREFORE WHAT WE NEED TO KNOW IN ORDER TO KNOW 
ITS MEANING-IS TlIE WHOLE OF THE PAST HISTORY OF THAT TERM. FOR THE MEANING OF A TERM IN A 
CONTEXT IS WHATEVER CURRENT USERS OF TlIE TERM TAKE IT TO MEA.'1. WHICH IS TO SAY WHATEVER Tl!EY 
INTEND IT TO 'lEAN A'ID BELIEVE OT!IERS INTEND IT TO MEA'I.' -IBID.P26. 'FOR IF DERRIDA IS HERE IN 
EFFECT ADVOCATING A RETURN TO THE HERACLITEAN CONCEPTION OF REALITY AS, BEING IN CEASELESS 
FLUX (OR S01'IE VERSION THEREOF) THEN THE VERY POSSIBILITY OF AN ACTION, INTENTION, UTTERANCE OR 
A CONTEXT, AND HENCE A MEANING, INCLUDING .-\N INDETERMINATE ME.-\NING A'lD CERTAINLY A PLETHORA 
OF ASCRIBED 'lEA.'1INGS, IS REMOVED. IN SUCH A WORLD INTENTIONS, llTTERA'JCES, MEANINGS. CONTEXTS. 
SPEAKERS AND INTERPRETERS DO NOT PERSIST LOl<G ENOUGH TO BE INTENTIONS, 'IEANlNGS, CONTEXTS 
INTERPRETERS ETC.' -IBID.P27. 
3 DERRIDA.J.(TRANSLATED:BENNINGTON.G: 1991). 'FIFTY-NINE PERIODS AND 
PERIPHRASES. 'OP CIT.P56. 
4SEE FOR EXAMPLE: POPPERK: 1959. 'THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY.' NEW YORK: 
HARPER AND ROW. 
5 IN THIS AREA SEE THE CRITICISM OF DERRIDA IN: SCRUTON.R. 'UPON NOTHING. 'OP CIT. 
6 FOUCAULT.M.'MONCOEUR, CE PAPIER, CE FEU 'IN PADEDIA.SEP 1971.P602. WE HAVE 
REPRODUCED FOUCAULT'S TEXT HERE AS QUOTED BY MACY. SEE. MACY.D. 'THE LIVES OF MICHEL 
F0UCAULT.'P238. THIS REPLY OF FOUCACLT TO DERRIDA'S CRITICISM OF HIS OWN WORK. WAS ALSO 
REPRINTED AS A.'1 APPENDIX TO THE 1972 EDITION OF FOUCAULT'S 'HJSTORJE DE LA FOLJE.' P583-603. 
7 FOUCAUL T.M.1Bm.P602. 
8 CAPUTO.J.D. 'THE TEARS AND PRAYERS OF JACQUES DERRIDA. 'OP CIT.Pl. 
9 MARION.IL 'GOD WITHOUT BEING. 'Op CIT.P53FF. 
10 SEE: DERRIDAJ.(TRANSLATED: BRAUL T.P. ET AL: 1993). 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND.THE 
SELF-PORTRAIT AND OTHER RUINS .. 
11 CAPUTO.J'THE PRAYERS AND TEARS OF JACQUES DERRIDA' OP CIT.P309. 
12 CAPUTO.J .!Bm.PXVII. 
13 DERRIDAJ. 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND. 'OP CIT.P3, 129. SEE ALSO CAPUTO.J.D. 'THE TEARS 
AND PRAYERS OF JACQUES DERRIDA 'OP CIT.P3I1. 
11 DERRIDA.I. 'MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND. 'Op CIT.Pl2. 
15 DERRIDA.I.' MEMOIRS OF THE BLIND. 'OP CrT.Pl3 
16 CAPUTO.J.0PCrT.P317. 
17 DERRIDAJ.Op CIT.PXVIIL 
18 DERRIDA.J: 1993.'CIRCUMCESSION: FIFTY-NINE PERIODS AND PERIPHRASES.'P314. IN 
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19 IBm.PXIX. 
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27 DERRIDAJ. 'MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY. 'OP Crr.P6. 
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